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[1980] SLR (CA) 16Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

VANDERPUYE vs. PIONEER SHOE FACTORY LTD. [1981] GLR 181

28 July 1980 · ARCHER JA · ≈ 32 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (CA) 16
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OSCOLAVANDERPUYE v PIONEER SHOE FACTORY LTD. [1981] GLR 181 [1980] SLR (CA) 16
APAVANDERPUYE v PIONEER SHOE FACTORY LTD. [1981] GLR 181, [1980] SLR (CA) 16 (Ghana).
BluebookVANDERPUYE v PIONEER SHOE FACTORY LTD. [1981] GLR 181, [1980] SLR (CA) 16 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330; 37 L.J.Ex. 161; 19 L.T. 220; 33 J.P. 70, H.L. affirming Fletcher v. Rylands (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 265.

(2) Kesiwah v. Jaja [1976] 2 G.L.R. 280, C.A.

(3) Ansah v. Busanga [1976] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A.

(4) Boateng v. Oppong [1980] G.L.R. 946, C.A.

(5) Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H. & C. 596; 5 New Rep. 420; 34 L.J.Ex.

220; 13 L.T. 148; 11 J.N.S. 204; 13 W.R. 410; 159 E.R. 665.

(6) Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co., Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 392; [1950] A.C. 185; 114 J.P. 172;

66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 597; 94 S.J. 128, H.L.; reversing [1949] 1 K.B. 54; [1948] 2 All E.R. 460; [1948] L.J.R. 1921; 64 T.L.R. 462; 92 S.J. 528, C.A.

(7) Sochacki v. Sas [1947] 1 All E.R. 344, P.C.

(8) Easson v. London and North Eastern Railway Co. [1944] K.B. 421; [1944] 2 All E.R. 425; 113 L.J.K.B. 449; 170 L.T. 234; 60 T.L.R. 280; 88 S.J. 143, C.A.; 8 Digest (Repl.) 83.

(9) Rickards v. Lothian [1913] A.C. 263; [1911-13] All E.R. Rep. 71; 82 L.J.P.C. 42; 108 L.T. 225; 29 T.L.R. 281; 57 S.J. 281, P.C.

(10) Read v. Lyons (J.) & Co., Ltd. [1945] K.B. 216; [1945] 1 All E.R. 106; 114 L.J.K.B. 232; 172 L.T.

104; 61 T.L.R. 148, C.A.; affirmed [1947] A.C. 156; [1946] 2 All E.R. 471; [1947] L.J.R. 39; 175 L.T. 413; 62 T.L.R. 646; 91 S.J. 54, H.L.

(11) Musgrove v. Pandelis [1919] 2 K.B. 43; [1918-19] All E.R. Rep. 589; 88 L.J.K.B. 915; 120 L.T.

601; 35 T.L.R. 299; 63 S.J. 353 C.A.

(12) Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924]1 K.B. 341; 93 L.J.K.B. 261; 130 L.T. 522;

40 T.L.R. 88; 68 S.J. 501, C.A.

[p.185] of [1981] GLR 181

(13) Goldman v. Hargrave [1967] 1 A.C. 645; [1966] 2 All E.R. 989; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 513; 110 S.J.

527; [1966] 2 Lloyds Rep. 65; [1967] A.L.R. 113, P.C.

(14) Collingwood v. Home & Colonial Stores, Ltd. [1936] 3 All E.R. 200; 155 L.T. 550; 53 T.L.R. 53, 80 S.J. 853, C.A.

(15) Mason v. Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd. [1967] 2 Q.B. 530; [1967] 2 W.L.R. 1384; [1967] 2 All E.R. 62.

(16) Huffell v. Armistead (1835) 7 C. & P. 56; 48 R.R. 756.

(17) Mellows v. Low [1923] 1 K.B. 522; [1923] All E.R. Rep. 537; 92 L.J.K.B. 363; 128 L.T. 667; 39 T.L.R. 190; 67 S.J. 261; 21 L.G.R. 180, D.C.

(18) Alameddine Brothers v. Paterson Zochonis & Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 403, C.A.

(19) Packer v. Gibbins (1841) 1 Q.B. 421; 1 Gal. & Dar. 10; 10 L.J.Q.B. 224; 5 Jur. 1036; 113 E.R.

1194.

(20) Sedleigh-Denfield v. O’Callaghan [1940] 3 All E.R. 349; [1940] A.C. 880; 164 L.T. 72; 56 T.L.R.

887; 84 S.J. 657; sub nom. Sedleigh-Denfield v. St. Joseph’s Society for Foreign Missions 109 L.J.K.B. 893, H.L.

(21) Solomons v. R. Gertzenstein Ltd. [1954] 1 Q.B. 565; [1954] 2 Q.B. 243; [1954] 2 W.L.R. 823;

[1954] 3 W.L.R. 317; [1954] 1 All E.R. 1008; [1954] 2 All E.R. 625, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from judgment of the High Court, dismissing the appellant’s claim for damages arising from a fire outbreak. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of Archer J.A.

COUNSEL

Adumua-Bossman for the appellant.

Tsatsu Tsikata for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.

In 1967, the appellant’s agent let a warehouse in a complex of buildings, known as Derby Works, in Accra, to the respondents, manufacturers of shoes and footwear, under an oral agreement at a monthly rent of ¢200. The warehouse was used by the respondents mainly for the storage of manufactured footwear and raw materials like leather, rubber soles and rubber sheets.

On 29 November 1972, at about 6 p.m. fire was detected in the warehouse by residents in the complex and the Fire Brigade was called in. Notwithstanding the efforts of the fire-fighting team, the warehouse together with an annex used as offices (but not let to the respondents) was completely burnt down. The respondents lost all the goods stored in the warehouse. The sparks from the fire damaged property in an adjoining house.

[p.186] of [1981] GLR 181

The appellant, as the landlord, then issued a writ of summons at the High Court, Accra, and claimed damages from the respondents for damages caused by the fire to the warehouse and the annex with its contents. The basis for the appellant’s claim was summarised in paragraphs (3), (4), (7) and (10) of the statement of claim as:

“(3) In the evening of 29 November 1972, a devastating fire broke out in the said warehouse owing to the defendant-company’s negligent storage of quantities of the highly combustible rubber, plastic and artificial leather forming the bulk of the materials used by the defendant-company in its manufactures, or alternatively, owing to the negligent dropping of a lighted cigarette but or match or other burning matter by an employee of the defendant-company in the said warehouse.

(4) Further or in the alternative, assuming but not admitting that the fire was not negligently caused, the defendant-company either unlawfully allowed the fire to escape or was negligent in allowing it to spread northward beyond the said warehouse to an adjoining part of Derby Works known as the ‘extension office’.

(7) By failing to remove the unsightly mass of charred remains of rubber, plastics and artificial leather the defendant-company has committed and continues to commit a nuisance of waterlogged rubbish which is breeding mosquitoes and an infestation of rats to the danger and discomfort and annoyance of the plaintiff in the unburnt residential parts of Derby Works.

(10) The defendant-company has unlawfully refused to pay rents since 31 October 1973, on the ground that it has lost the use of the gutted warehouse.”

The appellant’s case therefore rested on the common law ranging from the law of negligence, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, nuisance and to the law relating to recovery of rent. At the trial, the appellant called his relative, Evelyn Nortey, and his own daughter, Miss Okailey Vanderpuye. These two ladies saw the outbreak of the fire in the warehouse which later spread. Two fire officers also gave evidence on their operation to extinguish the fire that night. In addition, the then warehouse-keeper employed by the respondents also gave evidence as to the condition in which he left the warehouse before closing for the day. There was also evidence on the extent of the damage caused by the fire. The respondents did not give evidence and did not call any witnesses although they had counterclaimed for the refund of rents paid to the appellant after the warehouse had been gutted by the fire.

[p.187] of [1981] GLR 181

The learned trial judge in his judgment held that: (1) the appellant had failed to prove negligence on the part of the respondents and that res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the case; (2) the doctrine in Rylands v. Fletcher could not apply because the use of the warehouse by the respondents could not be said to be non-natural; (3) as the appellant had not addressed the court on the question of nuisance the court declined to deal with the issue; and (4) since the tenancy was not a demise for a term certain, the respondents were under no legal obligation to pay rent after the destruction of the warehouse. He also dismissed the respondents’ counterclaim as they chose not to offer any evidence to prove their counterclaim.

From that judgment, the appellant has appealed to this court. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted on the first and third additional grounds, which he argued together, that the appellant adduced enough evidence to raise a presumption of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur and the presumption should have been rebutted by the respondents by giving an explanation as to how the fire might have been caused; that as the respondents failed to give any explanation by not giving evidence, the learned trial judge should have held that the appellant had succeeded in proving his case. Learned counsel further argued that even if res ipsa loquitur did not apply, there was evidence of negligence on the part of the respondents. In support of this submission, he suggested that as the warehouse had been locked up at 5 p.m. and the fire was discovered after 6 p.m., then whatever caused the fire must have been left in the warehouse before it was locked up. He further argued that the respondents had defective fire-fighting equipment although they owed a duty of care to the appellant not to allow the fire to spread to adjoining premises.

Was there negligence? The fire officers could not, as experts, state what caused the fire. The insurers and their adjusters maintained that the cause of the fire was fortuitous, meaning accidental or caused by chance. The warehouse-keeper who was the last person to leave the warehouse testified that none of the employees in the warehouse smoked. He locked up the warehouse with padlocks and keys which were handed over to the workshop manager. There was no evidence that the watchman or an intruder thereafter opened the warehouse. There was no overt act on the part of the respondents or their servants and agents to suggest that the fire was caused by the negligence of the respondents. In such a case it seems to me that the learned trial judge was right when he held that the appellant had failed to establish negligence.

[p.188] of [1981] GLR 181

Was negligence established by the rule of evidence popularly known as res ipsa loquitur? The real complaint of the appellant was that after he had concluded his evidence and closed his case, the respondents should have given evidence by explaining how the accident happened or could have happened. In other words, the respondents did not rebut the presumption of negligence. Learned counsel for the appellant cited the cases of Kesiwah v. Jaja [1976] 2 G.L.R. 280, C.A. and Ansah v. Busanga [1976] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A. and submitted that the respondents’ failure to give evidence should have tilted the scales in favour of the appellant. In the recent and latest decision of this court in Boateng v. Oppong [1980] G.L.R. 946, CA, it was held that whenever the rule of res ipsa loquitur was relied on by the plaintiff, then a defendant had to discharge the evidential burden of displacing the inference of negligence against him. In the present appeal, failure by the respondents to enter the witness-box is not the sole and paramount consideration. What matters in my view is whether there was evidence during the trial to suggest that the respondents bad been negligent, or whether the facts as stated by the appellant were such that an inference of negligence could be drawn from those facts. Erle C.J. in Scott v. London and St. Katherine’s Docks Co. (1865) 3 H. & C. 596 at p. 600 in propounding this rule of evidence chose his words very carefully thus:

“There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary cause of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.”

It follows that absence of an explanation is a sine qua non for the operation or the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. This was emphasised by Lord Porter in Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co., Ltd. [1950] 1 All E.R. 392 at p. 394, H.L.:

“The doctrine is dependent on the absence of explanation, and although it is the duty of the defendants, if they desire to protect themselves, to give an adequate explanation of the cause of the accident, yet, if the facts are sufficiently known, the question ceases to be one where the facts speak for themselves, and the solution is to be found by determining whether, on the facts as established. negligence is to be inferred or not.”

[p.189] of [1981] GLR 181

Fortunately for the respondents, the vital witness, that is their warehouse-keeper, Bamfo Sampong, who could have been called by the respondents to give evidence (because he had control and management of the warehouse and was the last person to leave the warehouse) was called by the appellant. The effect of the whole evidence of this witness in examination-in-chief and in cross-examination was to exonerate the respondents from any liability in negligence. He was emphatic that nobody smoked in the warehouse—a possible theory for the cause of the fire which was suggested by the fire officers in their reports and also by the insurers and their adjusters. It seems to me therefore that where the evidence of explanation expected from the respondents has already been furnished by the appellant’s own witness res ipsa loquitur cannot automatically apply by the mere physical absence from the witness-box of the respondents or their witnesses.

As a follow-up, learned counsel for the appellant further argued that the learned trial judge erred in law by misinterpreting the decision in Sochacki v. Sas [1947] 1 All E.R. 344, D.C. to mean that res ipsa loquitur has no application to tortious liability arising from outbreaks of fire. In his judgment, the learned trial judge quoted the last paragraph of Lord Goddard C.J.’s judgment in the Sochacki case (supra) at p. 345:

“Counsel for the defendants argued that I am bound to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but I do not think this is a case of res ipsa loquitur. Everybody knows fires occur through accidents which happen without negligence on anybody’s part. There is nothing here to show that the plaintiff left any improper fire in his room, any larger fire than usual, a fire which was too large for the grate, or anything like that. There was a fire burning in his room. He left his room for two or three hours. I do not consider that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could possibly apply to a case such as this. I come to the conclusion here that there is no evidence of negligence against the plaintiff in this case, and without evidence of negligence there is no liability on the plaintiff for the fire. Consequently, there will be judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants, with costs.”

Nowhere in this passage, did Lord Goddard C.J. state expressly or impliedly that res ipsa loquitur has never applied to cases of fire since the enunciation of the rule in 1805. The two sentences in the passage, “but I do not think that this is a case of res ipsa loquitur”

[p.190] of [1981] GLR 181 and “I do not consider that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could possibly apply to such a case as this,” clearly demonstrate that Lord Goddard was considering the particular facts of the case before him and no more. In that case the lodger had left in his room a fire in his grate and neighbouring rooms had been damaged by fire spreading from the lodger’s room. Lord Goddard C.J. thought the fire in the grate was not improper, the fire was not larger than usual or too large for the grate. From such facts, he thought a presumption of negligence could not be inferred.

However, the learned trial judge after considering the Sochacki case (supra) expressed himself as follows: “In my view the contention that in a case of fire, negligence must be proved, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application is unanswerable.” A cursory reading of this passage is capable of giving the impression that in fire cases res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable. However, if the passage is split to reflect the contention referred to, it becomes obvious that the learned trial judge was dealing with the submission of learned counsel for the respondents in his address when he said that mere exclusive possession and control of the warehouse could not be circumstance from which negligence could be presumed if a fire broke out and that in all cases of fire, negligence must be proved. The learned trial judge’s view then was that in a case of fire, negligence must be proved and that res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the circumstances before him. I think that was what the learned trial judge meant. He was referring to the contention of learned counsel for the respondents and no more. I do not think the learned trial judge was attempting to lay down a new rule. He did not misinterpret Lord Goddard’s decision. He referred to “contention” and that contention could only be the one advocated by learned counsel for the respondents, namely, that res ipsa loquitur had no application to the facts presented by the appellant.

Even if my interpretation of the learned trial judge’s passage is untenable, sitting in an appellate court I am entitled to find out for myself, whether from the evidence adduced by the appellant and his witnesses an inference of negligence can be drawn. My view is that there is nothing from the evidence which “makes the thing speak for itself.” If one bears in mind that res ipsa loquitur is not a doctrine of substantive law but merely a rule of evidence, i.e. a forensic technique in proving negligence, then the court below was right in refusing to presume negligence at the close of the appellant’s case. Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence can apply to highway accidents where a vehicle has landed in a ditch or has gone off the road. But is the rule inapplicable where a vehicle,

[p.191] of [1981] GLR 181 while on the highway, becomes ablaze and is burnt down completely in the middle of the road? Surely, if all the relevant facts for establishing negligence on the part of the defendant cannot be proved, the plaintiff is at liberty to invoke res ipsa loquitur and rely on the facts of the accident raising the inference of negligence. But it must be remembered that previous cases where res ipsa loquitur has been relied on, are not precedents invariably or inflexibly binding in subsequent cases. Lord Goddard L.J. in Easson v. London and North Eastern Railway Co. [1944] K.B. 421 at p. 423, C.A. made the position clear when he said:

“None of the reported cases, however, really laid down any principle of law. They only show that in the circumstances of the case there was evidence on which the jury could find a verdict for the plaintiff.”

I do not therefore think that the court below misinterpreted the decision in Sochacki v. Sas (supra) where the court refused to apply res ipsa loquitur.

I shall now deal with the fourth ground of appeal, i.e.:

“The learned trial judge erred in law by making the finding that the defendants’ user of the warehouse was not a non-natural user thereof and that the storage thereon of footwear and the materials for the manufacture and packing thereof was for the natural benefit of the plaintiff and the defendants. The rule in Rylands v.

Fletcher was thereby misapplied to the facts of this case.”

What is the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher? Blackburn J. delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber said as reported in (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 265 at p. 279:

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

The facts have already been stated and the evidence indicates clearly that the wholesale room contained only materials for the manufacture of shoes, that is manufactured shoes in cases, rubber soles and rubber sheets. If Blackburn J.’s exposition of the law is applied, one can only say that leather shoes cannot be mischievous. So also are the rubber soles and rubber sheets—these cannot be described

[p.192] of [1981] GLR 181 as mischievous or dangerous things. In affirming Blackburn J.’s judgment, Lord Cairns in the House of Lords (see (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330) thought there must be “non-natural use” of the land. This expression was clarified in Rickards v. Lothian [1913] A.C. 263 at p. 280, P.C. to mean:

“It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.”

The House of Lords in Read v. Lyons [1947] A.C. 156, H.L. has emphasised that in deciding the question whether the user is natural or not, all the circumstances of the time and place and practice of mankind must be taken into consideration so that what might be regarded as dangerous or non-natural may vary according to those circumstances: see the judgment of Lord Porter at p. 176.

In the present appeal, the evidence shows that the appellant let the premises to the respondents to be used as a warehouse and the respondents did use the premises as a warehouse for storing manufactured shoes and raw materials for the same purpose. The articles stored were not mischievous or dangerous things. Indeed these were manufactured in a factory adjoining the warehouse in the same building complex. What are the circumstances in the evidence capable of suggesting that the user of the warehouse was non-natural? I think the court below was right in holding that the use of the warehouse was natural.

The real complaint of the appellant was that when the fire started, steps were not taken by the respondents to stop the fire or to contain it so as to prevent it from spreading to the annex and the residential parts of the complex. The appellant complained of defective fire-fighting equipment. The evidence of the warehouse-keeper was that after he had locked the doors of the warehouse, the keys were kept in the manager’s office. Nobody during that night had access to the warehouse. The watchman could not have opened the doors because he did not have the keys. The fire was first detected by the appellant’s relatives who wasted no time in calling in the Fire Brigade who were on the spot within a few minutes and fought the fire throughout the night.

Although the cause of the fire was not established, did the respondents allow the fire to continue through their negligence? In Musgrove v. Pandelis [1919] 2 K.B.43, C.A., petrol in the carburettor of the defendant’s car caught fire and the driver could have prevented the fire from spreading by turning off the tap from the petrol

[p.193] of [1981] GLR 181 tank. He failed to do this and the fire spread to the plaintiff’s rooms. The defendant was held liable. Scrutton L.J. explained the rationale behind this principle in Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924] 1 K.B. 341 at p. 357, C.A. as follows:

“There is a great deal to be said for the view that if a man finds a dangerous and artificial thing on his land, which he and those for whom he is responsible did not put there; if he knows that if left alone it will damage other persons; if by reasonable care he can render it harmless, as if by stamping on a fire just beginning from a trespasser’s match he can extinguish it; that then if he does nothing, he has ‘permitted it to continue,’ and become responsible for it. This would base the liability on negligence, and not on the duty of insuring damage from a dangerous thing under Rylands v. Fletcher.”

This dictum was approved by the Privy Council in Goldman v. Hargrave [1967] 1 A.C. 645, P.C. in which it was held that an occupier of land was under a general duty of care, in relation to hazards whether natural or man-made occurring on his land, to remove or reduce such hazards to his neighbour and that the existence of such duty must be based on knowledge of the hazard, ability to foresee the consequences of not checking or removing it, and the ability to abate it; and that the standard of care required of the occupier is founded on what it was reasonable to expect from him in his circumstances.

In the Goldman case lightening had struck a one hundred feet tree in the centre of the defendant’s land. The fire had started in the fork of the tree about 84 feet from the ground. It was impossible to deal with the blaze at that height and so pending the arrival of fire control officers, the defendant caused the tree to be felled. Unfortunately, he did not bother to extinguish the fire with water. The fire kept on burning until a few days later there was a strong wind the that fanned fire and caused it to spread from the defendant’s that land to the plaintiffs land. The defendant was held liable damage caused by the fire to the plaintiff’s properties.

In the present appeal, what has to be considered is whether in all the circumstances the respondents could have prevented the fire from destroying the annex and parts of the residential portion. It seems to me that by applying the test laid down in Goldman v. Hargrave, the respondents cannot be held liable on the ground that they were negligent in permitting the fire to spread from the warehouse.

As the appellant failed to prove negligence on the part of the respondents either before the outbreak of the fire or after the

[p.194] of [1981] GLR 181 outbreak of fire, then, if he wants to succeed on the principles of Rylands v. Fletcher, he must satisfy all the conditions laid down in that doctrine. First of all, the respondents did not start the fire and it cannot be said that they kept fire on their land which escaped.

At common law, liability for fire is governed by the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher and it is not obligatory that the plaintiff should prove negligence; in other words it is not necessary to prove lack of care on the part of anyone. At common law, the liability was originally absolute without qualification until the rule was enunciated in its present form by Blackburn J. And in Collingwood v. Home and Colonial Stores Ltd. [1936] 3 All E.R. 200, Lord Wright explained the rule at p. 203, C.A. as follows:

“. . . if a fire spread from a man’s premises and did damage to adjoining premises, he was liable in damage on the broad ground that it was his duty at his own peril to keep any fire that originated on his premises from spreading to and damaging his neighbour’s premises.”

As already pointed out, there is no evidence that the respondents kept any fire in the warehouse or that by their conduct they permitted the fire to spread to the annex.

The real fascinating and attractive decided case which the appellant regards as his trump-card is Mason v. Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd. [1967] 2 Q.B. 530. The headnote at pp. 530-531 reads:

“The defendants, in connection with their business as dealers, stored large quantities of combustible materials in their yard up to its common boundary of some 210 feet with the plaintiff’s garden in which stood his house, and they provided fire-fighting equipment and access lanes substantially as recommended by the local fire brigade, although some access lanes were narrower than recommended. A railway station was close by the yard. A severe fire of unknown cause started in the yard; it was detected at an early stage by the defendants, but the fire-fighting equipment was ineffective to control it, and it spread to the plaintiff’s land.

He brought an action for damages against the defendants . . .”

MacKenna J. applied the decision in Musgrove v. Pandelis (supra) and held that on the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas the defendants had brought into their yard combustible materials which were kept in such conditions that if they ignited, the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff’s land and as the defendant’s use of the land, was non-natural, they were liable to the

[p.195] of [1981] GLR 181 plaintiff in damages. At pp. 542-543, MacKenna J. disclosed what factors influenced him by saying:

“I have regard (i) to the quantities of combustible material which the defendants brought on their land; (ii) to the way in which they stored them; and (iii) to the character of the neighbourhood.

It may be that those considerations would also justify a finding of negligence. If that is so, the end would be the same as I have reached by a more laborious, and perhaps more questionable, route.”

It is significant to note that MacKenna J. confessed to taking a more laborious and perhaps questionable route. What was the route? At pp. 541-542 he reasoned as follows:

“A defendant is not held liable under Rylands v. Fletcher unless two conditions are satisfied: (i) that he has brought something onto his land likely to do mischief if it escapes, which has in fact escaped, and (ii) that those things happened in the course of some non-natural user of the land. But in Musgrove’s case the car had not escaped from the land, neither had the petrol in its tank. The principle must be, Romer L.J. said, the wider one on which Rylands v. Fletcher itself was based, ‘sic utere tuo’. . .”

Then the learned judge continued at p. 542:

“If, for the rule in Musgove’s case to apply, there need be no escape of anything brought onto the defendant’s land, what must be proved against him? There is, it seems to me, a choice of alternatives. The first would require the plaintiff to prove (1) that the defendant had brought something onto his land likely to do mischief if it escaped; (2) that he had done so in the course of a non-natural user of the land; and (3) that the thing had ignited and that the fire had spread. The second would be to hold the defendant liable if (1) he brought onto his land things likely to catch fire, and kept them there in such conditions that if they did ignite the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff’s land; (2) he did so in the course of some non-natural use; and (3) the things ignited and the fire spread. The second test is, I think, the more reasonable one. To make the likelihood of damage if the thing escapes a criterion of liability, when the thing has not in fact escaped but has caught fire, would not be very sensible.

So I propose to apply the second test. . .”

[p.196] of [1981] GLR 181

It must be remembered that in Musgrove’s case the court found that the fire was due to negligence. But as already mentioned, common law liability for fire is based on the principle of absolute liability and no proof of negligence is necessary. What actually compelled MacKenna J. to follow his laborious route in the Mason case was the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants “so used their land by cluttering it with combustible material closely packed that the plaintiff’s land was endangered.” What were these combustible materials? At pp. 533-534 of the report the following is stated in MacKenna J’s judgment:

“At the time of the fire almost the whole of the defendants’ yard, up to its boundaries, including that which runs with the plaintiff’s garden, was stacked high with cases of machinery. Inside the cases the machinery was either coated with oil or grease or wrapped in waxed or greased papers as a protection against rust. The cases were of wood, and some had broken open. Tarpaulins had been put over the stacks and some of these were torn. Flammable materials were stored for use in the defendants’ business, including petroleum, acetylene and paints. All those materials, including the wooden boxes and the grease, the oil and the waxed and greased papers, were, in the opinion of an assistant station officer at Lyndhurst Fire Station, highly combustible. His evidence satisfied me that the yard, used as it was by the defendants, was a serious fire-risk to the adjoining occupiers.”

What were the combustible materials in the warehouse in this appeal? According to Bamfo Sampong, the warehouse-keeper, there was:

“a quantity of men’s and women’s footwear, rubber soles of shoes, rubber sheets. The shoes were kept in cardboard boxes, 24 pairs in each cardbox. The cardboxes were more than 200. All the shoes were in boxes.

Th. rubber soles were loose ones. There were about 5,000 pairs of rubber soles. There were about 250 rubber sheets. The rubber sheets were about three feet square. These were all the things kept in the warehouse by the defendants.”

If one compares the present case with the Mason case, it is clear that the facts are distinguishable. In the present case, there was no petroleum, no acetylene, paints, grease, oil or waxed and greased papers in the warehouse which could be regarded as a danger or risk to adjoining premises. In the Mason case, MacKenna J. asked himself two questions: (i) did the defendants in this case bring to their land

[p.197] of [1981] GLR 181 things likely to catch fire, and keep them there in such conditions that if they did ignite, the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff’s land? If so (ii) did the defendants do these things in the course of some non-natural user of the land?

In the present appeal, the answer to each question should be No! The fourth ground of appeal is therefore untenable.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted under the fifth ground of appeal that the learned trial judge misdirected himself when he found in effect that a monthly tenancy is not a demise for a term certain and therefore the respondents as tenant ceased to be bound to pay rents after the fire had destroyed the warehouse. The evidence of the appellant as regards the respondents’ occupation was:

“I know the defendant company. They are my tenants. I have an oral tenancy agreement with them. They became my tenants in or before 1967. They paid ¢200 rent per month … It was in respect of the warehouse that they were paying me ¢200 … The defendants have not given any notice terminating the tenancy. But after paying rent for 10 months, they said they would not pay the rents because there was no consideration for the payment of any rents.”

Then in cross-examination, the appellant stated:

“The defendants have been my tenants since 1967, it could have been before. There was so specified period for the termination of the tenancy when the defendants entered into the tenancy agreement with my uncle.”

This piece of evidence gives one the impression that the appellant is not sure of even when the tenancy commenced and when it was to end. In such a case, it cannot be said that the respondents were tenants for a term certain. There was no written agreement between the parties to indicate the conditions and terms of the tenancy. To decide in the appellant’s favour that there was a term of years certain or a term certain without evidence appears to me to be deciding upon mere conjecture. The respondents by their statement of defence admitted that they were tenants of the appellant under an oral agreement at a rent of ¢200 a month. This admission does not assist the court in determining whether the tenancy agreement was for a term of years or a term certain. Nevertheless as the rent was paid monthly, a periodic tenancy was created by presumption of law: see Huffell v. Armistead (1835) 7 C. & P. 56. What is the nature of a periodic tenancy? In Mellows v. Low [1923] 1 K.B. 522 at pp. 524-525, D.C., McCardie J. explained a periodic tenancy as:

[p.198] of [1981] GLR 181

“It is vital to remember that the letting to a weekly tenant is not a letting which expires at the end of the first week or at the end of each succeeding week; in the ordinary course, as in the present case, it is a letting for a period of time which is determinable by due notice, generally regarded as a week’s notice. In Gandy v.

Jubber ((1865) 9 B. & S. 15) the Court of Exchequer Chamber pointed out that in the case of a tenancy from year to year there is not a reletting at the commencement of every year but there is springing interest which arises and which is only determined by a proper notice to quit. Bowen v. Anderson ([1894] 1 Q.B. 164) applied the same principle to a weekly tenancy …”

It seems to me therefore, that by presumption of law, the respondents had a periodic tenancy, and they could have terminated the tenancy by one month’s notice because until the proper notice to quit had been given, they had a springing interest in the warehouse. After the fire the respondents continued to pay rent for ten months whereas they could have given notice to quit immediately after the fire, i.e. up to 31 December 1972, or by paying one month’s rent in lieu of notice. It must be borne in mind that the tenancy was oral and therefore it was not necessary to give notice of termination in writing. I have not found it necessary to rely on the English decided cases because in Alameddine Brothers v. Paterson Zochonis & Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 403 , C.A. this court took the view that the English rules relating to the termination of weekly and monthly tenancies were developed to suit English conditions and might not necessarily be suitable to Ghanaian conditions.

The only passage worth considering is that stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 23, p. 554, para. 1215:

“If there is no demise for a term certain, however, the rent may be treated as accruing from day to day, so that it will stop if the premises are rendered uninhabitable by fire.”

The passage uses the expression “may be treated” and not “will be treated.” The case cited in Halsbury’s is that of Packer v. Gibbins (1841) 1 Q.B. 421. That case was relied on by learned counsel for the respondent, but it is of no assistance to this court because there Lord Denman C.J. took cognisance of the fact that the landlord had agreed with the occupant of the furnished apartments that liability to pay rent should cease after the apartments had been destroyed by fire.

[p.199] of [1981] GLR 181

In the present appeal, there is no evidence of any agreement relating to the occurrence of the fire.

Furthermore, there was no residue of any term vested in the respondents for which rent was exigible after the fire. I therefore agree with the learned trial judge’s finding that the respondents did not have a demise for a term certain. Even if the demise was for a month certain, the respondents did pay rent for the full month of November 1972 although fire had destroyed the premises completely on 29 November 1972. In the absence of any express contractual obligation, it was not necessary for them to terminate the tenancy formally by giving another month’s notice in view of this court’s opinion in the Alameddine case.

Under the last ground of appeal, it was argued that the respondents were liable in nuisance for allowing the debris after the fire to remain on the site. As already indicated the respondents did not cause the fire and they did not negligently allow the fire to spread. Can they be sued in nuisance? Lord Atkin in Sedleigh-Denfield v. O’Callaghan [1940] A.C. 880 at pp. 896-897, H.L. stated :

“. . . I think that nuisance is sufficiently defined as a wrongful interference with another’s enjoyment of his land or premises by the use of land or premises either occupied or in some cases owned by oneself. The occupier or owner is not an insurer; there must be something more than the mere harm done to the neighbour’s property to make the party responsible. Deliberate act or negligence is not an essential ingredient but some degree of personal responsibility is required, which is connoted in my definition by the word ‘use.’ This conception is implicit in all the decisions which impose liability only where the defendant has ‘caused or continued’ the nuisance. We may eliminate in this case ‘caused.’ What is the meaning of ‘continued’? In the context in which it is used ‘continued’ must indicate mere passive continuance. If a man uses on premises something which he found there, and which itself causes a nuisance by noise, vibration, smell or fumes, he is himself in continuing to bring into existence the noise, vibration, etc. causing a nuisance. Continuing in this sense and causing are the same thing. It seems to me clear that if a man permits an offensive thing on his premises to continue to offend, that is, if he knows that it is operating offensively, is able to prevent it, and omits to prevent it, he is permitting the nuisance to continue; in other words he is continuing it.”

In his judgment, the learned trial judge observed that learned counsel for the appellant did not address the court on the issue of

[p.200] of [1981] GLR 181 nuisance whether or not the respondents were liable for any misfeasance, he therefore declined to comment further or to consider the issue. Whether the learned judge’s refusal to deal with the issue of nuisance (although evidence had been led) was in order or not I wish to keep my silence. In any case, learned counsel for the appellant has addressed this court on the matter and I shall deal with the issue of nuisance. If the respondents did not cause the fire and they did not continue the nuisance because they had ceased to be occupants of the premises after the destruction of the premises by fire I cannot see how they can be held liable in law. The claim for damages in nuisance in my view cannot succeed.

Finally, in his reply during the hearing of this appeal learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the Factories, Offices and Shops Act, 1970 (Act 328), and regulations made thereunder and submitted that the respondents did not comply with statutory requirements. I think that if there had been any breaches of statute which enured to the benefit of the appellant, those breaches should have been pleaded and made issues for the trial. In Solomons v. R. Gertzenstein Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 243, C.A., it was held that where statutory duties have been imposed for the protection of a particular ascertainable class, those persons would have a right to an action for damages for a breach of statutory duty notwithstanding that the statute also imposed penalties for such breaches. Apart from the fact that the appellant did not plead these breaches, his learned counsel failed to demonstrate in his reply that the Act 328 and the regulations made thereunder were intended to protect the appellant as a member of a particular class.

I must confess that I have had some anxious moments over this appeal with a feeling of sadness for the appellant’s plight. However, in view of the reasons I have given, I have no option but to dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the court below.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A. I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

Decision of High Court affirmed.

E. P.-T.

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