KWABENA vs. ATUAHENE [1981] GLR 136
28 February 1980 · ARCHER JA · ≈ 15 min read
[1980] SLR (CA) 14Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Anane v. Donkor [1965] G.L.R. 188, S.C.
(2) Baruwa v. Ogunshola (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 159.
(3) Udofia v. Afia (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 216.
(4) Bedu v. Agbi [1972] 2 G.L.R. 239, C.A.
(5) Darko v. Agyakwa (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 163.
(6) Peniana v. Affram [1966] G.L.R. 220, S.C.
(7) Wardie v. Bukari (Awudu) [1976] 2 G.L.R. 371, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff. The facts are stated in the judgment of Archer J.A.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellant.
No appearance by or for the respondent
JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.
In this case, the plaintiff claimed against the defendant, a declaration of title to one cocoa and foodstuff farm situated at Bronkrome on Tepa stool land, damages for trespass, recovery of possession and perpetual injunction. The circuit court sitting at
[p.137] of [1981] GLR 136
Kumasi gave judgment for the plaintiff and granted the reliefs sought.
The defendant has appealed from that judgment to this court and the only ground of appeal filed by him was, “that the judgment of the learned circuit judge is against the weight of evidence.” In arguing this sole ground, learned counsel for the defendant concentrated mainly on the identity of the land and submitted that the plaintiff failed to establish the identity of the land in dispute and as such he was not entitled to a declaration. In support of this argument, learned counsel drew attention to the description of the land and the names of the boundary owners in the indorsement on the original writ of summons and submitted that the particulars indorsed were at variance with the description given by the plaintiff in his evidence-in-chief.
It would be convenient at this stage to dispose of this submission first. The indorsement on the writ of summons is:
“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant herein is for declaration of title to one cocoa and foodstuff farm situate at a place commonly known as Bronkrome on Tepa stool land forming boundary with Abena Broni, Kwaku Eshun, Bronkrome stream or Akontabuo stream and Osei Akwasi.”
It appears from the record of appeal that on 6 October 1974, the plaintiff filed an amended writ of summons and thereby amended his indorsement as follows:
“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant herein is for:
Declaration of title to one cocoa and foodstuffs farm situate and being at a place commonly known as Bronkrome on Tepa stool land bounded on all sides by the properties of Abena Broni, Kwaku Eshun, Bronkrome stream, Akontabuo stream, Osei Akwasi, Owusu Dome, Kwaku Boateng, Kojo Ofeh and Yaw Adom.”
Undoubtedly, this amendment became necessary in view of the plaintiff’s directions to the surveyor filed on 19 August 1974, as follows:
“(a) Boundaries with Abena Broni, Kwaku Eshun, Osei Kwasi, the Bronkrome, Akontabuo stream, Yaw Adom, Kojo Ofeh, Kwaku Boateng, Kwabena Dome and Osei Kwabena.
(b) Features: Bronkrome stream, flowers, Dannan tree, Akontabuo stream.”
On 16 December 1974, the plaintiff, by his solicitor, filed the following pursuant order:
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“Pursuant to the order of this court, I shall be grateful if the following boundary features could be shown on the plan:
(1) Boundary with Osei Kwasi: flowers, Watapuo, Odangya, Odum, forest and Akontabuo stream.
(2) Boundary with Owusu Dome: Nyankerenee tree, flowers, Onwama, the plaintiff’s cocoa-farrn and Bronkrome stream.
(3) Boundary with Kwaku Boateng and Kojo Ofeh: Bronkrome stream.
(4) Boundary with Yaw Adom: Bronkrome stream.
(5) Boundary with Abena Broni: flowers, ant hills (2), Wawa tree, flowers.
(6) Boundary with Kramo Yaa alias Kwaku Ashong: flowers, Odum trees, flowers, Onwama tree and Akontabuo stream.
(7) Boundary with Osei Kwabena: Akontabuo stream.”
These amendments to the writ of summons and detailed directions to the surveyor preceded the plaintiff’s evidence-in-chief on 4 June 1975 when he described the land, its location and boundary owners consistently with the amended indorsement. When the learned circuit judge delivered his judgment, he commenced as follows:
“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant herein is for ‘declaration of title to one cocoa and foodstuff farm situate at a place commonly known as Bronkrome on Tepa stool land forming boundary with Abena Broni, Kwaku Eshun, Bronkrome stream, Akontabuo stream and Osei Akwasi, Owusu Dome, Kwaku Boateng, Kojo Ofeh and Yaw Adom’ as amended.”
(The emphasis is mine.) No doubt the learned circuit judge wrote his judgment with the amended indorsement in mind. Notwithstanding this obvious mental approach on the part of the learned circuit judge, this court was referred to the original indorsement on the writ of summons without the amendment as the basis for the defendant’s learned counsel’s argument that the indorsement was materially different from what the plaintiff said in evidence and not in consonance with what the learned trial judge said in his judgment. It seems to me that if learned counsel for the defendant had taken cognisance of the amendment, his animadversions on this point would not have been necessary. In my view, the submission that the indorsement on the plaintiff’s writ of summons as regards his boundaries was at variance with his evidence is untenable.
Another argument urged on this court was that the plaintiff in his evidence mentioned two farms and thereby created confusion as
[p.139] of [1981] GLR 136 to the exact identity of the land in dispute. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff’s nephew, one Appiah, had a cocoa farm in the area and acquired his land one year earlier. After Appiah’s death, that cocoa farm went to his brother Kwame Ofeh. The farm lies within the area between the Kunsu-Wiawso-Tepa road and the Akontabuo stream. The plaintiff’s own farm, that is, the cocoa farm in dispute, lies about half a mile from the said road. The evidence further shows that some time after Appiah’s death, one Abena Kwabena trespassed on Appiah’s land and as a result, the plaintiff in his capacity as Appiah’s uncle, sued Abena Kwabena before the Tepahene. The plaintiff won the action for Appiah. The plaintiff explained that upon Appiah’s death his cocoa farm became family property and as he had an interest as a member of Appiah’s family, he sued.
In his reply to the amended statement of defence, the plaintiff averred that he had two farms at the place commonly known as Bronkrome on Tepa stool lands and that the second farm which was not in dispute was bounded on all sides by the properties of Kofi Asutia, Osei Kofi, Abena Kwabena, Kwaku Boateng and Kofi Fofie. But in cross-examination, the plaintiff explained that this particular second farm belonged to his deceased nephew Appiah and did not form part of the land in dispute. After giving evidence, the plaintiff filed an amended reply to the amended statement of defence and pleaded:
“The plaintiff denies paragraphs (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12) of the amended statement of defence: the plaintiff further avers that he has only one cocoa farm at ‘Bronkrome’ and his late nephew also had one cocoa farm there bounded on all sides by the properties of Kofi Asutia, Osei Kofi, Abena Kwabena, Kwaku Boateng and Kofi Fofie but that farm cultivated by Appiah is not in dispute.”
On 8 January 1976 the amendment was granted by the court without any objection from learned counsel for the defendant at the trial on the ground that the amendment tallied with evidence already adduced by the plaintiff. It appears that from the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff all along sued in respect of one farm only and that the inaccurate pleading in the reply to the amended statement of defence was corrected without delay.
Did the plaintiff succeed in establishing the identity of the land satisfactorily according to law so as to entitle him to a declaration of title and the other reliefs he sought? In Anane v. Donkor [1965] G.L.R. 188 at p. 192, the then Supreme Court, per Ollennu J.S.C., as he then was, stated the law as:
[p.140] of [1981] GLR 136
“Where a court grants declaration of title to land or makes an order for injunction in respect of land, the land the subject of that declaration should be clearly identified so that an order for possession can be executed without difficulty, and also if the order for injunction is violated, the person in contempt can be punished. If the boundaries of such land are not clearly established, a judgment or order of the court will be in vain.
Again, a judgment for declaration of title to land should operate as res judicata to prevent the parties relitigating the same issues in respect of the identical subject-matter, but it cannot so operate unless the subject-matter thereof is clearly identified. For these reasons a claim for declaration of title or an order for injunction must always fail if the plaintiff fails to establish positively the identity of the land to which he claims title with the land the subject-matter of the suit.”
See also Baruwa v. Ogunshola (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 159. It is also settled law that a plaintiff who claims declaration of title to land must establish all his boundaries: see Udofia v. Afia (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 216 and also Bedu v. Agbi [1972] 2 G.L.R. 238, where this court held that failure by the plaintiffs to establish their northern boundary was fatal to their claim. It may also be mentioned that where there is no properly oriented plan drawn to scale, which makes compass bearings vague and uncertain, the court would hold that the plaintiff has not discharged the onus of proof of his title : see Darko v. Agyakwa (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 163.
In the present case, the court ordered a proper survey of the area in dispute to be conducted by a licensed surveyor and a plan properly orientated and drawn to scale prepared. The area in dispute claimed by the plaintiff could be described near-accurately as oblong in shape and as such appears to have four sides. Both parties were present at the survey; in the case of the plaintiff who was too old, he was represented by his son Kwadwo Antwi, the second plaintiff witness. In his evidence the plaintiff narrated how he came by the land through a grant to him by the then Tepahene. He testified that he was requested to cultivate from the Bronkrome stream which formed his north-western boundary towards the Akontabuo stream but he was specifically enjoined not to go beyond the latter stream. On his behalf, two boundary owners who farmed on the other side of the Bronkrome stream, that is Yaw Adom, the fifth plaintiff witness, and Kwadwo Ofeh, the fourth plaintiff witness, testified that the plaintiff had his cocoa farm on the other side of the Bronkrome stream. As regards his north-eastern boundary, he was able to establish not only the physical features of this boundary but also who were his boundary
[p.141] of [1981] GLR 136 owners through the evidence of Osei Kwasi, the first plaintiff witness, and of Owusu Dome, the first defendant witness. These witnesses confirmed that they had a common boundary with the plaintiff and that the area marked as Nkrahene’s farmstead, pointed out to the surveyor by the defendant, in fact, belonged to the plaintiff.
As regards his western boundary, the plaintiff established positively that he had a common boundary with two farmers, namely, Kwaku Ashong or Eshun (alias Kramo, Yaa) and Abena Broni. In discharge of his burden of proof of this particular boundary, he tendered in evidence without objection, exhibit A—a High Court judgment in favour of the plaintiff in an action for trespass against Abena Broni. That judgment could not be binding on the defendant as he was not a party to that suit. Nevertheless, it was an invaluable piece of evidence which supported the plaintiff’s claim to land adjoining this particular boundary. In Peniana v. Affram [1966] G.L.R. 220 at p. 225, Bruce-Lyle J.S.C. (as he then was) speaking for the then Supreme Court said:
“The principle of law is that a judgment in a previous land suit is admissible in a subsequent suit though one of the parties to the subsequent suit was not a party to the former suit; such a judgment is admissible as evidence of acts of possession and evidence of acts of ownership but not as establishing res judicata and this principle was followed in the case of Ababio II v. Catholic Mission (Priest-in-Charge) (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.
380.”
The evidence clearly shows that when the plaintiff sued Abena Broni (the litigation in exhibit A) he sued on his own behalf as owner of the farm in dispute. He did not sue on behalf of his deceased nephew Appiah whose farm was situated elsewhere. Moreover, the plaintiff testified in the present suit that the defendant was aware of the litigation in exhibit A when a writ of fi. fa. was executed against Abena Broni in Bronkrome. If the defendant in 1967, when exhibit A was delivered, knew that Abena Broni was his co-boundary owner he would have taken steps to challenge the plaintiff’s title declared by the court against Abena Broni.
The boundary that generated the present suit is the plaintiff’s south-eastern boundary, that is the Akontabuo stream. The plaintiff testified that when he was granted the land he was specifically requested not to farm beyond this stream. The plaintiff in cross-examination stated that it was the defendant’s deceased brother, Kwadjo Fordjour, who farmed on the other side of the Akontabuo stream until his death. However in 1967 when he detected that the defendant had crossed this stream and was farming into his land he caused a letter
[p.142] of [1981] GLR 136 to be written to the defendant whose conciliatory reply is contained in exhibit B. As regards this particular boundary, the learned circuit judge declared:
“I find that the defendant, Osei Kwabena, succeeded his deceased brother Kwadjo Fordjour, and took over his farm in the area. I find that it was after he had taken over the farm that the defendant cleared the intervening forest between the plaintiff’s land and that of the defendant’s deceased brother. The defendant could not go beyond the stream Gyankontabuo, since the plaintiff was already in occupation of the area, and had made his farm there. I find therefore that the boundary between the plaintiff’s farm and the defendant’s farm at the point is the stream Gyankontabuo with the defendant’s farm on the left banks and the plaintiff’s farm lying immediately on the right banks thereof.”
These findings, in my view, are not only reasonable but also totally correct in view of the evidence and cannot be upset. But it seems to me that in his attempt to claim the area edged yellow, the defendant in his pleadings and in his evidence introduced the farm of the deceased Appiah as the farm that belonged to the plaintiff. He also carved out Nkrahene’s farmstead out of the area claimed by the plaintiff to buttress his case. But Nkrahene’s farmstead was disowned in evidence by Osei Kwasi, the first plaintiff witness who succeeded Nkrahene.
The strategy of the defendant was to dispossess the plaintiff of every piece of the area edged green, that is, 59.19 acres. He narrated in evidence how his father, Kofi Asutia, acquired the land from the Tepa stool and how subsequently his father gave portions of the land to his two brothers Kwasi Owusu Kokor and Yaw Nkrahene and another piece to himself, the defendant, whose portion was on the left side of Nkrahene’s farm. He mentioned the Kumasi-Kunsu-Wiawso motor road as the starting point of the four farms. If one looks at exhibit X and the location sheet, it becomes obvious that the said road also described as the Kunsu-Wiawso-Tepa road is some distance away from the area in dispute. The defendant confessed that when his father went to the land he was young and he got his land from his father when he was about eighteen years. He furthers alleged that it was his father, Asutia, who took the plaintiff to the Tepahene for his land to farm on but eventually the plaintiff cultivated all the forest land between his portion and the farms of the three brothers, that is, Asutia, Kokor and Nkrahene. A complaint was laid before the then Tepahene who found in favour of the three brothers. According to the defendant, panel members visited the
[p.143] of [1981] GLR 136 land on inspection before the Tepahene pronounced his decision and warned the plaintiff not to cultivate in the direction of the three brothers. This piece of evidence was confirmed by the Tepahene, the third defendant witness. Nevertheless, the Tepahene’s decision has no relevance to the Akontabuo stream, the south-eastern border claimed by the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant was not one of the complainants in that dispute. The learned circuit judge was therefore justified in treating this piece of evidence as irrelevant.
It was also argued that the evidence of the defendant’s wife, the second defendant witness, did not support the plaintiff’s case as reasoned by the learned circuit judge in his judgment. As I pointed out earlier, the defendant’s stand was that if the plaintiff had any farm at all, then it was the farm cultivated by Appiah (deceased) for the plaintiff which was half a mile away from the area in dispute. Indeed, he claimed a substantial portion of the area edged green and attributed ownership of the rest to Nkrahene. In effect, he maintained that all the cocoa farms in the area edged green did not belong to the plaintiff. Yet when the defendant’s wife, the second defendant witness, gave evidence, she testified that the plaintiff had a farm in the area and mentioned that the plaintiff’s farm was on the right, Asutia’s farm on the left; followed by Owusu Kokor’s farm and then Nkrahene’s farm and lastly by her husband’s farm. This narrative agrees with the boundaries stated in exhibit X as regards the adjoining boundary owners on the eastern boundary of the land in dispute. I think the learned circuit judge was justified in saying that this piece of evidence by the defendant’s wife supported the plaintiff’s case.
It seems to me that this is a case where the plaintiff successfully proved his title not by the weakness of his adversary’s case but rather won his case by the strength of the evidence he adduced. Briefly, he discharged the onus of proof required by law as regards the identity of the land. I would therefore dismiss the appeal and affirm the declaration of title to the area marked green on exhibit X and the other reliefs granted by the court below in favour of the plaintiff.
Finally, I wish to quote the following dicta in Udofia v. Afia (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. at p. 219:
“We think it desirable to state that we consider that the practice followed by one Judge at least in this country [Nigeria] of making the plan part of his judgment and causing it to be pasted in the judgment book is a practice which should be the rule in this country. The plan will, if the land claimed and awarded is clearly marked, be a permanent record and might obviate subsequent dispute in respect of the same land.”
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This sentiment was expressed 40 years ago and its inherent wisdom has not undergone my attrition; instead it has grown, in stature in view of what happened in Wordie v. Awudu Bukari [1976] 2 G.L.R. 371 at p. 380, where this court was obliged to adduce fresh evidence suo motu with the consent of the parties in order to establish the true identity of a plan relevant to a previous judgment—an exercise that would have been unnecessary if the plan had been pasted together with the judgment in the relevant court record books. I wholeheartedly recommend the 1940 suggestion to the registrar of this court for consideration and implementation.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
K. A. A. M.
