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[1982] SLR (CA) 3Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

ANDREWS vs. HAYFORD [1982-83] GLR 214

25 November 1982 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 11 min read

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OSCOLAANDREWS v HAYFORD [1982-83] GLR 214 [1982] SLR (CA) 3
APAANDREWS v HAYFORD [1982-83] GLR 214, [1982] SLR (CA) 3 (Ghana).
BluebookANDREWS v HAYFORD [1982-83] GLR 214, [1982] SLR (CA) 3 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R 535.

(2) Quagraine v. Edu [1966] G.L.R. 406.

(3) Adjei v. Appiagyei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 401 C.A.

(4) Attah v. Amissah, Court of Appeal, 4 May, 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 73. (5) Busumafie v. Hydecooper (1946) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 245.

(6) Adjei v. Asantewah [1961] G.L.R 629.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the trial circuit court granting the respondent title to a piece of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

E. M. Amponsah-Dadzie for the appellant.

No appearance by or on behalf of the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The land in dispute is situated at Tantri Road, Cape Coast. It formed part of a larger area bought by one Kwamina Prah (deceased). Kwamina Prah built a house on a portion of the said land. It is the undeveloped portion which has been the subject-matter of the present dispute. The learned trial circuit judge, Cape Coast, in a considered judgment found that Kwamina Prah died intestate and was survived by only two uterine brothers – Kojo Ackun and Kweku Dwenin. The late Kwamina Prah left no mother and no sister or maternal nephews or nieces. As a matter of fact it was found that on the death of Prah only these two uterine brothers, Ackun and Dwenin constituted members of Prah’s immediate Twidan family.

[p.216] of [1982-83] GLR 214

Kojo Ackun who was the senior of the two brothers was appointed Prah’s customary successor and he took charge and control of the house and the land in dispute. During his lifetime, Kojo Ackun as a successor and with the consent and concurrence of his only brother, Dwenin, sold the disputed land to the respondent. The sale took place in 1952 and was reduced into writing. A properly prepared indenture was executed by all concerned and registered in the Deeds Registry as No. 1153/1952. It was tendered at the trial as exhibit A. It should be observed that sometime after the sale Dwenin died. That is, Dwenin predeceased Kojo Ackun. It is also significant to note that nobody from the wider Twidan family objected to the sale.

Years after the death of Kojo Ackun and nineteen years after the said sale, the appellant who was a distant and remote relative of the late Kwamina Prah, Ackun and Dwenin, disputed the respondent’s right to the land, contending that the sale to the respondent by the late Kojo Ackun was null and void on the ground that Ackun sold the land without the consent of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast. The respondent therefore sued the appellant, among other things for a declaration of title. The learned trial circuit judge granted the respondent the relief she sought.

The appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment appealed to this court. Several grounds of appeal were filed. But learned counsel for the appellant argued only one of them, namely the learned trial judge erred in law by holding that the immediate family could dispose of the family property without reference to and obtaining the consent of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast. Counsel contended that on the death intestate of Prah who originally acquired the land, the land became family property and that without the concurrence of the members of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast the members of Prah’s immediate family alone could not sell the land. Counsel cited Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. 535 and Quargraine v. Edu [1966] G.L.R. 406.

We did not hesitate to point out to learned counsel that there was no basis for this argument in view of the positive findings made by the learned trial judge which findings are fully supported by the evidence. The learned judge specifically found that two members of the wider family were aware of the sale and that one of those two, called Smith, was at that time the only important member of the wider family who could be consulted and that the said Smith, in fact, consented to the sale. I will here quote the relevant portions of the judgment:

“The defendant (the appellant) was not present at the time of the sale. Williams, the second plaintiff witness who was present

[p.217] of [1982-83] GLR 214

testified that Smith and Darko – both members of the wider family consented to the sale. This evidence was not challenged.”

After further review of the evidence, the learned judge continued:

“It would seem therefore that Smith was the only important member of the wider family who could be consulted at the time, and I infer from the evidence of the plaintiff’s mother, and believe William’s evidence that Smith consented to the sale. At least he knew of it and if the family wanted to avoid it he (Smith) would have done so long before his (Smith’s) death which occurred about a year before this action was instituted.”

As I have already stated, sometime after the sale, Dwenin predeceased his brother Kojo Ackun. So when Kojo Ackun died he was succeeded by this Smith, a member of the wider family. It was a year after the death of Smith, that the appellant attempted to dispute the respondent’s right to the land and was sued. It cannot therefore be said that members of the wider family never knew of the sale. They were aware of the sale and if they, in fact, did not consent they ought to have acted timeously to set aside the sale and should not have waited for all those nineteen years. In the circumstances, I do not think it will be fair for any court of law to avoid the sale after the family had failed to repudiate it for nineteen years. The family must be held guilty of inordinate delay.

The principle was re-stated by Granville Sharp J.A. in Adjei v. Appiagyei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 401 at p.404, C.A. thus:

“A sale of land by the head of a family without the assent or concurrence of the rest of the family is not void.

It is voidable at the instance of the family, but the court will not avoid the sale if not satisfied that the family has acted timeously and with due diligence and that the party affected by the avoidance of the sale can be restored to the position in which he stood before the sale took place.”

Kojo Ackun, having been appointed the customary successor of Prah, he in law became the head of Prah’s immediate family and, as such head, he was the proper person to control and deal with the self-acquired properties of Prah including the disputed land: see Atta v. Amissah, Court of Appeal, 4 May 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 73.

In Kwakye v. Tuba (supra) the plaintiff sued for a declaration of title and for his right to possession of property to which he had succeeded. The head of the wider family applied to be joined as a co-plaintiff, the court in dismissing his application said at p.538 thus:

[p.218] of [1982-83] GLR 214

“. . . upon the death of a person intestate, although his self-acquired property becomes the property of the whole of his family, the immediate and extended together, the right to immediate enjoyment of the beneficial interest in it, and to the control of it, vests in the immediate or branch family, and the person appointed successor to the deceased is, in law, the head of that immediate or branch family. As such head he is the proper person to sue and be sued in respect of that particular family property.”

This brings me to another important aspect of the case. The learned judge further held that, in any case, Kojo Ackun and his uterine brother Dwenin could dispose of the land without first obtaining the consent and concurrence of the head of the wider family. One Nana Gyepi was the head of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast. This man had always been away from Cape Coast on sojournment and he occasionally visited Cape Coast. He was on sojournment for several years and came to settle down in Cape Coast in 1971. He never claimed to have any overriding powers over the self-acquired properties of Kwamina Prah which belonged to Prah’s immediate family.

The appellant and his witnesses admitted that the head of the wider Twidan family, Nana Gyepi, was never at any time consulted on matters affecting properties left by the late Prah. Such matters were the preserve of the members of Prah’s immediate family. The passage in the judgment which dealt with this aspect reads:

“It is clear from the evidence of the defendant (the appellant) himself and his witnesses that Nana Gyepi was not consulted on any matter affecting the house which Prah left for the family, and Nana Gyepi himself did not claim to have any overriding powers on matters affecting Prah’s property. On the contrary, he said under cross-examination that he could not succeed to Prah. His ignorance about the sale cannot invalidate it”.

Indeed, Nana Gyepi in the course of his evidence confessed that without any consultation with him, Ackun was appointed successor to Prah and he never saw anything wrong with that. He considered the said appointment as proper. He further admitted that he was not even responsible for the funeral of the deceased persons in the immediate family of Prah. As a matter of fact, the head of the wider family was indifferent as to what the members of the immediate family of Prah did with the self-acquired properties left by the late Prah.

The appellant was not a member of the immediate family of Prah and was found not to be an important or principal member of even the wider family at the time of the sale. How then could he claim the right to be consulted before the sale could take place?

[p.219] of [1982-83] GLR 214

On the particular facts of this case, and having regard to the findings made by the learned judge, it seems to me that this is a case where the only two surviving members of Prah’s immediate Twidan family—Ackun and Dwenin, could legitimately dispose of the disputed land without reference to the head of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast and the learned trial judge was therefore right in the view she took.

As I pointed out earlier on, Prah having died intestate, his self-acquired properties became his family properties to be enjoyed by members of his immediate family. Members of the immediate family in the case of a deceased male according to Fanti custom consist of the mother of the said deceased and the mother’s matrilineal descendants. It is this class which has the beneficial enjoyment and control of the self-acquired properties of which the deceased male died intestate; and it is therefore from this class that a customary successor is appointed to inherit the said deceased. Ackun and Dwenin were found to be the only persons who fell within this class. They were indeed the only surviving members of Prah’s immediate family and in view of the circumstances of the case, they did not need the concurrence and consent of the head and members of the wider family before they could alienate the land in dispute.

In Atta v. Amissah (supra), Anin J.A. (as he then was), said: “It is the immediate family, and not the extended family, which has the power to alienate the property by virtue of its possession of the right to the beneficial enjoyment of the property.”

I think the situation in the present case is not very much different from that of Busumafie v. Hydecooper (1946) D.C. (Land) ‘38 – ‘47, 245, on which the learned trial judge seemed to have relied. In that case, the first defendant happened to be the sister of the deceased woman and the only matrilineal descendant of their mother alive. She sold the property in dispute to the second defendant without reference to the members of the wider family; and a cousin of the deceased brought an action seeking to set aside the sale. The land court held that since the property had been inherited by the matrilineal descendants of the mother of the deceased, and since the first defendant was the only surviving member of this class, the property virtually became hers and she could dispose of it in the way she did.

In the present case, the surviving members of the immediate family were two males. If the immediate family with the right to beneficial enjoyment had power of disposition even where that family consisted of only one female as it was clear in the Busumafie case (supra), then I do not see any good reason why the two surviving members of the immediate family of Prah, one of whom was the head and successor to the property in dispute could not in their lifetime

[p.220] of [1982-83] GLR 214

dispose of the said property without reference to the head and members of the wider family.

In the circumstances of this case, I hold that the two uterine brothers, who happened to be the only surviving members of the immediate family of Prah, had the sole control and enjoyment of the self-acquired property of Prah and they could validly sell the disputed land during their lifetime without the concurrence and consent of the head and members of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast.

In Adjei v. Asantewah [1961] G.L.R. 629, it will be recalled that members of the immediate family gave the property involved to the plaintiff as a gift. It was contended that the gift was invalid since the head of the wider family did not consent. Ollennu J. (as he then was), dismissed that contention and held that the successor and the principal members of the immediate family had power to alienate and that it was only in very exceptional cases that the head of the wider family could intervene. There were no exceptional circumstances in the present case. If anything at all, it was rather clear from the findings that the head and members of the wider Twidan family of Cape Coast had nothing to do with the properties which belonged to the immediate family of Prah.

I am therefore of the opinion that the learned trial judge was justified in holding that the alienation of the land to the respondent was valid and could not be impeached by the appellant. Consequently, I find no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.S.C.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

D.R.K.S.

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