EKYINABA AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 76
16 February 1979 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 17 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 30Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Edwick v. Hawkes (1881) 18 Ch.D. 199; 50 L.J.Ch. 577; 45 L.T. 168; 29 W.R. 913.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the trial magistrate wherein he convicted the appellants of the offence of forcible entry. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Dr. Tackie-Otoo for the appellants.
Mrs. Otoo, State Attorney, for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
The appellants were convicted on 4 November 1977 by his worship I. Y. Buamah, Esq., on a charge of forcible entry, and each of them was sentenced to a fine of ¢100, or six months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The appeal is against the conviction on the ground that the “conviction cannot be supported by the evidence adduced at the trial.” There was an indication in the appellants’ petition of 4 November 1977 that additional grounds of appeal would be filed when the record of proceedings had been obtained, but it appears the appellants considered the only ground of appeal, referred to (supra) as sufficient, and learned counsel, Dr. Tackie-Otoo, has therefore argued basically on this ground with some amount of elaboration and emphasis.
The three appellants were charged before the District Court Grade I, Sekondi, with the offence of forcible entry contrary to section 202A (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 398). The particulars of the offence as set out are:
“Kofi Ekyinaba, farmer, Kwesi Donkor, farmer, Anthony Kofie, driver’s mate, for that you on 19 September 1976, at Apowa near Kwesimintsim in the Western Magisterial District did enter a plot of land the property of one Kwabena Payne without lawful excuse.”
The facts of this case upon which the appellants were charged and put before the trial court, as summarised by the trial magistrate on p. 16 of the record of proceedings were that: One Piedu (deceased), the complainant’s uncle, acquired a piece of land from the chief of Prestea and cultivated it into a cocoa farm. The complainant’s
[p.79] of [1980] GLR 76 uncle, Piedu, died on or about 28 June 1976, and was succeeded by the complainant , Kwabena Payne, the first prosecution witness. While late Piedu was alive, he employed Samuel Kwabena Donkor, the second prosecution witness, as his caretaker on the farm in question and, as the evidence shows, the second prosecution witness, worked on the farm for Piedu as such caretaker, for a period of about three years before Piedu died. The complainant retained the second prosecution witness, as caretaker on the said farm when he, the complainant, succeeded his late uncle, Piedu, and the second prosecution witness was therefore in charge and in possession of the farm at the time of the incident which gave rise to the complaint which culminated in the charge preferred against the appellants.
The second prosecution witness as caretaker of the farm in question on visiting the farm on 19 September 1976, met the appellants on the complainant’s farm harvesting cocoa pods. The evidence is that when the second prosecution witness questioned the first appellant as to what he was doing on the farm, the second appellant asked the second prosecution witness to leave the farm otherwise he would see what he did not like. The second prosecution witness left the farm and went to the complainant and told him about the presence of the appellants on the farm. The second prosecution witness accompanied by the complainant went to the farm again. The complainant upon seeing the appellants on the farm himself asked them what they were doing on his farm. It is the prosecution’s case that the appellants drove the first and second prosecution witnesses out of the farm with threats of violence and that led to the complaint which the first prosecution witness lodged to the police and the subsequent arrest, and the charge preferred against the appellants.
A greater part of the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses does not seem to have been seriously challenged by the appellants; only one of whom, the first appellant, testified in this case. The learned trial magistrate seems to have made the following findings, among other things, based on the evidence before him:
(i) that the complainant’s deceased uncle built a hut on the land in question and that fact was not disputed or challenged;
(ii) that the second prosecution witness, Donkor, was Piedu’s caretaker in possession of the farm for over three years before the latter died, and the second prosecution witness continued his caretakership and remained in possession of the farm when the complainant, Payne, took over the farm as successor to Piedu. That the complainant was therefore in possession of the farm at the material time of the incident in question; and
[p.80] of [1980] GLR 76
(iii) that the appellants were found on the first prosecution witness’s said farm on 19 September 1976.
Learned counsel, Dr. Tackie-Otoo’s argument, as I understand it, is that there is no evidence that the appellants entered the land or farm in question with violence. He has maintained that the evidence shows that the appellants went to the farm in the absence of both the first and second prosecution witnesses and that when subsequently the first and second prosecution witnesses came upon the appellants in the farm, even if they were driven off by threats of violence, as the prosecution seem to claim, that act did not accompany the act of entry and the same cannot therefore constitute the offence of forcible entry. Counsel therefore, urges this court to place the correct interpretation on section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended by N.L.C.D. 398. Counsel emphasized that the evidence shows that the appellants were met on the farm by the complainant and that, therefore, they cannot be said to have entered the farm forcibly. Counsel referred to p. 17, line 16 down of the record of proceedings where it is recorded, “Witness agreed with counsel that he met the accused persons already on the farm plucking the cocoa pods. Witness denied that the farm in dispute belonged to Mpohor stool. Witness admitted further under cross-examination that he was threatened.”
Counsel contends further that the offence can only be made out if the entry was made with violence and since it appears that the appellants entered the farm quietly or peaceably they cannot be said to have done anything which would bring them within the provisions of section 202A (1) of Act 29, as amended.
Counsel for the respondent, Mrs. Otoo, referred the court to p.1 of the record of proceedings, line one downwards, where there is ample evidence that the complainants were in possession of the farm at the time the appellants entered same. The first prosecution witness told the court, as appearing on p. 1, line 25 downwards:
“We arrived in the farm at about 2.00 p.m. In the farm I saw the second accused holding a single barrel gun, the third accused was holding a cutlass and the first accused also had a cutlass in his hand. They were plucking the cocoa pods. I asked them why they were plucking the pods. I challenged them that the cocoa they were plucking weren’t theirs. Then the second accused threatened me to go away else he will shoot me.
I became frightened in view of the way the second accused spoke and the manner he was holding the gun. I kept quiet and left the farm.”
There is further evidence that under cross-examination by Dr. Tackie-Otoo, the first prosecution witness said that the second
[p.81] of [1980] GLR 76 accused pointed the gun at him and said: “If you don’t leave the farm I will shoot you.”
Mrs. Otoo, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted forcefully that this clearly amounts to threats of personal violence and since they were used to prevent the complainants from entering the farm again, there was a clear case of forcible entry, coming within section 202A (1) of Act 29.
Now it may be necessary, at this stage, to set out the provisions of section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended by N.L.C.D. 398 (1). Section 202A (1) provides:
“202A. (1) Whoever with violence makes an entry into any building or land, whether or not he is entitled to the possession thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he does so in pursuance of a warrant or other lawful authority to use such violence.”
In my judgment, to constitute an offence under the section as quoted (supra), the entry complained of must have been made with violence. Merely entering the land peaceably without violence or without using threats of violence may not constitute the offence of forcible entry. It seems to me that the operative words in the provisions of section 202A (1) are “entry with violence.” What then constitutes an entry with violence? Section 197 of Act 29 itself defines violence thus:
“197. For the purposes of this Chapter ‘violence’ means any criminal force or harm to any person, or any criminal damage to any property, or any threat or offer of such force, harm, or mischief, or the carrying or use of deadly, dangerous, or offensive instruments in such a manner as that terror is likely to be caused to any person, or such conduct as is likely to cause in any person a reasonable apprehension of criminal force, harm, or mischief to him or his property.”
The chapter referred to in this definition is Chapter 3—Offences Against the Peace, under Part IV, of the Criminal Code, under which we have the amended section 202A (1) of the Act. It follows, therefore that entry with violence will mean, for our purpose in this case, an entry upon the land in question using criminal force or harm to any person, or causing criminal damage to any property thereon, or using threat or offer of such force, harm or mischief, or at the time or during the course of such entry, carrying or using deadly, dangerous, or offensive instrument in such a manner as that terror is likely to be caused to any person, or such conduct as is
[p.82] of [1980] GLR 76 likely to cause in any person a reasonable apprehension of criminal force, harm, or mischief to him or his property.
The trial learned magistrate in accepting the evidence of the complainant and the second prosecution witness thus found that the appellants carrying a single-barrel gun and cutlasses were found on the farm in question and when the complainant questioned them as to what they were doing on the farm the appellants threatened to shoot them down or cause harm to them. There is no evidence that any actual harm was caused to any of the witnesses, but the evidence shows clearly that the appellants threatened to use force on or harm the first and second prosecution witnesses at the time the appellants were carrying deadly, dangerous and offensive instruments or weapons. Indeed, the appellants acted in such a manner that they actually terrorized the complainants who undoubtedly became apprehensive of a possible criminal force or harm.
We now come to the main argument advanced by counsel for the appellants to the effect that even if the appellants are held to have threatened to use force on or harm against the complainants this was some time after they had entered the land without violence and that, therefore, whatever they did, subsequently, would not make that entry, an entry with violence. I think the learned trial magistrate rightly disagreed with learned counsel and rightly held that that is not the law. I endorse most of the views expressed by the trial magistrate on this aspect of the case. I am satisfied the evidence establishes that the appellants threatened to harm or to shoot the complainants after they had entered the farm and while they were still there plucking cocoa. The appellants held a gun and cutlasses saying that the complainants would be shot if they did not leave the farm. In my judgment that act was complementary to the very act of entry; it was done while the complainants remained on the land and were still in the process of entry, plucking cocoa from place to place. It was one and the same continuous act of entry. This was an entry with violence and therefore constituted a forcible entry. It may be argued further that even if the appellants entered the farm peaceably carrying a gun and cutlasses, when subsequently the owner of the farm or the person in possession thereof came and questioned them, if they used the gun and cutlasses and threatened to shoot him or cause criminal harm to him, and thereby prevented him from returning to the farm, that act or threat of violence would relate back to the original act of entry thus constituting a continued single act of entry with its attendant violence.
[p.83] of [1980] GLR 76
I will on forcible entry refer to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 10, p. 590, para. 1100 where it is stated:
“Any person is guilty of a misdemeanour both at common law and by statute who enters forcibly upon any lands or tenements without due warrant of law.”
It is stated further at p. 591 that:
“In order to constitute the offence it is not necessary that there should be actual violence to the person of anyone. It is sufficient if there is any kind of violence in the manner of entry, as by breaking open the doors of a house, whether any person is therein or not, or by threats to those in possession giving them just cause to fear that bodily hurt will be done to them, if they do not give up possession, or by going to the premises armed or with such an unusual number of persons as plainly to show that force will be resorted to. A mere trespass will not support an indictment for forcible entry. There must be proof of either such force, or such show of force, as is calculated to prevent any resistance.”
See again para. 1101 of the same volume of Halsbury’s where it is stated, “If a man enters peaceably into a house, but turns the occupant out of possession by force, this may be a forcible entry.”
It is my judgment that one or two passages from Archbold may clarify the position of the law further: see Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th ed.) at p. 1306, para. 3602 where it is stated:
“If, however, whilst the owner is out of his house, the prisoner forcibly prevents him from returning to it, and in the meantime sends persons to take possession of it peaceably, this is said to be a forcible entry … Also, where a party having right, and whose entry is congeable (i.e., permissible), enters or makes claim, and the other party afterwards continues to hold possession by force; this is considered a forcible entry in the party so holding; because his estate is defeated by the entry or claim, and his continuance in possession is deemed a new entry.”
Learned counsel for the appellants seemed to have submitted that these principles of law would only apply to an actual owner who is ousted by force, but it seems to me that the question of ownership of the land is not a necessary factor when the provisions of section 202A (1) of Act 29 are brought into play, for a person may be caught by the section in respect of a piece of land, whether or not he is entitled to possession thereof. This, I believe, is why section
[p.84] of [1980] GLR 76
202A (2) of the Act makes section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), inapplicable to an offence under subsection (1) of this section. I think this legislation is designed to prevent this sort of violence and encourage the parties who claim to have bona fide titles to land to resort to the civil court for redress rather than meeting each other with violence on the land and thereby generating a possible and serious breach of the peace. I think the judgment of Fry J. in Edwick v. Hawkes (1881) 18 Ch.D. 199 may be held to clarify the principles of law involved here. Even though Edwick v. Hawkes (supra) is a civil case the principle is the same on the question of forcible entry.
The landlord, in Edwick v. Hawkes (supra), entered the premises and forcibly ejected the tenant because of an alleged breach of a covenant in the tenancy agreement. It appears that the plaintiff, being the tenant, obtained the lease of the premises in which he intended to sell wine, spirit and beer which he covenanted to buy direct from the landlords, the defendants. Because the plaintiff was not getting another brand of beer direct from the defendants he arranged and got it for sale on the premises through an agent. When the defendants became aware of what the plaintiff had done, they told the plaintiff that he had committed a breach of his covenant and had thereby forfeited his lease. After some intervening events, the plaintiff refused to surrender the lease and give up possession. On 4 October 1880, the defendants’ foreman went to the premises accompanied by a policeman and two other men; the plaintiff still refused to give up possession. The plaintiff was put out with no great violence; he sustained no injury. He returned and was put out again. He returned again and was put out of possession again on 6 October 1880; it appears, however, that the plaintiff’s wife was forcibly thrown out of the premises. The plaintiff sued and claimed damages for wrongful and forcible ejectment.
As may be seen from the facts of the case cited, soon after the alleged breach of the covenant, the defendants made the plaintiff make and sign a document which authorized the defendants to eject the plaintiff without any process of law, and for that purpose, the document empowered the defendants to enter upon the property and use all necessary force in putting out the plaintiff and his family.
Fry J. having in his judgment held that the document which gave that authorization was void said at p. 208:
“If so, the document appears to me to be void as being in effect a license to commit a crime, because the statute of Rich. 2 has provided that, even where there is a legal right of entry, no man shall enter with strong hand, nor with multitude of people, but
[p.85] of [1980] GLR 76 only in a peaceable and easy manner. Any violence, therefore, which is used for the purpose of obtaining an entry upon land which is in the possession of another, anything amounting to a strong hand, is a violation of that statute . . . [i.e., Act 5 Rich. 2, Stat. 1 c. 8.”]
(The emphasis is mine.)
It seems to me that in a case of this nature even if a party enters land or premises peaceably and during the course of such entry or while he is still on the land, after such entry, he uses force, or violence, to eject or keep out the occupant thereof, that party shall be guilty of the offence of forcible entry, because the act of entry, be it peaceably or not, any subsequent force or acts or threats of violence, shall be deemed to be one continued series of acts amounting to forcible entry. On this Fry J. had this to say at p. 210 in Edwick v. Hawkes (supra):
“If on the 4th of October they had a right of entry which they might have put in force through proper means of law I think they nevertheless made a wrongful entry on that date. I couple the amount of force which they actually displayed on that entry — four men — with their previous letter of the 29th of September, I couple it with the Plaintiffs’ statement that he should not give up possession, and I think that the acts, which began with that entry on the 4th of October, were one continued series of acts until the wife had been finally ejected on the afternoon of the 6th of October, and until that ejectment the Defendants, in my judgment, never recovered actual possession of the property.”
In the case before me presently, the complainants were not present on the farm at the time the appellants entered same, but there is evidence that the appellants, two of them being farmers, and the remaining one being a driver’s mate, entered the land carrying a gun and holding cutlasses and if their intention was to take possession of the farm it can hardly be said that that entry was a peaceable one. However, the three men having entered the land so well armed with a gun and cutlasses, and having remained on the land plucking cocoa thereon at the time the complainants arrived, and having upon being challenged by the complainants, exhibited such show of force coupled with threatening acts and words, they clearly exhibited a conduct which amounted to an infringement of section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended. The provisions of this section of the
[p.86] of [1980] GLR 76
Act, in my judgment, are clearly, intended to repress the evil of persons who may have a right to enter upon a piece of land to take possession thereof, and those who may not have such right of entry, causing disturbance or serious breach of peace, or rioting for the purpose of obtaining possession of a piece of land which is, or which they claim to be their property. I, therefore, with all due respect, adopt the following statement of the law by Fry J. in Edwick v. Hawkes (supra) at pp. 210-211:
“Accordingly, it appears to me to be clear law, and I desire to restate it, that, if an entry be made peaceably, and if, after entry made, and before actual and complete possession has been obtained, violence be used towards the person who is in possession, that is criminal within the statute of Richard II.”
It seems to me that the statute of Richard II referred to was in clause 8 thereof passed for the repression of one and the same evil as provisions of section 202A (1) of Act 29 as amended, was passed. Again reference is made to Bacon’s Abridgment where the law is laid down thus (as quoted in Edwick v. Hawkes at p. 211), “If a man enters peaceably into a house, but turns the party out of possession by force, or by threats frights him out of possession, this is a forcible entry.”
Applying the principle I have herein referred to (supra), to the facts of this case, there can be no doubt that the appellants were guilty of the offence of forcible entry, and that they were rightly so found and convicted by the trial learned magistrate, whose judgment, from which the appeal has been brought, I find to be sound and right. The judgment, in my view, is fully supported by the evidence on record and the correct law has been applied and I can find no reason to disturb it.
The judgment appealed from is therefore upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
