LUGUTERAH vs. NORTHERN ENGINEERING CO., LTD AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 62
30 January 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 15 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 47Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R. v. Gray[1900] 2 Q.B. 36; 69 L.J.Q.B. 502; 82 L.T. 534; 64 J.P. 484; 48 W.R. 474; 16 T.L.R.
305.
[p.63] of [1980] GLR 62 (2) Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C.
(3) Septimus Parsonage & Co., In re [1901] 2 Ch. 424; 70 L.J.Ch. 706; 84 L.T. 866; 49 W.R. 700; 17 T.L.R. 617; 45 S.J. 655.
(4) Agbleta v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 445, C.A.
(5) Attorney-General v. Walthamstow Urban District Council (1895) 11 T.L.R. 533. (6) Steiner Products Ltd. v. Willy Steiner Ltd. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 986; [1966] 2 All E.R. 387. (7) Heatons Transport (St. Helens) Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers’ Union [1973] A.C. 15;
[1972] 3 W.L.R. 431; [1972] 1 C.R. 308; [1972] 3 All E.R. 101; 14 K.I.R. 48, H.L.
(8) Soromani v. Buachi, Court of Appeal, Written Judgments, January-June, 1958, 21. (9) Tart v. G. W. Chitty & Co., Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 453; [1931] All E.R. Rep. 826; 102 L.J.K.B. 568;
149 L.T. 261.
(10) Baker v. E. Longhurst & Sons, Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 461; 102 L.J.K.B. 573; 149 L.T. 264, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for interlocutory orders in respect of a pending originating motion on notice brought under section 217 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179). The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Gbeho for E. D. Kom for the applicant.
C. K. Amoah for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
Yesterday after hearing arguments of counsel for the parties I adjourned the application for a considered ruling this morning as in my opinion the points for decision in this application are very important for the proper administration of justice. This is a motion on notice filed on 14 September 1978 praying for interlocutory orders as follows:
(i) That the extraordinary general meeting of 7 September 1978 [of the N.E.C.] was invalid, its decisions invalid and resolutions passed thereon and thereat are invalid and all appointments made thereat are null and void and of no effect.
(ii) That the applicant and Mr. Ziblim Andan remain the lawful directors of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. and that any decision taken or to be taken by Messrs. C. K. A. Djokotoe, D. A. Mensah, T. B. Frimpong and L. K. Djokotoe as directors of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. are null and void and of no effect.
[p.64] of [1980] GLR 62 The necessity for this interlocutory application arose because on 30 August 1978, the applicant had commenced proceedings by an originating motion no notice against the respondents asking for the following reliefs:
(i) An order removing the respondent, Mr. C. K. A. Djokotoe, as director of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd.
(ii) An order that the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. be at liberty to purchase all the shares of the respondents, C. K. A. Djokotoe and Peter Tsekpo in the company.
(iii) An order declaring the respondents, Peter Tsekpo and C. K. A. Djokotoe trustees for the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. in respect of the business carried by them and C. K. A. Djokotoe’s wife under the name of Djokotoe and Sons Ltd. in Tamale and elsewhere.
(iv) An order that any lease or other document bearing the name of the respondent, Peter Tsekpo, conveying plot No. 53, at the industrial area of Lamashegu in Tamale to the said Peter Tsekpo be given up for cancellation and the said plot No. 53 be conveyed and a lease in respect thereto be executed and title therein be vested in favour and in the name of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd.
(v) An account of the utilization of import licences and particularly of the import licences valued at ¢59,000 in 1974, ¢583,750 for 1975 and ¢431,000 for 1976 for imports for the business of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. and also for all moneys particularized in exhibit B attached herewith, and for the following loans raised by the respondents:
(a) ¢22,575 raised by Peter Tsekpo on 21 August 1973.
(b) ¢60,000 raised by Peter Tsekpo on 11 October 1973.
(c) ¢150,000 raised by Peter Tsekpo on 12 February 1975.
(d) ¢685,000 raised by C. K. A. Djokotoe on 24 May 1976.
(vi) An order that the respondent, Peter Tsekpo, should return to the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. its property, vehicle No. GM 1969, which was unlawfully taken away by him in 1976.
(vii) A full and proper account of the Northern Engineering Co.’s account in Denmark with Dronningborg and the Handels Bank in Randers in Denmark.
(viii) A full and proper account of all moneys received by the respondents or either of them for and on behalf of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. and more particularly
[p.65] of [1980] GLR 62 moneys received by C. K. A. Djokotoe between 1 February 1978 and 31 August 1978 which moneys he admits he has not paid into the Northern Engineering Company’s account.
(ix) A perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding to convene the extraordinary general meeting requisitioned by them and scheduled for 10 o’clock in the forenoon on 6 September 1978 at the company’s premises and from proceeding to pass the proposed resolution contained in the requisition to remove all present directors and to appoint new directors.
(x) The respondents Tsekpo and Djokotoe to account for the cost of five (5) combine harvesters which they have misappropriated for uses other than those of the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd.
(xi) C. K. A. Djokotoe and the firm Djokotoe & Sons owned by the said Djokotoe be declared as trustees of Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. for the proceeds of the farm operations by them at Damongo and to account for the proceeds to the Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. and the applicant.
The application was brought in pursuance of the provisions of section 218 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), which is designed to give a remedy to a member against oppression. In view of this I would have thought the moment the case became pending in this court, the parties would naturally want a judicial decision touching their respective rights and the propriety or otherwise of the reliefs claimed and none of them would do anything to frustrate the action. It will be noticed by a study of the relief under (ix) that the respondents intended to hold an extraordinary general meeting at 10 o’clock in the forenoon on 6 September 1978 and proposed to pass a specific resolution at the said meeting dissolving the board of directors and appointing a new board; and by the originating notice of motion which was duly served on the respondents, the applicant asked for perpetual injunction restraining them from proceeding to hold the said meeting and to pass the said resolution. In spite of this the respondents dul held the meeting on 6 September 1978 and they had it adjourned to 7 September 1978 and on that date they duly passed the resolution they had proposed to pass by which resolution they purported to dissolve the board of directors and appoint a new board.
Apparently the meeting of 6 and 7 September 1978 was attended by Mr. Cletus Amoah, the solicitor for the respondents. On the first date of the meeting the applicant raised objection to the presence
[p.66] of [1980] GLR 62 of the said Mr. Amoah at the meeting, his objection was upheld and the said Mr. Amoah left the meeting. On the second day of the meeting, the said Mr. Amoah attended the meeting but the objection of the applicant was ignored, but in an affidavit filed by the chairman of the meeting, he deposed that he permitted Mr. Amoah to be present at the meeting. At the said meeting the applicant pointed out that as the matter of the meeting and the resolution was sub judice, the meeting and the passing of the resolution would be improper and unlawful. Mr. Amoah speaking from the bar has submitted before this court that he advised that since no order of injunction had actually been granted there was nothing wrong with holding the meeting. He concedes now that in giving the advice he was not aware of relief (ix) and that if he hd been aware of it, he would not have given the advice he gave.
Mr. Gbeho, counsel for the applicant, has urged this court to declare the meeting of 6 and 7 September 1978 and the resolution passed at the said meetings as invalid on the following three grounds:
(1) That as the letter concerning the meeting was signed by the secretary, the meeting had been called by the secretary, in contravention of the provisions of section 271 of Act 179 and the meeting is therefore not a legally valid one, and consequently the resolution passed is unlawful.
(2) That the attendance of Mr. Cletus Amoah, the solicitor for the respondents, was irregular and makes the meeting an unlawful one, and
(3) That in so far as the parties were aware of the pending proceedings in court, any action done with intent of stultifying the subsequent relief sought, would render what was done nugatory.
Mr. Cletus Amoah has drawn my attention to a meeting of the board of directors held on 4 August 1978 at which the secretary was authorized to convene a meeting for 6 September 1978 in accordance with the provisions of section 271 (1) of Act 179 on the requisition of the two respondent members of the company. In view of this I think the submission of counsel for the applicant that the secretary, Mr. C. K. A. Djokotoe, called the meeting on his own and without the authority of the board in violation of the provisions of section 271 of Act 179 is misconceived.
The second submission of the applicant’s counsel, that Mr. Cletus Amoah’s presence makes the meeting invalid is also not borne out by an examination of the affidavit in evidence. Mr. Amankwah, a member of the company and the chairman of the meeting of 7 September 1978, has deposed in an affidavit that he permitted Mr. Amoah to be
[p.67] of [1980] GLR 62 present at the meeting. Now section 160 of Act 179 provides as follows:
“160. Notwithstanding any contrary provision in the company’s Regulations the following persons shall be entitled to attend any general meeting of the company, namely, (a) every member of the company;
(b) every director of the company;
(c) the secretary of the company; and (d) every auditor for the time being of the company:
Provided that, (a) if the company’s Regulations so provide a member shall not be entitled to attend unless all calls or other sums presently payable by him in respect of shares in the company have been paid;
(b) any member who is holder of preference shares only shall not be entitled to attend if his right to do so is validly suspended in accordance with section 49 of this Code;
(c) nothing herein contained shall be deemed to preclude other persons from attending any general meeting with the permission of the chairman thereof.”
In view of the third proviso to section 160 above, it is clear that Mr. Cletus Amoah’s presence was in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Code and it was therefore unexceptionable. The second submission of counsel is therefore also misconceived.
The third submission of counsel, however, cannot be so lightly considered. It strikes at the very root of the administration of justice. The respondents, aware that the applicant intended to move the court for an injunction preventing them from holding a meeting and passing a resolution, nevertheless in an obvious effort at stultifying the proceedings, went ahead and held the meeting and passed the resolution.
It seems to me that the conduct of the respondent, C. K. A. Djokotoe, Peter Tsekpo and their solicitor, Mr. C. K. Amoah, amounted to contempt of court. In his classic book Oswald’s Contempt of Court (3rd ed.) it is stated at p. 6:
“To speak generally, Contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during the litigation.”
[p.68] of [1980] GLR 62
I cannot think of a more relevant instance of a conduct calculated to bring the administration of the law into disregard than the conduct of the respondents and their legal adviser. In R. v. Gray [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 at p. 40, Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. stated quite clearly, “Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court . . . into contempt, . . . is a contempt of Court.” (The emphasis is mine.)
As a legal practitioner, Mr. Amoah has a duty to the court apart from his duty to his client. Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the erstwhile Supreme Court in Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387 at p. 392, put the matter in his usually lucid style:
“It is perhaps unnecessary to stress the principle that the duty of a legal practitioner who had been engaged by a litigant is not only to his client but also to the court of which he is an officer, and it is essential that he should not permit these two facets of his duty to be in conflict with each other.
When an application is made to a court for an interim order that court becomes seised of the matter to the extent covered by the prayer contained in the application, and until the court makes an order in the matter it is an improper conduct for a legal practitioner to advise the doing of the very act which the application is intended to prevent, for it amounts to flouting the authority of the court. It is not a legitimate exercise of a legal practitioner’s duty either to his client or to the court.”
To submit that he gave advice to his client as Mr. Amoah has done, without looking at the case the applicant has against his client, is in my view inexcusably negligent. It becomes even more negligent when the applicant, also a lawyer in his own right, drew the attention of the meeting at which Mr. Amoah was present to the fact that the matter was sub judice. It seems to me that the respondents and their solicitor embarked on an obvious course of interfering with the course of justice by attempting to defeat the claim of the applicant to a fair hearing in court.
This case calls to mind the case of In re Septimus Parsonage & Co. [1901] 2 Ch. 424. This was a case in which a creditor presented a petition in court for the compulsory winding-up of a company. On the same day as the petition was filed in court, two of the directors of the company drew up a circular pretending that it was drawn up by a Mr. Grace. In the circular, Mr. Grace said to be a large independent shareholder allegedly hostile to the directors, was soliciting for proxies. He was said to be determined to have the management thoroughly investigated at his own expense and needed the proxies to be used against the directors. It turned out that the circular was
[p.69] of [1980] GLR 62 false and that Mr. Grace was a man of straw deliberately put up by the directors for the purpose of obtaining a vote for voluntary winding-up thus depriving the court of jurisdiction in the compulsory winding-up proceedings. Wright J. in commenting on the conduct of the two directors, the respondents in the said proceedings, said at pp. 429-430:
“It seems to me an obvious inference that all that was done by the respondents was done for the purpose of defeating the creditors’ petition, and that what they wanted to avoid was a compulsory winding-up…
Where there is a real interference with the jurisdiction of the Court, which is perhaps a better phrase than contempt of Court, the Court has no option but to act, however unwilling it is to deal with matters affecting the liberty of the subject…”
Having held now that the conduct of the respondents and their legal adviser amounts to contempt of court what are the legal consequences? I must say that but for the decision of the Court of Appeal in Agbleta v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 445, I would have been tempted to punish the respondents and their solicitor for contempt. I recall however that in that case which was before me at first instance, I peremptorily punished the appellant for contempt in failing to comply with a court order and in setting aside my order Azu Crabbe C.J. rightly pointed out at p. 447:
“the appellant failed to comply with the order of the court, and in the opinion of this court, he prima facie committed contempt. But to be punishable, there must be a contempt which implies an intentional or wilful defiance of the powers of the court.”
The principle that to be punishable a contempt must be shown to be wilful in the sense of not having been accidental and unintentional is supported by the cases of Attorney-General v. Walthamstow Urban District Council (1895) 11 T.L.R. 533; Steiner Products Ltd. v. Willy Steiner [1966] 2 All E.R. 387 and the joint opinion of the House of Lords delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Heatons Transport (St. Helens) Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers’ Union [1972] 3 All E.R. 101, H.L.
In this case the two respondents acted under legal advice so there is not an act of wilful contempt. The lawyer by his submission has in effect admitted that he gave the legal advice negligently, so he also did not do it intentionally.
In Soromani v. Buachi, Court of Appeal, Written Judgments, January-June, 1958, 21, while an application for interim injunction to restrain an auctioneer from carrying out a sale was pending before [p.70] of [1980] GLR 62 the court, the property mentioned was sold. The application for interim injunction had therefore to be withdrawn. The court therefore had not the opportunity to pronounce on the validity of the sale. Nevertheless, I venture to think that if the buyer was an innocent purchaser, without notice then the sale was unexceptionable. If however, he was aware that proceedings were pending in court to stop the sale but nevertheless he bought the property, I think the court would have been justified in setting aside the sale, if an application was brought before it for that purpose.
In this application before me the parties were all aware of the pending proceedings and had been served with the motion paper and supporting affidavits filed on 30 August 1978 showing that an injunction would be requested restraining the holding of the meeting and the passing of the resolution. In such a situation none of the parties can be said to be innocent. It is now a settled principle of the common law, and there is no need for an authority to support it, that no one is entitled to benefit legally from his own wrongdoing. The courts do not encourage that. If authority is needed for this proposition, two English cases admirably illustrate it. They are: Tart v. G. W. Chitty & Co., Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 453 and Baker v. E. Longhurst & Sons, Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 461. The acts of the parties if allowed to stand will disrupt the smooth running of the course of justice. If removed the status quo will be restored and the course of justice can be advanced unimpeded. For the above reasons and in the greater interest f justice I declare the meeting held on 6 September 1978 and 7 September 1978 as invalid; the decisions and resolutions passed at the said meetings and all appointments made thereat are hereby set aside and the decisions declared null and void.
I also declare that the only lawful directors of the Northern Engineering Co. are Mr. A. A. Luguterah, Mr. Ziblim Andan and Mr. C. K. A. Djokotoe. I further declare that any decision taken or to be taken by C. K. A. Djokotoe, D. A. Mensah, T. B. Frimpong and L. K. Djokotoe in their purported capacities as directors of Northern Engineering Co., Ltd. following the said decision of 7 September 1978 are null and void and of no effect.
The application of the applicant is in the circumstances granted. And since I find the conduct of Mr. Amoah to be unsatisfactory I award costs of ¢250 in favour of the applicant. The said costs to be paid personally by Mr. Amoah.
DECISION
Order accordingly.
Application granted.
S. Y. B.-B.
