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[1980] SLR (HC) 33High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

MENSAH vs. ADJEI [1981] GLR 360

14 March 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 33
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OSCOLAMENSAH v ADJEI [1981] GLR 360 [1980] SLR (HC) 33
APAMENSAH v ADJEI [1981] GLR 360, [1980] SLR (HC) 33 (Ghana).
BluebookMENSAH v ADJEI [1981] GLR 360, [1980] SLR (HC) 33 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Reeves v. Ivimey, Court of Appeal, 15 April 1890, unreported.

(2) Beldam’s Patent, In re [1911] 1 Ch. 60; 80 L.J.Ch. 133; 103 L.T. 454; 55 S.J. 46; 27 R.P.C. 758.

(3) Borthwick v. Elderslie S.S. Co., Ltd. (No. 2) [1905] 2 K.B. 516; 74 L.J.K.B. 772; 93 L.T. 387; 43 W.R. 643; 21 T.L.R. 630; 49 S.J. 618; 10 Asp. M.L.C. 121, C.A.

(4) Belgian Grain and Produce Co., Ltd. v. Cox & Co. (France) Ltd. (1919) W.N. 317, C.A.

(5) Borkloe v. Hlormenu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 327, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for extension of time within which to appeal against an interlocutory order. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

D. A. Nii-Aponsah for the applicant.

Kye (Ata with him), for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

On 5 September 1979, this court presided over by Griffiths-Randolph J., made an order transferring a suit which was pending before the District Court, Grade II, Teshie, to the Circuit Court, Accra, on an application by Mr. Kye, counsel for the defendant in the suit. The order of transfer was made when the plaintiff had given evidence and called several witnesses.

It would seem that the ruling giving the order was delivered in the absence of the parties; it was given during the long legal [p.363] of [1981] GLR 360 vacation. By a letter dated 15 October 1979, the registrar of this court sent a letter to Mr. Nii-Aponsah, counsel for the plaintiff-applicant, informing him of the court’s ruling on 5 September. The order of transfer was quoted in the letter. This letter reached counsel on 19 October.

Not unnaturally, the applicant felt very aggrieved about this order, but as the time within which to appeal against the order had lapsed, he made a formal complaint to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice expressed his sympathy with the applicant’s plight, but it would appear he could not help him much. The applicant referred to a paragraph in the Chief Justice’s letter, and since his counsel seems to place so much reliance on it, I will quote it here. It runs:

“His lordship feels great sympathy for your position and is inclined to feel that if he were a judge faced with a similar situation and on the material presented by the parties, he would, in all probability, not have exercised the power of transfer granted to a judge under section 102 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372).”

Encouraged by this letter, the applicant filed this application under Order 64, r. 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), for an extension of time within which to appeal against the order dated 5 September 1979.

Mr. Kye, counsel for the defendant, has taken a preliminary objection to the application on the grounds that it is misconceived. He referred to rules 10 and 28 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), and submitted that by computation of time, a period of one month had lapsed since the expiration of time prescribed within which this appeal should have been filed.

On his part, Mr. Nii-Aponsah argued that the Court of Appeal Rules only govern the procedure at the Court of Appeal and that the rules applicable to this application should be the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954. Specifically he relied on Order 64, r. 6 and argued that this court has unlimited discretion subject only to the justice of the case to enlarge the time for appeal.

I adjourned the matter for a few days for ruling. On the appointed day, I asked counsel on both sides to submit arguments as to when the ruling transferring the case should be taken as delivered. I took this course because when I examined the records, there was no indication that the parties were ever notified that the ruling would be given on the day on which it was delivered. The first intimation they had of the ruling was on a date well over one

[p.364] of [1981] GLR 360 month after its delivery. The registrar’s letter informing counsel for the applicant of the order, is dated 15 October 1979 and it reads:

“Dear Mr. Nii-Aponsah, RE: SUIT No. 388/78 I have been instructed by his lordship, Mr. Justice Griffiths-Randolph, to inform you that the written judgment in the above case which is dated 5 September 1979, was taken as read the next day; and that the result was as follows:

‘I order the transfer of the case from the District Court, Grade II, Teshie, to the Circuit Court, Accra Central, so that the question of consolidation does arise; but I shall make no order as to costs.”

Since the current legal year began on 1 October you may wish to obtain a copy from me at your earliest convenience.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) S. S. Okwaning-Ansa Senior Registrar.”

It is clear from this letter that the judge directed that the ruling should take effect from 6 September. Under Order 41, r. 3, the date of judgment pronounced in court shall be the day on which such judgment was pronounced, unless the judge otherwise directs. The ruling was dated 5 September but the judge had directed that it should be post-dated to 6 September. Therefore even though the order was not drawn up until October, the effective date would still be 6 September, for Order 52, r. 13 of L.N. 140A directs that every order when drawn up shall be dated the day it was pronounced: see Reeves v. Ivimey, 15 April 1890, C.A. unreported but digested at p. 1275 of the English White Book (1962 ed.).

In his written address, Mr. Nii-Aponsah submitted that in computing the time within which to appeal vacation time should not be counted. He relied on Order 64, r. 4 of L.N. 140A which reads:

“4. The times of the vacations, in any year shall not be reckoned in the computation of the times appointed or allowed by these rules for amending,, delivering, or filing any pleading unless otherwise directed by the Court or a Judge.”

The word “pleading” has been held not to include notice of appeal: see In re Beldam’s Patent [1911] 1 Ch. 60. The rule applies only

[p.365] of [1981] GLR 360 to “amending, delivering, or filing of pleading.” Order 1 of L.N. 140A defines “pleading” as including.

“any petition or summons and also includes the statements in writing of the claim or demand of any plaintiff, and of the defence of any defendant thereto, and of the reply of the plaintiff to any counter-claim of a defendant.”

Notice of appeal falls outside this definition. Strictly speaking, therefore, the computation of time in this case should be reckoned from the date when the ruling or judgment is to take effect.

The prescribed time within which to appeal is regulated by L.I. 218 as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618). The time limit for appeal against an interlocutory order is fourteen days from the date of the decision appealed against. The prescribed period is calculated from the date of the decision appealed against. Rule 10 (4) of L.I. 218 as amended by L.I. 618 sets the deadline for an application for extension of time to appeal. It sets the period at three months from the expiration of the time prescribed by the rules. This being an interlocutory decision, the time for appealing is fourteen days. The period should therefore be three months from the expiration of that period.

Mr. Kye raised a preliminary objection to this application because in his view, the time limit is set at one month. He relied on the repealed L.I. 218, s. 10. He did not advert his mind to the amendment contained in L.I. 618. He submitted that the application was misconceived. When the matter was adjourned and I invited fresh argument on the matter, a written submission was filed by Mr. Ata on 19 February in which he conceded that the applicant had three months within which to apply for enlargement of time but he submitted nevertheless that the three months had lapsed when this application was filed.

This application was filed on 17 January 1980. My difficulty in this matter has been the date from which to calculate the prescribed period within which to appeal. That is why I invited further argument in this matter but I have received not much assistance. It is my view that notice of appeal is not a pleading, so time will run during the legal vacation. The period should therefore be reckoned from the date of judgment, but exclusive of the first day: see Order 64. r. 1.

In this case, when the parties were completely unaware of the order, could time run against them? I have endeavoured but I could not find a comparable situation in any reported case. One does not, however, need any authority to see the injustice in such

[p.366] of [1981] GLR 360 a matter. Here is an order which will operate against the interest of a party, and it is given in his absence without any notification to him, and it was not brought to his notice until the time for appealing had lapsed. To enforce the rules of court strictly against him will definitely offend against the rules of natural justice.

By Order 52, r. 3 every order takes effect from the day it is made unless the court or a judge directs otherwise, and it shall take effect accordingly. It is clear from the wording of the rule that the power to ante-date or post-date need not be exercised by the judge who made the order, otherwise “the Court” would not be alternated with, “a Judge.” In Borthwick v. Elderslie S.S. Co., Ltd. (No. 2) [1905] 2 K.B. 516, C.A. the English Court of Appeal held that the power of the court to ante-date or post-date a judgment ought only to be invoked on some good ground, where there is something exceptional in the facts: see also Belgian Grain and Produce Co., Ltd. v. Cox & Co. (France) Ltd. (1919) W.N. 317, C.A. Basing myself on this principle, I shall direct that the effective date of that ruling be post-dated to the time when it was brought to the notice of the applicant. This was on 19 October 1979. The registrar’s letter was dated 15 October but it was delivered onto Mr. Nii-Aponsah on 19 October. Since time should start running from 20 October that is, excluding the first day, and the applicant had fourteen days, the fourteen days should expire on 2 November. Section 10 (4) of L.I. 618 as amended allows him three months within which to apply for extension of time. Calculated in accordance with section 23 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), the first month would be from 3 November 1979 to 2 December; the second month from 3 December-2 January and the third month from 3 January-2 February. In my view, therefore, the application is within the three months’ period and the preliminary objection is overruled.

Now the merits of the application. Even though the matter was taken on a preliminary objection, enough has been advanced by way of written submission to enable me to deal with the matter. It was submitted by counsel for the respondent that no good cause has been shown. The reason for the delay as advanced by counsel for the applicant is that the order was not brought to his notice in good time, and when he had notice of it, he sent a petition to the Chief Justice. He does not explain when he sent his petition or why he filed a petition rather than an appeal. Perhaps he thought the Chief Justice could use his administrative powers to deal with the issues involved in the appeal. But he found himself in a legal cul-de-sac, so in desperation, he filed this application for enlargement of time.

[p.367] of [1981] GLR 360

In an application of this nature, L.I. 218, s. 10 (4) as amended by L.I. 618 demands that the applicant should show good and substantial reasons and the grounds of appeal should prima facie, show a good cause for granting leave. The delay in filing this appeal has been occasioned partly by the unorthodox way in which the ruling was delivered, and the way counsel for the applicant reacted to the ruling. If he had approached the matter in the regular manner and filed an appeal rather than a petition to the Chief Justice, this delay would have been avoided. But I do think it will be unfair to visit the effect of counsel’s mistake on the client. I would think that there is a good cause shown for the delay. With regards to the success of the appeal, the applicant contends he had called a good number of witnesses, over ten of them, and he was nearly ready to close his case. To start the matter de novo before another court would put him out of pocket or involve him in unnecessary expenditure. The reasons given for the transfer are that the magistrate “is not learned in the law” and that counsel for the respondent had cause to complain about his handling of the case.

Since the trial district magistrate had jurisdiction to try the case and he was acting within his jurisdiction, and again, since the judge in his ruling gave reasons for the exercise of his discretion, I am of the view that the ruling is appealable. As van Lare J. (as he then was) said in Borkloe v. Hlormenu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 327 at p. 329, S.C.

“It is a well-established principle of law that where a court exercises its discretion simpliciter without assigning reasons it is difficult to interfere; but wherever reasons are assigned for the exercise of the discretion a Court of Appeal is competent to evaluate the soundness or otherwise of the exercise of the discretion in the light of the reasons given.”

To shut him out at this stage will, in my view, amount to denial of justice. The justice of the case demands that he should be given leave: see Order 64, r. 6 of L.N. 140A.

For these reasons. I would grant the application and enlarge the time for appeal in this case. The applicant has seven days within which to file the appeal. The applicant shall pay ¢100 costs to the respondent.

DECISION Preliminary objection overruled.

Application granted.

D. R. K. S.

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