CHARMANT vs. MENSAH [1982-83] GLR 65
19 January 1982 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 5 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 8Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Djabartey v. Awua II (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 202.
(2) Benin v. Ababio (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 216.
(3) Quist v. Kwantreng [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 605.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant against a judgment of the district court, grade 1 awarding the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
A. A. Munufie for the plaintiff.
S. K. Akoto for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
This is an appeal by the defendant against the judgment of the District Court, Grade 1, Goaso. By his writ of summons issued on 28 July 1980, the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), claimed from the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the appellant):
“(a) Cash the sum of ¢2,710.64 being the plaintiff’s three months’ salary and entitlement for the work done by the plaintiff for the defendant.
(b) The defendant should assign reasons why he should not be liable to pay the plaintiff’s transport expenses from Mim to Dokankye in the Ashanti Region amounting to ¢800 for unlawful dismissal of the plaintiff from the Agro Industries, Mim.
(c) ¢2,000 damages for unlawful dismissal.”
The appellant counterclaimed for “the sum of ¢4,230 or the sum of ¢1,519.36 representing the difference between the said sum of
[p.67] of [1982-83] GLR 65
¢4,230 and the sum of ¢2,710.64 due to the plaintiff as three months’ salary in lieu of notice.” On 15 August 1980, the appellant amended his claim to read ¢2,800 instead of ¢4,230. On that very day the trial magistrate entered judgment against the appellant for ¢2,710.64 in respect of the three months’ salary due to the respondent. The respondent thereupon discontinued his claim for ¢2,000 damages for unlawful dismissal. That aspect of the claim was struck out as discontinued. The court then proceeded to hear the case on 5 September 1980. On 19 September 1980, the court gave judgment in favour of the respondent for ¢800 with costs of ¢300. The appellant’s counterclaim was dismissed.
Among the several grounds filed in this appeal against the judgment is the one, that “The trial court was wrong in trying the action as it was apparent on the face of the writ of summons and the counterclaim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the matter.” There was an objection to the raising of this issue in their appeal as it was contended that the parties by their conduct had acquiesced in giving the court jurisdiction. The law, however, is that, an objection to jurisdiction can be taken at any time; it may even be raised for the first time on a second appeal; see the cases of Djabartey v. Awua II (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 202 and Benin v. Ababio (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 216. This court therefore has power to entertain this ground of appeal.
At the start of the hearing of the case, the respondent’s claim stood at ¢2,710.64 and ¢800; the appellant’s claim stood at ¢2,800. By section 37 (1) (a) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), the jurisdiction of the district magistrate, grade I, in such matters is limited to ¢2,000. It is therefore obvious that the claim before the court was above its jurisdiction and so it could not entertain the action. It is however provided by section 37 (3) of Act 372 that :
“(3) Where in any action, cause or matter the amount claimed or the value of any land or property exceeds the amount or value specified in subsection (1) of this section, the Court shall, notwithstanding that
subsection, proceed to hear the case if the parties agree that it should do so.”
Parties cannot by consent or by acquiescence confer jurisdiction on a court where it has none otherwise: see Quist v. Kwantreng [1961] G.L.R. (Pt II) 605. Thus, unless it could be shown on the record that the parties expressly consented to vest the court with jurisdiction, the court cannot assume any jurisdiction where the value is above its jurisdiction.
Counsel for the respondent argued that once there was acquiescence, the parties must be deemed to have consented to give jurisdiction to the court. In Quist v. Kwantreng (supra), Ollennu J. (as he then was) said at p. 612:
[p.68] of [1982-83] GLR 65
“The first important element in the principle of estoppel by acquiescence in any form is knowledge by the person acquiescing that he has a right. Therefore unless a party is shown to have knowledge of the existence of his right in respect of any particular subject-matter, he cannot be deemed to have acquiesced in the violation of that right by his mere inactivity, or silence.”
Although there was counsel in the case, nothing appears on the record to show that counsel himself adverted his mind to the issue of jurisdiction. And further, there is nothing which shows knowledge by the parties themselves of the violation of this right.
The district court being an inferior court, nothing is deemed to be within its jurisdiction unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that it is vested with jurisdiction in the particular matter. Therefore the proceedings of an inferior court must show on their face that its jurisdiction has not been exceeded: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 9, pp. 349-350.
Under section 37 (1) (a) of Act 372, the District Court, Grade 1, Goaso lacked jurisdiction on the face of the record. Since jurisdiction cannot be conferred by implication, it must be conferred specifically, otherwise there is none. And the court was under a duty to call the attention of the parties to the absence of its jurisdiction, and strike out the case at once, unless after it had so called their attention, the parties thereupon expressly consent that it should exercise jurisdiction in the matter. And such consent must be recorded as part of the proceedings.
It is quite obvious from the proceedings that no such steps were taken by the trial magistrate. He was therefore not seised with jurisdiction to try the case. The proceedings were therefore a nullity. On this ground alone the appeal must succeed. It is not necessary for me to touch on the other grounds, as the matter would have to be dealt with afresh. Accordingly, I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and all orders made thereunder. This case is remitted back to the court below to be tried de novo by a different magistrate and for the proper thing to be done. In the circumstances I will make no order as to costs. The cost of the abortive trial will abide the result of the rehearing. All moneys deposited with the registrar on the order of this court should be refunded to the appellant.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
Case remitted to be tried de novo.
J. A. A.
