AIKINS vs. AIKINS [1979] GLR 223
22 June 1979 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 19 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) L. (infants), Re [1962] 1 W.L.R. 886; [1962] 3 All E.R. 1; 106 S.J. 686, C.A.
(2) Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966; [1969] 2 All E.R. 385; 113 S.J. 344, H.L. (3) Bishop (Decd.), In re; National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Bishop [1965] Ch. 450; [1965] 2 W.L.R.
188; [1965] 1 All E.R. 249; 109 S.J.107.
(4) Jones v. Maynard [1951] Ch. 572; [1951] 1 All E.R. 802; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 700. (5) Gray v. Gray [1971] 1 G.L.R. 422.
(6) Crabbe v. Crabbe [1971] 2 G.L.R. 164.
(7) Ashong v. Ashong [1967] G.L.R. 135, C.A.
(8) Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] Fam. 72; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 366; [1967] 1 All E.R. 829; 117 S.J. 124, C.A.
(9) Davis v. Davis [1967] P. 185; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 1157; [1967] 1 All E.R. 123; 110 S.J. 830, C.A. (10) Hakluytt v. Hakluytt [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1145; [1968] 2 All E.R. 868; 112 S.J. 480, C.A. [p.226] of [1979] GLR 223-233 (11) von Mehren v. von Mehren [1970] 1 W.L.R. 56; [1970] 1 All E.R. 153; 113 S.J. 873, C.A. (12) N. v. N. (1928) 44 T.L.R. 324.
(13) Schlesinger v. Schlesinger [1960] P. 191; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 83; [1960] 1 All E.R. 721; 104 S.J. 509. (14) Bentsi-Enchill v. Bentsi-Enchill [1976] 2 G.L.R. 303.
(15) Kershaw v. Kershaw [1966] P. 13; [1964] 3 W.L.R. 1143; [1964] 3 All E.R. 653; 128 J.P. 589; 108 S.J. 640, D.C.
(16) Klucinski v. Klucinski [1953] 1 W.L.R. 522; [1953] 1 All E.R. 683, 117 J.P. 187; 97 S.J. 192, D.C. (17) Ette v. Ette [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1433; [1965] 1 All E.R. 341; 108 S.J. 181.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PETITION by a husband and a cross-petition by the wife on the grounds that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation. Both parties prayed for custody of the infant children and the wife also claimed for lump sum payment. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Gaisie for the petitioner.
Boateng for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.
The parties having lived under customary law marriage from December 1964, contracted on 18 April 1970 a second marriage under English law whilst the husband was a student in London. There are three children of the marriage: Joseph aged thirteen years, Peter aged eleven and Derrick seven years old. Husband and wife lived happily whilst in London; the wife working to support the husband who as a student, took up a part-time job to supplement their income. They had a joint banking account into which they paid all their earnings, the wife providing a greater proportion. The account was operated by the husband alone who only gave his wife sufficient money for her transport to and from work. The husband did all purchases for the household. Subsequently, the husband qualified as an engineer and he returned to Ghana with his family.
He was employed by A. Lang Ltd. and was very often out on trek. Things then began to fall apart. His family saw him only on week-ends. His visits became few and far between and subsequently, were once a month, even though the family lived in Cape Coast and he worked in Takoradi a distance of about 43 miles. When he did visit, it was only for about 48 hours each time. When the family moved to join him in Takoradi he was transferred to Cape Coast. Later the husband purchased a house subject to a mortgage at No. 3 South Kweikuma Estates, Sekondi, where he and his family have lived ever since. Again the husband was most of the time away.
An atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion developed which hung between husband and wife; a situation which eventually poisoned the relationship between them resulting in the husband refusing to have sexual intercourse with the wife and the wife refusing to cook for him. Since 1973
[p.227] of [1979] GLR 223-233 therefore even though the parties lived under one roof they have not lived as man and wife. The husband committed adultery with a woman with whom he had a child, and whom the husband intends to marry. The relationship degenerated to the extent that the husband threatened to kill his wife in December 1974 and after attempts at reconciliation had failed, the husband filed a petition alleging that his wife had behaved in such a way that he could not reasonably be expected to live with her. He prayed that the marriage be dissolved and that he be granted custody of the three children.
By her answer dated 9 October 1975, the wife denied all the allegations of infidelity against her. Her answer was amended later to add charges of adultery and a prayer for dissolution. She asked for custody of the children and asked the court to settle property rights between her and her husband.
On the whole, I think the wife is substantially a truthful witness. The husband behaved in such a way that she could not be expected to live with him. I will accept her evidence and grant her prayer. I hold therefore that the marriage between her and her husband has broken down beyond reconciliation. The said marriage is accordingly dissolved.
As the parties could not agree on the financial consequences and adjustments of property rights, these have to be settled by the court. But I shall first deal with custody of the three children of the marriage. The court’s duty with regard to the custody of the children of the family is to make an order which is reasonable and for the benefit of the children. But as Lord Denning M.R. said in Re L. (infants) [1962] 3 All E.R. 1 at P. 4, C.A. “Whilst the welfare of the children is the first and paramount consideration, the claims of justice cannot be overlooked.” Therefore in deciding what is in the best interest of the children, the conduct of the parents and in this case the pattern of life set up by them during cohabitation are some of the most important matters to be taken into consideration.
It seems the beginning of the end of this marriage was the wife’s uninvited visit to her husband at Tarkwa when he was on trek with another woman who subsequently bore him a child. The husband’s immediate reaction was to order his wife out of their common bedroom and to share a room with the children. Since then they have not lived as man and wife. The indications are that the husband will marry this other woman who probably may not be a better parent substitute for the children. It is no fault of the husband that he should very often be out of home as the nature of his work so demands. His family saw him only on week-ends, sometimes only once a month, leaving the children in the care of their mother. I do not believe that his present job which is not different from earlier ones will bring him home. He will certainly not have time for the children.
He says that if granted custody he would invite the sister to stay in the matrimonial home and to look after the children. He did not, however, deny that the sister herself very often travelled to Accra to stay in the house of her only daughter whenever she travelled abroad. That apart, Mrs. Aikins entertained fears as to the welfare of her children
[p.228] of [1979] GLR 223-233 because her husband’s sister does not talk to her. I do not think I should give custody to a parent whose purpose is to deliver the children to another. The wife has been staying with the children throughout their lives from Aboom Wells Road, Cape Coast, when the family returned from London finally to the matrimonial home, No.3 Kweikuma Estates, Sekondi. She has been supervising their school attendance, cooking for them and generally caring for them. The children are no doubt attached more to their mother than to any other person.
To deprive them of the love and attention of their mother would upset them emotionally. Taking into account all the facts and weighing all the circumstances, my view is that the wishes of an unimpeachable parent should stand high. I will grant custody of the three children Joseph, Peter and Derrick to the wife, who in my view, would be a more stable and reliable parent to them. The wife has indicated that her immediate concern is the welfare of her children who at the moment are very young. She concedes that a son’s proper place is near his father and would therefore like them to see their father very often and in particular they could go to him when they are old enough to look after themselves. He may visit them every week-end especially when he is in Takoradi and not travelling.
While they were in London husband and wife maintained a joint bank account to which they both contributed in unequal amounts, the wife paying the greater proportion. Prima facie, all moneys paid into the account must be treated as belonging to them jointly, so that each spouse could draw on the account not only for their joint benefit but also for his or her own personal benefit: see Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777, H.L. If one spouse draws on the account to purchase a chattel in their joint names, the property is prima facie joint property. If, however, one spouse draws on the account to purchase property for his or her own benefit or in his or her own name, to make an investment prima facie, that property or investment belongs to the person in whose name it is purchased or invested. In that case as was said by Stamp. J. In re Bishop (Decd.); National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Bishop [1965] Ch. 450 at p. 456:
“What is purchased is not to be regarded as purchased out of a fund belonging to the spouses in the proportions in which they contribute to the account or in equal proportions, but out of a pool or fund of which they were, at law and in equity, joint tenants.”
When the marriage breaks down or is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, the need to determine the ownership of the property purchased with money drawn from the account or the ownership of the balance remaining in the account may arise. After the death of one spouse, the survivor will be entitled to the balance of the account. After breakdown of the marriage the balance in the account belongs to the spouses in equal shares. The evidence may show a contrary intention as in Jones v. Maynard [1951] Ch. 572, where it was held that after divorce, the husband held the investments he had purchased with money from the joint account as trustee for the wife as to one half thereof. In the instant case the joint
[p.229] of [1979] GLR 223-233 account was operated by the husband alone even though the wife paid all her wages and earnings from other sources such as sale of wigs and textiles into it.
He allowed her enough for transport and pocket money while at work. The husband who was then a student took up a part-time job and was therefore contributing far less than what his wife put in. The intention of the parties throughout was to save money to furnish a house on their return to Ghana. Out of the savings the couple purchased a Hillman car, the husband borrowing ¢400 from his employers to make up the purchase price of ¢1,000. They brought it to Ghana, used it for the household and sold it second-hand. The car belonged to them in equal shares. On sale, the wife will be entitled to one-half of the selling price. The husband does not quarrel with the destination of household goods which they bought out of the joint account and which the wife will therefore be entitled to. (I shall list them later.)
The wife also claimed a lump sum payment. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), s. 20 provides that:
“20. (1) The court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party such sum of money or convey to the other party such movable or immovable property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provision as the court thinks just and equitable.
(2) Payments and conveyances under this section may be ordered to be made in gross or by instalments.”
It is accepted that this section does not specifically mention lump sum payment. But I do not think that is necessary because the section gives the court the widest possible discretion with respect to financial provisions and property settlements. It must be emphasized that the Matrimonial causes Act, 1971, is a reforming statute and as such, except where the intention is clear, it does not seek to do away with the law and practice relating to matrimonial proceedings existing before it came into force. It seems to me that one of its aims is to secure that the commonsense principles embodied in the Act founded upon long standing judicial decisions, in appropriate circumstances, should continue to be applied. Before the commencement of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which repealed the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84), any law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes which happened to be in force in England at any given moment had automatic application to Ghana: see Gray v. Gray [1971] 1 G.L.R. 422 and Crabbe v. Crabbe [1971] 2 G.L.R. 164 which applied Ashong v. Ashong [1967] 2 G.L.R. 135 C.A.
The power to order a lump sum payment was introduced in England by section 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963 (c.45). Before 1971, notable among various statutes relating to matrimonial causes was the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 (c. 72), s.16 (1) which specifically made provision for lump sum payment. It also set out circumstances under which the power could be exercised by the courts. The Matrimonial
[p.230] of [1979] GLR 223-233
Proceedings and Property Act, 1970 (c. 45), put into statutory form the practice of the courts.
Until the decision in Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 829, C.A. the courts had adopted, a restrictive view with regard to lump sum payment. Thus in Davis v. Davis [1967] 1 All E.R. 123, C.A. the first reported case in which lump sum payment was considered, Willmer L.J. said at p. 126 that:
“As a practical matter, it is clear that an order for a lump sum payment can only properly be made against a husband possessed of sufficient capital assets to justify it. It is not to be expected, therefore, that the question is likely to arise except in relatively rare cases.”
The husband in that case was chairman of a large group of companies and a director of a number of others, and had capital of not less than ¢400,000 and an income of ¢27,000 to ¢40,000 a year. The matrimonial home was a substantial estate in Kent. In Hakluytt v. Hakluytt [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1145, C.A. there was a reluctance to order a lump sum in the absence of some exceptional features. The court here ordered a lump sum of ¢500 to enable the wife to repair her house, the special feature being that the husband had commuted a large portion of his pension for a capital sum. Again in von Mehren v. von Mehren [1970] 1 All E.R. 153, C.A. the court applied the “relatively rare” principle (referred to by Willmer L.J. in Davis v. Davis (supra) at p. 126) where the husband had only a modest sum of ¢8,000 invested. His total income was ¢2,200 a year. Husband and wife had contributed to buy a house in the Isle of Wight which served as a house for the wife and children and could also be let out as a guest-house. The judge ordered a lump sum of ¢4,000 by way of secured provision. In confirming the order, the Court of Appeal per Karminski L.J. said at pp. 156-157:
“In this case, the figure is, roughly speaking, ¢8,000 capital. Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I think it comes within the category of what Willmer L.J. described as ‘relatively rare.’ It has the great advantage here, from the wife’s point of view, of giving her a settled and secure home. It has the same advantage for the children of this marriage.”
However, after 1970, in applying section 2 of the British Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, the courts adopted a new approach to the financial problems of family on divorce and by 1973 it had become clear that the lump sum payment was an important method of effecting re-allocation of assets on dissolution of marriage. Thus in Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 829 Lord Denning M. R. said at p. 840 that in every case the court had to consider whether to order a husband to pay a lump sum to his wife and that:
“The circumstances are so various that few general principles can be stated. One thing is, however, obvious.
No order should be made for a lump sum unless the husband has capital assets out of which to pay it – without crippling his earning power.”
[p.231] of [1979] GLR 223-233
Therefore where the husband has capital assets sufficient for the purpose, the court should not hesitate to order a lump sum for it has the advantage of enabling the payee to invest it and use the income to live on. This will reduce any periodical payments or render them unnecessary. In some cases it will enable the wife to meet any liabilities as expenses already reasonably incurred in maintaining herself or any child of the marriage. It will also help to remove the bitterness which is ever so often associated with periodical payments. “Once made, the parties can regard the book as closed” per Lord Denning M. R. in Wachtel v. Wachtel (supra) at p.840. Such a sum when granted is not affected by subsequent re-marriage and it is not reduced because a wife is likely to re-marry. But it is not without its drawbacks from the point of view of the recipient. For example it is an order made once and for all and cannot be varied when circumstances change. The payee cannot go back to the court and ask for more.
In considering the amount to be paid by way of lump sum the court must look at the realities and to take into account the standard of living to which the wife was accustomed during the marriage. She should be awarded such lump sum as will provide her with a standard of living commensurate with that to which she has been accustomed: see dictum of Lord Merrivale P. in N. v. N. (1928) 44 T.L.R. 324 cited and followed in Schlesinger v. Schlesinger [1960] P. 191 at p. 197. The wife in the instant case is 33 years old. She has no capital assets of her own. Apart from the period in United Kingdom when she worked to support her husband she has never been engaged in any gainful occupation. At the request of her husband she had cut short a course she was taking. She intended doing further studies when she arrived in the United Kingdom but the husband prevented her adding that he would not want his wife to work on their return to Ghana.
Apart from her ability to sew her own dresses and those of friends she has no trade or occupation to follow but says if given the opportunity she would improve upon her sewing and set herself up as a dressmaker. Among other things she wishes to purchase a flat, and this, in my view, is not asking for too much considering that she will have custody of the children. It is essential that she should have a home. In these days the difficulty of finding accommodation even to rent and the cost of such accommodation if it can be found is so great that it is essential to make provision for some capital to be made available to the wife, who will be leaving the matrimonial home in which she has no interest whatsoever and to which she has not laid any claim: see Bentsi-Enchill v. Bentsi-Enchill [1976] 2 G.L.R. 303. This will have the great advantage of giving the wife and the children a settled and secure home. It will also be in keeping with the husband’s obligation to maintain the wife on a scale appropriate to his status and to compensate her for the loss of the benefit which have accrued to her from living with her husband.
Expenses of setting up a home do not stop at the purchase of a property. It will probably require decoration and, will certainly require furnishing. I would be closing my eyes to reality if I fail to recognise that setting up a new home is bound to be an expensive adventure. Since the couple
[p.232] of [1979] GLR 223-233 returned to Ghana, the wife has always been a housewife looking after the husband and rearing the family. If she had been permitted to complete her education and allowed to work her financial position would be different. As against that background, is her present style of living. She has played the part of the wife of a properous business engineer and a business executive. Her standard and style of life should not suffer by reason of the dissolution of the marriage. Perhaps her standard of living may be slightly lower than it was before the break-up of cohabitation but in general she should not be relegated to a lower standard of living than that which her husband enjoys: see Kershaw v. Kershaw [1966] p. 13, D.C. She is used to living in a whole house with the children. She said the petitioner looked after her very well and that she could not complain.
The husband’s ability to pay is not merely to have physical cash but it has been interpreted to mean ability to provide money by way of overdraft or loan: see Klucinski v. Klucinski [1953] 1 All E.R. 683, D.C. and in the absence of full and frank information by the husband as to his financial position, the court is entitled to draw inferences adverse to the husband as to his capacity: see Ette v. Ette [1965] 1 All E.R. 341.
The husband who by 1975 was an engineer was earning ¢7,200 per annum when he was working with Messrs A. Lang Ltd., a firm of building and road contractors. He left A. Lang and together with some of his colleagues who also left A. Lang, floated a new company of building contractors called Harrods Construction Ltd. of which he was one of the directors, earning ¢1,200 a month after deductions. Some time in 1977 the husband left Harrods Construction Ltd. and on 1 July 1977 floated his own company, Jackenko Ltd., also engaged in building and road construction. The company also makes and sells cement blocks. In 1974 he bought a State Housing Corporation house then valued at ¢17,500. Having regard to the present rate of inflation this building is now worth three times that amount. He made extensions to this costing ¢10,000 in 1974 and part of the house now yields a rent income of ¢230 a month.
He says the building is subject to a mortgage the instalments on which he is still paying. When he was leaving Harrods Construction Ltd., he had a golden “hand shake” of ¢10,000 and he had paid to him the sum of ¢10,000 representing his shares in Harrods Construction Ltd. It was not easy to get facts relating to his income from the husband himself, the very scanty evidence having come from the wife and her witnesses. In all the circumstances I think the husband is in a position to command a substantial income and has the ability to make a lump sum payment to the wife. I am aware that such a sum should not be excessive and should not be such as would cripple him. I am not taking into account the conduct of either the husband or the wife. My main consideration at this juncture is to look at the realities and try to re-allocate the family assets. I will accordingly order the husband to pay to the wife the sum of ¢15,000 by way of a lump sum.
Finally, I hold that the marriage between the petitioner, Joseph Acquah Aikins, and the respondent, Dinah Aikins, celebrated at the Methodist Church, No. 4 Quex Road, London, N.W. 6 on 18 April 1970 has broken down beyond reconciliation and the said marriage is hereby dissolved. I make the following orders:
(a) I grant custody of the three children Joseph, Peter and Derrick to the wife with reasonable access to the husband. Until further Order, he may visit them every week-end or whenever he is in Takoradi; (b) The petitioner shall continue to pay the school fees of the three children;
(c) The petitioner shall pay to the respondent the sum of ¢300 a month towards the upkeep and maintenance of the said children. Payment should be made on or before the 27th day of every month commencing July 1978;
(d) the petitioner shall pay to the respondent the sum of ¢15,000 by way of lump sum; (e) the respondent will vacate the matrimonial home by 31 October 1978;
(f) the respondent is entitled to and shall have (i) the wall clock (ii) assorted cooking utensils (iii) electric cooker (iv) radiogram (v) refrigerator (vi) transistor radio (vii) the equivalent in cedis of £53 representing her rebate whilst leaving the United Kingdom;
(viii) three arm chairs, three coffee tables and one centre table;
(g) the petitioner shall bear the cost of these proceedings assessed at ¢600.
DECISION Divorce granted.
Custody in favour of respondent wife.
Lump sum payment, of ¢15,000 ordered.
S.Y.B.-B.
