ADJI & COMPANY vs. KUMANING [1982-83] GLR 1382
23 June 1982 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 25 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Nkansah v. Adjebeng [1961] G.L.R. 465.
(2) Nkum v. Andoh [1959] G.L.R. 358.
(3) Ntim v. Boateng [1963]2 G.L.R. 97, S.C.
(4) Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Agbematu [1972] 2 G.L.R. 337, C.A.
(5) Boston v. Khemland Brothers [1964] G.L.R. 277, S.C.
(6) Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris [1970] A.C. 652; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1437; [1969] 2 All E.R. 576, L.L.
[p.1385] of [1982-83] GLR 1382
(7) Fiscian v. Nelson and Baksmaty (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 21.
(8) Kyiafi v. Wono [1967] G.L.R. 463, C.A.
(9) Ababio v. Gyamfi [1962] 1 G.L.R. 428, S.C.
(10) Darkeh v. Lartey [1963] 1 G.L.R. 362, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the Circuit Court, Koforidua, wherein the plaintiffs’ claim for damages for trespass and perpetual injunction was dismissed and judgment entered for the defendant’s counterclaim for, inter alia, declaration of title. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.
COUNSEL
S.A.X. Tsegah for the appellants.
E. N. Moore for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
The appeal is from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Koforidua. In the said judgment dated 24 November 1980, the learned circuit judge dismissed the claim of the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs). The plaintiffs had sued the defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) for damages for trespass and perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his assigns and privies from interfering with a piece of land, with cocoa and foodstuff farms thereon, lying at Kwaboadi No. 1, near Otwereso in the Eastern Region. The defendant also counterclaimed for a declaration of title and recovery of possession.
It was an undisputed fact that the land in dispute was a portion of the stool land of Otwereso, a sub-stool of the Akyem Abuakwa paramount stool. In 1951 the plaintiffs, a syndicate of farmers and strangers to both stools, obtained the disputed land from the Otwereso stool for farming purposes. The occupant of the Otwereso stool at that time was one Barima Ofosu Kwabi II who deputed his elders to demarcate the land for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs performed the necessary customs appertaining to the grant. They then went into occupation of the land so granted and cultivated cocoa and food-crops farms thereon.
It was a condition of the grant that the plaintiffs were to present to the Otwereso stool one bottle schnapps plus a customary fee of ¢4.80 (four cedis eighty pesewas) every year. The plaintiffs observed this condition until 1970 when the paramount stool of Akyem Abuakwa, ostensibly acting with the consent of the Otwereso stool, raised the customary fee of four cedis eighty pesewas to ¢66 and described it as rent. A lease of some sort was then drawn up embodying fresh conditions. This lease was tendered as exhibit D.
The defendant admitted the grant made to the plaintiffs by the Otwereso stool. He also admitted the existence of the plaintiffs’ lease, exhibit D. But his contention was that the disputed land formed part
[p.1386] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 of forest land which the Otwereso stool had granted to his late granduncle, called Nana Antwi Awuah, for his services to the said stool. The said granduncle did not cultivate it and the stool by mistake granted the same forest land to the plaintiffs. So in 1973, after he had become customary successor of his granduncle, he petitioned the stool of Otwereso and the Stool Lands Revenue Office in Kibi, which was responsible for the administration of stool lands in the area, to release the land to him.
A copy of the said petition was sent to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs resisted the defendant’s claim. A series of correspondence took place between the plaintiffs and the Stool Lands Revenue Office. Eventually, the defendant’s claim was rejected by the said office. The defendant being dissatisfied, further petitioned the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council. But in the meantime, the plaintiffs had sued the defendant in the circuit court. The said traditional council summoned the plaintiffs to appear before it as it had decided to resolve the dispute between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendant on the other in respect of the land. The plaintiffs informed the traditional council that the matter was already before a competent court for adjudication and it was therefore not necessary for them to appear before it.
Following the failure of the plaintiffs to appear before the traditional council, the said council informed the Stool Lands Revenue Office by a letter dated 27 February 1978, that the land had reverted to the defendant, for it was granted to the plaintiffs by mistake; and that the lease, exhibit D, was no longer valid because the plaintiffs had failed to approach the traditional council or the stool of Otwereso, to negotiate for a new rent which was to be paid after January 1975 as stipulated in the lease, exhibit D. This letter from the council was tendered as exhibit 7 by the defendant. The learned circuit judge accepting the defence and the contents of the letter, exhibit 7, entered judgment for the defendant on his counterclaim and dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs.
The judgment was attacked on several grounds. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs, however, abandoned all the original grounds of appeal and concentrated on the seven additional grounds of appeal. Arguing ground (1) of the additional grounds of appeal, namely the trial judge erred in law in not making any finding of fact on the issue of estoppel, learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that since the question of estoppel was one of the issues to be decided, it was wrong for the trial judge not to have adverted his attention to it. There is great force and substance in this contention. I think this was a very grave omission on the part of the learned trial judge, especially because the learned judge himself referred to this very issue at the
[p.1387] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 beginning of judgment. Issues are not agreed upon for nothing. The parties having agreed and the trial judge having accepted that on the pleadings the question of estoppel was one of the crucial matters to be decided, he should have made a finding on it one way or the other.
Since the trial judge failed to make any finding on such an important issue, this court is entitled to make its own findings on the said issue having regard to the evidence which was adduced at the trial. The principle is that where an appellate court makes findings which were not considered by the trial court, it must demonstrate that there was evidence on the record to support those findings: see Nkansah v. Adjebeng [1961] G.L.R. 465 at p. 467. On a careful examination of the record, it is quite clear that there was more than sufficient evidence before the learned judge to hold that the defendant and his privies were estopped from disputing the grant made to the plaintiffs.
The defendant and his witnesses did not dispute the fact that the land in dispute was forest land that was granted to the plaintiffs and the said grant was made in 1951. It was also not denied by them that the plaintiffs after the grant went into possession, cleared the forest and cultivated cocoa and food-stuff farms without interference from members of the defendant’s family, even though the presence of the plaintiffs on the land had been known to them since 1951.
One Nana Adansi Abu customarily succeeded to the properties of the defendant’s granduncle, Nana Antwi Awuah, on the latter’s death. But the said Nana Adansi Abu during his lifetime never claimed the disputed land as belonging to his predecessor or to any member of his family. Indeed, he did not take any steps to retrieve this land from the plaintiffs on any ground whatsoever. The defendant customarily succeeded the said Nana Adansi in 1971 and in 1974 he suddenly realised that the land belonged to his late granduncle; and that it was granted to the plaintiffs by mistake. That is, the first occasion on which the defendant disputed the right of the plaintiffs was in 1974 and after the plaintiffs had been on the land for more that twenty years.
The defendant and members of his family, as I have stated, had been aware of the presence of the plaintiffs on the land for all those years, but never raised any objection. On the contrary, the defendant and his predecessor looked on unconcerned, while the plaintiffs expended money in improving the land. The defendant is a farmer and, no doubt, he is aware that it costs money to develop forest land into cocoa and food-crops farms. Indeed, the defendant did not deny that the plaintiffs had cultivated cocoa and food-crops farms on the land. The defendant having stood by for twenty years and over, and allowed the plaintiffs to occupy the land, spent money and energy in
[p.1388] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 improving it, honestly believing that it had been properly granted to them by the Otwereso stool, equity will not permit him to recover possession of the land. In my view, the evidence on record sufficiently established that the defendant and his family were guilty of acquiescence which was such that it should estop the defendant from obtaining recovery of possession and the declaration of title which he sought in his counterclaim: see Nkum v. Andoh [1959] G.L.R. 358 at p. 360 where the learned judge stated:
“If, therefore, for a period of 15 years the plaintiff’s family have sat by and allowed the defendant’s family to occupy the land, and, in the words of M’Carthy Ag. C.J. [in Fiscian v. Nelson (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 21 at p.
22] ‘to incur pecuniary commitments under the impression that they were entitled to the land’(… and spending money to establish villages and cocoa plantations on the land…) then I have no hesitation in holding that in the circumstances of this particular case the plaintiff’s family are estopped by their conduct.”
See also the case of Ntim v. Boateng [1963] 2 G.L.R. 97, S.C. In that case, the question of estoppel by acquiescence was fully discussed in the unanimous and instructive judgment of the court delivered by Adumua-Bossman J.S.C. In the course of his judgment at p. 121 the learned judge had this to say:
“If a landowner who is also a farmer and as such well aware of local farming conditions, including the position that cocoa when planted takes between four and five years to commence bearing, can allow his land to be occupied and developed in the manner described by the magistrate, how can he, in all fairness, be allowed to eject the farmers in occupation and take over their farms and villages and buildings? It is difficult to see how in the state of affairs indisputably established by the evidence available in the instant case, and having regard to the authorities to some of which reference has been made (supra) it can be seriously urged that the plaintiff has not been guilty of such acquiescence as at least should preclude him from dispossessing the defendants and taking over their cocoa farms, buildings, cottages and villages.”
In the circumstances, I hold that the learned judge ought to have dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim.
Learned counsel argued grounds (4) and (5) of the additional grounds together. These grounds complained that the learned trial judge erred in law in admitting the letter, exhibit 7, which was written when the case was pending before the court and that he further erred in law in relying on its contents. In support of these grounds, counsel
[p.1389] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 submitted that since exhibit 7 was contemptuously written after the case had been in court for some time, and since the matters raised in the said exhibit touched on the subject-matter in dispute before the court, it offended against Order 37, r. 62 of the High Court (Civil Procedure ) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A). Thus the trial judge ought to have rejected it.
The argument of learned counsel is unanswerable. The letter, exhibit 7, came into existence after the case had been pending before the circuit court for some time. The writ of summons was issued on 27 January 1977 and exhibit 7 was written by the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council on 27 February 1978. The council, no doubt, was an interested party, because the said council was the lessor of the disputed land, according to the lease, exhibit D; and any decision in the case before the court would definitely affect its interest one way or the other. Again, the contents of the letter were self-serving. They purported to show that the council had ruled that the said lease was null and void and that the land belonged to the defendant. What was worse, the contents of exhibit 7 dealt with issues that were before the court for determination. Order 37, rr. 60 and 62 of LN 140A read as follows:
“60. In any civil proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact if the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say: . . .”
“62. Nothing in this Order shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish.”
The two rules need no further explanation. Exhibit 7 was clearly the type of document which Order 37, r. 62 says is inadmissible and the trial judge ought to have rejected it: see Guardian Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Agbematu [1972] G.L.R. 337, C.A.
That the trial judge was greatly influenced by the contents of the said exhibit 7 is borne out by the following passage in the judgment:
“Thus by exhibit 3 and exhibit 7, the Okyeman Council has ruled that the land in dispute did not belong to the Otwereso stool at the time of the grant [to the plaintiffs]. I therefore say that the lease, exhibit D is null and void.. Whichever way the case is looked at I do say that the plaintiffs’ claim should fail both on the facts and in law.”
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In the circumstance, I agree with learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the trial judge erred in law in admitting exhibit 7 and in relying on its contents.
In respect of grounds (2) and (3), namely the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the lease, exhibit D, and that the wrong interpretation led him to the wrong conclusion that the said exhibit D was null and void, learned counsel contended that at the end of the first term, that is after 26 January 1975, the plaintiffs continued to pay the rent of ¢66 as stated in the lease, exhibit D, to those legally responsible for the collection of such rents on behalf of the stool, namely the Stool Lands Revenue Office based at the Lands Department, Kibi; and the said office acknowledged the receipt of all the payments made by the plaintiffs as evidenced by exhibits C and C1. Counsel therefore submitted that the acceptance of the rents after 26 January 1975 was suggestive of the fact that both the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council and the Administrator of Stool Lands regarded the lease as binding even after 1975. In the circumstances, it was wrong for the trial judge to hold that the lease became null and void after 26 January 1975.
It is important to remember that originally the rent which the plaintiffs were paying to the stool of Otwereso was four cedis and eighty pesewas a year. After the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), had come into effect, the plaintiffs were required to pay their rents to the Stool Lands Revenue Office at the Lands Department, Kibi, and no longer direct to the Otwereso stool. However, some years later, that is in 1970, the paramount stool of Akyem Abuakwa, acting through the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council, raised the four cedis and eighty pesewas to ¢66 and embodied all the conditions of the plaintiffs’ original grant in the lease, exhibit D. Exhibit D was executed on 26 January 1970.
It was the interpretation which the learned judge put on clause (4) of the said lease which has been attacked under grounds (2) and (3) of the additional grounds of appeal. It is significant to note that the plaintiffs were to pay the ¢66 a year for five years, that is from 26 January 1970 to 26 January 1975. Thereafter, a new rent was to be agreed upon, and that also was to be operative for four years, that is from 1975 to 26 January 1979. On the said 26 January 1979, the rent which would be fixed would be operative for nine years, that is until 26 January 1988; and any rent that the parties would agree upon on 26 January 1988 would no longer be varied and would be paid annually and in perpetuity.
Truly, no new rents were agreed upon by the plaintiffs and the stool after 1975, and the plaintiffs continued to pay the ¢66 a year. This conduct of the plaintiffs was severely criticised by the learned trial judge in the manner as follows:
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“The lease exhibit D was executed on 26 January 1970. Therefore going by paragraph 4(b) thereof the yearly rent of ¢66 should end on 26 January 1975. Thereafter it was the duty of the plaintiffs to approach the lessor for negotiations as regards the yearly rent for another period of four years… Thus as from 26 January 1975 there was no evidence of rent payable every year for the next four years by the plaintiffs to the Otwereso stool as evidenced by paragraph 4(b) of the lease, i.e. exhibit D. What is the agreed rent? None. There is no evidence. It would seem as if the continued payment of the ¢66 a year from 26 January 1975, i.e. exhibits C and C1 must have been decided by the plaintiffs alone thinking that there was continuity and so need to negotiate the amount payable a year with the lessor… I would therefore say that since no rent after 26 January 1975 had been agreed upon the lease is deemed to have terminated.”
With due respect to the learned trial judge, the evidence showed that the plaintiffs could not possibly have approached the stool in January 1975 to negotiate a new rent; because by December 1974 the stool of Otwereso had clearly identified itself with the defendant’s cause as evidenced in exhibit 3. Exhibit 3 was a letter dated 27 December 1974 and was written by the stool of Otwereso to the officer-in-charge of stool lands at the Lands Department, Kibi, backing the defendant’s claim. That letter insisted that the plaintiffs should leave the land to facilitate its release to the defendant and his family.
With that stand taken by the stool of Otwereso, did the learned trial judge think that the said stool, while assisting the defendant to eject the plaintiffs from the land, would at the same time negotiate a new rent with the plaintiffs? I do not think so. The stool by 26 January 1975 had declared its intention not to allow the plaintiffs to occupy the land any longer and so the question of negotiating a new rent with them was out. In a situation like this, what should the plaintiffs do? In my considered view, the plaintiffs did the right thing by continuing to pay the old rent.
In fact, the paramount stool of Akyem Abuakwa also gave its blessing to the defendant’s ill-conceived demand and acted in a very hostile manner towards the plaintiffs. Exhibit 7 is a clear testimony of this. It appears there was a conspiracy to take the land from the plaintiffs at all cost. In my opinion, it was the stool which failed to negotiate a new rent with the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were right, as I have stated, in continuing to pay the old rent pending the outcome of the dispute.
I therefore hold that the plaintiffs did not wilfully refuse to negotiate the new rent. It was rather the stool which made it difficult for the plaintiffs to do so. If anything at all, it was the stool which [p.1392] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 committed a breach by denying the right of the plaintiffs to occupy the land. The plaintiffs’ land could not therefore be forfeited under the pretext that they had breached the condition of their grant to negotiate for and pay a new rent and the lease had thereby become null and void and of no effect any longer.
In any case, even if I had held that the plaintiffs committed the breach complained of in the judgment and so the land could be forfeited, I would still have held that the plaintiffs were entitled to be granted relief against such a forfeiture. For, the alleged breach was in respect of payment of rent and since the said rent was capable of assessment at any time, I do not see any justification in depriving the plaintiffs of the said land which they had expended so much labour and money in developing.
The inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant relief against forfeiture in cases of this nature does not depend on the nature of the breach but on the ability to assess the rent payable or any financial loss that might have been caused by the said breach. Once the damage which flowed from the breach is capable of assessment so that the parties could be put in the same situation as if the condition had been performed, the court should not hesitate to grant the relief. This was made clear by Apaloo J.S.C. (as he then was) when he read the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Boston v. Khemland Brothers [1964] G.L.R. 277, S.C. At pp. 282-283 the learned judge stated the principle as follows:
“As I understand it, the principle upon which equity proceeded, was that it would give relief against forfeiture for non payment of rent, for interest upon its arrears would be a sufficient compensation for the breach of the covenant to pay it, but in the case of other covenants, for example to insure or repair, it would generally refuse relief, as the damage was incapable of exact assessment. Thus the refusal of relief in Barrow v. Isaacs [1891] 1 Q.B. 417 was understandable since it was the breach of a covenant not to assign without the landlord’s consent and was thus incapable of precise monetary compensation. But the cases, Cage v.
Russel (1681) 86 E.R. 481 and Wadman v. Calcraft (1804) 32 E.R. 768 show that where full compensation could be made, equity will not allow a forfeiture to attach.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
On the whole the plaintiffs were able to establish their possessory title to the land. As a matter of fact, the defendant admitted the plaintiffs’ possessory title but contended that they were put in possession by mistake which mistake he failed woefully to prove.
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It must be observed that the learned counsel for the defendant could not resist the attacks made on the judgment. He therefore conceded that the judgment was an unhappy and unsatisfactory one. But he invited the court to send the case back for trial de novo. I will not accede to that request since I do not see any justification for it.
Learned counsel for the defendant again contended that the plaintiffs failed to prove trespass; consequently, they were not entitled to damages and perpetual injunction. I agree with counsel so far as damages are concerned. But the plaintiffs having proved that they were in lawful occupation and possession of the disputed land they were entitled to be protected in their possession from unlawful interference by the defendant and his privies. For there was evidence on record that the defendant threatened to eject them from the land. In the course of his evidence under cross-examination, Robert Adji, one of the plaintiffs said: “It is not correct that the defendant is in possession of the land.
We have sued the defendant because he wrote to us purporting to eject us.” (The emphasis is mine.) The defendant never denied writing such a letter. Furthermore, the defendant without just cause had been trying to get the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council and the Stool Lands Revenue Office at Kibi to eject the plaintiffs from the land. I will here refer to exhibit 1, a letter sent to the plaintiffs by the Stool Lands Revenue Office at Kibi after the defendant had petitioned that office. Paragraph 3 of that letter reads:
“May I therefore request you to vacate and surrender the land within two weeks from the date of this letter to avoid any future embarrassment. By a copy of this letter the Revenue Inspector, Oda in charge of Abuakwa lands is being instructed to cancel your name from the register of tenants.”
(The emphasis is mine.) It can therefore be seen that even though the defendant had not yet entered the land, it was because of those harassments and the threats by the defendant to unlawfully oust them from the land that the plaintiffs were compelled to institute the action. Thus, I am of the view that there was, in fact, a very strong probability of future infringement of or interference with the plaintiffs’ rights over the land. In a case like this, it is proper that the court should exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiffs by granting them a quia timet injunction as a matter of course: see Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris [1970] A.C. 652, H.L. At p. 664 of the report Lord Upjohn who read the unanimous judgment of the house said:
“But to prevent the jurisdiction of the courts being stultified equity has invented the quia timet action, that is an action for an injunction to prevent an apprehended legal wrong, though none
[p.1394] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 has occurred at present, and the suppliant for such an injunction is without any remedy at of [1982-83] GLR 1382-1397 law.”
After referring to other authorities the learned lord at p. 665 continued:
“. . . quia timet actions are broadly applicable to two types of cases: first, where the defendant has as yet done no hurt to the plaintiff but is threatening and intending (so the plaintiff alleges) to do works which will render irreparable harm to him or his property if carried to completion.”
For the above reasons, I would allow the appeal. The judgment appealed from is hereby set aside together with the order for costs; and in substitution thereof, judgment is entered for the plaintiffs dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim. The plaintiffs are granted perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his privies and assigns from entering the land in dispute or from interfering with it in any manner.
Francois J.A. The judgment appealed against is clearly perverse. Even counsel for the respondent, hereafter called the defendant, could not help labelling the judgment as an “unhappy one.” This charitable description stretches euphemism to extreme limits.
The issue for determination was not complex. It involved the ascertainment of the legal rights of a subject grantee who claimed that by some error his family property had been conveyed to stranger-lessees. Legal consideration had to be given to the proposition advanced by the defendant that the stranger-lessees’ farming occupation, spanning a period of two decades and more could be defeated by the cry of error.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I do not wish to recapitulate the facts at any length. They have been sufficiently and admirably recounted in the judgment of my brother Abban J.A. I wish, however, to say that the appellants, hereafter called the plaintiffs, set out in their pleadings the history of their grant, from the acquisition of the primeval forest from the allodial owners, the Otwereso stool, in 1951 to the transformation of the virgin forest by sustained cultivation into flourishing cocoa farms. They explained why in 1970, from motives of pure caution, which seems to have been justified by the turn of events, they had had their leasehold arrangement recorded in a formal lease, which had been concurred in by the paramount stool of Akim Abuakwa. These matters were not disputed. Indeed, when the defendant availed himself of an opportunity to amend his defence he did not traverse the facts stated above; he admitted them.
[p.1395] of [1982-83] GLR 1382
The defendant’s sole concern was the regrettable mistake that had allegedly occurred and which had resulted in depriving a great son of the soil, his ancestor Awuah, of a gift of land made in recognition of his efforts to save Akim Abuakwa lands from predatory litigants.
The great stumbling block to the correction of this error is that the grant of the disputed land was made to the plaintiffs in the lifetime of the renowned Awuah; there was no protest from him or his immediate successor, Abu. Included among Abu’s official functions was the originally demarcated Awuah’s land and should have known its extent. If the evidence of the defendant’s caretaker is to be believed, no member of the defendant’s family lifted a finger when he reported encroachments on the land. They all sat by while the plaintiffs expended money, time and labour in developing the land. In my view, the defendant is caught by laches and acquiescence. I think the case of Fiscian v. Nelson and Baksmaty (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 21 covers this situation. There it was said at p. 22:
“ . . . a former owner would not be allowed to claim land where he had stood by for a long time while someone else occupied the land and incurred pecuniary commitments under the impression that he was entitled to the land, notwithstanding that prescription is unknown to native customary law and that no statutory limitation applies to the case.”
This case was decided in 1946; since then the Farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 107), has been passed; limitations over lands, untilled for a period of eight years can now defeat title. But if this 1962 Act does not apply because it has no retrospective effect it shows the trend in legislative policy. The Limitation Decree, 1972 (NRCD 54), has no such inhibitions. The Decree provides in legal form the customary law’s abhorrence of unjust enrichment.
Again arising from the stance of the defendant in relation to the plaintiffs’ pleadings, he undertook the burden of proving the mistake which he urged as his defence, and the prop of his counterclaim. He also had to establish that the result should enure to him and not to the plaintiffs. Consequently, a failure to discharge this burden would lose him the verdict, since the plaintiffs’ pleadings which had been in the main admitted, together with the evidence and title deeds, exhibit D, gave their claim enough prima facie support. This principle of a shift in the burden of proof is illustrated in the cases of Kyiafi v. Wono [1967] G.L.R 463, C.A. and Ababio v. Gyamfi [1962] 1 G.L.R 428, S.C.: see the second holding and at p. 433.
On the issue that the defendant was first on the land, the test is not dependent on the existence of a registrable title, but on factual
[p.1396] of [1982-83] GLR 1382 possession. So if indeed the defendant’s predecessor had demonstrated his possession of the disputed land, the plaintiffs would have been hard put to maintain their claim despite the existence of their registered document, exhibit D. This is the force of Darkeh v. Lartey [1963] 1 G.L.R 362, S.C. where it was held that the mere existence of a registered conveyance did not give priority against a customary grant provided proof of the grant was available. The issue should be determined on the basis of the effectiveness of the grant, and the burden of proof rested on the nature of the respective rights upon which the rival claims were founded.
Unfortunately, the issue of effective grant was completely lost sight of by the defendant. In my view, it was fatal to thedefendant’s case that the evidence disclosed that his ancestors’ land was not demarcated. The first defendant witness said:
“The land given to Nana Awuah was not a farmstead but virgin forest. The said land formed boundary with the forest reserve on one side. The other boundaries were not demarcated for nobody was having land in the area… I did not measure the extent of the land we carved for the late Antwi Awuah.”
The second defendant witness was equally non-committal. He knew of the forest reserve boundary but the other sides were merely Otwereso stool land. No surveyor could plot this land and give it sufficient identity to enable the defendant to secure the declaration of title he sought on his counterclaim. Clearly, on the evidence, the identity of the defendant’s land remained vague and unplottable.
There is another serious defect in the defendant’s case. Since his predecessor died in 1958, he must have received his grant for a period of over twenty years. Indeed, the caretaker dates his entry on the land from 1941. If the plaintiffs got their grant in 1959: (see paragraph 2 of statement of claim) then the forest had not been cultivated for eighteen years. The customary law is quite clear on the cultivation of forest land. It appears that forest land not cultivated within a reasonable time escheats to the stool, for valid re-alienation. So even if Nana Awuah had obtained his grant first, his inaction and laches would have lost him his title.
The clear bias of the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council as seen in exhibit 7, a letter from the council, must be commented upon. It states:
“The Council is satisfied that the land was originally cultivated by late Bafour Antwi Awuah and as it became secondary forest was leased to Teiku Adji & Co. error.”
[p.1397] of [1982-83] GLR 1382
The actual protagonists in the dispute are ad idem on the view that the plaintiffs acquired virgin forest and the issue had nothing to do with a “secondary forest.”
I agree with Abban J.A. on the other issues he has so expertly dealt with. In my view, the appeal should be allowed.
JUDGMENT OF COUSSEY J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
M.C.N.N.
