REPUBLIC vs. STOOL LANDS BOUNDARIES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION; EX PARTE ASIBU [1982-83] GLR 1040
9 February 1981 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 10 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 36Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for, inter alia, an order of prohibition to restrain the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner from hearing a boundary dispute between some stools on the ground that the assumption of jurisdiction by the commissioner was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, 1979, art. 114. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
B. J. da Rocha, for the applicant.
No representation for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
By article 114 (1) of the Constitution, 1979 the judicial power of Ghana is vested in the judiciary, and no organ or agency of the executive or legislature has any final judicial, power. The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (NRCD 172), s. 4 confers judicial power on the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner to hear and determine questions or disputes relating to the boundaries of stool lands. In this application, Mr. da Rocha has submitted that NRCD 172 is inconsistent with article 114 of the Constitution, 1979 because the commissioner is an organ or agency of the Ministry of Lands which is part of the executive. He has therefore called upon the court to prohibit the commissioner from hearing this case and to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for its opinion.
[p.1042] of 1982-83 GLR 1040
The applicant in this matter is one of the parties in a boundary dispute which is before the commissioner.
The dispute is entitled: “In the matter of the boundary dispute between Gomoa Fetteh and Awutu and Co. and (1) Nai Odupong Awushie Tetteh II, Ebla Odefey of Awutu Traditional Area, Awutu, (2) Nai Kwaku Bentum II, Ema Twufi Odefey of Awutu and Wulomo Mensah of Amanfrom Odupong-Kpehe Market (Kasewa), Senya Breku Paramount Stool . . .” During the course of the hearing by the commissioner, counsel drew his attention to the provisions of the Constitution, 1979, and invited him to refer the matter to the Supreme Court under article 118(2) of the Constitution, 1979. The commissioner ruled that he has jurisdiction and proceeded to hear the matter. But in fairness to him, Mr da Rocha told the court that since this application was served on the commissioner, he has suspended further hearing pending the outcome of these proceedings.
I must say that there are no counter arguments to these submissions. Even though an affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of the respondent by the registrar of the commissioner, the Attorney-General’s representative who has been appearing on his behalf did not attend court to reply to submissions by counsel for the applicant. So I had no assistance from that quarter. I was constrained to hear the matter after some adjournments.
There is no dispute about the status of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner. It is an administrative tribunal, and from the provisions of the NRCD 172, it is plain that it is enmeshed in the administrative machinery of the Ministry of Lands and an agency or organ of that ministry. Even though the commissioner is appointed by the government on the advice of the Judicial Council, when he wants to resign his office, the letter of resignation shall be addressed to the Minister of Lands and he may be removed or suspended from office by the Minister responsible for Lands, with the approval of the government: see section 2 (3) of NRCD 172.
By section 3 (1) the commissioner’s remuneration shall be determined by the Minister responsible for Lands in consultation with the government. It is clear that the Minister responsible for Lands has to find solution to these boundary disputes, but he does not want to be responsible for the decisions. The commissioner is therefore the machinery set up to decide these cases, by finding the facts and applying legal rules. This is the inference I make from sections 5 (2) and 9 of the Decree. By section 5 (2) questions or disputes arising as to whether any land is in a particular traditional area shall be referred to the commissioner by the Minister responsible for Lands; he will also transfer to the commissioner any uncompleted work commenced by any commissioner appointed under previous enactments. By section 9 the commissioner
[p.1043] of 1982-83 GLR 1040 shall submit his findings to the Minister responsible for Lands, and the minister shall publish the findings or decision in accordance with the provisions of the Decree.
The only conclusion which one may come to from these provisions is that the commissioner is part of the machinery for administering the Ministry of Lands. But it cannot be gainsaid that he makes his own decisions independently and is free from political influence, he is free and independent as a court of law.
The reliefs sought in this application are:
“(i) An order of prohibition directed to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner to stay further proceedings in the matter entitled in the matter of the boundary dispute between Gomoa Fetteh and Awutu and Co., And (1) Nai Odupong Awushie Tetteh II, Ebla Odefey of Awutu Traditional Area, Awutu and (2) Nai Kwaku Bentum II, Ema Twufi Odefey of Awutu and (3) Wulomo Mensah of Amanfrom Odupong-Kpehe Market (Kasewa), Senya Breku Paramount Stool:
(ii) An order of mandamus directing him to refer to the Supreme Court pursuant to article 118 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 the question whether on a true construction of article 114 of the Constitution, 1979 the said Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner can continue to exercise jurisdiction under the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (NRCD 172).”
But during argument counsel abandoned the second relief; he called upon the court to refer the matter directly if the court so finds that his argument is tenable.
The two main planks of the argument of Mr. da Rocha are (a) that the office of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner does not form part of the judicial system of courts in his country and (b) that the commissioner should not, upon the true interpretation of the Constitution, 1979 especially article 114, have the power to give final judicial decisions. In sum, learned counsel’s argument amounts to this: that the very existence of the office of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner and the exercise of judicial function by the commissioner is an affront to the Constitution of the Land. He is calling upon this court to refer this matter to the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of article 118 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 to declare and pronounce upon the constitutionality or otherwise of the matter.
Courts, as it is well-known, are creatures of law. They are by and large brought into being by Acts of Parliament. Unlike the courts of
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Great Britain which have a long history going into antiquity and grew out of the traditions of the people, the courts of this country have from the very beginning been created by the highest and most important legislative body in the land. They were first created by the Queen-in-Council, and then by the various legislatures that have since legislated for the country. These courts have been recognised by the two Republican Constitutions by which the country has been governed since independence as well as the military regimes – the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council. All the enactments which created and which recognised the existence of the courts of this land have, each of them, stated in no uncertain terms that the courts of this land consist of:
“the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior Courts and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
The above quotation appears in article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979. But identically worded provisions appeared in the Constitution, 1969, art 102 (4). Article 114 (1) is a reproduction of article 102 (1) of the Constitution, 1969 that were preserved by the National Redemption Council Proclamation, 1972. By section 27 (e) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) the inferior courts includes “such other inferior courts as may be established by law.” Which means the situation as it was before the Constitution, 1979 has remained the same. Similar provisions are always present in the various Courts Acts or Ordinances that have been in existence since this country was founded.
The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner is one of “such inferior courts” which appear in the designation of the judicial or court system in the quotation reproduced above which appeared in both the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions and in Act 372. The present one was established by NRCD 172, s. 4 (1) which reads:
“4. (1) The Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of stool lands and to hear and determine questions or disputes relating thereto.”
But that was not the beginning. It was the continuation of something that went before it. It was the refurbishing of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner which was created by the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance, Cap. 139 (1951 Rev.) see section 1 (2) of the NRCD 172. It is my view that the commissioner’s functions under the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council administrations were recognised and given legal validity [p.1045] of 1982-83 GLR 1040 by the present Constitution: see article 4 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. By necessary implication “any court” in that article will include the commissioner.
The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner is one of the special statutory tribunals set up with the power or jurisdiction to decide legal disputes between parties, i.e stool land owners. Such tribunals have been described as “one of the by-products of an age of intensive government . . .” by Prof. Wade in his book Administrative Law (2nd ed.) at p. 233. The commissioner like any other judicial tribunal had to decide facts and apply rules to them impartially to arrive at its decisions.
The commissioner is a device created to aid the smooth administration of stool lands by the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources. But all the same he is a court of law and forms part of the judicial system of the land. Prof. Wade puts the matter at p. 234 in this way, “ Such tribunals are in substance courts of law. They are ‘administrative’ because the reasons for preferring them to the ordinary courts of law are administrative reasons . . . “ Some proof of the fact that he is a court is the fact that the jurisdiction of this court extends to him for the purposes of reviewing his decisions.
The fact that the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner is an agency of the Ministry of Lands does not detract from the fact that he presides over a tribunal which is a court of law. The commissioner was endowed with the power to give final decisions by section 9 of NRCD 172. But this is the attribute of every court of law. And the power thus conferred is tautologous. The right to appeal from the decision of any court is a right that is conferred by statute. In the case of an appeal against the findings and decision of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner such right is conferred on the Stool Lands Boundaries Appeal Tribunal by section 10(1) of NRCD 172.
It is my considered opinion that the existence and functioning of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner are not unconstitutional. It is my view that the Commissioner is a court of law and also that he is endowed with and has the legal power to give final decisions. Having arrived at these conclusions, I am obliged logically not to uphold this application. But Mr. da Rocha has urged that this application is of paramount importance and it should have been treated with expediency, because there is no doubt that the commissioner has been functioning and determining other cases. These boundary disputes involve great expense, and if counsel’s submission were upheld it would mean that all the cases settled and decisions arrived at by the commissioner shall be null and void. In fact, it would mean that he has been adjudicating in error from his inception. If these submissions are sound then it will not be hard to see the futility
[p.1046] of 1982-83 GLR 1040 in the continued exercise of jurisdiction. In fact, there is another matter pending before this court in which the applicant is seeking an order of prohibition on similar grounds. It seems to me that it is a matter which is agitating legal practitioners and a final solution will be most welcome and soothing to the profession.
I will therefore by way of case stated refer the matter to the Supreme Court to make a final pronouncement on the matter, i.e. whether or not the existence of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution 1979 art. 114 (1).
DECISION
Application for prohibition dismissed.
Matter referred to the Supreme Court for final interpretation.
J. A. A.
