REPUBLIC vs. CENTRAL REGIONAL MINISTER AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE ACTION CONGRESS PARTY [1981] GLR 527
3 April 1980 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 16 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 40Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410; 81 L.J.K.B. 217; 105 L.T. 753; 27 T.L.R. 143; 55 S.J. 168, C.A.
(2) Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 K.B. 309; [1937] 2 All E.R. 726; 106 L.J.K.B. 728; 157 L.J. 290; 101 J.P. 349; 53 T.L.R. 623; 81 S.J. 357; 35 L.G.R. 436, C.A.
[p.529] of [1981] GLR 527
(3) R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.
[1924] 1 K.B. 171; 93 L.J.K.B. 390; 130 L.T. 164; 88 J.P. 13; 39 T.L.R. 715; 68 S.J. 188, C.A.
(4) R. v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Davis [1929] 1 K.B. 619; 98 L.J.K.B. 636; 141 L.T. 6; 93 J.P.
49; 43 T.L.R. 345; 25 L.G.R. 677, C.A.
(5) R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864; [1967] 3 W.L.R.
348; 11 S.J. 301; [1967] 2 All E.R. 770, D.C.
(6) R. v. Barnstaple Justices; Ex parte Carder [1938] 1 K.B. 385; [1937] 4 All E.R. 263; 107 L.J.K.B.
127; 158 L.T. 409; 101 J.P. 547; 54 T.L.R. 36; 81 S.J. 963; 35 L.G.R. 651, D.C.
(7) Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66; T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 214; sub nom. Ali v. Jayaratne 94 S.J. 516, P.C.
(8) R. v. Birmingham City Justice; Ex parte Chris Foreign Foods (Wholesalers) Ltd. [1970] 1 W.L.R.
1428; [1970] 3 All E.R. 945; 86 L.G.R. 737, D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to an application for prohibition and mandamus against the Central Regional Minister and his deputy. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
De Graft Aidoo for the applicants.
Sam Baddoo, Principal State Attorney for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
When the applicants’ motion came before the court on 17 March 1980, the outstanding reliefs sought were those of prohibition and mandamus; the relief for certiorari having been conditionally dismissed at the previous hearing. By their application for an order of prohibition, the court is invited to restrain the Regional Minister and the Deputy Regional Minister for the Central Region from distributing or selling essential commodities including outboard motors and cutlasses at the Central Regional and District Offices of the People’s National Party or through Mr. Gustav Ackumey of Cape Coast, a staunch member of the People’s National Party. They also pray for an order of mandamus to compel the Regional Minister and the Deputy Regional Minister to do the following acts:
“(a) to distribute and/or sell essential commodities including outboard motors and cutlasses only through the registered
[p.530] of [1981] GLR 527 commercial houses in Cape Coast and elsewhere in the Central Region;
(b) to publish the quantities of essential commodities including outboard motors and cutlasses so far received, the date of receipt, the warehouses in which they are kept, the persons to whom sales have been made, the persons who have conducted such sales and the mode of distribution and/or sales;
(c) to refer the matter to the police for prosecution; and (d) to declare the source of the said outboard motors.”
The Principal State Attorney has raised preliminary objections to this outstanding application. In regard to the prohibition sought, he has contended that the application can only be entertained where it is disclosed that both the Regional Minister and the Deputy Regional Minister (hereinafter to be referred to as the respondents) or either of them were exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and, whilst sitting as a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, they have exceeded their jurisdiction. With regard to mandamus, it was argued that it will only lie where it is established that there is a legal duty imposed on the respondents which they have failed or refused to discharge. It was contended that the applicants’ affidavits do not disclose either that the respondents were exercising a judicial function or that an enactment imposed a duty on them for the benefit of the applicants, such as that of selling essential commodities, which they have failed to carry out.
Counsel for the applicants fired his opening salvo to repel the objections raised with the following proposition:
“Wherever a public officer acting in his public capacity, does an act which affects the rights of citizens or if he takes a decision which affects the rights of citizens that public officer is under a legal duty to be honest, fair and disinterested in the decision he takes or the act he does. If he does not do this or if he takes the decision or does the act in bad faith or if he takes the decision or does the act with a view to discriminate against citizens equally entitled to the benefit of the decision, that public officer can be prevented by prohibition which, under the Constitution, 1979, the court is entitled as of right to grant.”
According to counsel, as the respondents arc the agents of the President of the Republic of Ghana, whatever the President cannot do they also cannot do. Conversely, they must do what the President is enjoined to do under the Constitution, such as to promote
[p.531] of [1981] GLR 527 national unity and not to discriminate. The respondents, counsel argued, hold public office and they are paid as officers of the government out of moneys provided by Parliament and they must exercise their powers honestly, fairly and without discrimination insofar as whatever they do affect the interest of citizens. Prohibition and mandamus will, according to counsel, lie first to prevent them from abusing their office and mandamus will lie to compel them to do not only what they must do as such public officers, but to perform these duties fairly and honestly. Counsel referred to article 35 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, which confirms the common law right of this court to issue prohibition and mandamus. He argued that it is a misconception to say that the legal duty imposed on public officers to act fairly, honestly and without discrimination must be something contained in an enactment because, as he put it, it is not only the presence of an enactment which will exhaust the totality of legal duties which will include those contained in unwritten laws. With regard to the contention that prohibition will lie where it is shown that the respondents are performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, counsel argued that if, acting in their public capacity, the respondents do what is unfair and their acts affect the rights of citizens, then they have exceeded their power or authority, and prohibition will lie to stop them and mandamus will also lie to compel them to act within their authority. In counsel’s view, the net effect of the applicants’ affidavits spell out two things: that the respondents are acting contrary to the general laws of Ghana as well as the fundamental principles of justice and also that the their acts violate the fundamental human rights laid down in chapter 6 of the Constitution, 1979. Time and space have conspired to place their constraints on me in perpetuating for posterity the full argument of the applicants’ counsel. Suffice it to say that, he made free incursions, for support, into the Constitution, 1979, which is not even calmed of its birth pangs. To him, the applicants’ affidavits disclose an abuse of articles 3, 7, 8 (1), 31 (2) and 45 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. As his last fling, he referred to article 56 (1) (b) of the Constitution and argued that if the allegations depose to in the applicants’ affidavits are substantiated, they will tend to bring into disrepute the office of the President, let alone that of the respondents, and this court can prevent its occurrence.
Before I proceed to rule on the objections raised, I am of the view that it will be pertinent and salutary to attempt the herculean task of distinguishing between the administrative, judicial and
[p.532] of [1981] GLR 527 quasi-judicial action This is important because if an official action or cause of action is held to be essentially administrative or executive, the means by which it can be challenged by an individual are few. This involves automatically, the principle of parliamentary responsibility; a minister may be called upon to account for his conduct in Parliament, and if he cannot justify it, and the matter is serious enough, may forfeit confidence by the vote of censure contained in article 69 of the Constitution, 1979. Short of an actual question of confidence, the minister may be put to a less drastic purgation by embarrassing questions in Parliament, quite efficacious as a means of restraining abuses of power and securing the rectification of individual grievances. But whatever Parliament may do, the private citizen can offer little resistance to purely administrative action. In exceptional circumstances, the administration may be subject to mandamus, that it may possibly be restrained by injunction from persisting in improper conduct, or that it may be precluded from it by an anticipatory declaration in the well-known form laid down in Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410, C.A. If, on the other hand, the function exercised by the administration is held to be judicial or quasi-judicial, it is eo ipso subject to judicial review by means of prohibition and certiorari, always provided that Parliament has not expressly made the subordinate judicial power final and unimpeachable. In his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.), at p. 60, de Smith has confessed that an administrative action cannot be exactly defined but that it includes the adoption of a policy, the making and issue of specific directions and the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements of policy or expediency or administrative practice. It is clear, however, that in the act of administration, the executive officer, the minister, or what you will, frequently has to exercise a “judicial” faculty in the sense that he has to form a judgment between several alternatives; and in order to arrive at his decision, he may have to weigh a good deal of “evidence” pro and contra. Sometimes he will be largely influenced in his decision by the precedent of a policy which has already been determined for cases of a class. Because of the interweaving of these different functions, the administrative, the judicial and the quasi-judicial, the Committee on Ministers’ Powers defined in their report (Command Paper 4060 of 1932), p. 73 (s). III, para. 3)
[p.533] of [1981] GLR 527 four characteristics of the judicial process. Their view on the matter was approved by Scott L.J. in Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 K.B. at pp. 340-341, C.A.:
“A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites:— (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence;
(3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law … to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4). The place of (4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is determined by the Minister’s free choice.”
With this understanding I will, hopefully, descend on the specific issues posed for determination.
I will take as my convenient spring-board for inquiry, the famous proposition of Atkins L.J. in R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at p. 205, C.A. where he said:
“Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs (i.e. prohibition and certiorari).”
This epitome of the law on the circumstances when prohibition and certiorari will issue has, ever since its pronouncement, been cited in many subsequent cases and, although the courts in many instances have amplified its scope, the central theme has remained the same that whenever the legislature entrusts to anybody of persons other than the superior courts, the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals, the court ought to exercise as widely
[p.534] of [1981] GLR 527 as they can, the power of controlling those bodies. By this proposition, an order of prohibition may issue against an individual minister as in R. v. Minister of Health; Ex parte Davis [1929] 1 K.B, 619, C.A. It must, however, be shown that the minister was invested by statute with jurisdiction to determine questions affecting the rights of individuals. Exceptionally, it has been held in R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain [1967] 3 W.L.R, 348, D.C. that the board was amenable to the supervision of the High Court exercised by way of certiorari in that it was a body of persons of a public, as opposed to a purely private or domestic character, having power to determine matters affecting subjects and a duty to act judicially; the fact that the board was a body of persons constituted by prerogative order and not by statute and that a determination by the board gave rise to no legally enforceable rights was no bar to the jurisdiction of the court. It was held that the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, although not created by statute but by prerogative order, had in fact the recognition of Parliament in debate and Parliament provided the money to satisfy its awards. Moreover, its non-statutory rules charged the board to act judicially save as varied by the scheme; its procedure involved the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and it is provided that the burden is on the applicant who claims compensation under the scheme and that the decision shall be arrived at solely in the light of the evidence brought out at the hearing. The procedure then bears all the characteristics of a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure; and the board, when determining applications in accordance with that procedure, is clearly performing de facto quasi-judicial functions or as an inferior tribunal. In his judgment Diplock L.J. said at pp. 359-360:
“The appointment of the board and the conferring upon it of jurisdiction to entertain and determine applications, and of authority to make payments in accordance with such determinations, are acts of government, done without statutory authority but none the less lawful for that …
If new tribunals are established by acts of government, the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court extends to them if they possess the essential characteristics upon which the subjection of inferior tribunals to the supervisory control of the High Court is based.”
I am yet to be convinced that the assumption of power by the respondents to control the distribution of essential commodities derives from any enactment or from any prerogative order which
[p.535] of [1981] GLR 527 has the recognition of Parliament; and, if there is any such enactment or prerogative order, whether it involves the judicial process.
We trace the origin of our regional offices controlling the distribution of essential commodities to the military era of the last seven years. As far as I know, the decisive role assumed by the regional commissioner of that era in this matter of distribution, was not supported by any Decree but emanated from the mere directives they issued. This had come to stay as a system at the time of the military handing over and, as it seems from the affidavits filed, the civilian administration, at least in this Central Region, is perpetuating that system. The legality or otherwise of that system is not the subject before me now. The argument of the applicants’ counsel, by his references to the Constitution as imposing some legal duty on the respondents, seems to suggest that their conduct in controlling the distribution of essential commodities is within the Constitution. Suffice it to say that, the orders of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus will not issue to persons who take it upon themselves to exercise a jurisdiction without any colour of legal authority, as the acts of usurpers are to be considered as nagatory. Indeed, in R. v. Barnstaple Justices; Ex parte Carder [1938] 1 K.B. 385, D.C., it was held that certiorari or mandamus could not issue to control an extra-judicial proceeding of a tribunal. In that case, no power was given by an Act to the county council or to the justices to approve plans; and the justices in so doing or in refusing to do so were engaging in an extra-judicial proceeding.
As noted before, the orders will issue where the body of persons have the legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects. As stated in de Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed.) at p. 344:
“…the determination may be either one that purports to create, vary or extinguish existing legal rights, or one that purports to declare existing legal rights by the interpretation of common law rules or of statutory norms and their application to a set of facts.”
So that if the respondents’ conduct does not seek to decide anything in the manner explained above, then I apprehend prohibition cannot lie. The “rights” affected must themselves be legally recognised interests and a decision affecting rights must be differentiated from the denial of a mere privilege as where, for instance a licensing function is held to import no “judicial” duty, the licence is likely to be characterised as a privilege: see Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66 at p. 78, P.C. de Smith has observed at
[p.536] of [1981] GLR 527 p. 347, that occasionally judges will still speak as if the availability of certiorari or prohibition depends on whether the act impugned is judicial or imports an implied duty to act judicially. He further observed that it has also been held that it is enough for the competent authority to be under a “duty to act fairly.” Thus in R. v. Birmingham City Justice; Ex parte Chris, Foreign Foods (Wholesalers) Ltd. [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1428, D.C. it was held that a justice acting under the procedure of the Food and Drugs Act, 1955, even though acting in an administrative or executive capacity, was obliged to act fairly and impartially; that in retiring with the officials of the local authority (who were authorised under the Act to seize as unfit for consumption the food in question), and then announcing his decision without indicating what further advice, if any, he had received from them, the justice was in breach of those rules of natural justice applicable to such a case, namely, openness, impartiality and fairness and accordingly, the order of certiorari should pass. It must be noted then that the insistence of fairness where a purely administrative or executive function is involved is not confined to a mere abstract notion of it but it is that concrete standard which is not unlike natural justice and which ought to be imposed on any body or person exercising administrative powers. Indeed, a purely administrative or executive function is one where there is no duty to afford a hearing to the parties interested and where the decision can be made on the basis of general considerations of policy. Except, perhaps, where a body exercising such functions acts ultra vires, it should be immune from the reach of certiorari.
Where any public authority or official is under an absolute, not a discretionary duty, to perform a certain function and refuses to do so, any person who has a demonstrable interest in its performance may move the High Court for a mandamus to compel the fulfilment of the duty. Mandamus is most frequently directed to local and public utility authorities, but rarely to ministers of departments who, on the face of it, are not likely to refuse performance of duties clearly laid upon them by statute. Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a moral duty or, as it seems, it will not lie to compel a duty to abstain from acting unlawfully.
It is appropriate here to consider how well the applicants have satisfied the call on them to show that the respondents are under a public duty to perform those acts itemised earlier on for which they seek mandamus. To do this, they had to show that the duty on the respondents was imposed by statute or some other law.
[p.537] of [1981] GLR 527
It was to answer this, and also to support the call on them in establishing the “legal authority” to buttress their application for prohibition, that their counsel made full play with the Constitution, 1979. I have perused the Constitution, especially those articles the applicants relied upon, and the fact leaps to the eye that there is not a syllable in this document which either imposes those duties on the respondents for which mandamus will lie or clothes them with any authority to determine questions affecting citizens. The simple truth is that those grandiloquent provisions grouped under the equally attractive name of “Directive Principles of State Policy” in chapter 4 of the Constitution will remain ideals until Parliament has enacted such laws as will give them the breath of life. In the meantime, they do not constitute any justiciable provisions which will incite the issue of prohibition or mandamus. My candid view is that the remedy now for any such excesses as the applicants complain of which, from their affidavits, transcend even the realm of crime in some cases, is political and not by judicial review. It is for all the above reasons that I uphold the objection and dismiss the applicants’ motion.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
E. P. -T.
