BRONYA vs. ASAFO II [1980] GLR 384
27 June 1979 · WUAKU J · ≈ 10 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 23Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A.
(2) Sakpaku v. Ahiaku (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 76.
(3) Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 374.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION under Order 14 of L.N. 140A for final judgment in an action for the recovery of possession of a parcel of farm land. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
G. K. Acquah for the applicant.
T. D. Brodie-Mends for Kyei for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF WUAKU J.
This is an application by the plaintiff under Order 14 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), as amended by the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No.2) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1129). By her application the plaintiff seeks to sign the final judgment against the defendant. The indorsement on the the plaintiff’s writ of summons reads:
“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for recovery of possession of all that farming land situate and being at Afratakorowa near Fobinso in the Dunkwa-on-Offin District which said land is bounded on the north and east by the property of Kofi Ankrah and on the west and south, the property of Kwaku Gyedu. By a judgment of the High Court, Accra, in the suit No. L. 589/76 plaintiff was on 12 May 1978 adjuged the owner of the said land. The defendant has since judgment been served with judgment after trial.”
Attached to the affidavit in support of the summons for judgment is exhibit A, a judgment of the High Court, Accra, dated 12 May 1978 between the parties herein mentioned in the indorsement on the writ of summons aforesaid. The ground upon which the applicant seeks to sign final judgment is that there was a previous litigation inter partes covered by the said exhibit A. The affidavit in support of the application is sworn to by one Elizabeth Owusu Afriyie of Accra, a daughter of the plaintiff. The relevant paragraphs of the said affidavit in support of the application are:
[p.386] of [1980] GLR 384
“(4) that the plaintiff is claiming recovery of possession of the farm described in the endorsement on the writ of summons.
(5) That a copy of the judgment referred to in the endorsement is attached hereto and marked exhibit A.
(6) That I am advised and verily believe same to be true that defendant has no defence to the action.”
Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the defendant has not taken any objection to the plaintiff’s writ of summons, therefore the identity of the land is not in dispute. He further argued that the affidavit in opposition to the application is irrelevant and although the court is entitled to have a look at the defence delivered by the defendant, the defence is irrelevant to the plaintiff’s claim insofar as the issue before the court is concerned. Learned counsel submitted that the arbitration award pleaded by the defendant should have been pleaded in the previous suit and not in the present action, and that it is not open to the respondent in the present proceedings to challenge the High Court’s jurisdiction in the previous suit because the question of jurisdiction ought to have been raised in the said action and that the High Court has unlimited jurisdiction. In reply to the respondent’s argument that jurisdiction could be raised at any time and at any stage of the proceedings, counsel submitted that that applies only to cases coming to the High Court on appeal from the inferior courts, because the jurisdiction of the inferior courts are always spelt out in the enactments that give them jurisdiction. Counsel submitted finally that the statement of defence has not disclosed any defence, therefore leave should not be granted to the defendant to defend the action and that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff summarily.
The defendant has personally sworn to an affidavit asking for leave to defend this action. He has delivered a defence. The respondent’s counsel has argued that even where the application is brought under Order 14 of L.N. 140A, the applicant should comply with Order 27, r. 18 of L.N. 140A, by filing a certificate in compliance with that rule. Mr. Brodie-Mends, counsel for the plaintiff, has submitted in his reply that the rule does not apply to application for summary judgment under Order 14. It seems to me the rule will apply to an action brought by any mortgagee or mortgagor. It appears counsel has in mind Order 27, r. 7 in that case the rule would apply if the writ was generally indorsed for recovery of land and the defendant makes a default in delivering his defence within the time allowed for defence. This rule will not apply under the old Order 14 where the writ is specially indorsed. It seems to me under the amended Order 14, actions begun with specially indorsed writ
[p.387] of [1980] GLR 384 are swept away. Nonetheless, in an action for recovery of land where the defendant defaults in delivering his defence and the plaintiff wants to proceed under Order 27 to obtain default judgment, rule 7 will apply.
Mr. Acquah for the defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s action was founded on exhibit A and that exhibit A shows that the relief claimed by the plaintiff in that suit was, namely: “Declaration for title and damages for trespass,” but in the present action the plaintiff is asking for recovery of possession. Counsel further argued that the action covered by exhibit A involves stool lands boundary dispute and therefore the High Court should not have entertained the suit. The defendant is the occupant of the Fobinso stool and that the land belongs to the Fobinso stool, and not to the Nkasawura stool as alleged by the plaintiff. Counsel submitted that the question of jurisdiction can be taken at any time and that the defence raises triable issues and that leave should be granted to the defendant to defend the action.
The new Order 14 as inserted by L.I. 1129 is differently worded from the previous Order 14 of L.N. 140A; it is also different in substance. The new Order 14, rr. 1 and 2 provides:
“1. Where in an action begun by writ a defendant has been served with a statement of claim and has entered an appearance, the plaintiff may apply to the Court for judgment against him on the ground that he has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or that he has no defence to such a claim or part except as to the amount of any damages claimed.
2. (1) The application must be made by summons setting out or having attached thereto the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, and supported by affidavit verifying the facts on which the relevant claim or part of a claim is based.
(2) The affidavit must state that in the deponent’s belief there is no defence to that claim or part, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed.”
All that is stated in the instant summons is that “the plaintiff herein that he (sic) be at liberty to sign final judgment in this action against the defendant herein.” I am of the opinion that in an action in which the plaintiff wants to invoke the application of the new Order 14, the deponent must not just swear to an affidavit as has been done by the deponent in this application, but must do more than that. She must conform with Order 14, r. 2 (1) and either set out clearly the reliefs she seeks in the summons, or attach thereto a statement of
[p.388] of [1980] GLR 384 claim setting out the reliefs and the facts upon which the claim is based.
The affidavit in support of the summons is sworn to by Elizabeth Owusu Afriyie of Accra, the daughter of the plaintiff. The land, the subject-matter of dispute, is situated within the Dunkwa-on-Offin District; the plaintiff too I believe lives within the same district. I do not think that the deponent living in Accra would be in a position to know the facts of the case, perhaps this accounts for the fact that the affidavit is very sketchy, not being the plaintiff, she should have disclosed the source of her information. The deponent failed to state that in her belief the defendant has no defence to the plaintiff’s claim; of course she has stated in the affidavit that she is “advised and verily believe same to be true, that the defendant has no defence to the action.” Here again, the deponent not being the plaintiff she should have stated who has so advised her. Although the new Order 14 does not require the deponent to be a person who can swear positively to the facts, I am of the view that the deponent must have, or show to have some personal knowledge of the facts she has sworn to. I am of the view that the deponent has no personal knowledge of the facts and cannot therefore depose to an affidavit as is contemplated by the new Order 14, r. 2 (1) and (2). I hold that the authority in Accra Furniture and Rubber Foam Co., Ltd. v. Indart S.P./A. of Rome [1973] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A. applies and therefore the affidavit sworn to by the deponent cannot be used to found jurisdiction for entry of summary judgment.
The plaintiff is by her action and in this application saying that the defendant is estopped by the judgment in exhibit A in re-litigating with her over the same land. The plaintiff never exhibited her writ of summons and her statement of claim and the defendant’s defence in the previous suit. Exhibit A however shows that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff were: (a) a declaration of title to the land, described fully in the writ of summons, and (b) damages for trespass. The exhibit shows that the plaintiff never called any witness to support her claim, not even her alleged boundary owners. The dimensions of the land were not given. The defendant was absent at the trial. One cannot with any certainty draw a plan of the land in dispute after reading through exhibit A: see the case of Sakpaku v. Ahiaku (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 76 which in my opinion applies to this case. Above all, the plaintiff never claimed recovery of possession in exhibit A. It is not uncommon to have title of a land vested in one person and the possessory title vested in another. It may be for just cause that the plaintiff never claimed for recovery of possession in
[p.389] of [1980] GLR 384 the previous suit. I hold that exhibit A does not operate as estoppel against the defendant in the action herein.
The new Order 14, r. 3 (1) of L.N. 140A provides that the defendant may show cause against the application by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court. The defendant has filed a defence in addition to his affidavit. Mr. Brodie-Mends has submitted that the court can look at the defence filed. The defence challenges the validity of the judgment exhibit A on the grounds that the dispute involved stool lands boundaries therefore by virtue of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 172), s. 4, the High Court ought not to have entertained the suit, and therefore the judgment exhibit A was a nullity. In Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 374, the West African Court of Appeal, held (as stated in the headnote at p. 375) that: “A Court is said to be of competent jurisdiction with regard to a suit or other proceeding when it has power to hear or determine it or exercise any judicial power therein.” Prima facie, section 4 of N.R.C.D. 172 ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court under certain conditions. Whether exhibit A is a nullity or not is a matter to be gone into, and it is for the defendant if he could, to establish its invalidity when it is offered in evidence against him. For the several reasons above given I am of the opinion that the defendant has by his affidavit and defence filed raised triable issues and has shown cause to be granted leave to defend the action.
I do hereby, therefore, give leave to the defendant unconditionally to defend the action. I also order that the deponent’s affidavit and the defence filed stand as pleadings but the plaintiff is at liberty within ten days from the date hereof to deliver further particulars in writing, if she so wishes, regarding any further statement of claim not disclosed in the affidavits and the defendant to deliver amended defence within fourteen days after service. The plaintiff to take out summons for directions within seven days after service on her or her solicitor of the defendant’s amended defence, thereafter the suit to take its normal course.
The application for summary judgment is dismissed. Costs of ¢50 to the defendant-respondent.
DECISION Application dismissed. S.O.
