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[1980] SLR (HC) 54High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

EWUDZIWA vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 625

19 November 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 26 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 54
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OSCOLAEWUDZIWA v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 625 [1980] SLR (HC) 54
APAEWUDZIWA v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 625, [1980] SLR (HC) 54 (Ghana).
BluebookEWUDZIWA v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 625, [1980] SLR (HC) 54 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Baiden v. Ansah [1974] 2 G.L.R. 407, C.A.

(2) Mbadiwe v. Yaya (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 613.

(3) Saoud Brothers v. Boateng [1964] G.L.R. 405, S.C.

(4) Hilton v. Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 705; [1961] 1 All E.R. 74.

(5) Agogro v. Ago [1973] 1 G.L.R. 45.

(6) Twine v. Bean’s Express Ltd. (1946) 175 L.T. 131; 62 T.L.R. 458, C.A.; affirming [1946] 1 All E.R. 202.

(7) Conway v. George Wimpey & Co., Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 266; [1951] 1 All E.R. 363; [1951] 1 T.L.R.

587; 95 S.J. 156, C.A.

[p.627] of [1982-83] GLR 625

(8) Ilkiw v. Samuels [1963] 1 W.L.R. 991; [1963] 3 All E.R. 481; 107 S.J. 680.

(9) Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (1862) 1 H. & C. 526; 32 L.J. Ex. 34; 7 L.T. (N.S.) 641;

27 J.P. 147; 11 W.R. 149; 130 R.R. 461; 9 Jur. (N.S.) 333.

(10) London County Council v. Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953] 1 W.L.R. 997; [1953] 2 All E.R. 582;

97 S.J. 505.

(11) Rose v. Plenty [1976] 1 W.L.R. 141; [1976] 1 All E.R. 97.

(12) Bennet v. Tugwell [1971] 2 Q.B. 267; [1971] 2 All E.R. 248.

(13) Higbid v. R.C. Hamnett Ltd. (1932) 49 T.L.R. 104.

(14) Dann v. Hamilton [1939] 1 K.B. 509; [1939] 1 All E.R. 59; 108 L.J.K.B. 255; 160 L.T. 433; 55 T.L.R. 297; 83 S.J. 155.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for damages against the Republic for injuries she sustained in an accident caused by the negligent driving of a police constable whilst she was in the police vehicle as a fare-paying passenger. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Kwesi Epton for the plaintiff.

Miss K. D. K. Quartey, Assistant State Attorney, for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

On 18 November 1974, the plaintiff, a middle-aged woman, was waiting in the early hours of the morning by the street at Kotokuraba in Cape Coast for transport to convey her to Accra. A vehicle came along and she hailed it to stop. It was police jeep No. GP. 449. Before she boarded, she noticed that it was a police jeep, nevertheless she told the driver she was going to Accra and demanded to know the fare. The driver charged her ¢2 for herself and her luggage. She agreed and boarded the vehicle. The vehicle, police jeep No. GP. 449, was driven by Constable Kofi Asare. At Anomabu the constable stopped and picked three other passengers.

The jeep was moving at great speed. The plaintiff admonished the driver against overspeeding but the driver told her he had been sent from Takoradi to Accra, implying that he was in a hurry to get to Accra. Sometimes he paid heed to the admonition, and slowed down, but generally his speed was high. At Mankesim the plaintiff fell asleep. The next thing she realised was that she was lying ill at Winneba Hospital, with serious injuries and in pain all over her body. The police vehicle had been involved in an accident at about six miles from the Winneba Junction towards Accra. She had multiple lacerations on the face, arms and right leg. There were also deep lacerations on the upper part of the right tibia with evulsion of the skin, and compound fracture of the right femur. At the time she gave evidence, [p.628] of [1982-83] GLR 625 she was still continuing her treatment at the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital. The court had to move to her bedside to record her evidence. Dr. Korsah’s opinion of her condition at that stage was that the plaintiff had three inches shortening of the right leg and that even though he thought the plaintiff might be able to walk again, she would have a shortened leg and a permanent stiff knee, and that that leg would only serve as a pillar of support and will only be functional to a very low degree. At the stage of her treatment, he assessed her incapacity at 55 per cent.

The plaintiff is a housewife who did poultry farming on a very moderate scale, and a lot of backyard gardening. As a result of this accident, she has had to abandon completely these hobbies from which she derived financial support. She is now a very unhappy and an unhealthy person. She brings this action against the Attorney-General as a nominal defendant representing the government, the employer of the driver in charge of the police jeep No. G.P. 449. The driver himself was not made a party to the suit. This the plaintiff had a right to do since the liability of master and servant is several and joint. Nevertheless, the plaintiff must establish the negligence of the driver, since the defendant’s liability is only vicarious.

The defendant denied the plaintiff’s charge of negligence, but offered no explanation. The plaintiff herself was not in a position to tell how the accident occurred; she is asking the court to hold that the circumstances of the case are such that negligence must be inferred from the conduct of the driver.

The speed at which the jeep was moving was so fast that the plaintiff on a number of times had to warn the driver to reduce speed and drive with care. Excerpts from the station diary at Winneba dated 18 November 1974 and contained in a letter written by Mr. B. S. K. Kwakye, Assistant Commissioner of Police at the time to the Attorney-General, shows how the accident occurred.

This letter was tendered by the defendant with no objection from the plaintiff. According to the contents of this letter, exhibit 5, the driver of the jeep (Asare) was approaching a stationary truck No. WR. 2683 which was properly parked and lighted on the nearside of the road facing the Accra direction. When he was about to overtake the truck, he saw a vehicle coming from the opposite direction. The time was about 5.45 a.m. To avoid a head-on collision, he applied his brakes but they failed and he ran into the offside of the stationary truck. The police jeep rebounded and landed 22ft. away on its offside on the road.

The vehicle examiner who inspected the jeep after the accident said it was totally damaged and was not roadworthy. His report on the damages as contained in exhibit D reads as follows:

“Case No. RMTO 147/74 TO: CERTMOTORS,

[p.629] of [1982-83] GLR 625

Licensing Authority Cape Coast Winneba 11 November 1974 Motor: Jeep No. GP. 449 Please test the brakes and steering gear of the above vehicle and inform me if same are in working order and state damages.

(Sgd.) ? ? Inspt., LICENSING AUTHORITY.

Report Vehicle was examined on 18 November 1974 and at the request of the police. The steering and braking systems were damaged as a result of the accident.

Damages Steel body right side panel ripped off and distorted. Driver’s cab and cab roof panel distorted; front grille damaged. Radiator damaged.

O/S and N/S headlights damaged: accumulator battery smashed; windscreen smashed; distributor head damaged; O/S and N/S front mudguards damaged; right hand side front road springs top leaf broken; front shock absorbers damaged; front propeller-shaft bent; steering rack rod bent; chassis right hand side frame bent; cab doors damaged and detached; right hand side front wheel brake hose damaged as a result of the accident; steering wheel damaged: Front bumper right hand side portion dented and bent inward.

At the time of the examination vehicle was lying on its left hand side on the road.

(Sgd.) M.A. Aryee.

Senior Technical Officer (Driving & Vehicle Exams.)

M.A. Aryee.”

In his testimony in court, the vehicle examiner said he formed the opinion that the accident was due to excessive speed.

This is all the evidence there is on record of the accident. It will be remembered that the plaintiff was asleep, she had no recollection of what happened. But the extensive damage caused to the police jeep from the impact of the collision would seem to tell its own story. It suggests clearly that great force was involved. The only inference which is deducible from this is that since the truck was stationary, and the jeep was moving, the jeep must have been moving at a great speed. Excessive speed alone is not a mark of negligence. It is true that no speed limit is imposed on drivers driving on the highway

[p.630] of [1982-83] GLR 625 except on certain types of vehicles. There is no evidence that the jeep in this case was restricted in any way to any speed limit. However, I have always held the view, and I think it is a reasonable one, that a prudent driver will drive at a speed which enables him in his particular circumstances to have effective control over the movement of his vehicle. Since the police jeep was driven into a stationary vehicle which was properly parked and lighted, the presumption is that the driver of the jeep was negligent. Even if he was driving at ten miles per hour and he drove into a stationary vehicle, I think an accident in those circumstances would raise a presumption of negligence, which would call for an explanation: see Baiden v. Ansah [1974] 2 G.L.R. 407 at p 417, C.A. and Mbadiwe v. Yaya (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 613.

The onus is on the defendant to disprove negligence. There is no evidence to explain the accident. Miss Quartey, relying on Saoud Brothers v. Boateng [1964] G.L.R. 405, S.C., contended that the plaintiff gave details of how the accident occurred, but those details were not substantiated in evidence, so negligence is not proved. I think that the established facts cogently point to negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep. In the ordinary course of things, a driver does not run into obstacles in his way if he has a proper look-out and good control of the vehicle. It is incumbent upon the defendant to explain why the driver had to run into the rear of the stationary vehicle. This he has not done. The onus which shifted on the defendant has not therefore been discharged.

As I said earlier on, the defendant’s liability can only be vicarious, and the driver must be proved to be acting in the course of his employment at the time of this incident. The defendant’s main defence to this claim is that the driver was on a frolic of his own. In paragraph 2 of the amended statement of defence it was averred:

“2. The defendant admits that G.P.C. No. 6960 Kofi Asare was at all material times an employee of the Ghana Police Force and the driver in charge of police jeep No. GP. 449 but denies that at that time he was in control of the vehicle with the consent and knowledge of his employers as alleged in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim.”

Then at paragraph 4 it was pleaded:

“4. In further answer to paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the statement of claim the defendants aver that G.P.C.

Kofi Asare was at all material times in charge of force vehicle No. G.P. 449 for his own private purpose, without any authority, knowledge or consent of his employers and in complete violation of police regulations and discipline.”

[p.631] of [1982-83] GLR 625

The plaintiff’s case has been that since the driver was driving a service vehicle, the court should infer that he was driving within the scope of his employment. That, in my view, the plaintiff was entitled to do. Having established that the vehicle belonged to the Police Force, the inference could be made that the driver was the agent or servant of the owner. The burden is therefore on the owner to disprove that the driver was his agent or servant driving within the scope of his authority, or in the course of his employment. A master is not liable for his servant’s tort unless it falls within the course of the servant’s employment. The wrong must be expressly or impliedly authorised by the master, or it must be an unauthorised manner of doing something which is authorised or incidental to something which the servant is employed to do: see Salmond on Torts. But it is a question of fact whether a servant is doing something which he was employed to do: see Hilton v. Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 705.

The defendant’s case is that the driver, Constable Asare, was assigned to Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr. Tetteh. On 17 November 1974, Constable Asare drove Mr. Tetteh to church with the police jeep No. GP. 449. Mr. Tetteh said his personal car was in the workshop so he asked Asare to bring the police vehicle to convey him.

At one o’clock, Asare went back to the church at Adabraka Assemblies of God and took Mr. Tetteh to Osu R.E. Mr. Tetteh was with a reverend minister on the vehicle and after he got down, he instructed the driver to convey the reverend minister to Adabraka and then return the vehicle to the service workshop. Mr. Tetteh expected Asare to collect him in the morning of 18 November 1974, but Asare never turned up. When Mr. Tetteh got to work at the service workshop he gave instructions to find Asare, but he had a report that neither Asare nor the vehicle could be traced at the workshop.

The station diary kept at the service workshop on 17 November 1974, p. 155, column 35 shows the following recording: “No. 6960 TC/1 Kofi Asare i/c S/V No. GP. 449 reported and left for assistant commissioner of police’s bungalow on duty.” This is recorded against the time 8.30 a.m. At column 40 of the same, against the time 10.20 a.m. and same date, it is recorded that the constable reported his arrival from the assistant commissioner of police’s bungalow. No more recording was made in respect of the constable or the vehicle. Mr. Tetteh said that senior police officers are allowed to use service vehicles for their personal use, but junior officers can only use them on instructions from superior officers, but all he authorised Asare to do after he dropped him, was to return the vehicle to the workshop after dropping the reverend minister at Adabraka. The evidence on record is that Asare picked the plaintiff at Cape Coast. In fact, he told the plaintiff he was returning from Takoradi to Accra. The crucial

[p.632] of [1982-83] GLR 625 issue on which the whole of this matter hinges is whether or not Asare was driving in the course of his employment when he took the plaintiff for a fare at Cape Coast.

I have heard very forceful and convincing argument from Miss Quartey that the facts of the case show clearly that the driver was not authorised to go to Takoradi nor take passengers. On the contrary, she maintained he was under instructions not to use the service vehicle to convey passengers. In the circumstances of this case, she submitted that the plaintiff was a trespasser and therefore not entitled to damages for the tort committed against her by Asare. For support, she relied on Agogro v. Ago [1973] G.L.R. 45; Twine v. Bean’s Express Ltd. [1946] 1 All E.R. 202 and Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 266, C.A. She argued further that the plaintiff consented to be carried at her own risk.

Mr. Epton on the other hand argued that since it had not been recorded that the vehicle had returned after Mr. Tetteh returned from church, it should be presumed that the constable was still on duty. He argued further that in the absence of express prohibition forbidding a wrong, the defendant will not be exculpated if the driver did an unauthorised act. He also relied on cases like Ilkiw v. Samuels [1963] 1 W.L.R. 991; Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (1862) 1 H & C. 526; London County Council v. Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 997, Rose v. Plenty [1976] 1 W.L.R. 141 and Bernett v. Tugwell [1971] 2 Q.B. 267 and maintained that the police should have exhibited a written notice on the vehicle before the defence of volenti non fit injuria would avail the defendants.

On the facts, it is firmly established that driver Asare was not authorised to go to Takoradi or Cape Coast or take passengers for fare. There is no controversy about that. The evidence is clear that driving the vehicle beyond Accra, all the way to Cape Coast and conveying passengers for a fare were all acts which were not authorised by the master. But the controversy is whether the unauthorised acts were done while the driver was doing that which he was employed to do. The presumption that the driver was on duty because there was no record in the station diary, and on which Mr. Epton relied, is not an unrebuttable presumption. The Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr. Tetteh, explained the circumstances and from that evidence it was quite clear that the driver had specific instructions and these limited the driver’s movement to within Accra. The driver had no instructions or permission to drive the vehicle to Cape Coast. Even if he had permission so to do, in using the vehicle for his own private and personal benefit, the defendants would not be liable for a tort committed in the course of such personal venture from which the defendant would derive no benefit: See Higbid v. R.C. Hamnett Ltd. (1932) 49 T.L.R. 104.

[p.633] of [1982-83] GLR 625

A master is not liable for the acts of his driver committed in the course of driving merely because he was employed to drive. For the master to be liable, the act which gave cause for inquiry must be authorised by the master or done in the course of the servant doing his normal work. The trip to Cape Coast and back was neither authorised, nor made in the normal course of the driver’s work. The evidence is plain and does not give room for any other inference. The driver was not doing what he was employed to do or authorised to do. The trip to Takoradi was outside the scope of his employment. Neither was it incidental to his work as a driver of the Assistant Commissioner of Police nor connected with it. I cannot therefore see how the plaintiff can recover against the defendant, while the driver was obviously on a spree of his own when the accident occurred.

On the issue of volenti non fit injuria, the evidence upon which this submission was made is that the plaintiff herself said she knew police vehicles are not for passengers and she would not have hailed it to stop if she had observed it before it stopped. She also said she had occasion to advise the driver to slow down yet she remained on the vehicle until the serious accident occurred. The plaintiff said she knew this, even though no notice was expressly exhibited on the vehicle.

Nevertheless, such instructions given to the driver would not exonerate the defendant from liability if the accident took place in the course of the driver’s employment. This defence is put up alternatively to the defence that the government is not vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver whom the Attorney-General maintains was on a frolic of his own. In other words, the Attorney-General is saying that the driver was not driving in the course of his work, but should the court find that he was, then his defence is that the plaintiff knew of the risk involved and she consented to the driver’s carelessness. It is sufficient to say that this alternate defence was not pleaded.

It was merely mentioned in counsel for the defendant’s address. The plea of volenti non fit injuria is a denial that the defendant owed any duty of care to the plaintiff, therefore a defendant should not be permitted no plead that there was breach of duty, but the plaintiff admitted to the breach. If the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff, then there cannot be any breach of any duty. This point was alluded to by Asquith J. in Dann v. Hamilton [1939] 1 K.B. 509. At p. 512 he observed:

“As a matter of strict pleading it seems that the plea volenti is a denial of any duty, at all, and, therefore, of any breach of duty and an admission of negligence cannot strictly be combined with the plea.”

[p.634] of [1982-83] GLR 625

It is my view that the line of defence relied upon by the defendant does not permit him to take refuge under a plea of volenti non fit injuria. I think this defence was raised in the last minute as a result of an admission by the plaintiff that she knew that police vehicles were not meant for use as passenger trucks. I do not think that knowledge negatived the wrongdoing on the part of the driver. However, it may be said that, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff was a trespasser on the police jeep so the defendant cannot be held liable.

This in fact is another way of saying that the constable acted outside the scope of his employment in permitting the plaintiff to board the vehicle. If the driver had been sent in the course of his normal work to go to Takoradi and he was forbidden to take passengers on the way, but in disobedience of these instructions he took passengers, the fact that he was expressly forbidden to take passengers would not be a defence which would avail the defendant should an incident like this have occurred, unless the notice was expressly exhibited and the plaintiff’s attention was drawn to it.

But what is the point in notifying a person of a matter of which he already has notice? Police jeeps as we have them in this country cannot be mistaken for private vehicles. I think the fact that the vehicle is a police vehicle is itself a notice to the public that it is not a passenger vehicle. Upon the facts of this case, I find that the defendant is not liable even though I think the plaintiff could successfully have sued the driver.

Damages

I will nevertheless assess her damages, should this be taken on appeal and the judgment is reversed. The claim consists of special and general damages. ¢60,000 is claimed as general damages and ¢9,643.50 as special damages.

General damages

The plaintiff received fairly serious injuries which were compounded by the nature of the treatment she received at the Cape Coast Hospital. The injuries as recorded in the medical report issued by the eminent orthopaedic surgeon, Professor K. G. Korsah, are as follows:

“(1) Multiple lacerations on the face, arms, and right leg.

(2) Deep lacerations on the upper part of the (R) tibia with evulsion of the skin.

(3) Compound fracture (R) femur.

(4) Pain over medial aspect on (L) clavicle”

The plaintiff was first admitted at the Winneba Hospital. Due to lack of adequate medical facilities — in equipment and personnel — she was transferred to the Cape Coast Hospital where she remained on [p.635] of [1982-83] GLR 625 admission for five months. During this period, she was subjected to some operations but these failed to align the fractures. At the end of the five months, Dr. Klimeoyic under whose care and treatment the plaintiff was, went on leave so the plaintiff was transferred to the Korle Bu Hospital and was admitted under the care of Dr. K. G. Korsah.

On admitting and examining her, Dr. Korsah discovered that the whole operation performed at Cape Coast Hospital had become infected. On opening up the wound, he further discovered that a metal plate had been inserted but which had not been properly fitted. This metal plate had six holes which had to be secured with screws. But only one hole had the proper screw. The rest of the holes were fitted with wire loops which had been twisted round the bone.

The wires failed to hold the metal plate to the bone so the broken ends of the bone fell apart and the whole area got infected. It was full of puss when the wound was opened up. Treating the infection involved the plaintiff in great pain. It was also discovered that certain segments of the femur were missing at the fracture site, presumably removed at the first operation. The missing of these bone pieces had caused great shortening to the plaintiff’s right leg. It is shorter by three inches than the normal left leg.

After the infection had been brought under control, another operation was performed and a nail was inserted at the fracture site. Later on, when she was taking physiotherapy treatment, the nail broke because it could not take her normal weight. Another operation became necessary. A bone had to be removed from the iliac crest (top hip bone) and grafted at the fracture site. In fact bone was removed from both sides of the iliac crest during the second of the operations performed at Korle Bu Hospital.

The fate of the plaintiff vis-a-vis this injured leg still hangs in abeyance. Even though Dr. Korsah says she will be able to walk one day, he is certain that the leg cannot be bent at the knee. All the muscles from the knee up are severely scarred; it is all replaced with scars, so the plaintiff can never bend the left knee. She can only walk by swinging that knee. She is still going in and out of hospital for admission for long periods ranging from six months to twelve months and over. This is the extent of the plaintiff’s incapacity resulting from this accident. It is not an easy task to put money value on this state of incapacity, her pain and suffering, loss of amenities and her disfigurement.

Incapacity

Professor Korsah assessed her incapacity of the left leg at 55 per cent at the time he gave evidence. At that time, the plaintiff still carried a metal nail at the fracture site and this always poses a risk of

[p.636] of [1982-83] GLR 625 infection. This risk, the doctor said, is eight per cent certain. If an infection sets in, an operation will have to be performed to put things right. The risk of the infection is a matter of which consideration will have to be taken in assessing her damages now.

Every operation which necessitates the administration of general anaesthetics poses a risk to life. Then the condition of the leg itself will have to be considered. This was a very active woman, and an industrious one at that. Besides being a housewife, she kept a poultry farm at her backyard. She kept 1,000 to 1,500 birds at a time, and her net profit per year was about ¢5,400. She tendered photographs and newspaper articles on her poultry in respect of a competition she had won on backyard gardening. A picture of her handing over a crate of eggs to her daughter, and a maid holding a fowl appears in the Ghanaian Times issue of 8 June 1970. The evidence admits no doubt that this woman was actively engaged in poultry farming.

With her state of incapacity, she cannot continue with this hobby which brought her substantial income. She said that even though she could have engaged farm hands to do the actual work, with her condition she cannot supervise it so it cannot be a fruitful venture. I agree with her. Since this accident, this woman has been in and out of hospitals; she is not in any condition to undertake such a venture. Poultry farming in this country is not an easy task.

Anyone with the least experience would appreciate the hard work involved in the venture. It involves making arrangements for the day old chicks and for the feed. I have had the experience. It is not the type of work one can entrust to a farm hand and expect to make profit. Again, what fun and enjoyment would the plaintiff derive from a hobby for which she would have to pay someone to do? None. Her loss therefore in respect of his poultry farming should be considered in two respects: It means loss of earning to her, it also involves loss of amenities to her. The poultry farming was a hobby to her, apart from the income it brought to her.

The plaintiff’s state of incapacity has also greatly affected her in housewifery duties. She cannot perform her household chores; she cannot even attend to her own needs. She now employs an attendant, and housemaid to do the housework. She pays them ¢20 and ¢30 monthly, respectively. With the increase in the daily rate of labourers, and the rising cost of things, these wages will have to be increased from time to time. When her condition improves, as the doctor is hopeful that it will be better some day — she may be able to do away with the personal attendant, but she may not be able to cope with the household chores single-handed. It means that she should be able to have the means to engage someone to assist her in the housework. In assessing her damages, all these matters will have to be taken account of.

[p.637] of [1982-83] GLR 625

Her loss of amenities following this accident and the treatment she had is quite substantial. For all practical purposes, she has lost the full use of that leg. She will never be able to do any sporting activity. A woman of her age is not likely to indulge in any sport as such, nevertheless it is a great handicap that she cannot bend her left leg at the knee and that in case of emergency she cannot run even for dear life.

The multiplicity of operations preceding the nail insertions and bone grafting have left the plaintiff’s left leg an ugly sight, the upper part of that leg is covered with scars. There are also scars on the face and right forearm, and the abdomen, and the donor site for the bone grafting. There is also three inches shortening of the left leg. For proper balance, the doctor said the plaintiff will need special orthopaedic shoes which will be raised to the height of the normal leg.

Considering all these matters, I have, with great difficulty, come to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s losses should be assessed as follows: Her incapacity which involves the left leg: the loss of one leg is assessed at 70 per cent incapacity. This was assessed at 55 per cent. For incapacity in this case, I would award ¢2,500. The loss of earning involved amounts to about ¢5,400 a year. There are a number of factors which would have operated to prevent the plaintiff from continuing with the poultry, or caused her to reduce it to a smaller scale and thus caused a reduction in profit. The plaintiff is 50 years; she might even disengage herself from the work as a result of old age. Considering the certainties and the uncertainties, I would fix her loss under this head at ¢10,000. For pain and suffering, I would award ¢3,000.

For cost of hiring a housemaid at ¢20 per month, the cost for a year would be ¢240. Considering the rising cost of labour, and the possibility that when she improved in health, she may dispense with her services, I think the sum of ¢2,400 is adequate. For the hiring of a personal attendant, I would award ¢3,000.

For loss of amenities, I would award ¢1,500 and for disabilities, involving the shortening of the leg, cost of special orthopaedic shoes, and scars which would be completely covered by the plaintiff’s dressing, I would award ¢2,500. The total sum awarded for general damages is ¢23,500.

Special Damages

The plaintiff claims medical expenses, transport expenses she incurred to enable her mother to visit her, transport expenses incurred by her husband to visit her in hospital and cost of personal effects which she lost in the accident, and loss of earning for three years between 1974 and 1976.

Firstly, the medical expenses: This includes medical fees, cost of drugs, transport charges paid for taxi fares for attending the Military

[p.638] of [1982-83] GLR 625

Hospital for physiotherapy treatment and cost of medical report.

All these were itemised in the statement of claim, but the figures given in evidence diverges from those pleaded in the statement of claim. The plaintiff’s explanation for the divergence is that she has become very forgetful since the accident. She said she paid taxi fares from her residence at Labone Estate to the Korle Bu Hospital three times in the week at ¢4 per trip, return being ¢8. This continued for over one year. Then for another year she paid ¢4 return taxi fares for similar treatment at three times in the week to the Military Hospital. The amount claimed is ¢516. There is nothing to contradict this. It cannot be denied that she did undertake the journeys for the treatment, I would therefore allow her the ¢516 for transport expenses.

When she was discharged from the Cape Coast Hospital, she paid ¢80.50. This is not disputed; it is supported by a receipt and I award it. The cost of clutches is ¢5.55 and I grant it. She said she spent ¢200 on transport for her mother to visit her in hospital. The plaintiff is an only child of her mother. The visits by her mother was no doubt necessary to her speedy recovery. It is expenses which she can lawfully claim.

But I cannot say the same of the expenses incurred by her husband. It cannot be denied that the visit by the husband was a therapy necessary for her recovery but I do not see how the plaintiff can claim for expenses which she has not incurred. The husband can claim his expenses, but I cannot allow such claim by the wife without any power or authority given by the husband to make this claim. I disallow the claim for expenses made by the husband. But I allow the claim for the medical report which is ¢30. In all I grant ¢832.05 for medical expenses.

For loss of personal effects, the plaintiff gave account of things worth a total of ¢1,445. She said she lost those in the accident. There was no serious challenge to this and I award it. The plaintiff also claims ¢3,600 as profit she would have made for three seasons between 1974 and 1976 on her poultry, at ¢1,800 per season. The evidence admits no doubt that this woman was engaged in poultry. She called a Mr. Thompson who supported her on this. To say that she made a profit of ¢1,800 a year on a poultry of 1,000 – 1,500 birds, is I think a modest claim. I allow her claim of ¢3,600 for the three seasons. The total sum I award as special damages is ¢5,877.05. This is the damages which the plaintiff has proved. Had the plaintiff been successful in her claim, this is the amount I would have awarded in special damages, and ¢23,500 in general damages.

Having regard to the fact that if the constable was not employed as a policeman, he would not have had access to the vehicle and thereby caused this accident which has completely maimed this poor woman, I would strongly recommend that the Attorney-General advises

[p.639] of [1982-83] GLR 625 the government to pay the plaintiff on humanitarian grounds at least part of the amount which she would have been entitled to receive had her claim against the Attorney-General been successful. DECISION Action dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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