KARLETSE-PANIN vs. NURO [1979] GLR 194
1 June 1978 · KINGSLEY-NYINAH JA · ≈ 42 min read
[1978] SLR (CA) 15Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Baruwa v. Ogunshola (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 159.
(2) Ababio v. Darkwa (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 124, W.A.C.A.
(3) Bissah v. Gyampoh III [1964] G.L.R. 381, S.C.
(4) Edu v. Ababio (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 55, P.C.
(5) Mieh v. Asubonteng [1963] 2 G.L.R. 37, S.C.
(6) Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938; Holt K.B. 524; 6 Mod. Rep. 45;1 Salk. 19; 3 Salk. 17. (7) Atwood v. Chichester (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 722; 47 L.J.Q.B. 300; 38 L.T. 48; 42 J.P. 341; 26 W.R. 320, C.A.
(8) Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh [1971] 2 Q.B. 597, [1971] 3 W.L.R. 31; [1971] 2 All E.R. 865; 115 S.J.387, C.A.
(9) Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190.
(10) Tehrani v. Rostron [1972] 1 Q.B. 182; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 6120 [1971] 3 All E.R. 790; 115 S.J. 641, C.A.
(11) Bansah v. Ollivant (G.B.) (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 408.
(12) Okine, Re [1960] G.L.R. 84, C.A.
(13) Amponsah, Re [1960] G.L.R. 140, C.A.
(14) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A.
(15) Frimpong v. Poku [1963] 2 G.L.R. 1, S.C.
(16) Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench).
(17) Bozson v. Altrincham U.D.C. [1903] 1 K.B. 547; 72 L.J.K.B. 271; 67 J.P. 397; 19 T.L.R. 266; 47 S.J. 316; 51 W.R. 337; 1 L.G.R. 396, C.A.
(18) State Gold Mining Corporation v. Sissala [1971] 1 G.L.R. 359, C.A.
(19) Tawiah v. Brako [1973] 1 G.L.R. 483, C.A.
(20) Okudzeto v. Irani Brothers [1975] 1 G.L.R. 96, C.A.
(21) Kwadwo (Atta) v. Badu [1977] 1 G.L.R. 1, C.A.
(22) Craig v. Kanssen [1943] K.B. 256; [1943] 1 All E.R. 108; 112 L.J.K.B. 228; 168 L.T. 38; 87 S.J.
48, C.A.
(23) R. v. London County Quarter Sessions Appeal Committee; Ex parte Rossi [1956] 1 Q.B. 682;
[1956] 2 W.L.R. 800; [1956] 1 All E.R. 670; 120 J.P. 239; 100 S.J. 225, C.A.
(24) MacFoy v. United Africa Co., Ltd. [1962] A.C. 152; [1961] 3 W.L.R. 1405; [1961] 3 All E.R.
1169; 105 S.J. 1067, P.C.
(25) Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A.
(26) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
[p.196] of [1979] GLR 194
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision by Osei-Hwere J. dismissing in limine the defendant’s appeal from a ruling by the trial magistrate refusing to vacate a judgment entered by him in default of appearance by the defendant. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Kingsley-Nyinah J.A.
COUNSEL
Kofi Akainyah for the appellant.
Adjei-Mensah for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A.
As I read and understand the facts and circumstances clear from the record of proceedings, the material data there provided places before us two distinct aspects for our careful consideration.
To my mind, the dictates of primary justice and fair-play make these relatively more important and far-reaching than the purely technical question of whether “leave” was required of the defendant to appeal, and whether he dutifully complied with the mandatory provisions of section 19 (4) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and sought and obtained that statutory permit to take his case beyond the limits of the District Court Grade II Duayaw-Nkwanta.
The first aspect concerns the question whether there was justness, balance and propriety in the proceedings before the Duayaw-Nkwanta District Court Grade II; while the second has to do with the spirit and intendment, the true meaning and effect of section 19 (4) of Act 372 aforesaid, having relevant regard to the facts and circumstances of this present matter. It is necessary, in my judgment, that whenever section 19 (4) of Act 372 comes to be considered and applied to the incidents of a particular case, regard be had to the rational and dominant trend that, in present-day administration of the law, the courts are slowly, but positively, veering away from technicalities for technicalities’ sake; and that they will, therefore, not favour such a narrow and illiberal adherence to technicality as, when followed to its logical hilt, will stultify and destroy substantial justice instead of advancing it. There is ample legal and social justification for this salutary tendency which must be considered essential for the more competent and effective operation of the rule of law in the circumstances of our present legal and social development.
When the parties to a cause or matter place their dispute in the hands of our courts, they do so in the justified expectation that, all the technical rules of procedure notwithstanding, before a decision as to their rights and interests in the matter is pronounced to bind them in law, a sufficiently adequate and exhaustive investigation into the merits and demerits of both the claim and the counter-charge urged in opposition thereto shall, first, have been carried out. It is only when this has been done, and each and both sides have been properly heard on the merits of their rival demands, that the requirements of proper justice, natural equity, and good conscience can, in my judgment, be said to have been met and satisfied.
When this has not been done, however, and one of the parties, feeling genuinely aggrieved by an adverse decision, applies for better justice to be done the court handling that application must be careful, statutory
[p.197] of [1979] GLR 194 and other technicalities notwithstanding, to preserve and advance substantial justice and fair equity, and not to stultify or destroy it by unwittingly sacrificing the essential merits of the case on the relatively unimportant altars of procedure and technicalities.
And now, to the essential facts and incidents of this case. The record of appeal herein shows that after the plaintiff-respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) had lodged her civil complaint against the defendant appellant (hereinafter designated the defendant) for a declaration of title and damages for trespass. The defendant was duly served, personally (on 9 May 1972), to attend the District Court Grade II, Sunyani, on Wednesday, 17 May 1972, there to answer the plaintiff’s suit.
Thereafter, and long before the suit itself became ripe for hearing, the defendant entered the lists and, stoutly opposing, (by means of an affidavit) an application by the plaintiff for the grant, unto her, of an order for interim injunction over the subject-matter of her action, so forcefully challenged the right of the plaintiff to title, as to demonstrate that he had a legally tenable defence on the merits. Among other things, the defendant averred that not only had he been in possession of the disputed parcel of land for upwards of seventeen years. his grant being rooted in the stool of Yamfo; but he also stated that he had successfully defended that title in the High Court, Sunyani, on 30 November 1960, against a man he named as Kwabena Kyere (deceased). And the defendant further urged that, in any case, “the plaintiff’s writ does not describe with certainty the limits of the land which she claims as his (sic).”
Now if this last averment were proved correct, and it was sustained at the trial, the case of the defendant would stand considerably strengthened because the authorities are legion which hold that, for the success of a claim for declaration of title to land, a clear and precise description not only of the res litigiosa itself, but of the limits thereof, as well, is essential (see e.g., Baruwa. v. Ogunshola. (1938) 4 W.A.C.A.159; Ababio v. Darkwa (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 124 W.A.C.A.; Bissah v. Gyampoh III [1964] G.L.R. 381, S.C.). Again, if at the trial the defendant succeeded in proving, satisfactorily, that by virtue of the grant by the stool of Yamfo he was not only first, thereafter, on the disputed parcel of land, but also that his seventeen years’ possession had been undisturbed, then his counterclaim for title, ownership, and possession would, quite naturally, stand much stronger in law, the precept being, of course: Qui prior est trempore potior est jure. And see, for example Edu v. Ababio (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 55, P.C. and Mieh v. Asubonteng [1963] 2 G.L.R. 37 holding (3) at p. 38, S.C., amongst a host of others. By these points the defendant was seeking to say that the real probabilities are that, when the trial came on and their rival claims were put to the test, the plaintiff’s case would be found to lack that requisite and inherent strength which should entitle her to succeed on her claim.
If it is an accepted legal truism that equity never tolerates any situation where a wrong stands without a reciprocal remedy (see e.g., Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938), then it must also go without saying, flowing directly out of that axiom, that the party from whom the remedy is sought [p.198] of [1979] GLR 194 to be exacted as a recompense must also, first, and in accordance with balanced justice, be afforded sufficient enough opportunity to stage a legally valid objection to that demand for redress.
Reverting to the facts of this present matter, we find the record of proceedings being silent and uninformative as to whether the plaintiff’s motion for interim injunction (mentioned above) ever came on before the district court for hearing. But the record does sufficiently clearly show that after a series of adjournments (partly because there were protracted attempts at a settlement of the parties’ dispute out of court, and partly because, at one time or another when the cause was to have been heard, either the defendant himself, or else his counsel, or both of them together (even though duly served with notice) were never present to assist the court to investigate the substance of the complaint before it), the trial magistrate hastily acceded to, and improperly granted, an application by counsel for the plaintiff that evidence be given, not viva voce, with a full-blooded trial culminating in an eventual assessment of the relevant oral and documentary testimony necessary to establish title and prove trespass, but on mere affidavit, without more. At that proceeding the magistrate purported to act under “Order 37, r. 2, of R.S.C.” That was on Thursday, 15 May 1975. 1 have, anxiously scanned the entire record without discovering even the slightest indication, anywhere, that either the defendant himself, personally, or else his counsel, was served with any notification of that affidavit hearing, or that the defendant had consented in writing, or otherwise, to that proceeding. On Friday, 16 May 1975, when “the defendant was absent from the court,” the suit was “Adjourned to 22 May 1975 at the instance of the court.”
On the adjourned date, 22 May 1975, the trial magistrate, without first satisfying himself from either his court registrar, or from his court bailiff, as to whether due notice had, in fact, been given to the defendant, or to his counsel, proceeded to make the following record:
“Defendant absent from court likewise his counsel, Barrister Anorba (sic). Suit is for motion on notice under, Order 35, Rule 4 of Cap. 4; ex parte.
By court: Under Order 34, r. 1A of the Annual Practice 1960. I give judgment for plaintiff for possession and title of land in dispute. Court awards ¢200 damages for trespass against defendant with costs at ¢100.”
It is my opinion that the magistrate’s conduct of that interlocutory matter was never in accord with irreproachable justice. Having the defendant’s affidavit in opposition (filed on 21 June 1972, exactly one week after the plaintiff had put in, on 15 June 1972, her motion and supporting affidavit “for injunction order”) before him; and being quite aware of the fact that, as a formal statement of his posture in the case, the defendant’s affidavit in opposition was neither frivolous nor vexatious, but rather a strong and legally reasonable challenge going to the very merits of the plaintiff’s claim to title and possession, I would hold that the magistrate had neither warrant nor justification for failing to regard
[p.199] of [1979] GLR 194 and consider it as such. As it is, the magistrate behaved as though the defendant had failed, or omitted to give any indication that he had even a prima facie answer to the averments of the plaintiff on the pivotal issue of ownership and title. If the magistrate had not been in such obvious hurry to dispose of the case, but he had been prudent enough to pause for necessary judicial thought, not only would he not have misdirected himself to favour the plaintiff with his discretion; he would also have readily appreciated the important fact that, since whatever order that resulted from the ex parte application was bound to affect the legal rights of the defendant over a parcel of land the title to, and ownership of, which he was stoutly contesting, it was only fair and just that, as a serious contender for that title, the defendant was properly notified of the pendency of that motion. The defendant would then have been afforded an adequate enough opportunity, not only challenging the propriety of that “ affidavit proceeding”, but of also demonstrating the reasonableness and force of his opposition to the plaintiff’s claim. I am satisfied, therefore, that in all the circumstances of the matter, while the magistrate on the one hand violated the audi alteram partem rule the indispensable injunction for the correct administration of faultless justice, he was also careless of his duty at all times, and in all cases, to hold the scales of justice at equal balance.
In view of the presence of clear evidence on the record that for the space of about a year the dispute before the district court had, by consent of both the plaintiff and the defendant, been taken temporarily out of court for settlement by the Krontihene of Sunyani and the Akuafohene (chief farmer) of Chiraa, too much capital ought not, in my view, to be made of the fact that the defendant (and his counsel, sometimes) had absented himself (themselves) from court on some occasions. If the trial magistrate had taken a fair and balanced view of the whole matter before him; and if he had acted with requisite judicial circumspection, he would have been readily mindful of the meritorious defence raised by the defendant’s affidavit in opposition and proceeded to heed the said defendant, the sole effect and purpose of whose righteous application was that the judgment in default, pronounced against him, be set aside and the full merits of the plaintiff’s claim, and his (defendant’s) counterclaim, be more properly investigated for justice by a thoroughgoing exploration of the pertinent issues of title, possession and trespass. It is not for nothing, therefore, but as a vital aid to fair and balanced justice, that the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II, and the rules of court, expressly provide that where an affidavit deposed to in answer to a plaintiff’s averments discloses a good and tenable defence on the merits, the defendant shall be let in to defend the suit: see, for example Order 2. r. 11 of Cap. 4 (Sched.II); Order 19, r. 3, etc.
Turning, now, to Order 35 of Cap. 4 relied upon by counsel for the plaintiff at the hearing of the ex parte application for affidavit evidence, we find there stated the following pertinent rules giving clear guidance as to what shall be done by any court faced with a situation such as confronted the magistrate herein. It says:
[p.200] of [1979] GLR 194
“3. If the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear or sufficiently excuse his absence or neglects to answer when duly called, the Court may, upon proof of service of the summons, proceed to hear the cause and give judgment on the evindence adduced by the plaintiff, or may postpone the hearing of the cause and direct notice of such postponement to be given to the defendant.”
“5. Any judgment obtained against any party in the absence of such party may, on sufficient cause shown, be set aside by the Court upon such terms as may seem fit.”
(The emphasis is mine.) (And see also Order 27, 1. 16 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Since by the substance of his sworn deposition the defendant had shown sufficiency of cause, and of purpose, to entitle him to succeed, at least on the strength of the clear probabilities; and because the defendant had never at any stage of the proceedings before the district court, compromised his defence by either expressly, or by necessary implication, admitting the truth of any material averment by the plaintiff as to her title, ownership, or possession so that he could, legitimately, be shut out, I would hold that his right to be heard could not be taken away, and that the sheer interests of justice appeared particularly to favour the direct application, by the trial magistrate, of these appropriate rules (3) and (5) under Order 35, to the special situation of the defendant. An adjournment was clearly indicated by the very peculiar circumstances of the matter. But if the magistrate’s indignation had been aroused (and this is not at all improbable) by what he considered to be a deliberate flouting, by the defendant, of his authority, and he was, therefore, averse to any further postponement then, as I see it, the very least he could and, indeed, should, have done (at his most grudging worst, and to teach the defendant a hard lesson) was to have quickly regarded the rules and then discerned that the situation before him was such as called for the award of reasonable costs against the defendant as an adequate enough compensation to the plaintiff for any inconvenience caused by the “misconduct” of the defendant. In the particular circumstances of the matter before the magistrate, the merits of the defendant’s challenge ought, in my opinion, to have been enough to mollify whatever displeasure the defendant’s absences had excited in the magistrate. And, in any case, what damage could the plaintiff have suffered if her “default judgment” had been set aside? None that I Can see.
That the trial magistrate had a discretion in the matter cannot be controverted. I would hold, however, that since he allowed the use, by him, of that discretion to be dictated and guided more by some private whim or fancy of his own, than by law, his exercise of that discretion was as unsound as it was illegal and irregular. The issues before the trial magistrate were so vital to both the parties involved in the dispute that they deserved to have been handled with necessary prudence and care, rather than in the hasty, lopsided and summary fashion adopted by the trial magistrate. I would, in the result, hold that if proper justice is to be
[p.201] of [1979] GLR 194 done to both parties herein, and it is not to be further miscarried against the defendant, then it behoves this court to give the defendant the day so that the frustrations that have formed the bases of his aggrievement in three successive courts are removed. I am inclined thus to conclude because the facts and incidents of the matter before us do not lend themselves to the reasonable inference that any prejudice could have resulted to the plaintiff if her judgment in default had been set aside, as prayed by the defendant: see Atwood v. Chichester (1878) 3 Q.B.D, 722 C.A. which held that in any such event, lapse of time cannot be a bar to an application to set aside a judgment obtained by default.
For these reasons, if for no other; and because I am satisfied that the learned judge of the High Court ought not to have confirmed and perpetuated the denial of fundamental justice meted out to the defendant, I would, without any mental reservations whatsoever, uphold the petition of the defendant and, allowing his appeal, vacate the decisions of both the High Court and the district court.
There is now left for careful consideration, the second vital aspect of this appeal. It hinges. materially, upon the intrinsic meaning of and the true requirements for the effectual applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case, of section 19 (4) Act 372, which says:
“(4) A person aggrieved by any interlocutory order or decision made or given by a District Court may appeal against it to the High Court with the leave of the District Court or of the High Court and the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any such appeal.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
By this the legislature, as I comprehend it, enjoins the High Court to have a watchful regard to the justice of the whole of the case before it, come well down to the “brass tacks” of all its facts and circumstances and then, in accordance with the demands of substantial justice, hear and determine the matter upon the full merits, not of one side only, but of both the rival contestations and, again, not upon merely procedural technicalities only.
When the defendant applied to have the default judgment against him set aside; and when the district magistrate wrongly refused to grant that application, they were, both of them, taking a step during the pendency of the action instituted by the plaintiff, the end result of which intermediate steps could not have been meant to determine, finally, the vital, but unanswered, question before the court, namely: which of the parties had the better right to title, ownership and possession? The magistrate’s decision was therefore an interlocutory one. The facts and incidents of this particular situation therefore qualifying the defendant to exercise his rights under section 19 (4), as a party truly aggrieved, he appealed against the magistrate’s refusal to the High Court, Sunyani (Osei-Hwere J., presiding), only to be again rebuffed, the learned judge saying, inter alia:
“… the appellant was bound to comply with the provisions of Act 372, s. 19 (4) to be vested with the right of appeal at all and, as he failed to do so, this court is obliged mandatorily to apply its guillotine
[p.202] of [1979] GLR 194 as enacted in Act 372. s. 19 (6) to the appeal, and, as the appeal is not properly before me, I strike it out accordingly…”
This has prompted learned counsel before us to inquire, on the one hand, whether the defendant did in fact ask for leave; and other, whether leave was at all necessary, seeing that the magistrate’s decision was final, and not interlocutory. As already expressed, it is my opinion that all the practical indications point to the situation before the district court not being final, but interlocutory. And since the defendant’s appeal was, therefore, properly before the High Court, the learned judge had appropriate jurisdiction to hear and determine it. When Act 372 was decreed. it was established (like all other statutes) upon the rational assumption that whenever a court was called upon to apply the provisions of section 19 (4), it shall, while so construing and applying it, observe the law in accordance with the demands of equity and substantial justice. There is, therefore, as I perceive it, a condition necessarily precedent to the effectual implementation of the subsection; and it is this: that the decision which forms the subject-matter of the appellant’s aggrievement and discontent shall itself, first have been reached in accordance with the indispensable requirements of law, equity and basic justice.
In Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh [1971] 2 All E.R. 865. C.A. the headnote states:
“In determining whether an application is final or interlocutory, regard must be had to the nature of the application and not to the nature of the order which the court eventually makes. Since an application for a new trial if granted would clearly be interlocutory, so equally when it is refused it is interlocutory.
Accordingly an appeal against a refusal to grant a new trial is an interlocutory appeal . . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
In the course of his judgment in that case (which was an application for leave to appeal out of time against the refusal of an application for a new trial) Lord Deaning M.R., in his celebrated and illuminating threw way a deal of very instructive light upon this troublesome question of whether an order is final or interlocutory. He said at p. 866 (dealing with the test to be applied in determining the issue, and I quote the relevant portion ad longum:
“In Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange ((1877) 3 C.P.D. 67) and Salaman v. Warner ([1891] 1 Q.B. 734 and 735), Lord Esher M.R. said that the test was the nature of the application to the court and not the nature of the order which the court eventually made. But in Bozson v. Altrinchim Urban District Council ([1903] 1 K.B. 547), the court said that the test was the nature of the order as made., Lord Alverstone C.J. said that the test is, ([1903] 1 K.B. at 548: ‘Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties? Lord Alverstone C.J. was right in logic but Lord
[p.203] of [1979] GLR 194
Esher M.R. was right in experience. Lord Esher M.R.’s test has always been applied in practice. For instance, an appeal from a judgment under RSC Ord. 14 (even apart from the new rule) has always been regarded as interlocutory and notice of appeal had to be lodged within fourteen days. An appeal from an order striking out an action as being frivolous or vexatious, or as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or dismissing it for want of prosecution—very such order is regarded as interlocutory: see Hunt v. Allied Bakeries Ltd. [1956] 3 All E.R. 513). So I would apply Lord Esher M.R.’s test to an order refusing a new trial. I look to the application for a new trial and not to the order made. If the application for a new trial were granted, it would clearly be interlocutory. So equally when it is refused, it is interlocutory. It was so held in an unreported case, Anglo-Auto Finance (Commercial) Ltd. v. Robert Dick (4th December 1967) unreported, and we should follow it today. This question of ‘final’ or ‘interlocutory’ is so uncertain, that the only thing for practitioners to do is to look up the practice books and see what has been decided on the point. Most orders have now been the subject of decision. If a new case should arise, we must do the best we can with it.
There is no other way.”
I would affirm and adopt this statement for the purposes of our present rehearing exercise.
In the matter now before us, there cannot be any question at all of the defendant having been, without time. If he ought to have applied for “leave” within two weeks, from when was that period to have been computed? The defendant was not in court when that ex parte decision was pronounced against him. And the record is strong evidence that the plaintiff did not, herself act with any commendable promptitude in bringing to the defendant’s notice the result of her application for affidavit evidence. The judgment in default was brought to defendant’s attention some thirteen days after the plaintiff had filed her notice of judgment which, in turn, was filed on 10 July 1975, a good six weeks and four days after the default judgment. The notice of judgment was answered by the defendant who filed his application to set aside on 23 July 1975 (thirteen days later). The defendant cannot be justly castigated for tardiness.
It is my considered opinion that the learned judge in this present case was not justified in his decision against the defendant herein. He was wrong because he not only completely disregarded the nature of the defendant’s applications; he also misapprehended, and applied too narrowly to the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s problem (and thereby overlooked the justice of the whole case), the letter of section 19 (4) of Act 372. In my judgment, it is because he showed much more concern for the relatively unimportant matter of the sheer technicalities of that subsection, than for the fundamental and paramount question of whether (the provisions of the statute notwithstanding), the defendant had received proper justice at the hands of the district court, at all; and, equally important, his failure to perceive from the clear facts and incidents
[p.204] of [1979] GLR 194 before him, that the trial magistrate had clearly abused his powers and exceeded his jurisdiction, that he fell into the error of confirming the trial magistrate’s infraction of a fundamental right due to the defendant as a proper party to the action.
In the present case, a decision was pronounced against the defendant. Feeling dissatisfied with that, he supplicated the trial magistrate to reverse his decision; the magistrate refused so to do. At that stage the defendant had become a person at once not only very much aggrieved, but also a party fully qualified and rightfully entitled under and by virtue of section 19 (4) of Act 372, to “appeal against it to the High Court,” with leave, of course. As he could not automatically, and as of right, pursue his rights in the High Court, the defendant properly appeared, first, before the district court which improperly turned down his rightful demand for a reversal of the court’s interlocutory decision. The subsection under discussion required the defendant to ask for “leave” either from the district court, or else from the High Court. But how was he to formulate his entreaty, there being no set form or pattern, to be used or followed ?
Whenever such a party decides to take the matter further, he at once assumes a burden which obliges him to support his plea for the statutory license with an affidavit setting forth with much greater particularity than does the complaint of the plaintiff, the facts upon which he relies, and the incidents from which his defence arises. He must demonstrate some extra effort, such a clear-cut case, as will convince the reason of the court (doing proper, and not pettish, justice, of course) to turn the key and then, in meaningful exercise of its cautious discretion, let him in to pursue his rights. When such party has by himself, or else by his representative, taken these necessary steps and informed the court as well as his opponent (as the respondent) of his intention; and when he has clearly demonstrated that, aside of all technical considerations, he has a sound case on the merits; he satisfies the essential meaning and requirement of section 19 (4) of Act 372, and with the statutory liberty being granted, he is then well positioned to present a formal petition in accordance with the provisions of rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1962(L.I. 218). By reason, therefore, of the fact that the party aggrieved, in our present instance, the defendant, was refused leave to appeal, he could not be properly subjected to the performance of any precedent conditions of appeal as required by section 19 (6) of Act 372, as the learned judge of the High Court erroneously thought he could.
Considering all the facts and incidents of this present matter together, and in the necessary context of the obligation upon our courts to do substantial justice between parties, I am inclined to think that, if equity has always aided the vigilant, and if she has always also counted the intent to be of more significance than the mere form of things, then, taking the substance of the defendant’s affidavit in opposition (that formal paper that clearly stated the full merits of his opposition and challenge) together with his conduct after his initial set-back: the unrelenting assiduity wherewith he pursued his legal right to be allowed to defend the suit so that the total merits of the whole case could be more dispassionately
[p.205] of [1979] GLR 194 exposed and fully assessed for justice—then the direction and depth of purpose shown by the defendant may be construed in his favour as demonstrating a bona fide effort, on his part, to satisfy the essential requirements of section 19 (4). But what if his act and conduct never can be said to have worked together to satisfy the statutory demand for “leave”? I would answer that that would never put the defendant out of court, seeing that initially the decision of the magistrate, the subject-matter of defendant’s aggrievement, was not arrived at in accordance with the law.
I am not unmindful of the existence of a long line of authorities which hold that irrespective of the merits of the case of an aggrieved party in an interlocutory matter, if he fails to act timeously, within a fortnight, in praying for leave, then his application cannot be countenanced. But can it be denied that this state of affairs has for far too long, undoubtedly plagued, and spelt the doom of, many a strong, meritorious and bona fide defence? Is not the time over-ripe for the Rules Committee of the General Legal Council to take a hard, close look at this with a view to amending and extending the inadequate two week time-limit to four or six, when three months is allowed in other circumstances? And since it certainly never was the intention of the legislature that the provisions of section 19 (4) of Act 372 shall be so construed and applied as to constitute an insuperable hurdle in the way of a bona fide applicant for leave to appeal, is the time not propitious for the courts to seriously reconsider their persistence in ignoring the merits of an aggrieved party’s case, once he omits, or fails, to satisfy the merely technico-procedural requirement of asking for leave? It is my considered opinion that since it is the true merits of a plaintiff’s civil complaint that founds for him a genuine cause of action, and since, furthermore, an answer that does not strike firmly at the very roots of a plaintiff’s complaint will never earn a defendant the right to defend an action, it cannot be truly just, or equitable, that a court, fully aware of the intrinsic merits of the posture of a party aggrieved by an interlocutory decision, or order, should completely ignore those merits and thereby, and forever, destroy the reasonably probable chances of success open to him on both the facts of the case, and the law.
In Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R.190 it was held that a party who urges an averment which his opponent denies must be ready and able, at the trial of the suit, to corroborate it by producing such available and material proof as will satisfy the legal conviction of the court hearing the action of the truth, or the rational probability, of that statement. And this, in my view, is precisely the quintessence of our present defendant’s stand in his applications. He was, in very effect. importuning both the courts below, and now this uppermost court, for their (and our) permission within the practical intendment, and the essential meaning of section 19 (4) of Act 372, to be let into arena and there, not only to pitch the strength of his case against that of the plaintiff in purposeful exercise of his privilege of establishing the cogency and probableness of his counterclaim but also. and equally important, he was pressing to be allowed to expose, thereby, such inherent weaknesses in the case of the plaintiff as should disentitle her to succeed upon her unproven assertion that title,
[p.206] of [1979] GLR 194 possession, and ownership rightly belonged to her. This, in my opinion, was a legally tenable stance which the learned judge of the High Court ought certainly not to have ignored, for it is clear from the face of the record, that before ever that stage was reached in the history of this case; before that point was arrived at in the proceedings when, because the defendant had then become a party genuinely aggrieved by the interlocutory decision of the magistrate, he was expected, nay obliged, to ask for leave to appeal to the High Court, the defendant had certainly not received justice at the hands of the trial magistrate. As I have already stated, the legislature expects, as an antecedent condition for the successful implementation of section 19 (4) of Act 372, that the decision sought to be appealed from shall, first, have been reached in accordance with law: see, for example Tehrani v. Rostron [1971] 3 All E.R. 790 at p. 793, C.A.
In all the circumstances of this case, therefore, I am satisfied that it was wrong for both the learned judge and the district magistrate to have barred the defendant from legally pursuing his rights and privileges under the law. It is well to remember that in our efforts to achieve a faultless dispensation of that substantial and balanced justice expected from our courts, we, as her chief executives, have inherent authority and power, in appropriate cases, to prevent proper justice from being defeated by mere technicalities. Wherefore I stand persuaded that in the present situation this court owes it to justice to remedy the inconvenience and prejudice caused to both the parties before us (but more so to the defendant) by the errors and irregularities hereinbefore mentioned.
It is for these several and conjoint reasons, then, that I would—and do, allow this appeal. Consequently, therefore, I would set aside the decisions of the High Court, Sunyani (dated 20 December 1976), and of the Duayaw-Nkwanta District Court Grade II (dated 22 May 1975), and, in accordance with rule 31 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), order that the whole of this matter be remitted to the District Court Grade II, Sunyani, for a de novo hearing upon its true merits, so that proper justice is seen to be done to both the defendant and the plaintiff.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.A.
The facts in this appeal are simple and straight forward. The plaintiff took out a writ for declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land situate and being “at a place called Asikasu-Nkran and bounded by the properties of Yaw Krah, Kwaku Bosea, Kwaku Sika and on another side the farm of the defendant, ¢200 for trespass.”
After several appearances in court by the parties and counsel there appeared this note in the record of appeal: “Suit adjourned to 12 June 1974 for mention for the time being negotiations will be at fact (sic).”
There is no indication in the record of appeal that the case came to court on 12 June 1974. However there was record that the matter came up for hearing on 14 April 1975 and the defendant was absent. Thereafter the defendant and his counsel were absent from court until the plaintiff was obliged to apply for judgment in default. Subsequently the defendant applied to vacate the judgment on the ground that he was unaware that the suit has been fixed for hearing. The learned magistrate declined to
[p.207] of [1979] GLR 194 vacate it and gave a reasoned ruling for his refusal, the gist of it being that the defendant and counsel had been deliberate in their refusal to attend to the summons of the court.
The defendant appealed against the ruling and the issue which arose for determination was whether or not the ruling appealed from was interlocutory. The learned High Court judge held it was and that special leave ought to, but has not been obtained and accordingly dismissed the appeal in limine.
It is from that decision that this appeal has been lodged. One of the issues which had arisen for determination in this appeal is whether the learned judge was right in holding that the appeal was from an interlocutory decision. In my view our own authorities have settled this point and we need not turn elsewhere for an answer.
In Bansah v. G. B. Ollivant (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 408, the west African Court of Appeal held according to the headnote:”
“A judge’s refusal to review his judgment is an interlocutory decision and if special leave to appeal from the refusal has not been obtained, the appeal from the refusal is not properly before the Court of Appeal; therefore the Court has no power to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal.”
It has often been observed by these courts that no right of appeal exists save such as is conferred by statute: see In re Okine [1960] G.L.R. 84, C.A. In re Amponsah [1960] G.L.R.140 at p.146, the Court of Appeal held:
“We are clearly of the opinion that an appellate court has no inherent jurisdiction to entertain an Appeal from an order or decision given by a court below it. In all causes or matters an appeal lies only if given by statute.
If it is accepted that the magistrate’s decision was interlocutory then section 19 (4) of Act 372 governs such appeal. The section reads:
“(4) A person aggrieved by any interlocutory order or decision made or given by a District Court may appeal against it to the High Court with the leave of the District Court or of the High Court and the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any such appeal”.
This provision may, as a matter of interest, be contrasted with Article 110 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, which deals with appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal:
“(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, an appeal shall lie as of right from a judgment, decree or order of the High Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal in any cause or matter determined by the High Court of Justice.
In my view the learned judge’s decision was correct on this particular issue.
Before us, however, other issues have been raised which were not before the High Court judge and they are, firstly that, there is no
[p.208] of [1979] GLR 194 evidence on record that the defendant was served with hearing notice when the hearing resumed after an adjournment of nearly a year for negotiation. Secondly, that the learned magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction when he gave judgment without hearing evidence.
All appeals are by way of re-hearing and accordingly I went through the exhibits in the record transmitted to this court and found that the parties were served to appear on 25 May notwithstanding the appellant’s affidavit to the contrary.
I have however been greatly disturbed by the procedure adopted by the magistrate in entering judgment by default. Under Order 35, r. 3 of Cap. 4, Sched. II there is the following provision:
“3. If the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear or sufficiently excuse his absence or neglects to answer when duly called, the Court may, upon proof of service of the summons, proceed to hear the cause and give judgment on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, or may postpone the hearing of the cause and direct notice of such postponement to be given to the defendant.”
When the defendant and his solicitor failed to appear, the court’s duty was to proceed to hear evidence of the plaintiff and her witnesses in proof of her title for a declaration and the alleged trespass in accordance with the rules. In this instant case, it is my view that the court acted in excess or its jurisdiction when it entered judgment without hearing evidence as prescribed by the rule. One good reason for this rule especially in land suits and causes is that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish with satisfaction his title. It is said that in land cases the plaintiff cannot profit from the weakness of the defendant’s case; and, as the cliché goes, he must succeed on the strength of his own case. If evidence had been taken and judgment had been given in favour of the plaintiff no one could cavil at it even though the Judgment may be erroneous in fact and in law.
As already observed, the magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction when he purported to enter summary judgment in breach of the provisions of Order 35, r. 3. Applying the principles enunciated in Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A. it is my view that the judgment entered by the magistrate is a nullity and ought to be set aside.
In fairness to the learned High Court judge, it must be emphasised that these matters were not raised for his consideration and he had no opportunity of considering them.
I will set aside the ruling of the High Court and the judgment of the magistrate and will remit the case to the court of first instance for hearing de novo by another magistrate.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I have had the privilege of reading beforehand the judgment of my brother Kingsley-Nyinah J.A. and although I agree with the conclusion that the appeal must be allowed, I feel I must set out my own views and reasoning as they do not fully accord with his.
[p.209] of [1979] GLR 194
Two issues arise in this appeal. First, whether the aggrieved appellant took the appropriate legal measures to have his adverse decision reconsidered by a higher court. Second, whether the trial magistrate could be said to have concluded validly against the appellant. In my view the second is the weightier of the two.
The determination of the first issue revolves round a resolution of the nature of the relief sought: was the application to vacate the default judgment, interlocutory or final ? If it was interlocutory, then the appellant would be bound by the mandatory provisions of section 19 (4) of Act 372 to obtain leave, before his right of appeal could vest.
Numerous decisions have settled conclusively that the merits notwithstanding, if an appellant fails to avail himself of a statutory dispensation to appeal within the time limited or abide by rules affecting the appeal he would be forever barred from re-litigating his cause. The nature of this peremptory rule is explained in Frimpong v. Poku [1963] 2 G.L.R. 1 at p.6, S.C. where Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) put it as follows:
“A right of appeal is always conferred by statute, and when the statute conferring the right lays down conditions precedent to the vesting of that right in a litigant it is essential that those conditions must be strictly performed, otherwise the right does not become vested.”
Some years later in Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench) Akufo-Addo then Chief Justice repeated this view, holding that the right of appeal and the power of any court to hear appeals are both creatures of statute and (at p. 83) “When… the right and the power do materialise they are exercisable only within the framework of the conditions imposed for their exercise.” In such an event, the court is not called upon to view the hardships that might flow in consequence. It may be said that the court’s judicial vision is circumscribed by statutory blinkers. I
It is clear in this case that the appellant failed to obtain leave to appeal. So if time were computed on the basis of an interlocutory decision the appellant would fall headlong at the first hurdle. It is this view of the matter that informs the High Court ruling dismissing the appeal in limine. But that ruling must depend for its viability on the category in which the application must be placed.
One cannot discern any consistency in the English decisions of the tests laid down for distinguishing interlocutory from final orders. The latest test stated in the headnote to Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh [1971] 2 All E.R. 865, C.A. looks “to the nature of the application and not to the nature of the order which the court eventually makes.” The two tests that have frequently been adopted in determining whether an appeal is interlocutory or final were considered by Lord Denning M.R. in the Ghosh case. Lord Denning M.R. there said at p. 866:
“In Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange ((1877) 3 C.P.D. 67) and Salaman v. Warner ([1891] 1 Q.B. 734 and 735), Lord Esher M.R. said that the test was the nature of the application to the court and not the nature of the order which the court eventually made. But in
[p.210] of [1979] GLR 194
Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council ([1903] 1 K.B. 547), the court said that the test was the nature of the order as made. Lord Alverstone C.J. said that the test is ([1903] 1 K.B. at 548): ‘Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties? Lord Alverstone C.J. was right in logic but Lord Esher M.R. was right in experience. Lord Esher M.R.’s test has always been applied in practice. For instance, an appeal from a judgment under RSC Ord. 14(even apart from the new rule) has always been regarded as interlocutory and notice of appeal had to be lodged within 14 days. An appeal from an order striking out an action as being frivolous or vexatious, or as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or dismissing it for want of prosecution—every such order is regarded as interlocutory: see Hunt v. Allied Bakeries Ltd. ([1956] 3 All E.R.513). So I would apply Lord Esher M.R. test to an order refusing a new trial.
I look to the application for a new trial and not to the order made. If the application for a new trial were granted, it would clearly be interlocutory. So equally when it is refused, it is interlocutory. “
Applying Lord Denning’s test, the matter is clearly interlocutory. That view at first blush appears irresistible for if a tribunal can be legitimately persuaded to re-agitate a matter to the extent of varying or vacating its previous decision then the issue cannot be regarded as finally determined. For finality does not allow for subsequent re-consideration or resuscitation. Dead members cannot be rekindled.
In recent years however, the courts in this country have veered from Lord Esher’s stand which found favour with Lord Denning, to the test laid down by Lord Alverstone C.J. in Bozson v. Altrincham U.D.C. (supra). That test was applied in State Gold Mining Corporation v. Sissala 1 [1971] 1 G.L.R. 359 C.A.; Tawiah v. Brako [1973] 1 G.L.R. 483, C.A.; Okudzeto v. Irani Brother [1975] 1 G.L.R. 96, C.A. and, recently in Atta Kwadwo v. Badu [1977] 1 G.L.R. 1, C.A. where Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) said at p. 4, “The criterion for distinguishing a final from an interlocutory order has come before the courts a number of times and the test generally accepted is that the judgment or order to be final, must finally dispose of the rights of the parties.”
For Ghana then the test is not to look at the nature of the application but at the nature of the order made. This is one area where the courts of Britain and Ghana have clearly parted ways and the Ghanaian court have shown remarkable consistency. In adopting the line followed by our courts, I must observe that the Alverstone test could only be applied to the final judgment in this case, but time had run out against the appellant and that remedy had lapsed.
Had the matter ended there I would have affirmed the decision of the High Court dismissing the appeal. But I think there was a matter of more fundamental importance in this appeal; and that is the second issue, namely, whether the judgment against the appellant had been properly obtained for there is considerable doubt whether he had been notified of the hearing of the motion for judgment.
[p.211] of [1979] GLR 194
I shall refer to the facts. After a lapse of a year when the parties were negotiating a settlement, the plaintiff resuscitated the matter in court, and filed a motion on notice, under Order 35 of Cap. 4, Sched. II seeking leave to be heard in the absence of the defendant. The relevant rule under which the application was made, rule 3, reads:
“3. If the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear or sufficiently excuse his absence or neglects to answer when duly called, the Court may, upon proof of service of the summons, proceed to hear the cause and give judgment on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, or may postpone the hearing of the cause and direct notice of such postponement to be given to the defendant.”
The matter came up on 8 May. The defendant was absent. The court notes of the day read:
“By court: Suit is adjourned to 15 May 1975 to enable counsel to file affidavit for ex parte on his application.
(Sgd.) District Magistrate.”
Pausing for a moment, it will be noted that though the magistrate postponed the hearing of the motion he failed to “direct notice of such postponement to be given to the defendant” as the rules require. On the contrary he tried to make the plaintiff’s task simpler by dispensing with service on the defendant to transform the application into an ex parte one. On the adjourned date of 15 May 1975, the defendant was absent but the record indicates that his counsel was served. This can hardly be service on the defendant to compel the visitation upon him of the full rigours of default.
But what is more curious in the count’s note for that day is the following entry:
“Suit is for motion on Order 37, r. 2 of R.S.C. for plaintiff to be heard ex parte. By court: Motion and affidavit for ex parte hearing is granted, evidence is given on affidavit.”
The suit was then further adjourned twice without any notice to the defendant personally. Then on 22 May 1975, the magistrate made his concluding order:
“By court: Under Order 35, r. 1A of the Annual Practice 1960 I give judgment for plaintiff for possession and title of land in dispute. Court awards ¢200 damages for trespass against defendant with costs at ¢100.”
Why the magistrate should have gone so far afield to the Annual Practice when his jurisdiction was confined to Cap. 4 and Act 372 is incomprehensible to me. Why evidence was not given on oath in accordance with the usual practice is a matter I consider also unsatisfactory.
This aside, the fact that notice of the adjourned date was not served on the defendant personally in compliance with the statutory directions in my view nullifies completely whatever occurred subsequently: see
[p.212] of [1979] GLR 194
Craig v. Kanssen [1943] K.B. 256, C.A. and R.v. Appeal Committee of Country of London Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Rossi [1956] 1 All E.R. 670 at 674, C.A.
When the defendant was served with a notice of judgment he was taken a back, because, as the record shows of judgment he was he had no notice that after a Year s adjourned for settlement the dormant suit had been reactivated. lie accordingly applied to have ‘the judgment set aside and after urging that negotiations fell through because the inspection of the locus could not he held. he added the following in an affidavit:
“6. That neither was I notified of any other day appointed for the inspection nor was I served with a hearing notice to attend court, and that I was under the misapprehension that I would be informed of any move the plaintiff would subsequently make in the case.
7. That being unaware that the case had been set down for hearing on 27 May 1975, I did not attend court, the court proceeding to hear the case on the said date and judgment by default being given against me as evidenced by a copy of an entry of judgment served on me.
8. That failure on my part is not deliberate.
9. That I have a good defence to make to the action taken against me and I had appeared in court on several occasions to establish the true boundary line between my property and the adjoining property of the plaintiff.”
That the defendant had not been served could be inferred from the plaintiff’s own affidavit in reply; she said:
“6. That the hearing of the case was adjourned on several occasions for the reason that service had then not been effected.
7. That when later proof of service was returned I filed a motion to have the case heard if defendant was not wanted to prevent the case being heard by this non-appearance.
8. That the said motion was also adjourned for non-service.
9. That by the next adjourned [date] Mr. Anorbah, solicitor for defendant had then been served.”
It is clear that even on the plaintiff’s own showing only the defendant’s solicitor was served at a later stage. The solicitor could not give evidence for his client.
The defendant’s plea to have the matter reinstated and heard on the merits fell on deaf ears. The magistrate erroneously contended that the parties had been served with “Hearing notices for court on 27 February 1975.” 1 am prepared only to accept the plaintiff’s own sworn statement which in effect confirmed that the defendant had not been served. The very fact that the magistrate had had to give leave for the motion on notice to be treated as one ex parte, suggests that the defendant had truly not been served. It is explicable only on that basis.
[p.213] of [1979] GLR 194
Failure to serve the defendant renders the subsequent proceedings null and void. For a step taken which is not sanctioned or warranted by the rules is wholly void and may be set aside. No considerations of time therefore matter. The magistrate’s judgment ex debito justitiae must be set aside: see MacFoy v. United Africa Co., Ltd. [1961] 3 All E. R. 1169, P.C. Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A. and Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
I would accordingly allow the appeal and remit the case for hearing de novo.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Case remitted for hearing de novo.
J. D.
