ALLOTEY AND OTHERS vs. QUARCOO [1981] GLR 208
22 January 1981 · ANIN JSC · ≈ 17 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Dam v. Addo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 200, S.C.
[p.210] of [1981] GLR 208
(2) Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1956] A.C. 218; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 81; [1955] 3 All E.R. 864; 120 J.P. 54; 100 S.J. 32; 54 L.G.R. 91; [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655, H.L.
(3) Welbeck v. M. Captan Ltd. (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 47.
(4) Quartey v. Quartey (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 401.
(5) Amon v. Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (1929) D.Ct. ‘26-’29, 7.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from decision of the High Court re-instating the respondent as joint head of family. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata (with him Miss Apaloo) for the appellants.
A. Q. A. Archeampong for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.S.C.
Anin J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. On 16 December 1980, we allowed this appeal and reserved our reasons. We proceed to give them now.
Since the death of Dr. C. E. Reindorf on 11 April 1968, the Onamrokor Adain family of Gbese, Accra, has been embroiled in protracted internecine litigation concerning his successor as head of family. The first suit entitled B. A. Quarcoo v. Manye Adorkor Allotey and Messrs. C.F.C. ended in a judgment incorporating an amicable settlement promoted by the La Mantse and Mr. Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu and filed in the court below on 23 December 1974. Under the terms of settlement, the plaintiff and the first defendant who incidentally fill the same roles in the present suit, were appointed joint family heads and it was also agreed that accredited representatives of the six constituent branches of the family should constitute elders and councillors to assist the joint heads in their administration of the family and its properties. The six elders who were selected by their respective branches of the family are the second plaintiff-non-respondent (now deceased) and the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants-appellants in the present action—the second in the series, commenced by a writ of summons filed on 3 June 1976. The reliefs claimed therein were: (a) a declaration that the first plaintiff is still the joint head of the Onamrokor Adain family and that he has not been constitutionally and customarily deposed, and (b) an injunction restraining the defendants from dealing with the family lands until the determination of the suit.
In the amended statement of claim, the plaintiffs first referred to the earlier suit and settlement reached and the formation of the
[p.211] of [1981] GLR 208 council of elders as briefly recounted above. It was next stated that the defendants herein invited the first plaintiff to a family meeting to answer five specified charges preferred against him, i.e. mismanagement of family property; failure to account for family moneys collected by him; unauthorised sale of family lands; refusal to co-operate with family council; and lack of respect and consideration for the other joint head, Manye Adorkor Allotey, as well as the elders of the family constituting the family council. These charges were allegedly answered by the first plaintiff in a letter dated 20 February 1976. It was further stated in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim that the plaintiffs attended the proposed family meeting on 21 February 1976 and that “the first plaintiff answered all the specific charges and therefore the meeting came to an end.” (The emphasis is mine.) However, by a poster dated 23 February 1976 he is alleged to have been deposed as joint head of family. Finally, the statement of claim made counter allegations of improper sale and irregular conveyances of family lands against the defendants during the pendency of the first suit.
In an amended defence, it was the first averred that at the family meeting held on 21 February 1976, the plaintiff “was lawfully, constitutionally and in full accordance with the relevant customary law and practice deposed as a joint head of the family,” whereby he lost his place on the family council and the first defendant was left as the sole head of family. Next, objection was taken to the plaintiffs’ attempt to invest the court with jurisdiction—which it lacked—either to hear charges preferred for the deposition of a family head or to pronounce on the merits of such charges or to evaluate any evidence adduced for the purpose. In short, it was contended, the court has no jurisdiction, whether original or appellate, to inquire into the merits of the matters raised in the amended statement of claim which touched on the substantive merits of the deposition charges duly brought against the first plaintiff before the only competent body, i.e. the Onamrokor Adain family. In paragraph 10 of the amended defence it was averred that:
“The plaintiff contemptuously withdraw from and walked out of, the said meeting before its conclusion and that after the plaintiff’s said withdrawal, the meeting, which was a full assembly of the family, unanimously decided and resolved that the first plaintiff be deposed from the position of joint head of the family with immediate effect, whereafter the meeting came to an end.”
In a subsequent motion and affidavit brought under Order 25 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), the
[p.212] of [1981] GLR 208 defendants implored the court to strike out the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Incidentally, an identical motion brought against the original statement of claim before a different judge was substantially successful; and led to the filing of the amended statement of claim. The argument in support of this second motion is as summarised above for the amended defence. As stated in paragraph 8 of the supporting affidavit, the defect is that there are no grounds disclosed in the statement of claim, whether original or amended, on which the first plaintiff could contend in this court that his dismissal and deposition as joint head of family is uncustomary, unconstitutional or in any other way invalid or even defective; elsewhere, the deponent contended that the first plaintiff was in effect inviting the court to re-hear deposition charges and evidence already adjudicated upon by the only competent body, namely, the family. Since the court’s jurisdiction in a matter where destoolment charges are brought against a head of family is supervisory and not an originating jurisdiction and since the amended claim did not disclose any grounds for the invocation of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction, his action should be dismissed.
After hearing counsel’s submissions on the motion, the learned trial judge in a reserved ruling, held as follows:
“There appears to be a triable issue on the face of the pleadings especially as to whether the meeting which allegedly removed the first plaintiff ended abruptly or rather came to a conclusion as required by law. The determination of this is a matter of evidence. The case will therefore proceed to trial on that issue.”
In this appeal, learned counsel for the defendants-appellants (hereafter called the defendants) argued two main grounds together, viz: (1) “The trial judge erred in introducing new issues for trial beyond the one issue set down by himself as left for trial; and (2) The judge erred in making findings of facts in favour of the plaintiff when the plaintiff had not pleaded those facts.” Instead of confining himself to the solitary issue for determination, i.e. whether the family meeting of 21 February 1976 came to an end or not, it was contended, the learned judge departed from his own ruling, widened the sole triable issue by introducing new issues of his own and resolved them in favour of the plaintiff-respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff). Among the new issues raised suo motu by the judge are firstly, the propriety of the alleged deposition of the first plaintiff; secondly, the examination of the procedural aspects of the meeting with a view to determining that no fundamental principle of the administration of justice was violated especially the rules
[p.213] of [1981] GLR 208 of natural justice, thirdly, the question whether the decision at the family meeting was taken by vote on the evidence by the majority of the principal members present; fourthly, whether the proceedings violated any fundamental principle of the administration of justice; fifthly, whether the plaintiff was not justified in leaving the family meeting having regard to the social disorder which occurred; sixthly, whether it was proper in the native custom for the meeting to have continued after the confusion which had caused the plaintiff to withdraw; seventhly, whether the question put to vote was appropriate in the circumstances; and finally, whether the manner in which the votes were carried was in accordance with custom.
In our judgment, these criticisms are well founded and justified. The eight new issues introduced by the learned judge and adjudicated upon by him in favour of the plaintiff considerably widened the area of controversy and resulted in the infringement of the fundamental rule laid down in such cases as Dam v. Addo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 200, S.C. that a court must not substitute a case proprio motu nor accept a case contrary to, or inconsistent with, that which the party himself has put forward, whether he be the plaintiff or the defendant. In the present case, the plaintiff’s upon whom the burden lay of alleging and proving particulars of impropriety of the family meeting, neglected to do so and failed to disclose any specific grounds in support of his claim that his deposition as joint family head was uncustomary and unconstitutional. The opposing party took elaborate care to expose and attack the plaintiff’s defective pleading and even twice moved for the striking out of the writ and claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. By his ruling on the motion, the learned judge himself acknowledged the correctness of most of the criticism levelled at the plaintiff’s pleadings and confined the trial of the action to the solitary factual issue set out above. The parties had therefore every right to expect that the judgment would be confined to that one issue. Instead, the appellants have had the misfortune of being adjudged on new issues not previously pleaded by their adversary; and have in the event been condemned without an opportunity being afforded them to adduce evidence to meet the new issues stated in the judgment.
As Lord Normand said in Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1956] A.C. 218 at pp. 238-239, H.L. a case of negligence in which the majority of the Court of Appeal raised the issue of inevitable accident for the first time:
“The function of pleadings is to give fair notice of the case which has to be met so that the opposing party may direct his
[p.214] of [1981] GLR 208 evidence to the issue disclosed by them. In fact the evidence in the case was concerned only with the negligence alleged … To condemn a party on a ground of which no fair notice has been given may be as great a denial of justice as to condemn him on a ground on which his evidence has been improperly excluded.”
Apart from the learned judge’s error in adjudicating on facts not pleaded by the respondent, the rule that the burden of alleging and proving specific grounds of invalidity of either the appointment or removal of a family head at a family meeting rests with the family member seeking to avoid a decision reached at a family meeting laid down in Welbeck v. M. Captan Ltd. (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 47, seems to have been infringed in this case; the plaintiff’s pleadings did not disclose any specific grounds of invalidity but the learned judge attempted to supply the omission in his judgment by considering such novel issues as the voting procedure adopted at the meeting, the appropriateness of the question put to vote and the manner in which the votes were carried.
Even though the learned judge correctly recognised the court’s lack of jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of the decision of the family to depose its head at a fully representative meeting and after due notice of the meeting and the charges given beforehand, since, both the common law and customary law have for centuries reposed that jurisdiction in the families themselves, yet he included the “propriety of the alleged deposition” in the issues for determination. And in his insistence upon the non-violation of any fundamental principle of the administration of justice, especially the rules of natural justice, he stated the limited supervisory role of the courts in family elections and depositions a shade too broadly; for it is not the infringement of any fundamental principle or rule of natural justice or the breach of every procedural step that suffices to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. As Jackson J. held in Quartey v. Quartey (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 401, the courts would interfere with the family’s decision only when there has been a complete denial of justice or a substantial denial of justice. In the words of Jackson J. at p. 403 :
“It is not within the competence of the Courts to arrogate to themselves decisions which customary law has for so many centuries reposed in the families themselves, and it is an interference in the subject’s rights which they rightly resent, and which aid is sought only when there has been that complete denial of justice.”
(the emphasis is ours)
[p.215] of [1981] GLR 208
In this case the propriety of the decision reached, not having been pleaded, was not an issue for the court to adjudicate upon. In any event, it is within the domestic jurisdiction of the family to decide on what they regard as good grounds for deposing their head of family, and unless there is clear proof of substantial departure from the tenets of natural justice, the courts will not interfere. There must be a substantial denial of natural justice before the court will strike the family decision down. If it was part of the plaintiffs’ case that there was a substantial or complete denial of natural justice, he should have averred the same with particulars in his pleading: see Quartey v. Quartey (supra) and Amon v. Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (1929) D.Ct. ‘28-’29,7 where it was held that where a minister has been expelled from a missionary society the court would not interfere to re-instate him or to recoup him for his losses if it is clear that the procedure laid down in the rules of the society has been followed and that no principle of justice has been violated. As Sawrey-Coomson J. observed in the course of his judgment:
“such a meeting of the executive council [of the society] has its prescribed procedure and as long as on a broad view of it, that council does not depart seriously from that procedure, although the more meticulous practice and procedure found in a court of justice are not necessarily followed, no exception will be taken to its findings.”
Turning to the solitary factual issue set down for trial, learned counsel for the defendants contended that the judgment of the court below was totally against the weight of evidence and that the learned judge erred in holding that the family meeting at which the plaintiff was removed as head did not come to a conclusion required by law especially since the account of the plaintiff’s own witnesses showed the contrary. It would be recalled that the main controversy between the parties was whether or not the family meeting of 21 February 1976 came to an end. In his evidence, the first plaintiff gave the following account of what transpired at the said meeting:
“When I attended the meeting, it was opened, then the charges were read over to me. I answered all the charges orally. At that time I had also prepared a written reply so I handed a copy to the secretary and another one to the second plaintiff who is now dead. The answers I gave orally were not considered at all.
After handing over the reply to the secretary, one Alex
[p.216] of [1981] GLR 208 Quarcoo asked me a question about quarry money and I replied that all moneys collected were paid into court during the first trial. During the cross-examination on my evidence certain words were used which provoked me and my followers. This led to a situation which made us leave the meeting. What actually happened was that I told the meeting that the quarry money after the trial and settlement of the case was being collected by my elder brother who happened to be present. He admitted having collected the moneys but said he had not been called to account to the family. When he said this, one Victor Quarcoo got up and said ‘you thieves what about the lands you have been selling?’ When he said this another brother of mine got up and said we were not thieves and accused the defendants for being responsible for the sale of lands. At this stage Victor and Alex Quarcoo got up with a view to fight us. They were followed by the others with them. The meeting developed into an uproar so amidst the confusion we all dispersed. Since then no other meeting was called. About an hour after arriving at my residence a leg of a sheep was sent to me. I did not take it because the messengers could not tell me who had sent them. I therefore left for my father’s house and on my return I came to find the leg of the sheep lying in the yard of my house. When I rejected it at first the messengers returned the leg of the sheep. When I came to find it lying in the yard I went back to my father’s house and informed my brothers who came to collect the leg and threw it in front of the house from where it was brought. A week after this, notices were sent out to advertise that I had been deposed. On seeing the notices I brought this action for the declaration sought in my writ of summons.”
Under cross-examination, the first plaintiff admitted that “when we were leaving the meeting, Mr. Amarteifio (i.e. the second defendant) invited us back but we did not believe the honesty of his intentions. Even the first defendant invited us but we knew it was all a camouflage.”
The plaintiffs’ first witness, Mr. Samuel Allotey Otoo Sackey, who hails from his own branch of the family, corroborated his account up to the point of the plaintiffs’ withdrawal. This witness stayed behind and saw the meeting continue to an end, after the family spokesman, the second defendant, had invited the members to consider the charges and answers of the first plaintiff and then called “on those who feel the charges have been proved against the plaintiff and wish him removed as co-head of family to raise
[p.217] of [1981] GLR 208 their hands.” After a positive vote against the plaintiff, a bottle of gin was produced and sheep was also produced; at which point the witness left the meeting. In answer to the court, Mr. Sackey said that “at the stage when the plaintiff and his followers left I found no reason to leave. There were other followers of the plaintiff who remained with me after the plaintiff had left.” And he gave the names of two such followers of the plaintiff as Captain Michael Tetteh Quarcoo and J. O. Lamptey Mills.
The last named also testified for the plaintiff and corroborated his account of the uproar in the course of proceedings after an accusation of theft had been made by one of his uncles and a counter-accusation had been made by another uncle, both of whom almost came to blows. The decision of the family to remove the first plaintiff as joint head had been taken “after things had died down.” And this was followed by the pouring of libation and slaughtering of a sheep. He confirmed that as the plaintiff and his followers were leaving, they were persuaded not to leave. Mr. Lamptey Mills’ evidence was important because he confirmed that after his uncles had been calmed down, “the meeting continued thereafter and that while the plaintiff and some of his followers left, he personally saw no reason to leave.” In answer to the court, he emphasised that before he left, the charges had been preferred against the plaintiff and answers given by him; he was aware of the attitude of members of the family towards what happened and he knew of the decision taken, after the second defendant had proposed that the plaintiff should be removed by vote.
The overwhelming impression one gets from reading the evidence of the plaintiff ‘s own witnesses as well as the testimony of the second defendant is that the meeting came to a decisive conclusion that first plaintiff should be removed as joint family head; that the hold-up or social disorder caused by the heated exchange between the two septuagenarians, Ahele Tufo and Victor Quarcoo, was only short-lived and did not result in bringing the meeting to an end; that the plaintiff acted perhaps hastily in withdrawing from the meeting since neither his own followers nor witnesses nor indeed any person came to any physical harm; and since no assault or battery was directed at the plaintiff personally. One could compare what transpired in this case with a temporary hold-up in a football match when two or more players suddenly flare up and hold up the game for a few minutes while steps are quickly taken by the referee, officials and even spectators, to placate the irate players and restore order for the game to resume. In this family contest, the final whistle or conclusion came with the taking of the vote
[p.218] of [1981] GLR 208 to remove the first plaintiff as joint family head, accompanied by the symbolic and evidentially significant customary pouring of libation and slaughtering of sheep to seal the act of removal. Whether those definitive steps ought to have been taken in all the circumstances of the case, and whether they were even properly taken or not, are in our opinion extraneous matters in this case, having regard to the sole factual issue set down for trial and the want of pleading on these issues. We accordingly express no opinion on these extraneous matters in this litigation.
Before concluding, it is only proper to mention that learned counsel for the plaintiff was also of the view that, after the withdrawal of the plaintiff following the social disorder, the meeting continued in fact, albeit with a different agenda. He submitted therefore that he was unable to support the finding of the learned judge to the contrary.
It was for the above reasons that we allowed the appeal with ¢500 costs to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and set aside the judgment appealed from.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. K. E. E.
