SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1978] SLR (HC) 31High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

OHENE-DJAN vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1979] GLR 213

19 June 1978 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 31
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAOHENE-DJAN v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1979] GLR 213 [1978] SLR (HC) 31
APAOHENE-DJAN v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1979] GLR 213, [1978] SLR (HC) 31 (Ghana).
BluebookOHENE-DJAN v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1979] GLR 213, [1978] SLR (HC) 31 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Heward-Mills v. Barclays Bank D.C.O. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 186.

(2) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

(3) Agbeko v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 408.

(4) Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 40.

(5) R. v. Mensah [1960] G.L.R. 53, C.A.

(6) R. v. Heyes [1951] 1 K.B. 29; [1950] 2 All E.R. 587; 100 L.J. 427; 210 L.T.J. 79; 114 J.P. 451; 94 S.J. 582; 48 L.G.R. 565; 34 Cr.App.R. 161, C.C.A.

(7) R. v. Hancock (1931) 100 L.J.K.B. 419; 145 L.T. 168; 75. S.J. 345; 23 Cr.App.R. 16, C.C.A. (8) Seedi v. Commissioner of Police (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 29.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for a declaration that the plaintiff’s trial for murder and his subsequent conviction and sentence for manslaughter on 11 August 1975 by the High Court, Accra, be set aside as null and void or voidable. The facts are sufficiently stated in the headnote.

COUNSEL

Peter Adjetey and D.O. Lamptey for the plaintiff.

F.E. Creppy, Principal State Attorney, for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

The writ issued by the plaintiff, Dr. Ignatuis Lawrence Ohene-Djan, is endorsed with the following relief:

“The plaintiff’s claim is for: an order of declaration that the plaintiff’s trial for murder and subsequent conviction of manslaughter on 11 August 1975 is a nullity, void or voidable at the instance of the plaintiff as being contrary to law and fair trial; and constitute such legal irregularity which has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice, thus such conviction, sentence and warrant of imprisonment be declared null and void, cancelled and set aside.”

[p.215] of [1979] GLR 213

It was accompanied by a statement of claim in the material parts of which the plaintiff averred as follows:

“(3) That the plaintiff states that on or about 9 May 1975, the plaintiff was arrested at Sunyani by the police and subsequently accused of an offence of murder together with one other person.

(4) The plaintiff states that the then Chief Justice transferred the case from Sunyani to be tried in the Accra High Court.

(5) The plaintiff states that at the trial in the High Court in Accra, the plaintiff was put in charge of a jury of seven men to try and give a true verdict in the case as required by section 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), on 30 July 1975.

(6) That on 6 August 1975, when the prosecution closed their case after tendering a statutory statement made by the plaintiff, the trial High Court judge failed to consider and make a ruling whether the plaintiff had a case to answer as required by section 271 of Act 30.

(7) That on 8 August 1975, after the close of the case for the prosecution, counsel for the plaintiff asked the court to allow the plaintiff to rely on section 239 (2) of Act 30.

(8) The plaintiff states that after the trial judge had had discussions with the Director of Public Prosecutions and defence counsel, and without asking the plaintiff personally to plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter, the judge said: ‘Dr. Ohene-Djan, so you are convicted of manslaughter of an unknown man . . .’ (9) The plaintiff states that at that stage of the trial, the judge had no right in law to allow the plaintiff to rely on section 239 (2) of Act 30.

(10) That again if the judge had such right at all, it was his legal responsibility to take the formal verdict of the jury emplanelled to try the plaintiff before formally convicting the plaintiff.

(11) That failure by the trial judge to take the verdict of the jury occasioned a fundamental miscarriage of justice to the plaintiff.

(12) That the judge also failed to acquit the plaintiff of the charge of murder before convicting the plaintiff of manslaughter, and that such an unorthodox procedure occasioned a fundamental miscarriage of justice to the plaintiff.

(13) That while still facing a charge of murder which carries the death penalty, it was contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act 191), to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter.

(14) The plaintiff states that what the trial judge was competent and permitted to do, if he had any such power after the close of the case for the prosecution to do so, was to acquit the plaintiff of a charge of murder and dismiss the jury, then a charge of manslaughter drawn up for the plaintiff to plead to it, and convict and sentence the plaintiff accordingly. The trial judge failed in his legal duty to do this, and wrongly convicted and sentenced the plaintiff.

[p.216] of [1979] GLR 213

(15) The plaintiff states that such conviction and sentence which fraught (sic) all known norms and practice of legal procedure, make such conviction and sentence a nullity, void or voidable at the instance of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff asks the court to so declare such a conviction and sentence, and set them aside.

(16) The plaintiff states that at no stage of his trial did he personally plead guilty to a charge of either murder or manslaughter, and that it was the plaintiff’s counsel who applied for the plaintiff to avail himself of section 239 (2) of Act 30, and the judge thereafter convicted the plaintiff and sentenced him.

(17) The plaintiff states that he was in no way connected with the alleged murder of the unknown man, and that he was framed up; and that the public was prejudiced against the plaintiff by pre-trial newspaper campaign, which generated a deliberate incitement of the public against the plaintiff and thus made a fair trial in the case impossible.”

Upon being served with the writ and statement of claim, the defendant, acting by the Director of Public Prosecutions, entered appearance under protest and applied to the court to set aside the writ.

The grounds for the application will be found in paragraphs (8), (9), (10) and (11) of the affidavit filed on behalf of the defendant which read:

“(8) I am advised by counsel and I verily believe the same to be true that section 239 (2) of Act 30, was judicially construed, interpreted, and applied by the High Court in the trial of the plaintiff for the crime of murder and his subsequent conviction for manslaughter in August 1975.

(9) I am also advised by counsel and I verily believe the same to be true and that the High Court is functus officio as far as the construction or interpretation and application of section 239 (2) of Act 30 relates or affects the said trial and conviction of the plaintiff.

(10) I am again advised by counsel and I verily believe the same to be true, that the High Court as constituted by one High Court judge has no jurisdiction to entertain an application by the plaintiff herein for a declaration that the trial and conviction of the plaintiff by the High Court as constituted by another High Court judge is a nullity.

(11) In the circumstances I am advised by counsel and I verily believe the same to be true that the application for a declaration is misconceived, the issue of the writ of summons is an abuse of the process of the court, and service of the writ on the defendant is wrong for lact of jurisdiction.”

In the course of the argument, I made it clear to counsel for the defendant that, in my view, the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment which is a nullity, and that for this purpose it is not necessary that the court be constituted by the same judge. The English authorities on this point are many, but I shall confine myself to the local

[p.217] of [1979] GLR 213 scene and cite the cases of Heward-Mills v. Barclays Bank D.C.O. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 186 and Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

In the former case, the plaintiff brought an action in the High Court, Kumasi, to set aside a judgment of the High Court, Secondi, on the ground that the judgment was obtained by fraud. The material facts haivng been admitted by the defendants, Djabanor j. had no difficulty in setting aside the judgment. The latter case was an appeal against the decision of Azu Crabbe J. who had refused to set aside a void writ of possession. In a judgment which was read by Akufo-Addo J.S.C., the Supreme Court said (as stated in the headnote at p. 338).

“(4) Where a judgment or an order is void either because it is given or made without jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule or procedure, the party affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, and the court or a judge is under a legal obligation to set it aside, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected. No judicial discretion arises here. The power of the court or a judge to set aside any such judgment or order is derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside its own void orders and it is irrespective of any expressed power of review vested in the court or a judge; and the constitution of the court is for this purpose immaterial.”

The position here, however, is that the plaintiff’s trial for murder and his conviction and sentence for manslaughter are a criminal cause whereas the present action is a civil cause. There is no doubt in my mind that if the conviction and sentence are a nullity they can be set aside by another judge exercising criminal jurisdiction: see Agbeko v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 408; but whether a judge exercising civil jurisdiction can set aside a criminal conviction and sentence is a point on which I should have liked to be satisfied. Unfortunately the plaintiff, a barrister by profession, has not been able to produce any decided case, and my own researches have failed to unearth any.

It should be observed that if a court having jurisdiction in criminal matters were called upon to make the declaration sought, it would have power either to discharge the prisoner unconditionally: see Commissioner of Police v. Marteifio (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 40; R. v, Mensah [1960] G.L.R. 53, C.A. and R. v. Heyes [1951] 1 K.B. 29, C.C.A. or to order a retrial: see R. v. Hancock (1931) 23 Cr.App.R. 16, C.C.A. Further, if the court should find that there have been irregularities bu that the proceedings are not void, it may dismiss the application: see Seedi v. Commissioner of Police (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 29. I do not see how I can deal with an action commenced by a civil writ of summons as though I were sitting in a court exercising criminal jurisdiction.

I am of the view that the plaintiff ought to pursue his remedies in a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, or, if so advised, by proceedings under the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244). It is, of course, obvious that since the High Court is not an inferior tribunal the remedy of an application for an order of certiorari is not open to the plaintiff.

[p.218] of [1979] GLR 213 To conclude, I agree with the defendant that the plaintiff’s action is an abuse of the process of the court. I therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s action with ¢100 costs in favour of the defendant.

DECISION Action dismissed.

S.Y.B.-B.

Scroll to Top