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[1980] SLR (HC) 45High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

THOMPSON vs. THOMPSON [1981] GLR 537

30 June 1980 · AGYEPONG J · ≈ 29 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 45
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OSCOLATHOMPSON v THOMPSON [1981] GLR 537 [1980] SLR (HC) 45
APATHOMPSON v THOMPSON [1981] GLR 537, [1980] SLR (HC) 45 (Ghana).
BluebookTHOMPSON v THOMPSON [1981] GLR 537, [1980] SLR (HC) 45 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Thompson (Decd.), In re; Laguade v. Thompson. Full Court, Accra, 22 May 1929.

(2) Youhana v. Abboud [1974] 2 G.L.R. 201, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for a declaration that he and the children of the deceased father were the beneficial owners of his entire properties. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Quao for the plaintiff.

R. T. Quansah for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AGYEPONG J.

In this suit, the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant is for:

“(a) a declaration that he, the plaintiff, and other children of S. A. Thompson (deceased) are the beneficial owners of house No. D.725/4, Accra, and other properties of the deceased;

(b) an account of all rents collected from the said house from April 1962;

(c) an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants or agents from collecting rents in respect of the premises or otherwise dealing with the said house; and (d) an order that the defendant shall surrender to the plaintiff all title deeds and other documents relating to any property of the deceased now in the possession of the defendant.”

The facts of this case are simple and free from complexity: Both the plaintiff and the defendant are Yorubas from Nigeria resident in Ghana. The plaintiff’s father, S. A. Thompson (deceased), was also a Yoruba resident in Ghana, and died a Yoruba, intestate, in Ghana, on 16 May 1960, leaving landed properties in Accra, namely, house No. C.133/1, Adabraka, Accra; house No.

[p.540] of [1981] GLR 537

109/1, Adabraka, Accra; house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra and a plot of land at Brewery Road, Accra, as well as money in his banking accounts at Standard Bank (Ghana) Ltd., Tudu Branch, Accra and Barclays Bank, High Street, Accra. He also left some estate in Nigeria.

The defendant is the son of E. B. Thompson, Snr. (deceased), also a Yoruba resident in Ghana, who died a Yoruba, intestate, in Ghana, in 1912. The said S. A. Thompson and E. B. Thompson, Snr. were the sons of two brothers.

On the death of S. A. Thompson in 1960, the plaintiff, one J. D. Thompson, Victoria W. Martins and the defendant were appointed joint administrators of the deceased’s estate on 11 November 1960. A certified true copy of the letters of administration was tendered in evidence by the plaintiff herein as exhibit A.

The plaintiff herein in this action claims that by Yoruba customary law, he and his brothers and sisters are entitled to inherit the whole of the estate of their deceased father. His counsel contended relying on Youhana v. Abboud [1974] 2 G.L.R. 201, C.A. that the personal law of the deceased should govern the succession to the deceased’s landed and other properties situate in Ghana and that the personal law was the Yoruba customary law of succession. That customary law of succession was that when a Yoruba dies intestate, his children alone inherit the deceased’s estate. It is only at the discretion of the deceased’s children that they can give a portion of the deceased’s estate to members of the deceased’s family on the father’s side. He tendered in evidence a judgment of the High Court, Lagos, dated 24 May 1965, exhibit B. in support of his contention.

In that suit before the High Court, Lagos, Mrs. Victoria Wojuara Martins, one of the administrators of the estate of the plaintiff’s deceased father (see exhibit A) sued two of the administrators, including the defendant herein, and Barclays Bank D.C.O., Lagos, for the repayment to her of the sum of £4,957 1s. 4d. withdrawn by the two administrators from that bank. Later the plaintiff joined the action as the third defendant. Eventually, the plaintiff therein discontinued the action against the plaintiff herein. The bank was also struck off, while J. D. Thompson died in a motor accident before judgment. Judgment was consequently delivered against the defendant herein alone and he was ordered to refund to the estate of the deceased the sum claimed by the plaintiff in that suit.

In the course of the judgment of the High Court, Lagos, the learned trial judge addressed himself to Yoruba customary law of succession thus:

[p.541] of [1981] GLR 537

“I hold that the estate of the deceased in Nigeria under the native law and custom of the Yoruba tribe to which I belong devolved on his five children.”

The plaintiff herein and his brothers and sisters are in possession of two of the deceased’s landed properties in Accra, namely, house No. C.133/1, Adabraka, Accra, and house No. 109/1, Adabraka, Accra, while the defendant and his brothers and sisters (he calls them members of the deceased’s family) are in possession of house No. D. 725/4, Tudu, Accra, and the plot of land at Brewery Road, Accra.

The plaintiff claims these two landed properties from the defendant, as well as the title deeds of the four landed properties in the possession of the defendant. The defendant admitted in evidence that he was in possession of the title deeds of the four landed properties of the deceased in Accra, but he denied that he was in possession of the two banking account books of the deceased which the plaintiff was also claiming.

Apart from the plaintiff’s claim for the surrender of the title deeds of house No. C.133/1, Adabraka, Accra, and house No. 109/1, Adabraka, Accra, which the defendant testified that J. D. Thompson, one of the administrators of the deceased’s estate, himself willingly gave to the defendant, the defendant resisted all the claims of the plaintiff.

As to house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, and the plot at Brewery Road, Accra, while the defendant admitted that according to Yoruba customary law of succession, the children of the deceased intestate inherited the whole estate of the deceased, the defendant contended that he and his family (meaning thereby his brothers and sisters) were entitled to keep the two landed properties because according to a varied Yoruba customary law of succession applicable to Yorubas resident in Ghana, dying intestate in Ghana and leaving property in Ghana, the deceased’s children took half the estate, while the deceased’s family on the father’s side took the remaining half. The defendant in support of this contention relied on the following:

(1) a meeting of the children and the family of the deceased on the father’s side at Accra in 1961 at which the estate of the plaintiff’s father was distributed: see exhibits 1 and 2;

(2) a judgment of the High Court, Accra, dated 30 April 1928, exhibit 4;

[p.542] of [1981] GLR 537

(3) a judgment of the Full Court, Accra, dated 22 May 192.9, exhibit 5; and

(4) estoppel by conduct or by laches and acquiescence. It must be noted that the defendant did not plead estoppel by conduct, or by laches and acquiescence, nor, consequently, was either made an issue in the summons for directions filed by the plaintiff on 3 February 1969.

I will first deal with the 1961 meeting in Accra of the children and the family. It is clear from the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant, as indeed it is from exhibits 1 and 2, that there was a meeting in Accra in 1961 of the children of S. A. Thompson (deceased), the plaintiff’s father, and the family of the plaintiff’s father on his father’s side. At that meeting, the estate of the plaintiff’s father was divided into two, the children were given half, while the family were given the other half. There is nothing in the exhibits to indicate that the plaintiff, who was present at the meeting, raised openly any objection to the mode of distribution. It was suggested to the defendant under cross-examination by Mr. Quao, learned counsel for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff wept at the meeting in disapproval of the mode of distribution. This was denied by the defendant, who explained that the plaintiff wept at the suggestion of the defendant’s sister that the real estate of the plaintiff’s father should be sold and not because the plaintiff disapproved of the mode of distribution. The defendant himself, who was the customary head of the family and chairman of the meeting, rejected his sister’s suggestion. The plaintiff in his evidence said he raised an objection to the mode of distribution, but did not say he wept at the mode of distribution. What he said in answer to a question by the court was that he had wanted to walk out of the meeting in protest against the mode of distribution, but his step-mothers restrained him saying he would disorganise the meeting if he walked out, and they, the step-mothers’ wept. The plaintiff also said he signed exhibits 1 and 2 under duress, for he was told that if he did not sign it, his deceased father’s real estate would be sold. While I find that the plaintiff was not happy with the mode of distribution of his father’s estate, he has not been able to satisfy me that he signed exhibits 1 and 2 under duress or that he was told that if he did not agree to the mode of distribution his father’s real estate would be sold. I believe the evidence of the defendant that the plaintiff wept at the suggestion of the defendant’s sister that the real estate of the plaintiff’s father should be sold and not at the mode of distribution. I find that the plaintiff did not openly object to

[p.543] of [1981] GLR 537 the mode of distribution. Mr. Quansah, counsel for the defendant, contended that the plaintiff could not re-open the mode of distribution.

I now come to the judgment of the High Court, Accra, exhibit 4. The defendant contended that this judgment laid down a varied customary law of succession to the estate of Yorubas resident in Ghana, dying intestate and leaving property in Ghana. According to the further contention of the defendant, that judgment laid down that where a Yoruba resident in Ghana died intestate in Ghana leaving property in Ghana, the children of the deceased were entitled to half of the estate, while the family were entitled to the remaining half of the estate. And this was the customary law of devolution applied by the Accra meeting of the children and the family of the deceased in 1961. True, this was applied at the Accra meeting, but I doubt if the judgment laid down any firm Yoruba customary law of succession as advocated by the defendant and his counsel, Mr. Quansah.

In that case, the plaintiffs, including the father of the present plaintiff, sued the defendant herein and his brothers and sisters for a declaration that the plaintiffs therein were entitled to a share in the distribution of the estate of the father of the present defendant, E. B. Thompson, Snr. The agreed issues in that case were:

(1) What is the Yoruba native customary law governing the succession to self-acquired property of an intestate?

(2) Are the plaintiffs related to the deceased, and if so, are their degrees of relationship such as to entitle them to a share in the distribution?

The court found that the defendants (except of course the chief registrar of the court who was joined to the action as a defendant in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the late Edward Benjamin Thompson of Accra) were the children of the deceased. The court also recognised that the children were entitled to a share of their deceased father’s estate, but the question was – to what share? The court referred to an earlier judgment of the High Court, and held that Yoruba law was applicable for the determination of what share the children should have. This was in consonance with the later Court of Appeal case of Youhana v. Abboud (supra). There was no difficulty about that. The real difficulty was how to ascertain the Yoruba law applicable. Incidentally, the High Court in the 1928 suit found that the plaintiffs therein were members of the deceased’s family on the father’s side. A number of so-called experts were called on either side who apparently did not impress the judge, the result was that the judge was unable to make a positive finding of fact as to what Yoruba customary law of succession

[p.544] of [1981] GLR 537 was in fact. What the learned judge did was to weigh the evidence on either side and to prefer the version which he considered the better of the expert evidence called. The learned judge said:

“Finding, as I have already indicated, that the Yoruba customary law of succession (according to what I consider the better of the expert evidence called in that behalf) is that members of the deceased’s family on the father’s side share equally with the children, I must make the declaration sought, viz: that the plaintiffs, including of course C. A. Thompson, are entitled to share in a distribution of one-half of all property left by the deceased.”

So that it could not be said that the Yoruba customary law of succession was in fact what the judge stated. What he stated was what to him (an Englishman) seemed the better of the two forms of inheritance put up by the plaintiffs therein on the one side, and the defendants therein on the other. The so-called expert witnesses called by the plaintiffs therein said the family were entitled to half the estate while the children were entitled to half, whereas the so-called expert witnesses called by the defendants testified that the children were entitled to the whole estate.

The defendant herein further relied on the judgment of the Full Court, Accra, to which the judgment of the High Court, Accra, exhibit 4 went on appeal. The Full Court, while compelled to dismiss the appeal because the judgment of the lower court was based on a finding of fact which the Full Court could not, on the evidence, disturb, nevertheless refused to accept as authoritative the lower court’s finding of what Yoruba customary law of succession was in fact. Crampton Smyly C.J., reading the majority judgment (Hall J. concurring and Gardiner Smith J. dissenting), said:

“The learned trial Judge Mr. Justice Sawrey-Cookson, after hearing the evidence, held that of the several witnesses called as so-called experts on this customary law those called by the plaintiffs had the better of the argument namely that an intestate deceased’s self-acquired property is divided into two parts of which the family of the deceased on the father’s side take the one half and the deceased’s children the other but if the deceased left a father surviving him then the children and the others would wait for their share, for which the father of the deceased would be only morally responsible if he chose to consume the whole of the property.

[p.545] of [1981] GLR 537

I do not propose to express my personal opinion on the weight or reliability of the evidence before the trial judge, beyond saying that the learned judge was placed in the very difficult position of having to decide on two contradictory stories as to what the Yoruba customary law was, one story told for the plaintiff, and one for the defendant, and decided for the plaintiffs not on the ground that as I gather he was satisfied that their contention was in fact a correct statement of the Yoruba customary law of succession, but rather as to what he considered would be more reasonable and equitable of the two statements put before him as to what the Yoruba law of succession should be.

It does not however necessarily follow that what would appear reasonable and equitable to a European would appear reasonable or equitable to a native of the Gold Coast-or that what would appear reasonable and equitable to a native of the Gold Coast would appear reasonable or equitable to a Sierra Leonian or Lagosian …

I am not at all satisfied that the Yoruba law of succession is in fact as stated either by the plaintiffs’ or the appellants’ witnesses.”

After commenting upon the strangeness of the expert evidence of the plaintiffs that in the absence of the deceased’s family on his father’s side (that is his brothers and sisters on his father’s side) their shares should not go to the children of the deceased, but to their grandfather and on his death to his collaterals, the learned Chief Justice concluded:

“At the same time it cannot be denied that there was evidence before the trial judge in support of his findings of fact and that the evidence for the defendants was not of a kind to justify us in reversing the conclusions of the Court below, the result is that I do not see my way to allow the appeal. At the same time it should be quite clear that we do not accept those findings as an authoritative statement of what the Yoruba law of succession really is in fact.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The defendant himself, as already stated, admitted under cross- examination, that the Yoruba customary law of succession is that children succeed to the whole, the movable and immovable of their deceased’s father’s estate. This is contrary to the Yoruba customary law of succession which the trial judge in exhibit 4,

[p.546] of [1981] GLR 537 found on the evidence before the trial court, that is to say, the children and the family of the deceased on the father’s side share equally the estate of a Yoruba who dies intestate.

I have before me exhibit B, a statement by the High Court, Lagos, of what the Yoruba customary law of succession is. That judgment was delivered in 1965, and it clearly supports the Yoruba customary law of succession as stated by the plaintiff and his second witness, Pius Olu, and admitted by the defendant, that is to say, where a Yoruba, who is subject to customary law, dies intestate, his children succeed to the whole of the deceased’s estate. That customary law of succession is what Ghana courts, would, by the process of renvoi in private international law or conflict of laws apply to a Yoruba, subject to Yoruba customary law, dying intestate in Ghana leaving real property in Ghana: see Youhana v. Abboud (supra). Exhibit 4 was decided on its own facts and the evidence before the court. It did not lay down a general varied Yoruba customary law of succession specially applicable to Yorubas dying intestate in Ghana and leaving property in Ghana as claimed by the defendant in his evidence and in paragraph 3 of his statement of defence which is as follows:

“3. The defendant further says that by Ghanaian law the estate of a deceased Yoruba devolves, as to one half on the children of the deceased and as to the other half on the paternal family of the deceased. In exhibits 1 and 2, the defendant, who was 59 years old in 1961, and who as I have said, was the customary head of the family and chairman of the meeting, explained that the half and half distribution was created by precedent following the decision of the Full Court, on appeal, in a previous case of similar circumstances in which the Yoruba law and custom was applied.”

The Full Court did not hold that the Yoruba customary law of succession applicable to Yorubas who died intestate in Ghana leaving property in Ghana was that the children and the family shared the deceased’s estate equally. As quoted above, the Full Court did not accept the Yoruba customary law of succession. as found by the trial judge in exhibit 4 on the evidence preferred before him, to be an authoritative statement of what the Yoruba law of succession really was in fact.

Since the Full Court did not accept the Yoruba customary law of succession as found by the trial judge to be an authoritative statement of what the Yoruba law of succession really was in fact,

[p.547] of [1981] GLR 537 it cannot be said that that statement by the High Court is an authoritative statement by the courts of Ghana that the Yoruba customary law of succession, as applicable to Yorubas dying intestate in Ghana leaving property in Ghana, is that the children and the family share the deceased’s estate equally. The true Yoruba customary law of succession applicable to Yorubas dying intestate in Ghana and leaving real property in Ghana is, on the authority of Youhana v. Abboud (supra), the same as the customary law of succession of Yorubas dying intestate in Nigeria and leaving real property in Nigeria.

The distribution of the real estate of the plaintiff’s deceased father upon the basis of the alleged customary law of succession in Ghana that when a Yoruba dies intestate in Ghana, leaving property in Ghana, his children and his family share the deceased’s property equally is therefore erroneous. I do not, however, share the view of Mr. Quao, learned counsel for the plaintiff, that because the High Court, Accra, enunciated a non-existent Yoruba customary law of succession, the judgment was delivered per incuriam. It enunciated a non-existent Yoruba customary law of succession on the evidence before it.

The next and last point made by the defendant was the admitted fact that following the judgments in exhibits 4 and 5, the plaintiff’s father enjoyed part of the estate of the defendant’s deceased father. Mr. R. I. Quansah, learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that the plaintiff was estopped by the conduct of the plaintiff’s father from repudiating the mode of distribution of the estate of the plaintiff’s deceased father during the 1961 meeting, since the deceased had championed that mode while alive. Mr. Quansah contended also that the plaintiff, having enjoyed his share of the deceased’s estate following the distribution at the 1961 meeting for seven years (the meeting was held in 1961 and this action was commenced by the plaintiff in 1968) and not repudiating the distribution during the Lagos meeting, was estopped from challenging the said mode of distribution.

Neither estoppel by laches and acquiescence, nor estoppel by conduct was pleaded by the defendant, not even the Lagos meeting. But I find neither estoppel by laches and acquiescence, nor estoppel by conduct proved. It has not been shown by the defendant that he interpreted the Full Court’s judgment to the plaintiff, that is to say, that the Full Court did not accept the High Court’s statement of the Yoruba customary law of succession as an authoritative statement of the real Yoruba customary law of succession. If this interpretation had been done, and the plaintiff had still accepted the mode of distribution, or failed to bring any action

[p.548] of [1981] GLR 537 for seven years, then probably estoppel by laches and acquiescence and estoppel by conduct, if they had been pleaded, would have operated against the plaintiff. In that case, it could have been argued that the plaintiff and his brothers and sisters had compromised their rights under the personal law of their deceased father and opted for the alleged Yoruba customary law of succession, specially applicable to Yorubas resident in Ghana and dying intestate in Ghana leaving real or other property in Ghana. But whether the mode of distribution accepted by the High Court, Accra, in 1928 and apparently affirmed by the Full Court in 1929 was still law in Ghana in 1961, will be discussed later.

As to the submission of Mr. Quansah that the plaintiff’s deceased father had championed the half and half mode of distribution and benefited therefrom and that therefore the plaintiff is estopped from repudiating the said mode, I do not see how if the plaintiff’s father propounded an erroneous or a non-existent customary law of succession, the plaintiff is estopped from propounding the correct existent customary law of succession. Does Mr. Quansah expect the plaintiff to perpetuate an erroneous or non-existent customary law of succession? In my view, the plaintiff would not be estopped if estoppel had been pleaded by the defendant.

Mr. Quansah again referred to the plaintiff’s first relief sought in his writ of summons, that is to say:

“(a). a declaration that he, the plaintiff, and the other children of S. A. Thompson (deceased) are the beneficial owners of house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, and other properties of the deceased.”

He submitted that this declaration disclosed no cause of action. Learned counsel described it as a peculiar endorsement, his ground being that since the deceased had died intestate, the plaintiff had no automatic right to share in the estate of the deceased, until the process of the administration of the estate had been put into effect. And it was after the administrators had decided who should take what, that the plaintiff could ask for this particular relief. The proper claim that should have been before the court, learned counsel further contended, was for an order setting aside the distribution of the estate by the administrators of the estate. He finally submitted that the endorsement was not a proper cause of action and should be struck out.

I entirely disagree with Mr. Quansah. In the first place, the defendant in his statement of defence did not plead that, that endorsement disclosed no cause of action as is required by Order

[p.549] of [1981] GLR 537

19,, r. 16 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which provides:

“16. The defendant or plaintiff (as the case may be) must raise by his pleading all matters which show the action or counterclaim not to be maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of defence or reply, as the case may be, as if not raised would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings, as, for instance, fraud, Statute of Limitations, release, payment, performance, facts showing illegality either by statute or common law, or Statute of Frauds.”

In the second place, the defendant himself, pleaded and led evidence to prove that the distribution of the estate of the plaintiff’s father (of which the defendant, the plaintiff, and two others were administrators) at least in Ghana, took place during the 1961 Accra meeting, by virtue of which the defendant and his family were in possession of the house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, and the plot at Brewery Road, Accra, which formed part of the estate of the deceased father of the plaintiff. If the administration had not been put into effect and indeed completed, how could the defendant and his brothers and sisters be in possession of these two landed properties to the exclusion of the children of the deceased father of the plaintiff and the three other administrators of that estate?

At the Accra meeting, the suggestion by the defendant’s sister that the real estate of the plaintiff’s deceased father should be sold was, as I said, rejected by the defendant and so the sale did not take place. And the real estate of the plaintiff’s deceased father. at least in Ghana, remained and still remains real property. Under the repealed Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), s. 66, rr. 4 and 5 (the Act was in force in Ghana at the time of the 1961 meeting) the plaintiff was entitled to make the claim he now makes. The Courts Act, 1960, s. 66, rr. 1, 2, 4 and 5 provided:

“Rule 1. Where two persons have the same personal law one of them cannot, by dealing in a manner regulated by some other law with property in which the other has a present or expectant interest, alter or affect that interest to an extent which would not in the circumstances be open to him under his personal law.

Rule 2. Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of a transaction the parties to which have agreed, or may from the form or nature of the transaction be taken to have agreed,

[p.550] of [1981] GLR 537 that such an issue should be determined according to the common law or any system of customary law effect should be given to the agreement . . .

In this rule ‘transaction’ includes a marriage and an agreement or arrangement to marry . . .

Rule 4. Subject to the foregoing rules, where an issue relates to entitlement to land on the death of the owner or otherwise relates to title to land— (a) if all the parties to the proceedings who claim to be entitled to the land or a right relating thereto trace their claims from one person who is subject to customary law, or from one family or other group of persons all subject to the same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;

(b) if the said parties trace their claims from different persons, or families or other groups of persons, who are all subject to the same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;

(c) in any other case, the issue should be determined according to the law of the place in which the land is situated.

Rule 5. Subject to Rules 1 to 3, where an issue relates to the devolution of the property (other than land) of a person on his death it should be determined according to his personal law.”

It is clear from section 66, rr. 4 (a) and 5 that in the present case, Yoruba customary law of succession ought in 1961 to have determined the respective claims of the plaintiff and the defendant, and this customary law is stated in exhibit B, the judgment of the High Court, Lagos, dated 24 May 1965, at pp. 4 and 5, that is to say, the children of the deceased take all the deceased’s properties, both immovable and movable. Rule 2 could have no application because the true import of the Full Court’s judgment was not brought home to the plaintiff. Besides, what the High Court, Accra, in exhibit 4, set out to do, as Mr. Quao correctly put it, was to find Yoruba customary law of succession, not Yoruba customary law of succession as applicable to Yorubas dying intestate in Ghana and leaving property in Ghana as advocated by Mr. Quansah in his submission, and by the defendant in his evidence and his pleadings. In fact, I would go so far to say that the judgment of the High Court, Accra, given in 1928 to the effect that the children and the family of E. A. Thompson (deceased) should share the estate of the deceased equally, which is admitted by the defendant, did not represent the Yoruba customary law of succession in Nigeria

[p.551] of [1981] GLR 537 and was supplanted by the Courts Act, 1960, S. 66, rr. 4 and 5 with effect from 29 June 1960, the date the Act came into effect. As I have already said, the Courts Act, 1960, was in operation in 1961 at the time of the Accra meeting and the judgment was consequently of no effect. In the circumstances of this case, according to section 66, rr. 4 and 5 of the Act, since the plaintiff and the defendant, and in fact all the children of S. A. Thompson (deceased) and his family on the father’s side, claimed through S. A. Thompson, a Yoruba admittedly subject to Yoruba customary law, his personal law, then Yoruba customary law of succession, ought to have governed the distribution of S. A. Thompson’s estate in 1961, and not the judgment of the High Court, Accra, dated 30 April 1928. The distribution, based upon a null and void judgment, was itself consequently void.

And at the time the plaintiff filed his writ on 9 October 1968, the law as I have stated above, had not been changed. It had been preserved in the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), para. 64, rr. 1, 2, 4, and 5. I would like to quote them:

“Rule 1. Where two persons have the same personal law one of them cannot, by dealing in a manner regulated by some other law with property in which the other has a present or expectant interest, alter or affect that interest to an extent which would not in the circumstances be open to him under his personal law.

Rule 2. Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises out of a transaction the parties to which have agreed, or may from the form or nature of the transaction be taken to have agreed, that such an issue should be determined according to the common law or any system of customary law effect should be given to the agreement.

In this rule ‘transaction’ includes a marriage and an agreement or arrangement to marry . . .

Rule 4. Subject to the foregoing rules, where an issue relates to entitlement to land on the death of the owner or otherwise relates to title to land— (a) if all the parties to the proceedings who claim to be entitled to the land or a right relating thereto trace their claims from one person who is subject to customary law, or from one family or other group of persons all subject to the same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;

(b) if the said parties trace their claims from different persons, or families or other groups of persons, who are

[p.552] of [1981] GLR 537 all subject to the same customary law, the issue should be determined according to that law;

(c) in any other case, the issue should be determined according to the law of the place in which the land is situated.

Rule 5. Subject to Rules 1 to 3, where an issue relates to the devolution of the property (other than land) of a person on his death it should be determined according to his personal law.”

These rules have been substantially preserved in the present Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 49, rr. 1-5 which also provides:

“Rule 1. An issue arising out of a transaction shall be determined according to the system of law intended by the parties to the transaction to govern the issue or the system of law which the parties may, from the nature or form of the transaction be taken to have intended to govern the issue.

Rule 2. In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to any issue arising out of the devolution of a person’s estate shall be the personal law of that person.

Rule 3. In the absence of any intention to the contrary the law applicable to an issue as to title between persons who trace their claims from one person or group of persons or from different persons all having the same personal law, shall be the personal law of that person or those persons.

Rule 4. In applying Rules 2 and 3 to disputes relating to titles to land due regard shall be had to any overriding provisions of the law of the place in which the land is situated.

Rule 5. Subject to the foregoing Rules, the law applicable to any issue arising between two or more persons shall, where they are subject to the same personal law, be that law; and where they are not subject to the same personal law, the Court shall apply the relevant rules of their different systems of personal law to achieve a result conformable to natural justice, equity and good conscience.”

An examination of rules 2 and 3 will reveal that even according to the Courts Act, 1971, Yoruba customary law of succession, that is to say, the children of the deceased intestate take all the deceased’s estate, will apply to the present suit. There has never been in Ghana a varied Yoruba customary law of succession applicable to Yorubas dying intestate in Ghana and leaving property in Ghana. On application of section 49, r. 4 of Act 372, the courts of Ghana will apply, by the process of renvoi in private international law, Yoruba customary law of succession: see Youhana v. Abboud (supra). The Yoruba customary law of devolution, being the personal law of

[p.553] of [1981] GLR 537

S. A. Thompson (deceased) would also be applied by the Ghana courts. On the application of section 49, r. 1 of Act 372, I have found that the plaintiff did not openly object to the mode of distribution of S. A. Thompson’s estate employed at the 1961 Accra meeting, but as I have already also found, that mode of distribution was based upon the 1928 High Court judgment that had since 29 June 1960 ceased to have any effect in law in Ghana and therefore void. The distribution was therefore void and of no effect in law.

I reject the contention of Mr. Quansah that the plaintiff cannot ask for the first relief in his writ. The law applicable in 1961 when the distribution of his deceased father’s estate took place, the law applicable when he took out his writ and the law applicable at the date of judgment, all support his claim that he and his brothers and sisters (being the children of S. A. Thompson, a Yoruba who died a Yoruba intestate) are entitled to the whole estate of their deceased father including house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra. I would accordingly grant that relief.

A personal representative who holds overall or a portion of the deceased’s estate after administration has ceased (in this case it ceased, at least as far as deceased’s real estate in Ghana is concerned, with the distribution of that estate) holds that estate or the portion thereof as trustee for the beneficiaries, in this case the children of S. A. Thompson (deceased) including the plaintiff. The defendant is therefore liable to account to the plaintiff for the rents of house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, which he admitted he and his son Olu collected from July 1962 to October 1968, when a receiver and manager was appointed by the court.

Since I have held that the plaintiff and his brothers and sisters are entitled to a declaration that they are beneficial owners of house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, they are also entitled to an order of perpetual injunction claimed by the plaintiff.

The defendant admitted in evidence that he had all the title deeds of the deceased’s landed properties in Ghana, namely, house No. C.133/1, Adabraka, Accra; house No. 109/1, Adabraka, Accra; house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra and a plot at Brewery Road, Accra. Since I have found that the plaintiff, his brothers and sisters are the beneficial owners of the whole estate of S. A. Thompson (deceased), the plaintiff is entitled to an order that the defendant shall surrender to the plaintiff all the title deeds in connection with the four landed properties.

As to the two banking account books in respect of S. A. Thompson’s account at Standard Bank (Ghana) Ltd., Tudu Branch, Accra, and Barclays Bank, High Street, Accra, the defendant denied being in possession of them. The plaintiff was not able to satisfy me [p.554] of [1981] GLR 537 that the defendant had them. I therefore cannot order that he surrenders these documents. I accordingly enter judgment for the plaintiff for:

(a) a declaration that the plaintiff and the other children of the late S. A. Thompson, are the beneficial owners of house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, and other properties of the deceased;

(b) an account of all rents collected from house No. D.725/4, Tudu, Accra, from July 1962 to October 1968;

(c) an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants or agents from collecting rent in respect of the said premises or otherwise dealing with the said house; and (d) an order that the defendant shall surrender to the plaintiff all title deeds relating to the four landed properties of the deceased in Ghana now in the custody of the defendant.

I would award costs of ¢750 in favour of the plaintiff.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.

E. P.-T.

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