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[1979] SLR (HC) 72High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

TEKYI ALAIS MENSAH vs. ACKON AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 779

26 November 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 72
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OSCOLATEKYI ALAIS MENSAH v ACKON AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 779 [1979] SLR (HC) 72
APATEKYI ALAIS MENSAH v ACKON AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 779, [1979] SLR (HC) 72 (Ghana).
BluebookTEKYI ALAIS MENSAH v ACKON AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 779, [1979] SLR (HC) 72 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 535.

(2) Manko v. Bonso (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62.

(3) Waya v. Byrouthy (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 413.

(4) Wiafe v. Kom [1973] 1 G.L.R. 240.

(5) Djan v. Owoo [1976] 2 G.L.R. 401.

(6) Short v. Morris (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 339.

(7) Asare v. Antwi [1975] 1 G.L.R. 16, C.A.

(8) Lester v. Foxcroft (1701) Colles 108, H.L.

(9) Campbell v. Mensah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 98, C.A.

(10) Asiama v. Adjabeng [1971] 2 GLR 171, CA.

(11) Boateng v. Ntim [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 671.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for specific performance of an oral agreement allegedly evidenced by a written document whereby the defendant agreed to sell a parcel of land to the plaintiff. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

A. H. Sackeyfio for the Plaintiff.

E. M. Amponsah-Dadzie for the defendant.

T. B. Brodie-Mends for the co-defendant.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

The indorsement on the plaintiff’s writ of summons reads:

“The plaintiff’s claim is for specific performance of an agreement between the parties for the sale of land by the defendant to the

[p.781] of [1980] GLR 779 plaintiff; which said land is situate lying and being at Nbabae Nkanfoa on the south-west of Cape Coast and bounded on the north-west by Abura Abiradze family land, on the south-east by government town boundary line, on the north-east by Twedenfo family land and on the south-west by J. E. Amanquandoh and Kwesi Christian lands, and comprising of 34.98 acres. The plaintiff has fully paid for the said land in the sum of ¢200 plus trama (earnest money of C10) and he is in active possession and has been in possession since 1951, but the defendant is refusing to execute the relevant deed of conveyance wherefore the plaintiff seeks an order of specific performance.”

The plaintiff’s case, in the witness-box, was quite simple. According to him he came to Cape Coast on leave on 31 December 1950 and upon what his mother told him he approached the first defendant and bought from her a piece of land which was sold to him for £100 together with £5 as trama. He agreed with the defendant to pay the purchase price by monthly instalments of £3. Exhibits A to X are some of the receipts which covered the payments he made to the defendant. After the land had been sold to him, the defendant gave him a will which disclosed her root of title and which she took back to show to another vendor. It was also the plaintiff’s case that in 1973 the defendant gave him a document in which she had stated that she had sold the land to him. This document was tendered as exhibit Y. In 1976 the plaintiff took exhibit Z (the deed of conveyance which the plaintiff had drawn up) to the defendant to execute and her failure to do so triggered off this action which seeks to compel her execute the document.

The defendant testified that the land which the plaintiff claims to have purchased from her is a portion of a larger tract of land which descended on her mother, Ekua Etsiwa, by reason of the will which was tendered as exhibit 1. On the death of the defendant’s mother she succeeded her and she thus came to be in possession of the land. According to the defendant, her mother and the plaintiff’s mother were intimate friends and she permitted the plaintiff’s mother to cultivate food crops on a portion of the land and that the plaintiff’s mother used to give her 1 pound or 15s. out of the sale of the crops. The plaintiff was later introduced to her by his mother but she never gave him any land.

It was her case that this land is family land and that she has no right to sell the land. On how she came to thumbprint exhibit Y, the defendant explained that the plaintiff brought her to a place near the Zion Church where she met a man writing down something. After the man had concluded his writing she was asked to thumbprint the document and the plaintiff himself held her thumb to impress it on the document. They assured her that they would

[p.782] of [1980] GLR 779 explain why she had been asked to thumbprint the document but that explanation never came. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought her back home in a car. All this happened when none of her children was around. The co-defendant claims to be the head of the first defendant’s family and he joined the suit to protect the family’s interest in the land.

In exhibit 1 the defendant’s mother was granted letters of administration with will annexed. The will was made by one Kweku Mensah, the defendant’s uncle, where he certified that the village of Mbaba-Mbaba and all its surrounding lands are family property which he had occupied as caretaker. By that document he further sought to appoint Ekua Etsiwa as his successor who should take possession of the village and the surrounding lands on his death. He further declared that the village and the surrounding lands were to go to her “for her use and children’s children absolutely and forever … without any interruption from any member of the Edwinadze family …” The purported disposition of these properties by Kweku Mensah as if they were his self-acquired estate was, undoubtedly, wrongful and voidable.

Exhibit 1 also discloses that Kweku Mensah made this will on 29 May 1922 and died two days later. There is no evidence that since the letters of administration with will annexed were granted to Ekua Etsiwa on 1 November 1922 any person from the first defendant’s family has sued to set aside the disposition made under the said will. The first defendant herself came by the property not only as a beneficiary under the will but also as the successor to her mother. The declaration made by Kweku Mensah’s will, at least, fully acknowledged that the properties belong to the immediate family of the defendant and as she is the successor to her mother, Ekua Etsiwa, who enjoyed these properties, she becomes, at customary law, the head of her immediate family: see Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt.II) 535. It was no wonder that the first defendant minced no words at all when on her first day in the witness-box she said that the land “originally” belonged to her mother but that it now belongs to her.

I have no doubt that the co-defendant was only proposed as the head of family for the purpose of defending this action. There is ample evidence before me that in 1972 the first defendant sold a portion of this Mbaba-Mbaba land to one Mr. Joseph Ebenezer Amanquandoh, the first plaintiff witness. The negotiations for the sale were fully carried out by the defendant alone without the interference of any other person who claimed to be the head of family. It was the defendant herself who also executed the deed of conveyance as the vendor even though it was claimed on behalf of the co-defendant that he was the head of family at the time. As counsel for both

[p.783] of [1980] GLR 779 the defendant and the co-defendant fully acknowledged the validity of the conveyance to the first plaintiff witness which is in exhibit AA, their clients were confronted with the difficulty in explaining why the head of family, i.e. the co-defendant, never joined in the sale.

The simple truth, as contended by the plaintiff, was that the defendant is her own head of family. I accept the first plaintiff witness’ evidence, which was in no way challenged, that one Kwasi Botwe and one Aba Eduakua signed the conveyance as witnesses for the defendant. The plaintiff explained that Aba Eduakua is a daughter to the defendant. But even if it is true that the first defendant is not the head of family and it is also true that she sold the land to the plaintiff without their consent then the alienation is only voidable and the re-opening at the instance of the family must be timeous so that the purchaser may be restored in his former position: see Manko v. Bonso (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62.

In basing his claim on specific performance, the plaintiff has inextricably got himself caught in the tangled web which that doctrine has woven around itself by the rules of equity as well as the provisions of statute. One of the requisites for the grant of specific performance is that there must have been a valid contract. This condition straight-away leads the court to the inquiry as to which of the alleged contracts the plaintiff is seeking to enforce by specific performance. It is his alleged oral contract he entered into with the defendant in 1951 or that which the defendant allegedly confirmed in 1973 in exhibit Y? In either case it was incumbent on the plaintiff to have proved the existence of the contract. The plaintiff, apart from his own evidence, called no other witness to prove that in 1951 the defendant sold the land to her for £100 together with trama in the sum of £5. The plaintiff himself told the court that the reason the defendant gave for selling the land to him was that she needed the money to develop her building. It is hard to believe that, in spite of this reason, the defendant would consent that the plaintiff should take his own time to pay this purchase price in a matter of some three years and at £3 per month. The supposed receipts on the payments were challenged by the defendant who is illiterate. Apart from two of those receipts none of them bears any thumbprint purporting to be the defendant’s and neither does any of them contain any jurat to show that the defendant made the receipt. It was the plain duty of the plaintiff who wanted to place his reliance on exhibits A to X, the receipts, to prove that she did not only cause them to be prepared but that she understood the contents: see Waya v. Byrouthy (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 413 and Wiafe v. Kom [1973] 1 G.L.R. 240.

The plaintiff had to call evidence also to prove that the defendant granted to

[p.784] of [1980] GLR 779 him the vast portion of the land (some 34.98 acres) which he is claiming. After all, he claims to have cultivated only about one-quarter of the land allegedly granted to him. If he had cultivated this whole stretch of land I dare say that the defendant would have been put upon her inquiry to react. I find that the plaintiff has not satisfactorily proved that the defendant sold that particular area of land to him at that particular price.

With regard to exhibit Y, I find that the circumstances under which the plaintiff extracted the document from her are so suspicious that it will be unsafe to hold it out against the defendant. The defendant herself is a grand old woman who is bowed down with considerable age. She said she was fifty years old during the influenza scourge (which occurred in 1918) and she certainly looked above 95 years when she entered the witness-box. As counsel observed she must not have been any younger in 1976 when she was asked to thumbprint exhibit Y which the plaintiff himself got his second witness to prepare at his own dictation.

The second plaintiff witness, in fact, told the fantastic story that the plaintiff and the defendant only came to him to draft the contents of exhibit Y and that thereafter they went away with his draft and returned later with the type-written document, exhibit Y, which the defendant thumbprinted before him. He confessed, however, that they did not take the necessary precautions in dealing with an old woman like the defendant because all they were interested in was to get her thumbprint on the document. Exhibit Y itself has the following contents:

“I Ekua Ackun, formerly staying at Old Bentsir Quarters, Cape Coast and now resident in Ola Bentsir, Cape coast, Housing Estate, house No. 33/34, sold my own land at Mbaba-Mbaba, not family land, to Mr.

Kwamina Tekyi (Safohene of No. 1 Asafo Company, Cape Coast, alias William Mensah) in 1952, and added to him document showing my title deed. The document is a legacy inherited from my mother Madam Ekua Etsiwa whose name is mentioned in the said document dated 22 May 1922.

The land is bounded on the north by Christian land, Abura land and Kwesi Bu land. On the south by government land, on the east by government land, and on the west by Ekua Ackun (vendor’s) land and Pedu land. Dated at Cape Coast on this 30th day of May 1973. her R.T.P.

(Sgd.) J. H. B. Dadzie Ekua Ackun X Writer and Witness mark to Thumbprint.”

[p.785] of [1980] GLR 779 From the sequence of events it seems to me that the plaintiff was advised to get the defendant acknowledge in writing the alleged oral contract of sale so that the plaintiff could use that as his lever to get a formal deed of conveyance executed. I have no doubt that the plaintiff rushed to the first plaintiff witness solicitor after he had seen the first plaintiff witness’ deed of conveyance. That is why the recitals in exhibits Z and AA are in identical words. But this honest and well-intentioned advice of his solicitor was not meant to encourage the plaintiff in using a dubious process in extracting exhibit Y.

Be that as it may, section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Cha. 2, c.3), (which has always been applied by our courts) provides:

“No action shall be brought … whereby to charge the defendant… upon any … contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them …unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.”

Accordingly, an action for specific performance will be excluded under the Statute of Frauds unless there was a signed writing or memorandum of the contract or agreement. The memorandum or writing will, of course, not be complete unless it contained all the essential terms of the agreement, viz: (a) the names of the parties; (b) the description of the property to be transferred; (c) the purchase price of the property; and (d) the signature of the party to be charged therewith or that of some other person he has lawfully authorised to sign: see Djan v. Owoo [1976] 2 G.L.R. 401. It should here be noted that the provisions in section 2 (a) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD 175), which have since 14 January 1974 impliedly replaced section 4 of the Statute of Frauds are not any different from those of the Statute.

Exhibit Y founders and fails to qualify as a note or memorandum of agreement within the meaning of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds as it is silent on the very essential term about the purchase price. Thus in Short v. Morris (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 339, Adumua-Bossman J. refused to decree specific performance for the reason, inter alia, that no ascertained price was disclosed by the memorandum to satisfy the statute. The reasoning in Short v. Morris (supra) was applied of late by the Court of Appeal in Asare v. Antwi [1975] 1 G.L.R. 16, C.A. Exhibit Y again suffers the serious short-coming that as it is an instrument under sections 24 (1) and 36 of the

[p.786] of [1980] GLR 779

Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), its non-registration renders it of no effect until it is registered. The plaintiff cannot, therefore, claim any rights under the unregistered instrument: see Djan v. Owoo (supra).

In spite of the prohibition in section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, equity has, since 1686, addressed itself to what has been described as the task of decorously disregarding an Act of Parliament by means of the doctrine of part-performance. The fundamental idea behind this doctrine, which was firmly established by the House of Lords in Lester v. Foxcroft (1701) Colles. 108, is that if the plaintiff has done acts in performance of his part of the contract, it would be fraudulent of the defendant to plead the statute as a defence, and consequently, equity would enforce the contract despite the absence of any memorandum.

Statutory recognition has been accorded to this doctrine in section 40 (2) of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (hitherto an English Statute of general application and by section III of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which has now been replaced by section 3 (2) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (NRCD 175), where the rules of equity including the rules relating to unconscionability, fraud, duress and part-performance have been expressly recognised to govern sections 1 and 2 of the Decree which generally demand a written memorandum to transfer an interest in land.

In Campbell v. Mensah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 98, the Court of Appeal restated the circumstances which must co-exist for the court to grant specific performance of an oral contract so as to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. The conditions to be satisfied are: (a) the acts of part-performance must be such as not only to be referable to a contract such as that alleged, but to be referable to no other title; (b) they must be such as to render it a fraud in the defendant to take advantage of the contract not being in writing; (c) the contract to which they refer must be such as in its own nature was enforceable by the court; and (d) there must be proper parol evidence of the contract which was let in by the acts of part-performance.

The act of part-performance on which the plaintiff relies is that since 1951 he has occupied the land and made his farms on it. As noted by Williams, Statute of Frauds, Sect. IV, p.253, “in the nature of things no act of part-performance could be so eloquent as to point unequivocally to one particular contract and no other.” Without even stretching the point thus far, I cannot accept the plaintiff’s occupation of the land and his farming thereon necessarily to indicate that the land had been sold to him as that conduct may be consistent with a lease or even a licence. The defendant’s contention is that the plaintiff is a licensee on the land.

[p.787] of [1980] GLR 779

The court requires clear evidence, whether parol or otherwise, that there was a contract and definite in its terms and the onus of establishing this lies on the plaintiff who seeks to be relieved by part-performance. In this regard, the plaintiff seems to rely on customary grant of the land to him in 1951 by the defendant. The co-defendant’s counsel invited the court, and properly so, to discountenance any such claim made by the plaintiff as he failed to prove any cutting of guaha. Of course, the performance of the custom of cutting guaha is an essential element in the conduct of sale under customary grant: see Asiama v. Adjabeng [1971] 2 G.L.R. 171, C.A.; and where there is no such cutting of guaha there must be sufficient publicity of the transfer by unequivocal acts of the transferor: see Boateng v. Ntim [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 671. The plaintiff has, as indicated before, failed to lead any sufficient evidence about any customary sale of the land as will lift the case out of the Statute of Frauds, 677.

In the summons for directions, issues as to estoppel and laches were raised for determination. In Boateng v. Ntim (supra) Ollennu J. (as he then was) stated some of the matters that must be proved to establish acquiescence amounting to laches. These are that: (a) the party relying on it had a bona fide belief that he had a good title to the land, when, in fact, he had none; (b) that the person sought to be estopped had knowledge of the error on the part of the person pleading the estoppel; and (c) that the person pleading it had been led fraudulently, by the silence or active encouragement of the person sought to be estopped to spend money to improve the property or in respect of it. The question of estoppel or of laches will not arise where the defendant says that the plaintiff is on the land upon her own licence.

I am satisfied, from the foregoing reasons, that the plaintiff has failed to prove his claim and I cannot decree any specific performance. I would dismiss his action and I award to the defendant ¢600 costs.

DECISION

Judgment for the defendant.

S. O.

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