BENTIL vs. BENTIL [1980] GLR 285
9 May 1979 · WUAKU J · ≈ 18 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 21Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Coleman v. Shang [1959] G.L.R. 390, C.A.; affirmed [1961] G.L.R. 145; [1961] A.C. 481; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 562; 105 S.J. 253; 2 All E.R. 406, P.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
ACTION by the plaintiff for a declaration that he was a legitimate son of a deceased intestate. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
J. B. Hammond for the plaintiff.
A. H. Sackeyfio for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF WUAKU J.
Joseph Benjamin Bentil died intestate on 6 January 1971. Joint letters of administration was granted to the first plaintiff witness, the deceased’s sister, Mrs. Elizabeth Abban and the defendant, the deceased’s widow, Mrs. Agnes Bentil. The defendant, Mrs. Agnes Bentil, was married to the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil on 19 April 1949 under the Marriage ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.). The defendant demanded that the deceased’s properties be divided into two moieties, one for herself and the other for the deceased’s family.
The other administratrix, the first plaintiff witness, made it known to the defendant that the deceased left behind a son surviving him. This was denied by the defendant who asserted that the plaintiff is not the son of her husband. The defendant’s denial of the paternity of the plaintiff has resulted in this action.
By the indorsements on his writ of summons, the plaintiff claims:
“1. Declaration that he is the lawful child of Joseph Benjamin Bentil (deceased) and that he is entitled to four-ninth share of the said intestate Joseph Benjamin’s estate.
2. An order for account of rents collected from house No. 5A/28, situate at Essikado, Sekondi, since 6
January 1971 up to date and payment to the plaintiff of his legitimate portion thereof.”
The plaintiff’s story as told by himself and by his first four witnesses is that the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil in or around 1938 was staying at Kumasi with his mother and sisters. The fourth plaintiff witness was also staying in the same area and along the same lane as the Bentils. One Agnes Kusi was also staying along the same lane but closer to the Bentil’s and were separated by a distance of about two yards. A friendship developed between the late Joseph Benjamin and Agnes Kusi; and this was followed by a customary marriage. The said Agnes Kusi gave birth to the plaintiff on 19 September 1939. The plaintiff asserts that his birth was the result of the customary marriage between Agnes Kusi and the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil.
About the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the late Bentil appeared to have become embarrassed by lack of money, and therefore he and Agnes Kusi lived apart. Agnes Kusi lived at her hometown at Sunyani with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was maintained by his uncle by name Nana Owusu Ansah who sent the plaintiff to school with the surname of Owusu. Agnes Kusi died in 1951, before then she and the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil had separated.
[p.287] of [1980] GLR 285
In the meantime the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil got married to another Agnes, this time, the defendant under the Marriage Ordinance on 19 April 1949. The only issue out of this wedlock died within one week after birth.
Between 1948 and 1954, the plaintiff attended school at Sunyani as the ward of Nana Owusu Ansah, his uncle, who paid his fees. After the death of Agnes Kusi, the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil and the defendant paid a visit to Sunyani, and his father claimed him as his son. In 1955 the plaintiff joined his father and his stepmother at Sekondi. The plaintiff was sent to the Methodist Senior School at Ketan, Sekondi, to complete his middle school education. The plaintiff says that he entered school the school with the name Alexander Owusu, but before he sat for the standard seven school leaving examination his father, the deceased, had his, the plaintiff’s name changed to Alexander Bentil.
The plaintiff has since been known and called Alexander Bentil. The late Joseph Benjamin Bentil paid his school fees at the Methodist School and other subsequent schools that the plaintiff attended. The plaintiff had lived with his father and his step-mother ever since until the father’s death on 6 January 1971. The plaintiff still lives in the said house.
The defendant tells a different story. Her story is that she got married to the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil at Apam on 19 April 1949. In December 1955, her husband, the deceased, returned from his man left, leaving the plaintiff behind. Her husband told her that the man had brought the plaintiff to stay with them and to attend school, that the plaintiff was in standard seven. In January 1956, her late husband wrote down the plaintiff’s name as Alexander Owusu and the defendant was asked by the husband to go and enroll the plaintiff at the Methodist Senior School at Ketan, Sekondi. The defendant got the plaintiff enrolled as requested by her husband.
The plaintiff failed the standard seven examination. However, in 1958, she noticed that the plaintiff was attending the Fijai Secondary School. The plaintiff continued to stay with the defendant and her husband until the husband died on 6 January 1971 and is still living in the house.
The defendant denies that she ever went to Sunyani with her late husband. She also denies that the plaintiff is the son of her husband. She stated that the plaintiff was never introduced to her as her husband’s son. She had known the plaintiff called as Alexander Owusu until after the death of her husband and up to the time of the distribution of her husband’s properties.
The plaintiff called five witnesses. They all supported him in his claim. The defendant called no witnesses. The first and second
[p.288] of [1980] GLR 285 witnesses for the plaintiff are the deceased’s own sisters. It was the first plaintiff witness who asked for the hand of the defendant for her deceased brother. The fifth plaintiff witness was the plaintiff’s classmate at Fijai Secondary School in 1958 and said that the plaintiff was known at the school as Alexander Bentil and that the plaintiff left the school in 1959.
For the defence, it was urged that for the plaintiff to succeed upon his claim as the son of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil, the plaintiff must prove and satisfy the court that when he was born there was a naming ceremony by his father and that the father gave the plaintiff a name which is known to the family. It was also contended on behalf of the defendant that if the plaintiff is the son of the late Bentil, there must be evidence of his baptism. And finally there must be proof that “nkasa” was on the death of the late Bentil sent to the plaintiff’s family informing them of the death and above all according to custom the plaintiff had to provide a coffin and burial clothes for the burial of the late Bentil.
The above contentions were all made additional issues by the defendant and were agreed upon by both counsel at the hearing of summons for directions. Mr. Sackeyfio argued vehemently that if the plaintiff failed to resolve the additional issues in his favour, then his claim must fail and the action dismissed. He submitted that the plaintiff has failed to resolve the said issues in his favour.
The issues filed by the defendant were:
(a) Whether or not when the plaintiff was born there was a naming ceremony organized by Bentil (deceased).
(b) If so what was the name given by the alleged late father?
(c) If there is such a name is it known in the house of the late Bentil at Sekondi?
(d) Whether plaintiff is baptized and if so in what church, and with what name?
(e) Was any customary drink given to the family when Bentil died, and if so to whom was the drink given?
(f) Whether plaintiff provided coffin for his alleged father when he died as demanded by custom.
I must say without delving into the evidence that the plaintiff failed woefully to resolve issues (a), (b), (c) and (d) in his favour. No evidence whatsoever was led by the plaintiff to resolve these issues in his favour. I will now consider issues (e) and (f). With regard to these issues, some evidence was led by the plaintiff and hotly contested by the defendant. There is evidence that the plaintiff’s family was informed about the death of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil, and in consequence whereof the third plaintiff witness and his
[p.289] of [1980] GLR 285 sister attended the funeral of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil.
The third plaintiff witness said that they were informed and first went to Sekondi where they were directed to Afrensie Ajumako, the deceased’s hometown. Evidence was led to show that it is the deceased’s family that had to inform the plaintiff’s family about the death of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil, and not the defendant. The first and second witnesses for the plaintiff are from the deceased’s family and they said that that was done. The defendant’s answer was that she did not know that was done and never saw any member from the plaintiff’s family at the funeral. Weighing the plaintiff’s evidence against that of the defendant, I am persuaded to accept the plaintiff’s version and do accept the fact that the plaintiff’s family was customarily informed about the death of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil, and that the third plaintiff witness and his sister attended the funeral of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil.
The evidence in support of issue (f) is one of confession and avoidance. The plaintiff said that he did not provide the coffin and burial clothes. His reasons were that on the death of his father, the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil, he approached his stepmother, the defendant, as to what they were to do about the burial. The defendant assured him that she would do everything and later submit a bill after the funeral and that when the expenses were ascertained, it would be shared equally between him and the defendant. Again this was denied by the defendant.
The first and second witnesses for the plaintiff gave evidence in support of the plaintiff that there was such an arrangement but it is only now that the defendant is trying to retract from it. The first and second witnesses for the plaintiff gave evidence to show that it is customary to allow the mother, in this case the defendant, to be responsible for providing the coffin and the burial clothes and later submit a bill and the expenses shared between the widow and the deceased’s children. The third plaintiff witness said that when he attended the funeral he was informed about the said arrangements. I can very well imagine such arrangement being made or agreed upon, especially where the children are minors or are incapable of offering immediate financial assistance.
I do not see anything wrong with such an arrangement. The evidence shows that up to December 1975, when the plaintiff sat for the West African Examinations Council General Certificate of Education, the plaintiff had been following series of courses of studies and taking various examinations: see exhibit D. Under the circumstances the defendant was in a better position to buy the coffin and burial clothes and later submit her bills to the plaintiff. On the totality of the evidence, I accept the plaintiff’s story that there was such an arrangement and that the plaintiff did not fail
[p.290] of [1980] GLR 285 or refuse to provide coffin and burial clothes for the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil.
Mr. Sackeyfio quotes from Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.), p. 54 in support of his argument that when a child is born, the father must perform the naming ceremony to signify that he is the father of the child: “A child receives its name from its father or the head of the father’s family, eight days after its birth, and every child bears as its first name the day of the week on which it is born.” He quoted from the same work and from the same page to support his argument that “Children bear the cost of the coffin and burial clothes of their father.” Mr. Justice Ollennu deals more eloquently on the naming ceremony than Sarbah in his book The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana (1966), Chap. 28, p. 205. And here I quote from pp. 206-207:
“The naming of the child by the father, even without marriage to its mother, is legal acknowledgment by the father of the paternity of the child; that ceremony identifies the child with the father and his paternal family, his Ntoro, and makes it his lawful child.”
The question which comes for consideration in a case such as this is, where there is no evidence of the performance of the naming ceremony or the kpodziemo must a child be denied his claim that X is his father even if there is evidence to support the child’s claim that X is his father and no one else claims that child as his?
In his evidence-in-chief and under cross-examination, the plaintiff stated that he was called Alexander Owusu at the time when he joined his father in 1955, and that it was his late father Joseph Benjamin Bentil who asked that his name “Owusu” be changed to Bentil about the time when he the plaintiff was going to sit for the middle school leaving examination in 1957. For no cogent reason, after the plaintiff had given evidence and called one witness, the defence sought (without objection by the plaintiff) leave to have the plaintiff re-called for further cross-examination.
Exhibit 1, Methodist Senior School, Sekondi Report, on Alexander Owusu dated second term 1956 was tendered through the plaintiff. Exhibit 1 shows that Alexander Owusu was in Form 3B in 1956. Although exhibit 1 confirms the defendant’s story that the plaintiff at the time he joined the deceased’s household was known and called as Alexander Owusu, the deceased’s household was known and called as Alexander Owusu, I do not think that the recall was necessary, because the exhibit merely confirmed what the plaintiff had already stated and admitted.
The recall of the plaintiff gave him the opportunity to tender several documents in evidence. No objections were raised against
[p.291] of [1980] GLR 285 the tendering of those documents. These documents are exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H and J. Exhibits E, F, are letters written by Joseph Benjamin Bentil between 1961 and 1963, to Alex. Except exhibit J dated 20 October 1961 written from Takoradi, all the others were written from Dunkwa. Upon a careful perusal of these letters, one could only come to one conclusion that the letters were written by a father to his son.
I will take extracts from these letters to illustrate the point. I will do this in the order in which they were written. Exhibit E was dated 24 March 1962 and was written from Dunkwa; it began “Dear Alex,” and ended “from your father.” In this letter the father asked to know from his son whether the son would like to train to become an accountant. The letter in part goes on:
“You know how I took you dearly at heart and forced even stubborn circumstances to clear off my way and put you to secondary school but you could not, and eventually left off, because of a behaviour you put on quite in disconcert with the school’s rules in vogue. This behaviour hurt me as you are my first born and for the fact that you have been left alone by the death of your mother.”
Exhibit F was dated 30 May 1962, it also began “Dear Alex,” and ended “Your father.” This letter also reads in part:
“It is always very good that one gets a clear understanding of certain familiar affairs. The building as it stands now has consumed all my savings and leaves off an indebtedness which I strive to pay monthly with my salary, in addition to petty rents collected.
I am only blessed that these debts are owed to my sisters who share my full sympathy … I have just tried to give you some light about my present financial position and to alert you so as to give the least possible assistance towards the maintenance of the house and more particularly the way you should consider your own life at present. It is not yet time for you to think of ease. You will have to strive and achieve some aim.”
I think that is a piece of information and advice which a father is likely to give to his son. This letter also acknowledged the receipt of letter by Joseph Benjamin Bentil from Alex.
Exhibit G is a letter dated 25 March 1963. It is very touching indeed. It began like this, “Alex, I have just received your letter dated the 22nd instant and its contents. You do not know how hard I
[p.292] of [1980] GLR 285 have been working to step you up.” This letter covers three pages of foolscap papers. Other excerpts from this letter are:
“As a father I have tried to show my love to you during your trouble with the social Welfare when you failed to get school leaving certificate. I was not discouraged but fought tooth and nail to put you to Fijai and there too second time you were engaged in subversive acts and was turned out. Thereafter Mama took charge of you and put you to commercial school whilst there you took to subversion conflicting enough. But all these could not dampen my spirit and forced your way to Timber Marketing Board where you are at present.
. . . I will continue to advise you as a father who loves a child whose mother has passed away to the other world, and who feels that he has a charge to keep in respect of that child. You may or may not know how dearly I hold you at heart but at each turn I take to step you up in life I meet with a share challenge from your goodself . . . I am a man who always likes to face facts. Truth is like a CORK which cannot easily be submerged under water. That is why I choose to speak the truth. If I come to know your faults, my first duty as a father who loves well his child is to show my displeasure and give you my mind in the form of advice.”
This letter ended “Always remaining your beloved father.”
Mr. Sackeyfio for the defendant has submitted that the letters could have been addressed to anybody, and that without the envelope there is no evidence that the letters were in fact addressed to the plaintiff. The letters therefore according to counsel have no probative value. There is evidence that the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil was one time resident at Dunkwa. It is not disputed that the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil was the author of these letters. There is no evidence before me that the deceased had any other son who goes by the name “Alex” or anybody else apart from the plaintiff who claims to be the son of the deceased.
The facts that the plaintiff attended Methodist Senior School at Sekondi, that he failed in the standard seven leaving examination, and thence got admission into the Fijai Secondary School, but never completed his course of studies are all confirmed in the letters exhibited, and as well as the death of the plaintiff’s mother. Therefore sufficient evident connecting the plaintiff with the said letters. I hold that the letters were written by the late Joseph Benjamim Bentil to the plaintiff. In those letters the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil referred to himself as the father of the plaintiff.
[p.293] of [1980] GLR 285
Except exhibit A and the letters already referred to, all the other exhibits are testimonials or certificates issued in favour of the plaintiff. All these exhibits, i.e. B, C, D and H bear the name Alexander Bentil or Alexander Kwesi Bentil. Exhibit B was dated 8 May 1972, and is a testimonial from the Fijai Secondary School, indicating that the plaintiff was in that institution in 1958 and was withdrawn at the end of the second year. Exhibit H an earlier testimonial dated 11 August 1971, shows that the plaintiff attended the Sekondi-Takoradi Workers’ College for four academic years between 1967-68 to 1970-71. With the exception of exhibit A, all the exhibits tendered by the plaintiff satisfy me conclusively that the plaintiff has been known from at least 1958 as Alexander Bentil. This is confirmed by exhibit B and the evidence of the fifth plaintiff witness.
I do not believe the defendant when she said that exhibit 1 was given to her by the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil to go and check upon its genuineness; my belief is that exhibit 1 was sent to the defendant’s husband as the father or guardian or both of the plaintiff and that the defendant came across the exhibit and probably others which would normally have been sent to the late Bentil. The defendant never explained why after checking upon the genuineness of the exhibit about 23 years ago, she still has possession of it, and no other reports on the plaintiff sent to the plaintiff’s father.
Had the paternity of the plaintiff been claimed by two persons, and one of them has claimed to have performed the kpodziemo or the naming ceremony, and the other person had not, the performance of such a custom would be a prima facie evidence in support of that person’s claim. In the instant case Bentil is dead. No one claims the plaintiff as his son. In my opinion lack of proof of the performance of the kpodziemo or naming ceremony of the plaintiff or his baptism and the performance of any custom concomitant thereto by the deceased is not fatal to the plaintiff’s claim, because there is ample evidence before me that the late Bentil was the father of the plaintiff and that the late Bentil recognised, accepted and cared for the plaintiff as his son.
I accept the plaintiff’s story that on the death of his father he approached the defendant, his stepmother, and asked how the father was to be buried and that the defendant opted to bear the cost of the coffin and the burial clothes and later on submit a bill to the plaintiff for both of them to share equally. This arrangement was known to the first and second plaintiff witnesses.
In conclusion, I am satisfied that the late Joseph Benjamin
[p.294] of [1980] GLR 285
Bentil was the father of the plaintiff and having so found, the plaintiff upon the authority of Coleman v. Shang [1959] G.L.R. 390, C.A. is entitled to four-ninth shares in his father, the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil’s estate. There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff upon his claim as indorsed on his writ of summons. The defendant is hereby ordered within one calendar month from the date hereof to render account of all rents collected by her and other assets which came into her possession since the death of the late Joseph Benjamin Bentil to enable the plaintiff get his due share of the four-ninth.
There will be costs of ¢500 in favour of the plaintiff and for the defendant ¢200. The costs are to be paid from the estate and before distribution.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
D. R. K. S.
