FIRST GHANA BUILDING SOCIETY vs. ADDY [1982-83] GLR 1089
22 February 1983 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 6 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Quaiko v. Mobil Oil (Ghana) Ltd. 1977 1 G.L.R. 461.
(2) Richmond v. Branson & Son [1914] 1 Ch. 968; 83 L.J.Ch, 749; 58 S.J. 455.
(3) Lewis v. Nobbs (1878) 8 Ch.D 591; 47 L.J. Ch. 662; 26 W.R.631.
(4) Nalder v. Hawkins (1833) 2 My. & K. 243; Coop. Temp. Brough 175.
(5) Foster v. Cautley (1853) 10 Hare App. 24; 22 L.J. Ch. 639; 21 L.T. (o.s.). 262; 17 Jur. 370; 1 W.R.
275.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order to strike out an action instituted by the plaintiff, as the next friend of a mentally disabled person. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
K. W. MENSAH for the defendants-applicants.
Willie Amarfio for the plaintiff-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
By two separate actions the next friend herein, first in his capacity as principal tenant and subsequently in his capacity as caretaker to Kingsley Anyimadu Acheampong, sued the defendants to set aside the sale of the house which is the subject-matter of this action. Both suits were dismissed on the ground that he had no locus standi. He has come back to court in his changed capacity as the plaintiff’s next friend and he has pleaded the unsoundness of the plaintiff’s mind as his authority to act.
The defendants invite the court by this motion to dismiss the action on the principal ground that the plaintiff, Norris Kingsley Hansen Addy, is not fit and qualified to act as next friend in the event of
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Acheampong suffering from mental disability or infirmity. The defendants have disclosed in their affidavit a catalogue of certain acts of the next friend which they hold as adverse to the interest of Acheampong to disqualify him from so acting. They also complain that it was after the next friend had commenced the action that he filed his statement authorising his solicitors to commence and prosecute this action against the defendants. It was argued on behalf of the defendants that failure to sign and file the written authority to the solicitor before the issue of the writ makes the whole action incompetent.
Order 16, r. 19 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), which is the bedrock upon which the defendants have staked their objection to the next friend’s right to sue because he had not signed the written authority to his solicitor, and he had not filed same before he used his name to sue as such, no longer forms part of our rules. Even if it did apply, the defendants would not have been permitted to complain, since under Order 70, r. 2 they had taken a fresh step in the action by filing their defence and had subsequently agreed to the summons for directions: see Quaiko v. Mobil Oil (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 1 G.L.R. 461.
In so far as commencing an action by a person under disability is concerned, what is required under our new Order 15, r. 12 (1) and (4) contained in the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No.2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129), is that he must sue by his next friend who must act by a lawyer. If a person under disability, accordingly, sues by his next friend, it is not competent for a defendant so sued to plead that the plaintiff is not in fact suffering from mental disorder. The first ground stated in the defendants’ motion for dismissal is, therefore, no good ground. The defendants are, however, entitled to challenge the authority of the next friend to sue by applying to the court in a summary way for the dismissal of the action, as in cases in which the authority of the plaintiff’s solicitor to bring the action is challenged: see Richmond v. Branson & Son [1914] 1 Ch. 968.
The only outstanding issue to determine is whether the respondent is a fit person to act as a next friend. A person within the jurisdiction not being under a personal incapacity to sue, and not being an accounting party, and not having an interest adverse to the person under disability, and not connected with the defendants may be a next friend: see Lewis v. Nobbs [1878] 8 Ch.D. 591. The court actually expects a next friend to be a substantial person; and, as in the case of a guardian ad litem, it is desirable that he should be a relation, connected to or friend of the family and not a mere volunteer: see Nalder v. Hawkins (1833) 2 My. & K. 243 and Foster v. Cautley (1853) 10 Hare App. 24. It seems quite patent from the conduct of the next friend that the two futile law suits he unleashed, as a caretaker
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and also as a principal tenant, were meant to protect his own interest, i.e. his continued stay in the house. As he had brought the defendants to court on two previous occasions and he had failed, it would, in my view, be quite vexatious to allow him to espouse, without some express permission from an authoritative source, somebody’s cause as his own in the guise of a next friend.
Counsel for the next friend showed to the court a note which purports to emanate from Acheampong’s family and seeks to authorise the next friend to bring the actions. I find the authority of this note to be apocryphal. It is neither signed nor thumbprinted but marked with an X for the signature. As the court is entitled to dispose in a summary manner the challenge of his authority to sue, he should have thought that the next friend would have supported his claim with an affidavit from Acheampong’s family instead of this spurious note. All these go to satisfy me that the next friend is a mere volunteer. It was also sought to impress on the court that when the defendants once made a demand on Acheampong to settle the outstanding amount of over ¢2,000, the next friend went to Acheampong’s rescue upon his request.
Counsel showed to the court some indecipherable scribble on the letter of demand to Acheampong which the next friend claimed Acheampong minuted to him to settle the account. The implication put forward was that as the defendants had known all along that the next friend had sought the interest of Acheampong they cannot now challenge his authority. It came out in the argument of counsel for the defendants that the next friend could pay only a paltry sum of ¢100 and that the post-dated cheques he issued were dishonoured. Under our customary laws, the affairs of a member of a family under disability by reason of unsoundness of mind, is primarily the concern of his family. As the next friend has failed to establish any satisfactory proof of his connection with Acheampong’s family coupled with my other reasons above, I would allow the defendant’s motion as prayed and strike out the action for want of capacity in Mr. Norris Kingsley Hansen Addy to sue as next friend. I would award to the defendants ¢600 costs.
DECISION
Application granted.
Action dismissed.
J. A. A.
