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[1981] SLR (HC) 15High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. GHANA RAILWAY CORPORATION; EX PARTE APPIAH AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 752

30 September 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 15
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v GHANA RAILWAY CORPORATION; ex parte APPIAH AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 752 [1981] SLR (HC) 15
APAREPUBLIC v GHANA RAILWAY CORPORATION; ex parte APPIAH AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 752, [1981] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v GHANA RAILWAY CORPORATION; ex parte APPIAH AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 752, [1981] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the respondent-corporation penalising the applicants by reduction in their ranks on the basis of adverse findings made against them by a board of inquiry appointed by the corporation. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Gaisie, Zwennes and Hughes for the applicants.

Bonsu for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

The matter before this court involves the Ghana Railway Corporation and two members of the senior staff of the corporation. They are Joseph Emmanuel Appiah, Deputy Chief Internal Auditor and David Armah Annan, Chief Accountant, respectively. These two senior officers say that on 15 August 1981, the corporation reduced their official ranks from deputy chief internal auditor to principal internal auditor in the case of Mr. Appiah, and from chief accountant to deputy chief accountant in the case of Mr. Annan. In Appiah’s case, the reduction in rank was to be operative for a period of two years with effect from 17 August 1981. In the case of Mr. Annan, there was also a consequential order transferring him with immediate effect to the accounts department on special duties. Naturally, these two gentlemen did not take the matter kindly with the corporation because their punishment brought to them not only humiliation and disgrace, but was destined to cause them some financial loss in salary and other entitlements. They therefore quickly picked up a grudge against the corporation in this court.

Their case is that they and other senior members of staff were given notice to appear before a board of inquiry set up by the corporation to scrutinise a certain transaction relating to purchasing and stores during the period November 1980 to March 1981. They attended the investigation and answered questions put to them by the committee. It appears from the evidence that the board of directors imposed the penalty complained of upon the basis of the report of the board of inquiry. The keg upon which the case of the applicants is perched can be found in paragraphs (6) to (10) of their affidavits in support of the application for an order of certiorari to quash the penalty imposed upon them by the board of directors. These are that:

[p.755] of [1981] GLR 752

“(6) The board had no authority or right to effect reduction in our ranks without a proper inquiry held on specific charges preferred against us.

(7) By virtue of the conditions of service for senior staff, the board’s primary duty is to call upon an officer involved in writing, to show cause why he should not be reduced in rank with the facts of the case to enable the officer to reply to it.

(8) This provision in the condition of service was not followed.

(9) Ghana Railway Corporation was part of the Civil Service before it was turned into a corporation.

(10) By the Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960 (L.I. 47), which is saved by the conditions of service for senior staff, a written charge should be preferred in all proceedings against the officer involved who should be given the opportunity in formal proceedings to call witnesses in his defence.”

Counsel for the applicants read article 24 (1) of the conditions of service for senior staff which is:

“24. (1) Unless and until the authority declares otherwise, all existing rules, regulations, manuals and instructions not specifically declared at the time of the conversion into the Authority to be obsolete, ineffective or inoperative shall be deemed to be in force until reviewed or declared obsolete, ineffective or inoperative by the authority.”

What the applicants contend, if I understand them clearly, is that when the Ghana Railways Department (as it then was) was converted to a public corporation, it did nostalgically remember its former parent, the Civil Service, of which it formed an integral part and therefore decided to remain umbilically tied to the apron strings of the Civil Service in terms of conditions of service until such time that the fledgling corporation could stand on its own feet to manage its own affairs in its own way. Therefore the rules and regulations in the Civil Service still applied to the new corporation in appropriate cases. The Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960 (L.I. 47), provided an infinitely complex machinery of processes in disciplinary matters which bore close affinity to the accusatorial system of criminal trial where a formal charge is preferred against a person suspected of having committed a crime and the latter is tried by an impartial arbiter. The major attributes of the accusatorial system are, among other things, that the arbiter is not an inquirer or prosecutor. He is placed in complete detachment while

[p.756] of [1981] GLR 752 the prosecutor proves the commission of the crime by the person accused. The latter is given the opportunity to defend himself and if the need arises, call witnesses. Opposed to the accusatorial system is the inquisitorial system where the person who gives final decision as to whether a crime or any conduct not amounting to crime has been committed, enters the arena of the proceedings and plays the role of both prosecutor and an arbiter by asking most of the questions with a view to ascertaining the truth of the matter. Anglo-American law features the accusatorial system while the other countries of Europe espouse the inquisitorial system. Ghana law is noted for its naked flirtation with the two systems, so much so that both systems are entrenched in the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana. The provisions of chapter six of the Constitution, 1979, as well as the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), are manifest demonstration of Ghana’s espousal of the accusatorial system of inquiry and the provisions relating to commissions of inquiry as enshrined under chapter 23 of the Constitution, 1979, are the stereotype of the inquisitorial system.

Not far to seek, is the reason why Ghana law betrays an ambivalence in her adoption of the inquisitorial system along with the accusatorial system. The reason is that, seen with the benefit of hindsight, the accusatorial system has not proved efficacious in the enforcement of certain acts or omissions requiring punitive sanctions and we have to resort to the inquisitorial system, if only in its modified form, to suit our special circumstances. With regard to commissions of inquiry, the practice in this country is invariably marked by a thorough probe by an appointed commission, sole or composite. The commission works on the basis of specified terms of reference. It is given power to summon before it any person to give evidence, often in respect of alleged malpractices, financial or administrative, committed by him which may or may not amount to a crime. The commission submits its findings to the appointing authority which acts upon it as it deems fit. Frequently, punitive sanctions are imposed upon persons adversely affected by the report of a commission of inquiry. This procedure is not, strictly speaking, a formal criminal proceeding of a judicial character where witnesses are called by those whose conduct may be under investigation.

The Ghana Railway Corporation while retaining the Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960, which insist upon formal disciplinary proceedings in proving specific charges against any officer, has adopted an alternative procedure whereby it empowers the board or the general manager to appoint a board of inquiry

[p.757] of [1981] GLR 752 in appropriate cases. This is contained in article 4 (8) of the conditions of service for the senior staff which runs in the following terms:

“(8) Board of Inquiry The Board or the General Manager may in appropriate cases, appoint an Inquiry Officer or a Board of inquiry to investigate and report his or its findings.”

Then article 4 (1) of the conditions of service provides:

“Article 4 Disciplinary Code (1) Misconduct not meriting dismissal An officer may be held by the Board to have been guilty of gross neglect or misconduct not meriting dismissal in which event he may be punished by deferring or withholding an increment, warning or reprimand, suspension from any duty without pay for a period of 3 months, reduction in rank with immediate reduction in salary.”

I have taken pains to make a microscopic examination and study of the Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960, dealing with formal disciplinary proceeding, along with article 4 (1) and (8) of the conditions of service for the senior staff conjunctively and I have been impelled to hold that the Ghana Railway Corporation has conferred plenary powers on the board of directors in disciplinary matters. The board has power to inflict the penalties specified in article 4 (1) on any officer on the basis of the findings of a board of inquiry or an inquiry officer appointed by the board to investigate malpractices or any neglect of duty or gross misconduct. The board is in this regard, entitled to hold any officer guilty of neglect of duty or gross misconduct and proceed to reduce the rank of any such officer. This procedure was scrupulously followed by the board. It appointed a board of inquiry to inquire or investigate the purchase of buff envelopes for the period November 1980 to March 1981. The board of inquiry submitted its findings to the board of directors, making adverse findings against the applicants. The board of inquiry found that Mr. J. E. Appiah failed to check the unauthorised alteration in the envelope size on invoice No. 742 dated 13 January 1981 from Messrs. Enyaman Trading Company; that he intentionally overlooked the payment made for 15” X 5” envelopes, which payment exceeded the general manager’s sanction and that he failed to exercise proper financial judgment in ordering letter headed forms for his department worth ¢123,000. In the case of Mr. D. A. Annan, the board found that he passed for payment the payment voucher No. A40 of 14 January 1981 worth ¢347,638.50 when

[p.758] of [1981] GLR 752 the general manager’s sanction was made for ¢202,500 and handed over the voucher and attachments making this payment to the client who carried these documents from Takoradi to Accra where he handed these for payment. These acts were irregular and imprudent in the view of the board of inquiry. Acting upon these findings, the board punished the applicants by reducing their ranks.

In my view, the applicants cannot accuse the board of directors of acting ultra vires their powers under the conditions of service for the senior staff. I am even inclined to the view, after carefully reading article 4 and appendix B. para. 10 of the conditions of service, that the corporation’s disciplinary proceedings are those prescribed under article 4 where only proceedings by a board of inquiry are provided. By such express provision, it seems like the corporation has parted ways with the Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960, with respect to formal disciplinary proceedings. It needs hardly be over-emphasised that developing countries, finding themselves beset with the problem of having to telescope the terrible years of economic and industrial development by the advanced countries into a shorter period, have become disenchanted, if not disillusioned, with the over-judicialisation of disciplinary proceedings in the Civil Service and are frequently resorting to the commissions of inquiry approach as the most dependable vehicle for the ascertainment of malpractices or neglect of duty by public officers in order to inject discipline into the system.

Counsel for the applicants submitted that the corporation flouted the elementary rules of natural justice in that no notice of specific charges was served on the applicants and that no opportunity was given to them to conduct their defence or to reply thereto. But the facts of the case show clearly that the applicants and others were notified to appear before a board of inquiry and that they knew what matter was going to be investigated. Several questions were put to them each of which they were given opportunity to answer. It cannot therefore be said justifiably that the applicants were condemned unheard. The core idea implicit in the principle of natural justice: “no one ought to be condemned unheard” is simply that a party must have reasonable notice of the case he has to meet and that he must be given the opportunity to make his statement in explanation of any question and to answer any arguments put forward against it. The principle does not, in my view, require that there must be a formal trial of a specific charge akin to court proceedings. In commissions or boards of inquiry, the principle of audi alteram partem is complied with if a person suspected of any malpractice or neglect of duty is invited to answer questions put to him by the inquirers or investigators. In dealing with the

[p.759] of [1981] GLR 752 principles of natural justice, one always has to bear in mind that the principles are substantive rather than procedural safeguards Therefore the fact that a particular formal procedure is not adopted, does not of itself imply that the principle has not been applied in an appropriate case.

In conclusion, I would like to say that there is nothing in the decision taken by the board of directors to reduce the ranks of the applicants which contravenes the conditions of service or any rule of natural justice. There is no merit whatsoever in the applications before the court and accordingly, I would dismiss them with ¢1,000 costs against the applicants.

DECISION Application dismissed.

J. K. E. E.

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