EGYIR vs. HAYFRON [1984-86] 1 GLR 510
29 July 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 17 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 23Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Anto v Mensah (1957) 3 WALR 1; (1957) 3 WALR 218, CA.
(2) Codjoe v Kwatchey (1935) 2 WACA 371.
(3) Darko v Agyakwa (1943) 9 WACA 163.
(4) Cobblah v Gbeke (1947) 12 WACA 294.
(5) Donkor v Asare [1960] GLR 187.
(6) Poh v Konamba (1957) 3 WALR 74.
(7) Agyeibi-Kojo v Bonsie (1957) 3 WALR 257.
(8) Ntsin VII v Dougan [1960] GLR 26.
(9) Abinabina (Stool of) v Enyimadu (1953) 12 WACA 171, PC.
(10) Kuma v Kuma (1938) 5 WACA 4.
(11) Dotwaah v Afriyie [1965] GLR 257.
(12) Archibong v Ita (1954) 14 WACA 520.
(13) Bruce v Quarnor [1959] GLR 292.
(14) Cobblah v Okraku [1961] GLR (Pt. II) 679 (15) Aquah v Cofie [1961] 1 GLR 475.
(16) Abdulai v Manue (1945) 10 WACA 172.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiff for a declaration of title to and recovery of possession of the land in dispute. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Amowee Dawson for the plaintiff.
Ebo Bentsi-Enchill for the defendant.
[p.512] of [1984-86] GLR 510
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
The plaintiff’s claim is for a declaration of title to and recovery of possession of all that piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Old Town, Sekondi and is bounded on the south by the Methodist Church house and Lawyer Mercer’s building, the east by Beach Crescent, the north by Beach Crescent and George Grant’s house, and on the west by Fritz Eghbert’s house. The plaintiff is the head of the Twokoa Anona family of Sekondi and sues in that representative capacity. In his statement of claim the plaintiff avers that the Twokoa Anona family owns all that piece of land described by him. He avers that his late uncle by name Azariah, his immediate predecessor whom he succeeded as head of the Twokoa Anona family, granted to the defendant some time ago a licence for temporary use of the land but the defendant now asserts ownership of the land and refuses to give up possession thus provoking this action.
The defendant in her statement of defence avers that the land described by the plaintiff in his statement of claim is her own property by right of gift from her father, the late Peter Awoonor Renner. There is therefore no dispute about the identity of the land and the plaintiff is happily relieved of the all too often formidable task on a plaintiff to prove clearly the identity of the land in a claim for a declaration of title.
In an action for a declaration of title where there is a specific or general denial of his title a plaintiff cannot succeed without proving his root of title: see Anto v Mensah (1957) 3 WALR 218 at 222, CA per Ollennu J (as he then was). Thus where a plaintiff derives his title from his predecessor he cannot succeed unless he proves the title of his predecessor. As Ollennu J (as he then was) said in Anto v Monsah (1957) 3 WALR 1 at 2:
“To succeed in an action for declaration of title it is necessary to show what the origin or root of title is. In this country it is derivable in various ways—either by grant from a stool, or where by virtue of being a subject of a stool one acquired original possession by cultivation of forest land, or by sale from a proved owner . . .”
Each party to the instant suit claimed to have derived title from some predecessors or predecessor as the case might be, so it was incumbent upon them to prove their respective titles bearing in mind the principle of law unshakably settled by a spate of cases, that the plaintiff in an action for a declaration of title to land succeeds on the strength of his own case: see Codjoe v Kwatchey (1935) 2 WACA 371 at 374; Darko v Agyakwa (1943) 9 WACA 163; Cobblah v Gbeke (1947) 12 WACA 294 and Donkor v Asare [1960] GLR 187. It follows that where a plaintiff fails to prove his title to land satisfactorily his case ought to be dismissed without considering the defence.
[p.513] of [1984-86] GLR 510
Let us now take a critical view of the plaintiff’s case. First he narrated a traditional history which he said was imparted to him by his late uncle, Kwaku Azariah, at a time when the latter was critically ill. The historical account was that between the years 1850 and 1860 the plaintiff’s ancestors moved from Cape Coast and settled on the land part of which is in dispute and established a branch of the Methodist Church in Sekondi. These ancestors granted to the Methodist Church all that piece of land comprised in the Methodist Mission, Sekondi. The ancestors further granted permission to the church to develop the vacant portion of the land directly in front of the Methodist Mission whenever the need arose but that that permission has not been utilised. It is the latter land which is in dispute. The late Azariah also told the plaintiff that he granted permission to the defendant at the latter’s request to settle some fisherfolks on the land in dispute. Azariah then charged the plaintiff with the task of reclaiming the land for the Twokoa Anona family. The plaintiff was not told the exact time the alleged grant to the defendant was made. In his invaluable book Customary Land Law in Ghana the learned author Mr. Justice Ollennu says at p. 123 and I quote with much relish:
“It has from time immemorial been the practice among Ghanaians for a leading member of a family who anticipates death by reason of extreme age or serious illness, to summon members of his family . . . to tell them the tradition of the family, to furnish them with proof respecting property he held (either as family property or his individual self-acquired property) and to give directions how these properties are to be dealt with after his death, and who is to take charge and control of them.”
It is significant to observe that Ollennu’s statement of this practice among Ghanaians finds support in Hayes-Redwar’s Comments on Gold Coast Ordinances at 87 and also by Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) in Poh v Konamba (1957) 3 WALR 74 at 78. If the, practice as described by Ollennu, an eminent jurist and well-known authority on Ghana law, dates back to antiquity, then the traditional history given by a leading member of a family when he is critically ill must not be dismissed outright. The plaintiff’s predecessor followed the practice of his Ghanaian forebears. Indeed, no one would lightly dismiss as untrue an account given by a person who is critically ill because the chances are that such a person is much more likely to speak the truth than to speak falsehood. But it seems to me pre-eminently important that a court must satisfy itself that the deceased member of the family, in fact, said what has been attributed to him. In other words, the court should
[p.514] of [1984-86] GLR 510
satisfy itself with the credibility of the person who receives the traditional history; in this case the plaintiff. The evidence shows that after the death of Azariah the plaintiff took steps to recover the land from the defendant, but the latter refused to give up possession and instead asserted ownership. On two occasions the plaintiff sent messengers to inform the defendant about what the late Azariah, had said but the defendant would not yield her grip over the land. The matter even went before the Omanhene of Sekondi but all to no avail as the defendant still stuck like a leech to her unyielding stance on the matter. I had no doubt whatsoever of the plaintiff’s credibility in this matter.
If, as I have stated already, the, story told by Azariah is accepted as proof respecting the property in dispute, then the court is entitled to hold that the very act of granting permission to the defendant to settle fisherfolks on the land would constitute a recent fact or act which lends credence to the traditional histories. The veracity of one history or the other can be ascertained only by means of testing it against facts in recent memory as established by the evidence: see Adjeibi-Kojo v Bonsie (1957) 3 WALR 257 at 260 per Lord Denning; Poh v Konamba (1957) 3 WALR 74 at 78; Ntsin VII v Dougan [1960] GLR 26. It seems to me that even where there is only one traditional history proffered by one of the parties to the suit, the court is obligated to take the story through the acid test of referring it to the recent facts established by the evidence and reject it if it is in any material way irreconcilable with the recent facts. Where, for example, a traditional history is fantastic, romantic or merely entertaining and has no reference to recent facts it ought not to weigh upon any court. A traditional evidence must be cogent and reliable before it can support a claim for a declaration of title to land. The importance of traditional evidence m actions for a declaration of title was emphasised by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in two leading cases: Abinabina (Stool of) v Enyimadu (1953) 12 WACA 171, D and C Kuma v Kuma (1938) 5 WACA 4.
Of equal importance is the question as to who is competent to give traditional evidence. In Dotwaah v Afriyie [1965] GLR 257 at 263 the Supreme Court speaking through Ollennu JSC said:
“We deduce from the above cited cases and comments, that for evidence of tradition to be admissible the witness who deposes to it must be a person who has a right to be told, and a duty to know the tradition or the history, and none other, however intimate and close that other may be to the deceased member of the family who might have related the tradition to him.”
[p.515] of [1984-86] GLR 510
The plaintiff in this case clearly qualifies to give evidence of the traditional history respecting property of the Twokoa Anona family as related to him by his deceased uncle Kweku Azariah. The weight to be attached to such evidence is yet another thing altogether and, as I have stated earlier in this judgment, much weight should be attached to what Azariah told the plaintiff when he was critically ill. Not only that, but there are facts proved by the plaintiff including acts of ownership which add weight to the traditional evidence. There is evidence that the plaintiff’s family granted permission to the Oman of Sekondi to settle their fetish on the disputed land some time in 1962 when the Sekondi Naval Base was being constructed. This was confirmed by one of the elders of the Omanhene of Sekondi, the second plaintiff witness. This elderman said that the Twokoa Anona family was approached by the Oman of Sekondi for its permission, obviously because they acknowledge that family to be the owners of the land. Last but not the least, the plaintiff’s family granted a portion of land in the area to Mr. James Mercer, Barrister at Law, Sekondi for building purposes after the latter had provided money and a customary drink. This piece of evidence stood unchallenged. There is also the unchallenged evidence of the grant of a portion of land in the area by the plaintiff family to the Methodist Church.
What then is the legal effect of these acts done by the plaintiff’s family? I can do no more than to refer to what Coussey JA (as he then was) said in Archibong v Ita (1954) 14 WACA 520 at 522 and I quote:
“. . . there is a general proposition in the law of evidence that repeated acts of ownership done with respect to other places connected with the locus in quo by such a common character of locality as to give rise to the inference that the owner of one is likely to be the owner of the other is sometimes receivable. Thus, in Jones v. Williams (2), Parke B, said that ‘evidence of acts in another part of one continuous hedge adjoining the plaintiff’s land was admissible in evidence on the ground that they are such acts as might reasonably lead to the inference that the entire hedge belonged to the plaintiff’. In such a case it is a probability, not a presumption of ownership.”
Since in an action for a declaration of title, like all other civil cases, a plaintiff succeeds by a preponderance of evidence, that is on the balance of the probabilities, can it not justifiably be said that the plaintiff ‘s cue is more probable than not especially in view of the fact that the defendant has not adduced any evidence of acts of ownership with respect to other places in the locus in quo? I think it can. If the plaintiff’s family owns the whole land in the area covered by the Methodist Mission and the area covered by Mr Mercer’s building then
[p.516] of [1984-86] GLR 510
it seems to me that a reasonable inference can be drawn in his favour that his story is highly probable. The plaintiff’s case is that the defendant was granted permission or licence by the plaintiff’s predecessor to settle some fisherfolks on the land. And there is no dispute that there are fisherfolks on the land.
The defendant for her part relied solely and, rather perilously in my view, upon a document of title. She derives her title by way of gift from her late father, Peter Awoonor Renner, Barrister at Law, Sekondi. The latter in turn derived his title by way of purchase of the land in dispute from one Vroom of Elmina, Gold Coast Colony through his agent William Plange and the said Vroom in turn derived his title by further purchase from one Djonfia, Chief of Dutch Sekondi and his elders and counsellors in 1900. These facts are contained in a document tendered by the defendant as exhibit 1. In my judgment the document per se does not settle the dispute in favour of the defendant. The settled principle of law is that where a party derives his title to land from someone else, either by way of gift or purchase or other form of alienation of land, it is incumbent upon that party whose title is derivative to prove the title of his grantor or vendor or donor as the case may be. Consequently, a grantor has a duty to sue or defend jointly with his purchaser in any dispute relating to the land sold and the purchaser has a corresponding duty to bring his vendor into the suit in his own interest. Thus in Bruce v Quarnor [1959] GLR 292 at 294 Ollennu J (as he then was) said:
“By native custom, grant of land implies an undertaking by the grantor to ensure good title to the grantee. It is therefore the responsibility of the grantor, where the title of the grantee to the land is challenged, or where the grantee’s possession is disturbed, to litigate his (the grantor’s) title to the land; in other words, to prove that the right, title or interest which he purported to grant was valid.”
This principle is transferable to all forms of alienation of land by one person or body of persons to another. For other authorities: see Cobblah v Okraku [1961] GLR (Pt II) 679 (holding (3) ) and Aquah v Cofie [1961] 1 GLR 475 (holding 2). In these two cases the rationes decidendi were that a party who falls to prove the title of his grantor must fail in his action if his title is derived from the alleged grantor. In my judgment, therefore, it was not enough, in order to contradict the plaintiff’s traditional history respecting his family’s title to the land, for the defendant just to rely on a document of purchase of the land by her predecessor-in-title. She should have gone further back to prove that the Chief of Dutch Sekondi and his elders and counsellors had better title to the land than the plaintiff’s ancestors. In one important respect it can be said that the defendant’s case is an implied admission that her
[p.517] of [1984-86] GLR 510
father was not an original owner of the land who first settled on it or who broke the virgin forest. Her father’s title is derivative only and she should have proved the title of the original vendors of the land. If the defendant had brought in the original vendors or the successors in title of the original vendors, which in this respect would be the present occupant of the stool of Dutch Sekondi or any of the elders and counsellors of the stool, there would have been before the court two competing traditional histories respecting title to the land. In view of the principle of law which requires a grantor or vendor to sue or defend jointly with his purchaser. I was of the opinion that the question of whether by custom land is not saleable in Sekondi was completely irrelevant because, even if land were saleable, the purchaser could not retain his land if in an ensuing litigation he is not able to prove the title of his vendor. Conversely, even if land were not saleable by custom that would still not be conclusive evidence that a particular piece of land in dispute has or has not been sold. Whether a transaction is a lease or absolute sale the lessors’ or the vendor’s title must be proved by the lessee or the purchaser as the case may be. It is always possible for people either to follow the custom of their community or depart from it as and when they choose. And it should be a question of fact in each case for the court to determine on the evidence whether a particular piece of land has been sold out or not.
Consequently, I have to find out whether the land in dispute has, in fact, been sold by anybody and if so when, by whom and to whom? The onus of proof lay squarely on the defendant not only to prove the sale but also to prove that the vendor had title to the land which he could transfer to Vroom and which the latter could transfer to the defendant’s father. The defendant failed woefully to discharge this onus of proof. The defendant was harping on acts of ownership done by her on the land such as planting foodcrops and coconut on the land with a view to establishing ownership of the land. I think I ought to say straightaway with respect that the defendant misdirected herself on the issue at stake. The rule of evidence with regard to the burden of proof in actions for declaration of title to land is that no onus of proving acts of ownership arises where a party relies upon and proves title by grant or other form of alienation such as sale or gift: see the headnote in Abdulai v Manue (1945) 10 WACA 172. In the instant case, it was the plaintiff who had the onus of proving acts of ownership over the land because his evidence as to tradition was not conclusive evidence of title. So the defendant completely misplaced her onus of proof but as I have already stated the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case.
I have already made mention of acts of ownership done by the plaintiff’s family. I wish to dilate a little on the naval base fetish matter.
[p.518] of [1984-86] GLR 510
It is significant to observe that the removal of the fetish and its resettlement on the land happened in the lifetime of Azariah, the plaintiff’s predecessor. The defendant’s story is that, although before the Oman placed the fetish on the disputed land she was not consulted, yet when she saw the fetish on the land she went to see the Omanhene of Sekondi, the late Nana Anaisie IV, but the latter directed her to see the chief fisherman on the land. She said she made a claim to the land but upon the advice of the chief fisherman she permitted the fetish to be on the land and she provided drinks for libation and the fisherfolks recognised her as owner of the land. The defendant called no witness from the Omanhene’s house and never called any of the fishermen. The defendant relies on the chief of the fisherfolks but it was not upon the authority of the fisherfolks that the fetish was placed on the land. The evidence which has been confirmed in this court is that it was on the authority of the Twokoa Anona family that the Oman resettled the fetish on the disputed land. The crucial issue between the plaintiff’s family and the defendant on the fetish is: Which of the two granted permission before the fetish was placed on the land? The grant of that permission is an important act of ownership. It ought to be vehemently emphasised that a document of title per se does not confer ownership of land. Ownership must be proved by facts. Even in the instant case, there has not been before the court any document evidencing the grant or sale of the land by Chief Djonfia and his elders to Vroom. One would have expected that Vroom would pass that document on to the defendant’s father. No explanation whatsoever was given.
This coupled with the fact that no person has been called from the stool of Dutch Sekondi to dispute the title makes me doubt the authenticity of the document on which the defendant relies. I do not attach any probative value to it either. If that were not the law anybody could prepare any document and use it as proof of ownership.
On the evidence, I am satisfied that the land in dispute is the ancestral property of the Twokoa Anona family and that the plaintiff’s uncle, Azariah, late of Sekondi granted permission or licence to the defendant at the latter’s request to settle fisherfolks on the land. The defendant is therefore a licensee who has now asserted an adverse claim to the land. It is therefore adjudged that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration he seeks and it is hereby granted. He is also granted an order for possession of the land. The defendant’s counterclaim fails.
There will be ¢1,000 costs for the plaintiff.
DECISION
Judgment for the Plaintiff.
Counterclaim refused.
M C N-N
