ANNOBIL vs. OBOSU AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 585
10 July 1980 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 5 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 48Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Marfo v. Adusei [1963] 1 G.L.R. 225, S.C.
(2) Edward Nasser & Co., Ltd. v. Abu-Jawdi [1965] G.L.R. 523, S.C.
(3) Young v. Kershaw; Burton v. Kershaw (1899) 81 L.T. (N.S.) 531; 16 T.L.R. 52, C.A. (4) Anderson v. Titmas (1877) 36 L.T. 711; 41 J.P. 680.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATIONS by the plaintiff seeking leave to amend his reply to the defendants’ amended defence and to introduce fresh evidence after close of case by both parties. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
de Graft Aidoo for the plaintiff.
Ewusi Wilson for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
This ruling incorporates the answer to two applications made by the plaintiff. The first seeks leave to amend his reply to the defendants’ amended defence which the plaintiff filed out of time and the second attempts to introduce fresh evidence after the formal evidence taken at the trial has closed and what now remains is to hear the addresses of counsel. The former application does not attempt to rectify any inconsistencies in the pleadings occasioned by the oral evidence but rather to bring the plaintiff’s pleadings to conform with the oral evidence which he was permitted to lead without any objection. In Marfo v. Adusei [1963] 1 G.L.R. 225, S.C., the following comments on practice are set down in the headnotes:
“(2) The penalty for failing to plead a material fact is the exclusion, upon objection being taken, of evidence to establish it. But where evidence which could have been ruled out as inadmissible because it is adduced to prove a material fact which was not pleaded, has nevertheless been adduced without objection, a judge is bound to consider it. Abowaba v. Adeshina (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 18 and Yartey v. Construction and Furniture (West Africa) Ltd. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 86, S.C.
(3) Counsel should take every care to exclude evidence of averments which are not pleaded for where he
does not raise objection at the trial, he is precluded from doing so on appeal.”
It was thus that an amendment was allowed to bring the pleadings in line with the evidence already led in Edward Nasser & Co., Ltd. v. Abu-Jawdi [1965] G.L.R. 523, S.C.
The fresh evidence in the instant case, concerns certain judgments, five of them in all, which the plaintiff’s counsel seeks to tender through an employee of the National Archives who has been called,
[p.587] of [1982-83] GLR 585
by leave of court, for a limited purpose only. The defendants are not privy to any of these judgments and, indeed, it is only in respect of two of them where the plaintiff is privy. If the defendants’ counsel had consented to their being admitted in evidence, the court would have granted without question its fiat. The defendants’ counsel has raised his objection and, in my view, the objection is, quite apart from what has been urged by counsel for the defendant, sustainable on three grounds:
First, it will be prejudicial to the defendant who, because it is not tendered through the plaintiff, will have no opportunity to cross-examine on the judgments. Secondly, as they seek to supplement certain issues raised in the plaintiff’s evidence they are material facts which ought to have been pleaded. Thirdly, as the fresh evidence (from what I could make of the submissions of the plaintiff’s counsel) is aimed to support the evidence of the plaintiff at the trial which was contradicted by the defendant, that, in my view, cannot be a legitimate ground for permitting the plaintiff, long after he has closed his case, to lead fresh evidence.
I am of the opinion that the rationale being the denial or grant of permission to order a new trial upon the discovery of further evidence must be the same as that which denies or grants permission to lead further evidence after the close of the case for the parties. Collins L.J. went over the governing principles which will guide the court in permitting a new trial for the purpose of adducing fresh evidence, in the consolidated cases of Young v. Kershaw; Burton v. Kershaw (1899) 81 L.T. (N.S.) 531 at p. 532, C.A., as follows:
“. . . it is a matter of the greatest importance, and has always been so treated by the courts, that all material evidence, which could with reasonable skill and diligence be produced at the trial, shall be the only evidence which can be considered, and must be adduced at the trial. It is obviously in the public interests that parties, who have gone through the ordeal of litigation and have had their rights settled at the trial, should not afterwards be allowed to patch up the weak parts and fill up the omissions in their case by means of fresh evidence . . . It is true that in special and exceptional circumstances a new trial has been granted because new evidence has been discovered. But the rule which permits that to be done is fenced round with many limitations. The party asking for the new trial must show that there was no remission on his part in adducing all possible evidence at the trial. Then, again, as to the class of new evidence, the rule is that the new evidence must be such that, if adduced, it would be practically conclusive—that is, evidence of such a class as to render it probable almost beyond doubt that the verdict would be different.”
[p.588] of [1982-83] GLR 585
The learned Lord Justice then referred to Anderson v. Titmas (1877) 36 L.T. 711 which held that where the new evidence was one to support the evidence of the defendant at the trial which was contradicted by the plaintiff, that could be no ground for granting a new trial. It is for all these reasons that I hold that the application to introduce fresh evidence at this late stage must be rejected. It is for well to remind ourselves that there is a vast difference between an amendment which can be taken at any stage of the trial even up to the Court of Appeal and an application like this which seeks to introduce fresh evidence.
In the result, I would grant the plaintiff leave to file his amended reply but dismiss his application to introduce fresh evidence and, consequently, the judgments. The exhibits would accordingly be rejected.
DECISION
Application for leave to amend the reply granted. Objection to the introduction of fresh evidence sustained.
J. A. A.
