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[1978] SLR (HC) 16High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

ASUMADU-SAKYI. II vs. OWUSU AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 423

14 November 1978 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 16
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OSCOLAASUMADU-SAKYI. II v OWUSU AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 423 [1978] SLR (HC) 16
APAASUMADU-SAKYI. II v OWUSU AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 423, [1978] SLR (HC) 16 (Ghana).
BluebookASUMADU-SAKYI. II v OWUSU AND OTHERS [1979] GLR 423, [1978] SLR (HC) 16 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) De la Pole (Lady) v. Dick (1885) 29 Ch.D. 351; 54 L.J.Ch. 940; 52 L.T. 457; 33 W.R. 585, C.A.

(2) Greer, In re; Napper v. Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch. 217; 64 L.J.Ch. 620; 72 L.T. 865; 59 J.P. 441; 43 W.R. 547; 39 S.J. 503; 2 Mans. 350; 13 R. 598.

(3) Monk v. Bartram [1891] 1 Q. B. 346; 60 L.J.K.B. 267; 64 L.T. 45; 39 W.R. 310; 7 T.L.R. 227, C.A.

(4) Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C.

(5) Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33.

(6) Shardey v. Adamtey; Shardey v. Martey [1972] 2 G.L.R. 380, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for stay of execution of an order for payment of money into court pending an appeal. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

E.D. Kom for the appellant-applicant.

K. Asumadu-Sakyi for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

Bearing on this application for stay of execution, many learned and weighty points have been advanced. But, on reflection, it appears to me that the matter falls to be decided on a few comparatively simple grounds.

The order of which a stay is sought is that: the co-defendant-appellant-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) do pay into court the sum of ¢1,029,592 within ten days from the date of the judgment appealed against. Before I address myself to the merits or demerits of

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this application for stay, I feel some explanation is due from me for ordering that the sum for which judgment was given was to be paid into court.

I have already expressed in the body of my judgment in this suit, the view that the Administration of Lands Acts, 1962 (Act 123), covers those cases in which land is already known to belong to a particular stool and that is why no machinery is provided under Act 123 for the resolution of rival claims. The provisions of Act 123, in my view, thus apply only where the land is undoubtedly land belonging to a particular stool. The State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), on the other hand, was fashioned to cater for all other cases where there may be conflicting claims because there is no certainty as to whether the ownership of land is in a stool or in an individual. The provisions of Act 123, were, therefore, not meant, and cannot apply, to compensation claimed and payable under Act 125. But it seems to me that, once it is determined that the land for which compensation is claimed is the land of a particular stool, the compensation which is payable is, as of that moment, affected by the provisions of Act 123; and the compensation must necessarily be paid into the stool lands account set up under section 18 of Act 123. It was the judgment in the present suit which decided that the compensation, the subject-matter of this suit, belonged to a particular stool—the Kumawu stool.

The only way in which this court could ensure that the amount for which judgment was given, which is part of a trust fund for the people or oman of Kumawu, would be paid and transferred into the stool lands account for the benefit of the people, was to order that the total amount for which judgment was obtained be paid into court by certain date. That there is jurisdiction in this court to give a judgment or make an order for payment of money into court within a stipulated time cannot be doubted; for by Order, 42, r. 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), “A judgment for the. payment of money into Court may be enforced by a writ of sequestration, or in cases in which attachment is authorised by law, by attachment.” And I take the view that, were jurisdiction not reposed in the court to make such an order, there would have been no such provision in our rules of court. This view is buttressed by the distinction which manifests itself in the rules of court between an order for payment of money into court and a judgment for the recovery of money by or payment of money to any person, when regard is had to the different methods of enforcing them.

Whereas under Order 42, r. 4 an order for the payment of money into court may be enforced by sequestration or attachment of the person (the emphasis is mine), under rule 3 of the same Order:

“A judgment for the recovery by or payment to any person of money may be enforced by the attachment and sale of the property of the party against whom judgment was given or the decree made, or, subject to the provisions of Order 69, by his imprisonment or both.”

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(The emphasis is mine.) See Lady De La Pole v. Dick (1385) 29 Ch.D.351, C.A. And as Chitty J. pointed out in In re Greer’ Napper v. Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch.217 at p. 220:

“Judgments for the recovery of money are final, and orders for payment of money are generally final; but judgments or orders for payment into court are generally not final: the money paid in may be paid for security only or for safety of the fund, and the person ordered to pay in not unfrequently is entitled to have some part of the money afterwards paid out to him: ordinary writs of execution are, therefore, not made applicable to orders for payment into court.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It is abundantly clear that this application for stay of execution pending appeal is not grounded on any fear that unless a stay of execution is granted, the prospect of the appellant recovering his money, should his appeal succeed, would be remote. In order to appreciate the reason for the application and to be in a position to decide whether it is desirable to grant or refuse it, it is necessary to recount briefly the uncontroverted facts of this case.

With the full knowledge and connivance of the applicant herein, three separate claims for compensation were lodged in the names of the three defendants, in these consolidated cases, in fraud of the Kumawu stool. When the claims were paid, the applicant admits receiving the moneys, but there was no evidence before this court that any of the moneys claimed in the names of the three defendants and admittedly received by the applicant was ever paid into any account to which the oman and people of Kumawu were beneficiaries. There was no evidence to substantiate an allegation that ¢400,000 were paid out of the compensation moneys into the Kumawu stool account.

By this application to stay execution of the court’s order to pay these moneys into court, the applicant is requesting that he, who had been a party to the fraud that gave him possession and control over these funds, should be allowed to retain possession and control of them, in preference to the court, pending his appeal. And this application is not made with any contrition, but brazenly, on the ground that he had disbursed what he had obtained by fraud and, therefore, payment into court of the judgment debt by him is well-nigh impossible.

By February 1976, a total amount of ¢1,561,560 representing the moneys claimed in the names of the three defendants had been paid to the applicant. In April 1976, barely two months from the receipt of these funds, questions which would have made a prudent and honest man deposit these moneys in safe-keeping, until all legal issues relating to them have been settled, were being raised in the newspapers; yet the applicant did not deem it wise to deposit these moneys in the Kumawu stool account or desist from disbursing them arbitrarily.

Although it is in the discretion of the court to grant or refuse a stay of execution, the discretion of the court is exercised on well-known principles. Even though the trial court is not supposed to assess the

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possibility of the appeal succeeding, a stay is not granted where the applicant makes no attempt to demonstrate where the trial court went wrong and thus the likelihood of this appeal succeeding, but merely trots out grounds of appeal and supports them with a bare statement that the appeal is likely to succeed. The applicant has not even attempted to demonstrate that this appeal has any chance of success. Allegations of misdirection, or that there was no evidence to support the judgment or that it was against the weight of evidence are not sufficient to support an application for stay: see Monk v. Bartram [1891] 1 Q.B. 346, C.A. But that aside a stay of execution may be granted where the special circumstances of the case require that it should be granted. The question is. What special circumstances are there that require that I should accede to the applicant’s request? Should a court of law grant stay of execution of an order for payment into court and leave vast sums of money with an applicant in whose hands funds appear to vanish without trace? The answer to this question is given in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387 at p. 390 read by Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was):

“Generally speaking it is not our view that the policy of the law in this country should be against staying execution pending appeal especially where large sums of money are involved, and we would urge that when execution is stayed it should, where the circumstances permit, be on the condition that the judgment-debtor pay into court the amount of money involved, or, when refused, on the condition that the judgment-creditor give security as aforesaid and approved by the judge.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The order of this court contained in the judgment delivered on 19 October 1978, conformed with the wisdom in the above-quoted judgment that: with regard to large sums of money it is desirable to order that they be paid into court.

An applicant for stay may also show that his appeal would be rendered nugatory if a stay were not granted, but clearly that is not the case here and the special grounds which counsel canvassed are: (a) that the amount of the judgment debt is so large that the order for payment into court should be stayed; and (b) that the money is simply not there. I propose to deal with these grounds seriatim.

If I were to stay execution simply because the amount of the judgment debt were large, it seems to me that I would then be subscribing to a principle that the greater the judgment debt the safer the debtor. Such a principle would encourage defaulters to make no attempt whatsoever to settle a judgment debt and does not accord with the policy of the law that both great and small are equal before it.

In Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33 at p. 40 Baidoo J. expressed the view that: “It will obviously be inflicting an intolerable hardship to order the judgment debtor to deposit such a colossal sum in court pending appeal.” But that was a simple running-down action in which the amount for which the judgment was given was not obtained by fraud. What is

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more, Baidoo J. refused to make an order for payment into court only because he had been satisfied of the likelihood of the appeal succeeding; for he says at p. 39 of his ruling:

“In view of the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A. in which all, the relevant authorities on the question of assessing damages from date of accident were exhaustively reviewed, it appears on the face of the record that the award was made per incuriam.”

It was, therefore, the special circumstances of the case which made it undesirable that an order for payment into court of damages assessed at ¢46,882.21 should be made, and not the enormity of the judgment debt.

It is also said that the applicant is unable to pay the money ordered to be paid into court because the money is not there. No receipts were produced to satisfy this court that the money had been used to pay professional fees as alleged; and I am not satisfied that the money, or some of it at any rate, is not there. Furthermore, if disbursing or squandering money were a ground upon which stay could be ordered, everyone who takes another’s money would spend it as quickly as possible and when judgment is given against him turn round and say: “You cannot go into execution against me because the money simply is not there.” If stay of execution were to be granted for such a reason, it would open the flood gates for fraud and the havoc that such a rule would cause to banking and commerce in general would be unimaginable.

As in Shardey v. Adamtey; Shardey v. Martey [1972] 2 G.L.R. 380, C.A. the judgment of this court dated 19 October 1978, was based substantially, except for the legal points raised, on unequivocal admissions by the second defendant and the applicant herein. It would, therefore, not be a judicial exercise of this court’s discretion if I were to grant this application for stay. The application for stay of execution is accordingly refused with ¢100 costs to the respondents.

DECISION

Application for stay of execution refused.

S. Y. B. – B.

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