REPUBLIC vs. REGISTRAR OF POLITICAL PARTIES; EX PARTE PEOPLE’S VANGUARD PARTY [1981] GLR 316
23 May 1979 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 18 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 80Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Hamilton Gell v. White [1922] 2 K.B. 422; 91 L.J.K.B. 875; 127 L.T. 728; 38 T.L.R. 829, C.A.
[p.318] of [1981] GLR 316
(2) C.F.A.O. v. Thome [1966] G.L.R. 107. S.C.
(3) Farquharson v. Morgan [1894] 1 Q.B. 552; 63 L.T.Q.B. 474; 70 L.T. 152; 58 J.P. 495; 42 W.R.
306; 10 T.L.R. 240; 9 R. 202, C.A.
(4) R. v. Arundel Justices; Ex parte Jackson [1959] 2 Q.B. 89; [1959] 2 All E.R. 407; [1959] 2 W.L.R.
798; 123 J.P. 346; 103 S.J. 433.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the People’s Vanguard Party for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Registrar of Political Parties cancelling its certificate of registration. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy for the applicants.
Mrs. Bamford-Addo, Chief State Attorney for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
In these proceedings, Mr. Kwaw-Swanzy moves on behalf of the People’s Vanguard Party, for an order of certiorari to quash a decision of the Registrar of Political Parties (hereinafter referred to as the registrar) and dated 6 April 1979. The said decision was embodied in a letter exhibited by a copy as K.A.A. 4. The dispute arose in the following circumstances. Among the several parties founded in this country lately, in the quest of offering political leadership in civil government for the Third Republic, was the People’s Vanguard Party (hereinafter referred to as the party). Under the provisions of the Political Parties Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 208), the party was registered as a lawful political organisation and on 9 February 1979 obtained from the registrar a final certificate of registration marked herein as K.A.A. 1. On 9 March 1979 the registrar wrote by exhibit K.A.A. 2 requesting from the party certain information, including particulars and location of offices in the following terms:
“9th March 1979.
Registration of Offices I am directed by the Registrar of Political Parties to ask you to submit to this office by Friday, March 23rd 1979 for registration as provided by section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208, particulars of the location of the national, regional, district and constituency offices of your party.
The particulars required are:
(1) Location of the office.
[p.319] of [1981] GLR 316 (2) Name and address of the owner of the premises in which the office is housed.
(3) If the premises are owned by the party the nature of ownership; (a) lease, (b) freehold or (c) rented. If rented, how much is the rental; and if bought how much it was bought for, and when stating also the name, address and nationality of the owner from whom it was bought.
Signed: Secretary.
To All Political Parties.”
The deadline of 23 March 1979 proved rather too short, and following a joint petition from the political parties, the registrar by a letter dated 27 March 1979, conceded an extension to Wednesday, 28 March 1979. The registrar’s letter is marked K.A.A. 3; and need not be quoted here.
The obvious uncertainty of the receipt of that letter in good time must have been apparent to the registrar. It is a matter of public notoriety that as a cure the registrar caused to be announced on the national radio and television networks on 24 March 1979, the fact of his having acceded to an extension to 12.00 noon, 28 March 1979. This fact is not controverted by the applicants.
Learned counsel for the respondent was anxious and managed to get the registrar’s letter to the national mass media requesting announcement of the extended date tendered as exhibit 1 to prove the date of the registrar’s decision. But in my view the material point is the date of the public announcement. And since exhibit 1 was; so to speak, a res inter alios as far as the applicants were concerned, I pay no regard to it.
It is to be observed that till then the registrar was acting under S.M.C.D. 208, the enactment then in force, and except for the minor complaint of his inclusion of particulars of constituency offices in exhibit K.A.A. 2, the applicants do not complain. Indeed the applicants endeavoured to comply with the registrar’s demands in exhibit K.A.A. 2, within the extended deadline, on the 28 March 1979; but as conceded, at about 4.30 p.m. and that being some four hours outside midday, the particulars were received by the registrar’s office with some protest.
In the meantime on 26 March 1979, a new Decree, the Political Parties Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 229), had come into being, with an attendant repeal of S.M.C.D. 208. Crucial for our inquiry is section 15 (1) of the new Decree which provides:
“15. (1) Within sixty days after the issue to it of a final certificate of registration, a political party shall furnish to the
[p.320] of [1981] GLR 316
Registrar evidence satisfactory to the Registrar of the existence and location of its head or national office and its regional, district and constituency offices.”
In calling for the particulars by exhibit K.A.A. 2 the registrar was then acting under S.M.C.D. 208, s. 14 which in essence left it open to the registrar to fix the time limit for handing in the said particulars. It may be noted that having received its final certificate, exhibit K.A.A. 1, on 9 February 1979, the demand for the said particulars even on 28 March 1979 meant only a period of some 48 days—twelve days short of the 60 days stipulated by section 15 of S.M.C.D. 229. It was in this maze of computation of time that the registrar decided to exercise his statutory power of cancelling the certificate, exhibit K.A.A. 1, on the applicants’ breach of the stipulation of the deadline, i.e. 12.00 noon on 28 March 1979.
His decision was notified to the applicants in the contentious exhibit K.A.A. 4, dated 6 April 1979, and which reads:
“Dear Sir, Registration of Political Parties Pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the Political Parties Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 229), I wrote to you on the 9th of March, 1979 asking you to submit to me by Friday, 23rd March 1979, for registration particulars of the location of the national, regional, district and constituency offices of your party.
1. This period was later extended to Wednesday, March 28th 1979.
2. The particulars of your party’s offices were submitted out of time and I have therefore, cancelled your registration as from today Friday, 6th April 1979, pursuant to section 15 (4) (b) and (c) of the Decree.
3. In this connection, I wish to call your attention to the provisions of section 26 (2) of the Decree and to ask you to advise yourself. You are also required to return to me as soon as possible your party’s certificate of registration.
Yours most sincerely, (Sgd.) Justice J. Kingsley-Nyinah Jnr.
Registrar of Political Parties.”
The relevant parts of section 15 relied upon by the registrar, i.e. subsections (1) and (4) in exhibit K.A.A. 4 and with which Mr. Kwaw-Swanzy takes issue provide:
[p.321] of [1981] GLR 316
“15. (1) Within sixty days after the issue to it of a final certificate of registration, a political party shall furnish to the Registrar evidence satisfactory to the Registrar of the existence and location of its head or national office and its regional, district and constituency offices.
(4) Without prejudice to any other penalty prescribed in relation thereto, where—
(a) any political party refuses or neglects to comply with any provision of this section; or (b) any political party makes any statement in any matter submitted to the Registrar under this section which is false in any material particular; or
(c) the Registrar is at any time satisfied that any political party has refused, neglected or failed to establish or maintain a national office or to establish or maintain a regional office in every region of Ghana, or a district office in every district or a constituency office in every constituency in Ghana, the Registrar shall cancel the registration of that political party.”
It is the submission of learned counsel that as section 15 (1) under which the registrar in exhibit K.A.A. 4 professed to have acted, allowed 60 days for the applicants to furnish the aforesaid particulars; to have fixed 28 March 1979, which allowed the applicants only 48 days amounted to an abridgment of the statutory period of 60 days. It is upon this contention that Mr. Kwaw-Swanzy founded the three grounds in his statement which he argued, namely:
“(e) Under the provisions of S.M.C.D. 229 the respondent has no power to abridge the period of time indicated under section 15 (1).
(f) The cancellation of the applicants’ registration is unauthorised under and by virtue of section 15 (4).
(f) The respondent had no power to ask for the surrender of the applicants’ certificate of registration; the applicants not having been declared a prohibited organisation.”
The grounds all boil down to want or excess of jurisdiction with regard to the section as indicated in the registrar’s letter, exhibit K.A.A. 4. And were that all that there is to it, it would look as though it were the simplest case of want of jurisdiction. The point of the matter, however, is that the registrar until he referred to section 15 of S.M.C.D. 229 in exhibit K.A.A. 4, had all along
[p.322] of [1981] GLR 316 avowed to be acting under S.M.C.D. 208. It was by virtue of section 6 (d) of that Decree that he issued the certificate, exhibit K.A.A.1. It was under section 14 thereof that he called for particulars of party officers. It was under the same section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208 that by public radio and television announcements the registrar conceded to extend the deadline to 12.00 noon on 28 March 1979—which act he confirmed to the applicants in writing on 27 March 1979.
It is the submission of Mrs. Bamford-Addo, learned Chief State Attorney, that notwithstanding the coming into force of the new enactment, S.M.C.D. 229 on 26 March 1979, with its attendant repeal of S.M.C.D. 208 on the same date, the obligation of complying with the requirements of exhibit K.A.A. 2 was imposed, and were to be exacted under section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208. The legal basis of the submission rests on the provisions of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), s. 8 which provides:
“8. (1) The repeal or revocation of an enactment shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal or revocation takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed thereunder; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed or revoked.”
The section may be described as a general statutory saving as to the effect of repeals. Commenting on a similar English enactment, i.e. the Interpretation Act or 1889 (52 and 53 Vict., c. 63), it has been stated that “the provisions would appear to govern all repeals by statute, whether effected expressly or by implication: (see Halsbury’s Laws Of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 36. at pp. 472-473. The case of Hamilton Gell v. White [1922] 2 K.B. 422, C.A. which deals with rights of property, illustrates the principle that rights to be preserved should be specific rights of individuals who before the repeal had
[p.323] of [1981] GLR 316 satisfied any conditions for their acquisition. Again in C.F.A.O. v. Thome [1966] G.L.R. 107, S.C. rights and obligations acquired or incurred under contract for premises let out under the Rent Control Ordinance, 1947 (No. 30 of 1947), by force of the Interpretation Act, 1960, were held to be unaffected by the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952 (No. 2 of 1952), which had repealed the 1947 Ordinance.
Now section 34 (2) of S.M.C.D. 229 made a limited saving by providing that:
“(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Decree [i.e. S.M.C.D. 208 and S.M.C.D. 213] but without prejudice to the generality of section 9 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) any registration lawfully made or any licence or permit lawfully granted under that Decree shall be deemed to have been made or granted under this Decree and the provisions of this Decree shall otherwise apply thereto.”
The aforesaid section 9 of C.A. 4 reads:
“9. Where an enactment is repealed or revoked and another enactment is substituted, by way of amendment, revision or consolidation— (a) all authorities and persons established or acting under the repealed or revoked enactment shall continue to be established, or to be entitled to act, under the substituted enactment;
(b) every bond and security given by a person appointed under the repealed or revoked enactment shall remain in force and all books, papers and things used under it shall continue to be used so far as consistent with the substituted enactment; and (c) all proceedings taken under the repealed or revoked enactment shall be prosecuted and continued under and in conformity with the substituted enactment, so far as consistently may be.”
It is the contention of learned counsel for the applicants that S.M.C.D. 229 having by section 34 (2) made specific saving of certain matters under section 9 of C.A. 4, S.M.C.D. 229 becomes retrospective and no resort can be made to section 8 of C.A. 4, and apparently to any other section thereof. I do not find the wording of section 34 (2) sufficiently express to import retrospectivity of S.M.C.D. 229. That is in my view, for emphasis, and does not exclude the general application of C.A. 4 to other matters that section 34 (2) might not have covered. Nor are the words in section 34 (2) sufficient to invoke the maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius to sustain the argument
[p.324] of [1981] GLR 316 that all other provisions of C.A. 4 are thereby excluded from the operation of S.M.C.D. 229
The Interpretation Act, 1960, deals with general provisions. It now makes it unnecessary for every repealing statute to contain its own host of saving provisions. As noted in regard to the English Interpretation Act of 1889 (52 & 53 Vict., c. 63):
“the existence of the general provisions has made it possible for many statutes subsequently passed to dispense completely with saving provisions, but it may still prove necessary in a particular case to supplement or vary the general provisions by express savings. . .”
(See Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 36 at p. 473.) Again as aptly stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (10th ed.) at pp. 316—317.
“Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was already and more widely the law, have occasionally furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial or limited enactment, resting on the maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in such cases. The only inference which a court can draw from such superfluous provisions (which generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections and the idle doubts), is that the legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive caution.”
I am satisfied that section 34 (2) of S.M.C.D. 229 does not exclude section 8, nor indeed the application of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), as a whole in construing S.M.C.D. 229. By virtue of section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208, the registrar acquired the right or privilege of exacting the penalties under obligations imposed upon the applicants as expressed in exhibit K.A.A. 2, and varied by exhibit K.A.A. 3. I am of the opinion that on the proper construction of section 8 of C.A. 4 the repeal of S.M.C.D. 208 on 26 March 1979 did not extinguish the obligation on the party to submit the aforesaid particulars by 12.00 noon of 28 March 1979. It was a Venitian merchant’s bond that the applicants had incurred, and it was exacted to the letter.
The point then, I think is rightly taken, that the registrar acted in excess of jurisdiction in demanding, in anticipation of S.M.C.D. 229, the particulars of constituency offices in exhibit K.A.A. 2. But that is not the order or decision for which the relief is sought to
[p.325] of [1981] GLR 316 quash; and in any case when the matter reached as far as exhibit K.A.A. 4, the importance of this aspect paled into nothingness. The decision sought to be quashed is to be found in exhibit K.A.A. 4. And the gravamen of the decision is that the applicants submitted the particulars past 12.00 noon. It is not the case of the applicants that the excess demands under section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208 for particulars of constituency offices was the cause of their non-compliance with the zero hour. Consequently the excess of jurisdiction under section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208, does not seem to be material.
Now the learned chief state attorney confesses that the reference by the registrar in exhibit K.A.A. 4, as having acted under section 15 (1) of S.M.C.D. 229 in his demands by exhibit K.A.A. 2, is hard to understand and difficult to defend. Counsel urges the court not to rest on what she terms as a mere technical error, if in all the circumstances it is satisfied the registrar in substance acted within jurisdiction. This she prays on the principle that the grant of a certiorari is discretionary. This submission can rightly, in my view, be limited to the reference to section 15 (1) and not to section 15 (4) (b) and (c) of S.M.C.D. 229. For it may be observed from the text of subsection 15 (4) (b) and (c), earlier quoted above, that the subsections as well as section 26 (2) impose penalties or punishment. Broadly, the imposition of penalties is part of the adjectival law of procedure. And it is trite learning that needs no authority that as a general rule no party has a vested right in procedure. Therefore when the applicants incurred obligations under section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208, then on its repeal on 26 March 1979, any penalties to be imposed were in my opinion rightly imposed under S.M.C.D. 229, ss.15 (4) (a) and 26 (1).
Again in exhibit 4 the registrar in paragraph 4 called the attention of the applicants to the provisions of section 26 (2) of S.M.C.D. 229 and asked for the return to him of the party’s certificate of registration. Section 26 (2) lists a catalogue of prohibitions that a proscribed organisation shall not do. Nowhere in section 26 (2), or under any other section of the S.M.C.D. 229 is the registrar given power to ask the applicants to surrender their certificate. I hold that in so ordering, he acted without any jurisdiction.
To sum up then there appears on the face of exhibit K.A.A. 4, with regard to penalties, erroneous references to sections of S.M.C.D. 229; not only that section 15 (4) (b) and (c) did not apply to the applicants, but also there was excess or want of jurisdiction in asking for the surrender of the certificate. It is with regard to these aberrations in law that learned attorney urges that the court’s discretion to grant the relief of certiorari be exercised against the suppliants.
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It is well to note that although the remedy of certiorari is qualified as a writ of grace, the discretion is exercised judicially upon grounds as known at common law. So the remedy issues ex debito justitiae when the applicant has satisfied the court that his case falls within those grounds. The application here concerns the fundamental human right of right of freedom of association that persons of like minds engendered by virtuous persuasion, or driven by extravagant ideology are free to propagate by lawful means their political faith of fanatism. To deny any group of persons of such right must be in accordance with strict adherence to the law of the land.
By S.M.C.D. 229 far reaching powers have been given to the registrar by which he may proscribe an organisation of persons from taking part in the politics of their country as a political party. Such is the fate of the applicants. And their complaint is that the registrar resting on section 15 (1) of S.M.C.D. 229 had no jurisdiction since his time limit of 28 March fell short of the statutory 60 days. As it happens by operation of section 8 of the Interpretation Act, 1960, the registrar in law and in fact, exercised his jurisdiction under section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208. Again there was under section 15 (4) (a) of S.M.C.D. 229 clear and undisputed penal power to cancel the applicants’ certificate of registration for their default as to the time stipulated by exhibit K.A.A. 2 as later amended.
The applicants pitched their battle on jurisdiction, and on that substance the respondent had jurisdiction under both arms of the inquiry. The question now is does the admittedly erroneous references to the sections pointed out above render fatal the exercise of his jurisdiction ? In Halsbury’s Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. 9, para. 1492 at p. 887, there is the following statement of the law:
“Merely formal or accidental errors on the face of the proceedings do not now afford ground for certiorari.
Where there occurs any omission or mistake in drawing up an order or judgment of justices, and it is shown that there was evidence before them which would have authorised the drawing up of the order, court may free from such omission or mistake, the superior court may on certiorari amend the order or judgment and adjudicate thereupon as though no such omission or mistake existed. If, however, the error complained of is one of substance, and not merely formal, it cannot be amended and must be quashed on certiorari.”
Again in Farquharson v. Morgan [1894] 1 Q.B. 552, C.A. it was held to be wrong exercise of discretion to refuse the relief of prohibition to a lessor, where total absence of jurisdiction appears on the face
[p.327] of [1981] GLR 316 of the proceedings in the inferior court on the ground that the applicant had acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction by the inferior court. The principle I discern from these statements of the law quoted, as applicable to the facts here, is that the substantial issue of jurisdiction having been established, it may not be defeated by the mistaken references to the relevant enactments thereof. It will therefore be the duty of this court to order that exhibit K.A.A. 4 be amended by substitution section 14 of S.M.C.D. 208 for section 15 of the Political Parties Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 229) and also section 15 (4) (a) of S.M.C.D. 229 for section 15 (4) (b) and (c) of S.M.C.D. 229.
One more matter yet. With regard to the registrar’s order in exhibit K.A.A. 4 asking for the surrender of the certificate, exhibit K.A.A. 1, section 15 (4) (a) goes no further than empowering the respondent to cancel the registration of the offending political party. I am satisfied that it is excess of jurisdiction to demand its surrender. The law is that if the invalid part of an order or conviction is distinct and severable from the remainder, certiorari may issue to quash that part only: see R.v. Arundel Justices; Ex parte Jackson [1959] 2 W.L.R. 798. I am satisfied that the part of exhibit K.A.A. 4 ordering surrender of the certificate is clearly distinct and severable, and I hereby quash that order in exhibit K.A.A. 4 which amounts to the applicants being entitled to keep exhibit K.A.A.1—and may be for a collector’s treasure at some future time. Save as to this, the application is dismissed. By that conclusion my order of stay of proceedings dated 10 April 1979 is hereby vacated.
The applicants having won in part there will be diminished costs of ¢200 to the respondent.
DECISION
Application for certiorari granted in part.
D. F. L.
