REPUBLIC vs. AKIM ABUAKWA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE APPEANYO II [1980] GLR 799
17 December 1979 · APATU-PLANGE J · ≈ 16 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 59Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391.
(2) Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.
(3) Republic v. Kumasi Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Opoku Agyeman II [1977] 1 G.L.R. 360, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to discharge interim orders made by the High Court in an application for leave to apply for an order of certiorari [p.801] of [1980] GLR 799 and prohibition. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Miss Rose Owusu, Senior State Attorney, for the applicant, District Chief Executive, East Akim District Council.
Asante Tannor (Kwaku Boateng with him) for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APATU-PLANGE J.
On 15 November 1979, the then applicant, Barima Appeanyo II, filed an ex parte application in this court for leave to issue out orders of certiorari and prohibition against the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council to quash the order of the council dated 16 November 1975 ordering the applicant herein to cease to exercise any functions exercisable by him as Adontenhene of Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area from the date of the said order and or the destoolment order made against the applicant on the said date and also to prohibit the said council from giving recognition to any candidate who may be nominated, elected and installed in place of the applicant. This ex parte application was brought under Order 59, r. 2 (1) and (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The application came on for hearing on 16 November 1979 and the court after reading the supporting affidavits and statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the reliefs sought, and the grounds on which they were sought and on hearing counsel for the applicant, granted the leave prayed for.
Now Order 59, r. 2 (4) provides:
“4. The grant of leave under this rule to apply for an order of prohibition or an order of certiorari, shall, if the Court or a Judge so directs, operate as a stay of the proceedings in question until the determination of the application, or until the Court or a Judge otherwise orders.”
The Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council has as far back as 16 November 1975 declared the applicant destooled and this was brought to the notice of the government which culminated in the issuing out of an executive instrument, the Kukurantumi Stool Property (Seizure) Instrument, 1979 (E.I. 54), ordering the District Chief Executive, East Akim District Council, to take over the Kukurantumi stool property which was then in the possession of the applicant. It was brought to the notice of this court that at the time of this application for leave, the district chief executive had in compliance with E.I. 54 taken over the said stool properties and had locked out the applicant from the Kukurantumi palace. Counsel for the applicant therefore submitted that since the application before the court was for an order to quash the destoolment order made by the
[p.802] of [1980] GLR 799 council on stated grounds and to prohibit the council from giving recognition to any candidate who may be enstooled in his place, it was necessary in the interest of justice that the proceedings against the applicant in respect of his destoolment should be stayed until his application for certiorari and prohibition was heard and determined.
This court after careful consideration of this application felt that indeed it was necessary to stay the said proceedings complained of and consequently exercised its discretion under Order 59, r. 2 (4) by making the following consequential order:
“It is hereby ordered that leave be and is hereby granted the applicant herein to issue out writs of certiorari and prohibition in this matter and that the grant of this leave is to operate as a stay of proceedings, that is to say, the district chief executive should open up the palace of the Kukurantumihene, to enable him to enter therein and continue to exercise the functions of Adontenhene of Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area . . . until the final determination of this application.”
Copies of this order were accordingly served on the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, the District Chief Executive, East Akim District Council, Kibi, and the Regional Administrative Officer, Koforidua, on the same day that the order was made, i.e. 16 November 1979. In that order the district chief executive was specifically ordered to open up the palace of the Kukurantumihene for the applicant to enable him enter and continue to exercise his functions as Kukurantumihene until the validity of his destoolment which is being challenged by him is heard and determined.
Instead of carrying out this interim order the district chief executive on 19 November 1979 filed a motion on notice asking this court to discharge the order made against him on the grounds that:
(1) The order was irregularly obtained.
(2) That Order 59, r. 2 (4), which requires that the grant of leave shall if the judge so directs operate as a stay of proceedings means preservation of the status quo ante, and that at the time the leave was granted the status quo ante was that the applicant had been declared destooled and the stool properties taken over from him.
(3) That at the time leave was granted to the applicant, the district chief executive had already been ordered by an executive instrument E.I. 54 of 1979 to take possession of
[p.803] of [1980] GLR 799 the Kukurantumi stool property and that so long as the said E.I. 54 is in force this court cannot make an order to violate the provisions of the executive instrument.
This court first has to consider whether this application by the district chief executive asking this court to discharge the order made against him is proper at this stage. Order 59 of L.N. 140A expressly lays down the procedure to be adopted by all in respect of hearing of all matters connected with prerogative writs. Order 59, r. 6 provides:
“6. On the hearing of any such motion or summons as aforesaid, any person who desires to be heard in opposition to the motion or summons and appears to the Court or Judge to be a proper person to be heard shall be heard, notwithstanding that he has not been served with the notice or summons, and shall be liable to costs in the discretion of the Court or Judge if the order should be made.”
The above provision does not shut out the applicant or for that matter any person who desires to be heard in opposition to the application for certiorari and prohibition and any consequential orders made thereunder. In the circumstances, the district chief executive on whom a copy of the interim order was served became a party to this application and if he desires to be heard in opposition as it appears from his instant application, then he can only do so after the pursuant notices have been served on all parties concerned and the application is fixed for hearing and determination. Since the pursuant notices have not been served, the original application is not yet ripe for determination and therefore the instant application by the district chief executive is premature and in direct contravention of Order 59, r. 6.
Counsel for the district chief executive in support of this application sought reliance on the judgment of my brother Abban J. in the case of Republic v. Moffat; Ex parte Allotey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 391. In that case the applicant filed an ex parte motion under Order 59, r. 2 (1) and (2) asking for leave to apply for an order of prohibition against the respondents to restrain them from outdooring their candidate for the reason that such an outdooring would prejudice the chances of settling any future constitutional dispute.
The motion was heard and granted on 23 April 1971 the very day it was filed and on the same day the first, second and third respondents were served.
[p.804] of [1980] GLR 799
The return date for the motion was 6 May 1971. The fourth respondent was also served on 28 April 1971. The respondents nevertheless carried out the outdooring on 24 April 1971. The applicant, consequently applied for an order for attachment for contempt of court against all the respondents. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the mere fact that the applicant was granted leave by the court to apply for an order of prohibition could not by itself operate as a stay so as to prevent the respondents from outdooring their said candidate, and that if the applicant wanted a stay he should have, when applying for leave asked for an interim order for stay. And so long as the court never indicated that the order should operate as a stay, as provided under Order 59, r. 2 (4) the respondents could carry on the outdooring ceremony. It was also argued on behalf of the respondents that the order granting leave to the applicant to apply for the writ of prohibition was irregularly obtained and that the application was also misconceived. I reproduce below that portion of the judgment of Abban J. at p. 399 in respect of the said submission:
“Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the application for the order of prohibition against the respondents was misconceived. That may be so. But it cannot be a defence in the present application.
This argument could have been advanced by the respondents, if the respondents had exercised patience and come to court for the hearing of the said application. My view is that whether the said application for an order of prohibition was misconceived or was ill-grounded, it was pending before the court for hearing and determination, and it was the duty of the respondents to come to court and to put forward their reasons why the order nisi, granting leave to the applicant, should not be made absolute. I would be laying down a very dangerous precedent if I were to hold that a party, when served with application for an order of prohibition from the High Court, can disregard or ignore the said application and treat the court with contempt, if he believes that the said application is misconceived.”
This judgment of my brother Abban J. did not in any way suggest that a party on whom a court order has been served, and who believes the order to be misconceived, can on his own motion apply to the court to have the order discharged without waiting to say so at the hearing of the substantive application. What my learned brother said in his judgment was that whatever arguments the respondents had to put forward in opposition to the order, they should exercise
[p.805] of [1980] GLR 799 patience and come to court to urge them at the hearing of the substantive application. This judgment is clearly in line with Order 59, r. 6 of L.N. 140A which this court has earlier referred to as having been infringed by the instant application. The decision in the Moffat case under which the applicant sought to seek refuge unfortunately, therefore, cannot avail him. Consequently, I hold that the application as it stands at present is not properly before this court and cannot therefore be countenanced at this stage.
Counsel for the district chief executive also contended that the order in question was irregularly obtained. Order 70, rr. 1 and 3 provide:
“1. Non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the Court or a Judge shall so direct, but such proceedings may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court or Judge shall think fit . . .”
“2. Where an application is made to set aside proceedings for irregularity, the several objections intended to be insisted upon shall be stated in the summons or notice of motion.”
In the instant case, the applicant who is contending that the order was irregularly obtained failed to state in his notice or motion the several objections he intended to insist upon and in this court he again failed to point out any such irregularity in the application seeking leave to apply for an order of certiorari and prohibition and the orders made by this court in response to the said application. Indeed, learned senior state attorney failed to point out any such irregularity because there is none.
The application for leave was made under Order 59, r. 2 (1) and (2) and the order of this court was made under Order 59, r. 2 (4) which clearly explains the procedure. It seems to me therefore that in the absence of any irregularity being pointed out by the learned senior state attorney, it is preposterous for her to contend that the order was irregularly obtained.
Again, learned senior state attorney for the applicant contended that the interpretation put by the court on Order 59, r. 2 (4) by ordering the district chief executive to open up the palace of Kukurantumihene to enable the said Kukurantumihene to enter the palace and continue to exercise the functions of Adontenhene of Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area until the final determination of this application was erroneous. She argued that in her opinion the “stay of proceedings” used in Order 59, r. 2 (4) means the preservation
[p.806] of [1980] GLR 799 of the status quo ante and the said status quo ante was that the applicant had been declared destooled and the stool properties taken over from him, and consequently, this position is what Order 59, r. 2 (4) intended to preserve. It is indeed surprising and a matter of regret that learned senior state attorney should come to this court and ask the court to set its own order aside on the ground that in her opinion the court has erred in putting the correct interpretation on a point of law. If in the opinion of the learned senior state attorney, the court’s interpretation of the law is erroneous, she is entitled to appeal on that ground for the Court of Appeal to determine whether the court’s interpretation or counsel’s interpretation is the correct one. When pressed to justify this ground, learned senior state attorney quickly shifted ground and submitted that in effect this application could be taken as one by way of review. This argument could not avail her either because review of an order is entirely different from discharging an order and in any case this court cannot see how it can treat this application as one for review.
I now come to the last ground put forward by learned senior state attorney for the applicant and which appears to be the sheet anchor of her case. Learned senior state attorney contended that at the time the order was made for the district chief executive to open up the palace for the Kukurantumihene, he had already been ordered by the Kukurantumi Stool Property (Seizure) Instrument, 1979 (E.I. 54) to take possession of the Kukurantumi stool property and so long as this executive instrument is in force this court cannot make an order to violate the provisions of the executive instrument. She also argued that the district chief executive acted as an agent of the government and not the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, and that since the district chief executive is not a member of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, and the application was against the council, it was wrong for this court to make an order to extend it against him.
Now it is trite learning that the government does not now make and unmake chiefs in this country. Under the Constitution, 1969, the government has to recognise the enstoolment of a chief by publication in the Local Government Bulletin before the said chief shall be deemed to be a chief for the purposes of the exercise by him of any function under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), or any other enactment. This situation also led to the publication of the destoolment of a chief by the government either in the Local Government Bulletin or by executive instrument. However, under the Constitution, 1979, this recognition by government has been taken away. Be that as it may, the government always acted upon the information furnished by the appropriate traditional council that a particular [p.807] of [1980] GLR 799 chief had been enstooled or destooled. The government therefore does not on its own, issue an executive instrument on chiefs but acts on the advice of the traditional council concerned. The government for the purposes of any publication concerning a chief must therefore be taken to be acting as an agent of the traditional council, and consequently, the district chief executive who acts on the publication by the government must be deemed to be acting also as an agent of the traditional council.
The application for an order of certiorari and prohibition filed by the Kukurantumihene was to quash the order of destoolment made by the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, since the very basis which culminated in the issuing out of E.I. 54 of 1979 is being challenged as invalid, it seems to me that any order made by the High Court in respect of this matter can validly be extended to cover all parties who have in one way or the other acted upon the order of the alleged destoolment. The district chief executive therefore having acted upon E.I. 54 of 1979 which was issued by the government as a result of the order of alleged destoolment of the Kukurantumihene by the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, cannot be heard to say that he ought not to be served with any order of the High Court in connection with any acts of his in respect of the said destoolment.
Finally, the submission by learned senior state attorney that this court cannot make an order to violate the provisions of the executive instrument appears to me to be untenable. In Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231 at p. 245, C.A. Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) in delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal stated:
“Counsel for the appellants brought to our attention, two Gazette notices of 27 September 1974 and 12 June 1975. In the first one, the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs took note, on behalf of the government, of the destoolment of the respondent and in the latter one, the Commissioner noted in the same capacity, the enstoolment of a new queenmother for Asokore. These are official acts which cannot be lightly disregarded.
But counsel has not sought to suggest that these notices put a seal of finality on the matter. The government did not profess to do more than take cognisance of these matters. It did not pronounce on their legal validity and has, by itself, no machinery for doing so.”
It seems to me that this observation by the Court of Appeal shows that an executive instrument does not pronounce on the legal validity of the destoolment or enstoolment of a chief, and if the legal validity
[p.808] of [1980] GLR 799 is being challenged by the aggrieved person in the High Court, any orders made as a result of the application is bound to affect the executive instrument, since the very basis culminating in the issue of the instrument is being challenged.
Learned senior state attorney again referred the court to the case of Republic v. Kumasi Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Opoku Agyeman II [1977] 1 G.L.R. 360, C.A. in which the Court of Appeal in allowing an appeal in a destoolment case stated that they recognise the fact that under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), s. 48 (1) and regulations made thereunder, the Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs may by notice published in the Local Government Bulletin recognise a duly installed chief (and for that matter a destooled chief as well) and publish any subsequent correctional notices that may become necessary from time to time. The Court of Appeal therefore directed that their judgment and reasons for judgment in that case should be brought to the attention of the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs for any consequential administrative action he may feel disposed to take as a result of the judgment. With respect, this judgment was delivered at a time when the Constitution, 1969, provided for the recognition of the destoolment and enstoolment of a chief by the government and as such it became necessary in any such case to notify the government. The present 1979 Constitution has taken away this recognition by government of the destoolment and enstoolment of chiefs and thus this authority relied on by the learned senior state attorney is inapplicable at the moment.
The powers of the High Court to issue out prerogative orders have been enshrined in the 1979 Constitution. Article 119 provides:
“119. The Supreme Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all other Courts in Ghana and over any adjudicating authority; and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”
Consequently, E.I. 54 being a mere administrative directive the basis of which is being challenged by a certiorari application, the district chief executive cannot be heard to say that this court cannot make an order under the prerogative writ of certiorari to affect that executive instrument. That apart this cannot be a ground for asking the court to discharge its orders. It could well have been a ground of appeal.
[p.809] of [1980] GLR 799
In the end, I hold that this application apart from being procedurally faulty and misconceived, is also entirely without merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
DECISION
Application to discharge interim orders in a prerogative application dismissed.
D. F. L.
