REPUBLIC vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL; EX PARTE QUAYE MENSAH AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 429
18 July 1979 · CHARLES CRABBE JA · ≈ 29 min read
[1979] SLR (CA) 1Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Okine, In re [1959] G.L.R. 1; affirmed [1960] G.L.R. 84, C.A.
(2) Dumoga, In re [1961] 1 G.L.R. 44.
(3) Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos [1958] 1 W.L.R. 546; [1958] 2 All E.R. 23; 102; S.J. 362; 122 J.P.
362, P.C.
(4) Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206; [1941] 3 All E.R. 338; 110 L.J.K.B. 724; 116 L.T. 1; 58 T.L.R. 35; 85 S.J. 439, H.L.
(5) R. v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260; 86 L.J.K.B. 1119; 116 L.T. 417; 81 J.P. 237; 33 T.L.R. 336; 61 S.J. 443; 25 Cox C.C. 650, H.L.
(6) Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66: 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 214, P.C.
(7) Attorney-General for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd. [1952] A.C. 427; [1952] 1 T.L. R. 1408; 96 S.J. 395, P.C.
(8) Escoigne Properties Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] A.C. 549; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 336;
[1958] 1 All E.R. 406; 102 S.J. 159; [1958] T.R. 37; 37 A.T.C. 41, H.L.
(9) Dundee General Hospitals Board of Management v. Walker [1952] 1 All E.R. 896; [1952] W.N.
180, H.L.
(10) State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte, Braimah [1967] G.L.R. 192, A.C. (full bench).
(11) R. v. Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 Q.B. 243; [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1154; [1962] 3 All E.R. 641; 106 S.J. 736, C.A.
(12) Semayne’s Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91 a; 77 E.R. 194.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a refusal by Andoh J. in the High Court, Ho, on 14 May 1978 to grant an application for habeas corpus. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgement of Charles Crabbe J.A.
COUNSEL
W.A.N. Adumua-Bossman (Nutsugah with him) for the appellants.
Creppy, Principal State Attorney, for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.
This case, civil appeal No. 104/78 began its course in these courts as an application for an order for:
“a writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum to issue directed to the Attorney-General and the Assistant Director, Ghana Prisons Service, Ho, to have the bodies of Quaye Mensah and Davis Kwakye before the High Court, Ho, to undergo and receive all and singular such matters and things as [that] court shall there and then consider concerning [the two persons].”
In the affidavit supporting the application for the writ it is stated:
“That the applicants were variously arrested between 5 to 14 April 1978. That they have since their arrest been kept in prison for reasons which have not been sufficiently disclosed. That presently, the applicants namely Quaye Mensah and Davis Kwakye are being kept at the Ho Prisons. That to the best of my information it is being
[p.432] of [1979] GLR 429 alleged that the applicants are being kept in prison for their own safety. That the lives of the applicants have never been in danger and they have never requested any such protection. That the applicants have not done anything to warrant their being kept in prison . . .”
Leave was granted. There was a supplementary affidavit in the following terms:
“That since the swearing of the [original] affidavit new facts have come to the knowledge of my principal in respect of the first applicant, Quaye Mensah, to which facts I have been authorised to depose in this supplementary affidavit. That the said first applicant was arrested at his house at Alarjo, a suburb of Accra on Wednesday 5 April 1978 at about 7.30 p.m. That the said arrest was effected by one Superintendent Abraham C. Ofei of Tesano Police Station, Accra. That on the arrest of the first applicant herein the said superintendent said that the said applicant was being wanted at the Tesano Police Station for interrogation by a panel of investigators without stating what crime or offence the said applicant had committed. That the first applicant, a blind man and an asthmatic patient, aged 82 years, was therefore without any sympathy taken to the Tesano Police, Station, Accra, for apparently no just cause. That at the said police station the said applicant was detained without any interrogation. That I am informed that he was taken that very night to Achimota Police Station where he passed the night. That on the following day his son, Abdul Jelil Quaye of Accra visited him and discovered that his health had deteriorated and he was in a critical condition. That despite incessant requests, supplications and entreaties for his hospitalisation and treatment he was sent to the Ho Prisons where he has since been kept. That the first applicant’s physical condition is so grave, serious and critical that if he is not released immediately he will most probably lose his life in prison for apparently no offence. That before the arrest of the said applicant the police had gone to the first applicant’s house in search of his son Mohamed Quaye who is now at large. That it is suspected that the first applicant was arrested merely because the police could not find his son for it is difficult to see how the first applicant, a blindman, could have committed any subversive offence . . .”
The Assistant Director of Prisons submitted the following report:
REPORT OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, HO, VOLTA REGION PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 (b) OF THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT, 1964 (ACT 244)
I, ALEXANDER AHENE KOFI NUNOO, Assistant Director of Prisons, Ho, and in charge of the Ghana Prisons Service in the Volta Region of Ghana submit the following report:
[p.433] of [1979] GLR 429
(1) I admit that the applicants are detained in my custody as the Assistant Director of Prisons, Volta Region, at the Ho Prisons.
(2) The first applicant is in detention by virtue of an executive instrument entitled Preventive Custody (No. 5) Order, 1978 (E.I. 38), a photostat copy of which is attached hereto and marked A.
(3) The second applicant has been detained under an executive instrument entitled Preventive Custody (No. 6) Order, 1978 (E.J. 42), a photostat copy of which is attached hereto and marked B.
(4) The said executive instruments are therefore the warrants and legal justification for the detention of the applicants in my custody.”
It was on the basis of these affidavits and upon that report that the application was argued. A ruling in the High Court, Ho, 4 May 1978, unreported was given by Andoh J. refusing and dismissing the application.
The executive instrument, E.I. 38 of 1978 in question, in its relevant part, stated:
“The Supreme Military Council hereby authorises the arrest and detention of the persons whose names are specified in the Schedule to this order, with effect from the 5th day of April, 1978, being persons in respect of whom the Council is satisfied that it is in the interest of national security and in the interest of the safety of such persons so to do.”
In the schedule appears the name Quaye Mensah. The other instrument, E.I. 42 of 1978, is in identical terms. The name David Kwakye appears in the schedule.
The original grounds of appeal stated that:
“(i) The learned judge failed to state whether or not the report filed by the Assistant Director of Prisons, Ho, disclosed any grounds for detention as required by the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244).
(ii) The learned judge misconceived the effect of the arguments presented in favour of Davis Kwakye and fell into abysmal error in relying heavily on the cases of Re Okine [1959] G.L.R. 1 and Re Dumoga [1961] G.L.R. 44 where there were other particulars as to identity.
(iii) The learned judge’s long citation of the dicta of Lord Macmillan was wholly inapplicable to the present case and in fact shows the judge’s misapprehension of the case before him.
(iv) The learned judge wrongly ignored whether the executive instrument was in conformity with the parent Decree, i.e. the Preventive Custody Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 2), and consequently failed to make any ruling as to whether the executive instrument so conformed to the parent Decree.
(v) The learned judge failed to consider the full effect of interpretation of section 2 of Act 244 as far as it relates to the instant application.”
[p.434] of [1979] GLR 429
The additional grounds of appeal were in the following terms:
“(a) The learned High Court judge erred in law in that he failed to appreciate that the appellants by their affidavits were raising a substantial objection that E.I. 38 and E.I. 42 both of 1978 were not made in good faith, and accordingly that a triable issue arose requiring him to open up the detention orders contained in those executive instruments and to hear evidence from the appellants and respondents alike.
(b) Judicial notice ought to be now taken of the ex post facto pronouncement of the Supreme Military Council on 10 July 1978 that for a number of years hitherto, official acts purporting to have been done by the pre-5 July 1978 Supreme Military Council were in fact carried out by the chairman thereof alone as a ‘one-man show.’ Consequently, E.I. 38 and E.I. 42 of 1978 were not the act of the Supreme Military Council but of only one member thereof and therefore ultra vires N.R.C.D. 2 of 1972.”
Before this court on the question of identity, it was argued that, as regards E.I. 42, the trial judge erred. The person detained was not the David Kwakye described in the instrument. The person detained was a Mr. Davis Kwakye. The description given in the executive instrument was David Kwakye. The description given in the instrument was not sufficient to identify the person arrested and detained. No particulars had been given. As such the onus lay on the arresting authority to show that they had arrested the person they wanted to arrest and to detain. The mere difference in the first name did not show that the arresting authority had got the man they wanted.
Therefore, in the view of counsel for the appellants, evidence ought to have been adduced “to show and identify the person to be arrested. What was in the mind of the arresting authority was not known” and there ought to have been evidence. All that the affidavit showed was that the person had been detained. There was nothing more to it. It was legislation, contended by counsel for the appellants, and therefore the description should be accurate—or void. In an ordinary legislation the court could rectify a printing error. He referred to the High Court case of In re Okine [1959] G.L.R. 1, affirmed [1960] G.L.R. 84, C.A.
In that case a description of the abode of the persons concerned had been given. That was sufficient to identify the persons concerned. There was an element of particularity in that case which was lacking in the present case, making the detention, on the basis of the instrument in the present case wrong. In the instant case a particular person described as David Kwakye, without more, was the person wanted. The person arrested was Davis Kwakye: see Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos [1958] 2 All E.R. 23, P.C.
On the original grounds, (iii) and (i), argued together, it was contended that the celebrated ease of Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206, H.L. was not applicable to this case. The question of subjective and objective considerations had been raised in Liversidge v. Anderson. Counsel would persuade the court to accept the arguments in favour of the objective rule rather than of the subjective rule. Counsel argued further
[p.435] of [1979] GLR 429 that in all the leading cases on the matter, R. v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260, H.L.; Liversidge v. Anderson (supra); Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66, P.C.; Attorney-General for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd. [1952] A.C. 427, P.C. the majority view is emphatic in taking into account the circumstances of each case, that is to say, extreme emergency in which the life of the nation was in danger, the external context, the fact of. war. And counsel referred especially to Lord Denning’s statement in Escoigne Properties Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] A.C. 549 at p. 565, H.L that to arrive at the meaning of a statute one should know the circumstances with reference to which the words were used in the statute.
It was essential, counsel argued, that there should be limiting factors to arbitrary power, as for example, the honesty of officials and the circumstances of each particular case. In the instant case, no materials had been shown upon which the arresting authority could have acted and one would distinguish a mere arbitrariness from a genuine exercise of power: Dundee General Hospitals Board of Management v. Walker [1952] 1 All E.R. 896, H.L. The Attorney- General therefore ought to have shown that he had the requisite material and on that material the authority acted. That is to say, that, the Attorney-General—or his representative—should have sworn to an affidavit, or the report, stating that the arresting authority acted on information.
The court has asked that the Attorney-General submit a report. That report should have contained the grounds on which each person had been detained. Moreover, State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte Braimah [1967] G.L.R. 192, C.A. (full bench) had changed the position and all the English cases did not now apply in Ghana. The learned justice had, therefore, misdirected himself.
Counsel then argued that the appellants, both Davis Kwakye and Quaye Mensah, had not told anybody that they were in immediate danger. If none of the persons concerned had asked for protection then it was pertinent that in the report there must be grounds that those persons, in spite of themselves, needed protection. In other words, the government must show cause for the detention. And in the absence of any such explanation, one could conclude that there was bad faith. And if there was bad faith then the detention was void ab initio. Quaye Mensah was a blindman of over 80 years. That was an obvious case of bad faith. It was positive cruelty. [His lordship then dealt with Civil Appeal No. 105/78 with which this report is not concerned and continued:]
Counsel for the respondents argued, on the question of description or mistaken identity, that nowhere in the respective affidavits had that identity been challenged. Indeed the state attorney originally arguing the case had raised the question of identity. But the learned justice did not consider it important to ask for evidence to be taken.
On the question of the sufficiency of the grounds of detention, counsel submitted that what was required was that a report should be submitted. That had been done. The grounds to be submitted were legal grounds: He referred to the Braimah’s case (supra). A distinction should be drawn between “police cases,” that is, those involving investigation and other
[p.436] of [1979] GLR 429 cases. On the issue of bad faith counsel referred to the affidavits and submitted that the statements in the affidavit were not enough, relying on R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte; Soblen [1963] 2 Q.B. 243 at p.281, C.A. Lastly, counsel for the respondents agreed with counsel for the appellants that in respect of the Civil Appeal No. 105/78, the learned justice was wrong on the question of jurisdiction.
It has been said that a name is only a nonsense syllable. That may well be true for logicians. Nonetheless, a name, as applied to human beings, serves to distinguish one particular individual from all other human beings. Where two individuals have the same name some distinction is always drawn. For example the addition of the word “senior” or “junior.” Were that not so wherein lies the necessity to give each individual his or her own name? The issue of description in this case raises quite important questions. Is it enough to describe an individual to be arrested by stating, simpliciter, only his name? Should particulars be given of his address? Should a reference be made as to his vocation? Would it be necessary to mention his parentage? Do the authorities just grab an individual and detain him? Do the security agents not maintain a dossier, the facts of which lead to the arrest and detention of a particular individual?
As In re Okine [1959] G.L.R. 1 clearly demonstrates, these are no mere questions. We live in a country where two brothers, having the same father and mother, may not have the same surname. We have examples of two individuals having the same surname and yet being complete strangers. But, whatever the arguments about these names, an instrument, as in the present case, which authorises the arrest and detention of a named individual or named individuals, is saying, on the face of the instrument, that a certain particular individual is, or certain particular individuals are, to be arrested and detained. In the interest of all concerned a full description of any such individual is thus absolutely essential.
I do not agree with the learned justice at first instance where he contends that the first name Davis or David is a misdescription, and that such a misdescription does not affect identity. How does one identify an individual one does not know? It is by reference to his name! A wants to speak to B, A goes to a particular place in search of B. If A does not know the name of B, he would have to describe B by reference, say, to his height, his manner of dressing or perhaps some physical characteristics by which B can be identified. All these processes can be cut short by simply referring to B by the name which A knows is used normally to describe B. Failure to do so would make A’s attempt a very futile exercise.
The justice’s example by reference to his own name reinforces the point I am making here. The letters he had referred to, each had an address. He may be the only “Andoh” or “Andor” at that address. Where there are other Andors whether with an “h” or an “r” at that address, with the same initials, there can be no doubt that they would be opening each other’s letters. There is need for one individual to be distinguished from the other. What is considered a misdescription may be only a spelling mistake. And once there is the possibility of the identity of a
[p.437] of [1979] GLR 429 particular individual being called in question, it is necessary, it is desirable, it is essential that there should be no doubt as to the identity of the individual concerned. It is not just a question of a variation in spelling. It is a question of identity. More so, when as in this case, we are dealing with individuals who are, if I may say so, at large. More so, where the liberty of the individual is involved.
Let me examine the case of Quaye Mensah. He is alleged to be a blindman. That was not challenged. He is alleged to be of over 80 years of age. That was not challenged. How does a blindman of over 80 years of age, per se, become a security risk if he is at large? And an asthmatic patient at that too! The assertion contained in the supplementary affidavit that the police were after his son, Mohamed Quaye, had never been challenged.
This underlines the necessity to give as full as possible a description and particulars of an individual to be arrested and to be detained. When the police are after an individual they always give particulars of his age, his personal physical characteristics and even the language he is most likely to use, when encountered, by which it could be easy to identify him. The example by the justice would therefore not help us much in this case since the possibility of his august presence being mistaken would, indeed, be remote. Not so with all other individuals. In these cases of arrest and detention, it is absolutely essential that a full and proper description as much as possible is given which does not leave room for doubt—the slightest doubt—that a particular individual is the individual who is wanted to be arrested—and to be detained.
The name Davis Kwakye, in the instant cases, symbolises an individual. That individual has certain attributes and characteristics that go to make him the individual named Davis Kwakye. The name David Kwakye equally denotes or is intended to denote a particular individual whose characteristics, that is to say, his acts, his manners, his whole outlook and activities led to the conclusion, in the opinion of the authorities, that he is a dangerous individual who must not be allowed to be at large in the interest of national security.
To arrest and detain the one in the belief that the other individual is the individual arrested and detained establishes clearly a monstrous error that has been perpetrated and is sought to be perpetuated. There is all the difference in the world between the word “mustard” and the word “custard,” between the word “employer” and the word “employee.” When a trader orders one hundred tonnes of mustard and he is sent one hundred tonnes of custard there is no identity of subject-matter; the parties are not ad idem. It then becomes a question of evidence whether indeed mustard not custard was ordered. The consequences of such a situation are well known in the law of contract.
The point should be emphasised, then, that when an individual is arrested and detained, and he raises the question of identity, the onus is on the person who arrested and detained that individual to show—at this stage I am dealing only with the question of identity—that the individual
[p.438] of [1979] GLR 429 detained is the individual wanted to be detained. It is not incumbent on the individual detained to prove that he is the individual wanted to be detained.
Arrest and detention, for the purposes of the instant cases, are not just a matter of issuing executive instruments. Those who seek the arrest and detention of an individual are acting in the best interests, so they understand it, or so they claim, of the body politic as a whole. Since the appropriate authorities do not lack the necessary legal power to arrest and detain, so, too, the individual to be arrested and detained does not lack the right to challenge his arrest and detention. When he does so challenge and raise the question of identity or mistaken identity, the authorities seeking the arrest and detention are obliged to prove that they have got the man they want.
And the first step in that exercise, when the issue of identity become important, is the sure proof of the identity of the individual wanted. And the authorities arresting and detaining have a bounden duty to furnish the requisite materials which satisfies a court of competent jurisdiction that there can be no doubt that the arresting authorities had got their man. It is not for the individual arrested and detained to prove that he is the individual wanted by the authorities.
Evidence then is required. Evidence adduced by the authorities arresting and detaining. Evidence, clear, cogent and convincing which satisfies the court—not the arresting authorities —that the arresting authorities had got their man.
The authority for the arrest and detention, for the purposes of the instant cases, is section 2 of the Preventive Custody Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 2). That Decree can be described as an enabling statute. It was issued to enable certain persons to be detained which was not previously authorised by law. The relevant part of section 2 empowers the appropriate authorities to:
“. . . authorise the arrest and detention of any other person in respect of whom they are satisfied that it is in the interest of national security or in the interest of the safety of the person so to do . . .”
The use of the word “they” in this section is very important. The section does not say that the council qua council should be satisfied. The section uses the word “they”—”they are satisfied.” What that means is that each member of the council should individually be satisfied—not the council collectively, but each individual member of the council—of the reasons for the arrest and detention. This implies that information which leads to that satisfaction is required to be placed before each member of the Supreme Military Council so that he makes an independent judgment on the matter. Were that not so, the Decree would have used the word “Council” for the word “they” and the enabling power would then read:
“. . . authorise the arrest and detention of any other person in respect of whom the Council is satisfied that it is in the interest of national security or the interest of the safety of the person so to do . . .”
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The word “they” as used in the Decree means, and can only mean, the members, individually, of the Supreme Military Council.
The second consideration is that “the interest of national security” is involved. Information is thus required that the individual arrested and detained had conducted himself in such a manner as to endanger the security of the nation. This should not be a mere allegation. The information required should be such that a reasonable man, in the shoes of a member of the Supreme Military Council, would come to the irresistible conclusion that on the material available there would be the justification for the arrest and detention of the individual concerned.
A third consideration is that the safety of the individual concerned requires that he be arrested and detained. This third consideration is an alternative. The use of the word “or” emphasises that the third consideration is an alternative. The requirements of the second consideration are opposite here.
Looking at the executive instruments in these cases, I find that each of them, E.I. 38 of 1978 and E.I. 42 of 1978 raises two important issues. Firstly, whereas the parent Decree, the enabling Decree, requires the satisfaction of each member of the Supreme Military Council— the “they” was there used—the instruments recite that “the Council is satisfied.” Secondly, whereas the parent Decree uses the word “or,” as regards the reasons for the arrest and detention, the instruments use the word “and.” The word “and” is a co-ordinating conjunction. “Or” is disjunctive. Thus, in the enumeration of duties or powers, the use of either conjunction is permissible. Since “or” is used in the parent Decree, it means that the members of the Supreme Military Council have the power to authorise the arrest and detention using either reason. It means that they could use both. And there should be no quarrel when only one reason is adduced. The exercise of the one power does not obliterate the exercise of the other. It is an alternative condition. To say A, B or C means A or B or C. And thus only one condition, one statutory condition, need be satisfied. To say A, B and C means A and B and C. Three statutory conditions would then have to be satisfied.
Since, on the face of it, without more, the executive instruments concerned recite “the Council is satisfied” I have very serious doubts whether the Supreme Military Council had, in fact, complied with the requirements of the parent Decree. And I would question the validity of each instrument on that basis. But that point was not canvassed before this court; though I appreciate that at first instance the question of good faith bad been raised as well as the validity of the instruments. I would, therefore, not go into the question of whether the Decree is an absolute enactment on a directory enactment or both absolute and directory.
For, be it noted, the distinction between an Act of Parliament—in our present circumstances a Decree—and an instrument made thereunder is that the authority when making the subordinate or delegated legislation is bound by the terms of its delegated or derived authority. And
[p.440] of [1979] GLR 429 a court of competent jurisdiction will, as a general rule, not give effect to any such subordinate legislation—in the instant cases the instruments—unless satisfied that all the conditions precedent to the validity of the instrument had been fulfilled. The validity of such an instrument, as a general rule, can always be questioned.
Perhaps the time has come when we in these courts—if we have not already done so—should declare our inability to respond reasonably respectfully to doctrines and propositions of law which have been outmoded, which have been discredited in the land of their birth. One such, proposition is Liversidge v. Anderson. I say this because the social control which necessitated such decisions is not appropriate in our surroundings here at least, at the moment. And the circumstances of their birth are different from the circumstances which give rise to the cases which come before our courts in respect of which such authorities are invoked. And caution is needed how far we assert that a form of action, that a course of conduct is such as threatens our very existence as a nation. For, after all, that is what national security is all about.
What are the facts of the instant cases? Taking only one example, a man is arrested. He is detained. He questions the arrest and detention. He is met with an interesting answer. The answer is that it is in the interest of national security and in the interest of his own safety that he should be arrested and detained. The man had never sought for an injunction to restrain any other person or persons from molesting or harassing him which was not being obeyed. The man is not a lunatic—at least he has not been so certified. And had he really asked any other person for protection on the ground that his life was in danger? Blind in both eyes, the man is suffering from asthma. He is 82 years old. Does he need protective custody? At best he needs a hospital bed, not a prison cell. Does Liversidge v. Anderson, and the cases that derive their authority from Liversidge v. Anderson really apply under such circumstances ?
How come that a man of over 80 years, completely blind in both eyes, poses such a threat to the existence of the Republic of Ghana that it becomes necessary for him to be arrested and detained? The facts of these cases cry aloud for an inquiry as to the grounds which demanded that such individuals are individuals whose presence at large would make the Republic of Ghana totter to the ground.
The argument that the call for an inquiry would lead to the disclosure of confidential material requires close scrutiny. The provisions of article 124 of the Constitution, 1969, which, I believe, are still good law—provide the machinery for determining whether a certain document—and thus the information contained, therein—should not be disclosed. Whether the information contained should not be disclosed for the purposes of legal proceedings, is now a matter for this court to determine.
The effect of those provisions is that the call could be made for the production of the document. When a legitimate call is made the court
[p.441] of [1979] GLR 429 at first instance cannot now say that the call would lead to the disclosure of information which ought not to be disclosed. The authorities concerned have the right to refuse to produce the document. And the court should not, I had almost said dare not—knowing not what the document would say but presuming that the document is of a confidential nature—deny the call for the submission of the information required.
The practice under the famous regulation 18B which gave rise to Liversidge v. Anderson was that the person arrested was served, at the time of his arrest, with a statement, albeit a brief statement in general terms, of the grounds of his detention. Particulars were not supplied to him and in general he would not know the weight of the facts against him. Before the advisory committee, which was set up to go into the question of his detention, he was not represented by counsel. He was not allowed to be so represented. Evidence was not taken on oath and the procedure was informal. Questions were asked and answers supplied by the individual detained. And his complaints and objections were entertained. The available material against him including the secret dossiers were placed before the advisory committee though the individual detained was not allowed to see them. The committee did its best under those circumstances. A strictly confidential report was then made to the Home Secretary. Careful consideration was given to the case of each individual detained. In some cases—where the evidence was not satisfactory as recommended by the advisory committee—the orders for detention were suspended and releases were ordered. This machinery, a necessary adjunct to the operations of regulation 18B—even in war-time England—has been lacking in this country. And the only authority to deal with the matter, in the absence of an advisory body provided for by the Decree in question or even if administratively set up, is the courts in this country when an arrest and detention are challenged.
The matter for consideration now is whether the return, that is to say the report, discloses a sufficient answer. In other words, does the report contain material that justifies the arrest and the detention? In my view the report does not.
I would not accept the contention that the mere recital of the issue of an executive instrument is all that is required. I find it difficult to accept the proposition that the most important fundamental human rights of the individual, the right to life, the right to personal liberty, could, in this country, hang on the mere flutter of an executive instrument. To arrest and detain an individual is to restrict his freedom of movement which is, to me, the essence of personal liberty.
To deny a man his right to liberty is to deny a natural right. To deny a natural right is to invade the rights and liberties of man. I do not think that the government of the day had ever claimed that a citizen of this country has no rights save those that the government grants him. That absolute power had never been assorted by any government of this land, now called Ghana.
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If then an authority takes it upon itself to arrest and detain an individual for the safety of that individual, then, it is the duty of these courts to question the fundamental basis of that claim. More so, where the individual detained states categorically that he does not need the protection offered—a protection which does violence to his liberty. The statements contained in the affidavits were not challenged. The court was therefore bound to accept those statements as the facts of the matter as and to act on those facts. Acts regarding the security of the nation may be very, very tangible things indeed. In the absence of oral evidence, a judge is bound by the statement of facts contained, uncontroverted, in an affidavit.
The record of the proceedings shows that on 25 April 1978, it was agreed that “the person in whose custody the prisoners [were should] submit a report in conformity with section 2 (b) of Act 244.” Section 2 (b) of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), requires the person in whose custody is a person detained “to submit a report in writing stating the grounds of the detention.” This is statute law. And where Parliament expressly provides for a matter, the law as laid down by Parliament ousts the operation of the common law. The principle would apply even where the Act of Parliament is but a codification of the common law. The law as laid down by Parliament prevails.
What then does the word “grounds” mean within the context of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964? It means the foundation, the base, the motive that led the appropriate authority to cause the arrest and detention of the individual detained. The instruments, on the face of each of them, seek to recite no more than the words of the parent Decree. And the report seeks no more than to recite the existence of the executive instruments.
What section 2 (b) of the Act requires is that the report shall embody the circumstances of the arrest and detention, the particulars of the facts, in fine, all the available information which would make an individual detained know the case which he has to meet, and thereby prepare to meet that case. Not only that. The particulars and information are needed by the court so that, in the words of subsection (1) of section 4 of the Act, the person in whose custody a person is detained is given “an opportunity of justifying the detention.” And I appreciate fully well the importance of the word “enquire” as used in section 2 of the Act.
The report submitted to the court of first instance falls far short, in my view, of the requirements of section 2 (b) of the Act. Under the circumstances and as already demonstrated, the appellants succeed. I allow the appeal. I hereby declare unlawful the arrest and detention of the appellants.
Quaye Mensah’s house was to him as his castle and fortress as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose: Semayne’s case (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91 a. Why deny him the essentials of the orderly
[p.443] of [1979] GLR 429 pursuit of happiness as a free man? Why break the sanctity of his home and deny him the normal comforts which are a necessity to him for human existence even as an animal? And when he complains to meet him with the bare assertion that some authority—nay the government of the day—is satisfied that for his own safety he should be detained? It is not only injustice. It is man’s inhumanity to man to subject a blind, asthmatic man of 82 years, marching towards the end of his earthly existence, to such a monstrous treatment. Quaye Mensah’s arrest and detention was an injury to him. It was an injury which despoils the society of Ghana—justitia fiat . . . [His lordship further referred to civil appeal No. 105/78 and continued:]
I cannot, in concluding this judgment, fail to draw attention, once again, to the appeal to all of us, thus contained in State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte Braimah (supra) at p. 200:
“The courts in Ghana have a duty to safeguard the liberty of the citizen and in any matter affecting that liberty the actions of the executive and its officers are subject to the supervision and control of the courts on habeas corpus (see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. II. p. 25).”
JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.
I would also allow the appeal.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Arrest and detention declared unlawful.
S. Y. B. -B.
