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[1980] SLR (HC) 15High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ALFA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. vs. NYAMEKEH [1981] GLR 470

12 May 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 15
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OSCOLAALFA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. v NYAMEKEH [1981] GLR 470 [1980] SLR (HC) 15
APAALFA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. v NYAMEKEH [1981] GLR 470, [1980] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookALFA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. v NYAMEKEH [1981] GLR 470, [1980] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Fick & Fick Ltd. v. Assimakis [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1006; [1958] 3 All E.R. 182; 102 S.J. 632, C.A.
(2) Cassidy & Co., Ltd. v. M’Aloon (1893) L.R. Ir. 32 Q.B. & Ex. 368.

(3) R. v. Cowper (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 533; 59 L.J.Q.B. 265; 38 W.R. 408; 6 T.L.R. 179, C.A. [p.472] of [1981] GLR 470 (4) France v. Dutton [1891] 2 Q.B. 208; 60 L.J.Q.B. 488; 64 L.T. 793; 39 W.R. 716. (5) Hill v. Luton Corporation [1951] 2 K. B. 387; [1915] 1 All E.R. 1028; 115 J.P. 340; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 853; 95 S.J. 301; 49 L.G.R. 388.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION by the defendants to set aside the plaintiff’s writ on the grounds that the specially endorsed writ of summons was not properly signed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

H. K. Akuffo for the defendants-applicants.

Arthur-Mensah for the Plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

This is an application to set aside the writ of summons specially endorsed with claims for re-instatement of the plaintiff to his former position as a manager of the defendant- company, and payment of his salary or in the alternative damages for breach of contract and other consequential losses.

The defendants have through their solicitors entered conditional appearance to the writ and by this motion, they are seeking to set the writ aside on the grounds that the copy which was served on them was not signed either by the plaintiff or his solicitors. Mr. Akuffo, counsel for the defendants contends that the unsigned writ is a nullity and therefore void ab initio.

In reply Mr. Arthur-Mensah, counsel for the plaintiff, has argued firstly, that the reverse side of the writ bears the name and address of service of the solicitors who issued the writ, and secondly, that the writ was issued together with statement of claim and the two documents were delivered together, so any defect in the writ was cured by the statement of claim which was duly signed by the solicitors who prepared them.

Mr. Akuffo based his argument on Order 5, r. 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which provides:

“4. The plaintiff or his solicitor shall, on presenting any writ of summons for sealing, leave the Registrar a copy of such writ and all the indorsements thereon, and such copy shall be signed by or for the solicitor leaving the same, or by the plaintiff himself if he sues in person.”

The signature of the person issuing the writ referred to in this rule is not the same as the signature to the statement of claim endorsed on a writ under Order 3, r. 6 of L.N. 140A. The signature envisaged under Order 5, r. 4 must appear at the back page of the writ after the words “THIS WRIT was issued by.” But in

[p.473] of [1981] GLR 470

this country the practice has been to print or type the names of the issuing solicitors and their address in the space provided after those words. Order 5, r. 4 must be dealing with the person who is issuing the writ. The signature to the endorsement is regulated by Order 19, r. 4 of L.N. 140A, and not Order 5, r. 4. It means that the signature to the endorsement does not relieve the person issuing the writ to sign as the person issuing the writ and give his particulars for service. In the English Annual Practice (1962 ed.), p. 63 commenting on Order 5, r. 12 of the English rules, which is stated in identical words as our Order 5, r. 4, it is stated, “The signature to the statement of claim indorsed on a writ under Order 3 rule 6 is not a sufficient compliance with the Rule.”

The signature which is called in question in this application, is the signature to the statement of claim endorsed on the writ. The defendants’ complaint is that the writ was specially endorsed writ or accompanied by a statement of claim under Order 3, r. 6 but it was not signed. The rules require that the endorsement must have certain characteristics. By virtue of Order 19, r. 4, it is requisite that the statement of claim endorsed on the writ shall be signed by the plaintiff or his solicitor. The copy of the writ which was served on the defendants was not signed. The original copy which is in the docket is also not signed. The space provided for the signature under the statement of claim is left blank. The endorsement therefore does not bear all the marks prescribed by the rules, and it cannot therefore be a proper statement of claim. In Fick & Fick Ltd. v. Assimakis [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1006, C.A. Lord Evershed M.R. had a similar situation to grapple with. The defendant in that case took out summons to set aside a specially endorsed writ on the grounds that the copy served on her was not signed. The original had been signed but whoever made the copy was not sufficiently assiduous in his copy work and left out the solicitor’s name in the space provided by the word, “signature.” In the course of his judgment, the learned Master of the Rolls stated at p. 1009:

“If an endorsement is to be a statement of claim, then it must possess certain characteristics. One is that there should be at the head of the particulars or statement the words ‘Statement of Claim’; and there is no doubt that those words appear in the copy which we have, and which corresponds to the copy given to the defendant. But in addition, by virtue of Order 19, r. 4, it is requisite that the statement of claim on the endorsement should be signed—actually signed. It is at this point that the defendant has discerned what might be for her a tabula in naufragio, because she says: ‘The thing with which

[p.474] of [1981] GLR 470

I was served, the copy which I was given, omitted to have upon it any signature. Therefore it was not a statement of claim; the endorsement was not a statement of claim, and therefore I have not appeared to a writ endorsed with a statement of claim; and you, the plaintiffs, are shut out from any proceeding under Order 14, r. 1’.

If that is right, then she is entitled to prevail: although it is to be observed, as Mr. Littman conceded, that if his client is right, there is no possible means by which the plaintiffs, by amendment or otherwise, can rectify the situation.”

Since the original in that case was signed, it was held that the defendant had appeared to the original writ. In an Irish case, Cassidy & Co., Ltd. v. M’Aloon (1893) L.R. Ir. 32 Q.B. & Ex. 368, the omission of the legend “statement of claim” and signature at the end of the particulars of a specially endorsed writ, was held to be fatal defects. These cases clearly show that non-compliance with Order 19, r. 4 to clothe the statement of claim specially endorsed on a writ with the requisite characteristics renders the endorsement defective, and not merely irregular.

Mr. Arthur-Mensah’s contention that the writ bears the name and address of the solicitors who issued the writ cannot, to my mind, be tenable. Those particulars comply with Order 5, r. 4 discussed above. In any case, where the rules provide that the particulars of the endorsement should be signed, the name of the issuing solicitor printed at the space provided cannot satisfy the provision under Order 19, r. 4. The printed name of the solicitor appearing on the writ, albeit at the same page as where the signature under Order 19, r. 4 should have appeared, is not a compliance of the rule. In R. v. Cowper (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 533, C.A. cited in France v. Dutton [1891] 2 Q.B. 208, the English County Court Rules, 1889, required a solicitor who prepared particulars of claim to sign them. The signature in that case was lithographed, and the court had to decide whether the rule had been complied with. It was held, that a lithographed signature put to a form by a lithographer was not a signature by the solicitor. Likewise, the printed names of the solicitors who issued this writ cannot be a signature in compliance with Order 19, r. 4 of L.N. 140A.

The endorsement is therefore defective. The question is whether this defect renders the writ a nullity or irregular. It has been argued that the defect was cured by the accompanying statement of claim which was duly signed. If the defect is fatal then it renders the writ a nullity. The defect in this case cannot be rectified by an amendment or otherwise because it is fatal. Therefore the writ is

[p.475] of [1981] GLR 470

a nullity and the accompanying statement of claim could not rectify the defect, ex nihilo nihil fit. If a writ is void, it is void ab initio and all that follows is likewise void: see Hill v. Luton Corporation [1951] 1 All E.R. 1028. The writ is therefore not an effective instrument to commence an action and it should be set aside.

Order 70, r. 1 of L.N. 140A cannot be invoked to save the situation. I must comment briefly here that this application was brought under Order 70, rr. 1 and 3. It is difficult to see the logic or the basis of application of the rule to the present situation. Order 70, r. 1 of L.N. 140A provides that non-compliance with any rule shall not render any proceedings void unless the court or judge shall so direct. The rule prevents the automatic invalidation of any proceedings for non-compliance with a provision of the rules. It gives the court power to save processes which may otherwise be invalid for offending against the rules. But the rule does not give power to validate proceedings which are null and void. In other words, it does not apply to any proceeding which is a nullity from the start. Since the defendants maintain in this application that the writ is a nullity, I fail to appreciate the reason of counsel’s reliance on the rule. The grounds upon which this motion was argued are faulty, but the submission that the writ is a nullity is right.

I uphold Mr. Akuffo’s submission that the writ is a nullity and all that follows on it is likewise void; the accompanying statement of claim did not give it any virtue. Accordingly, I order the writ, statement of claim and the motion for judgment to be set aside. There is a nominal costs of ¢50 for the defendants.

DECISION Application to set aside writ allowed. E.P.-T.

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