DZOTEPE vs. HAHORMENE III AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 289
11 December 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 7 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 16Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for a stay of execution of a High Court judgment granting a writ of possession of the disputed land after setting aside on the ground of fraud, the judgment of the Anloga Native Court B in favour of the applicant’s predecessor in an action for declaration of title to the disputed piece of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.
COUNSEL
Armstrong Ackuaku (with him Dotse) for the applicant.
Senaya for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The applicant’s predecessor-in-title, one Agbemabiese, obtained judgment against one Dzisam and four other persons in the Anloga Native Court B on 14 May 1953. The defendants were sued “for themselves and on behalf of the Tovie tribe of Tegbi.” The claim then was for title to a piece of land which was described by reference to adjoining land said to be bounded by natural features or named persons. The applicant’s predecessor als
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obtained an injunction “restraining the then defendants, their servants or agents from meddling with the land and the trees thereon.”
What appears to be the question in controversy was whether the applicant’s predecessor who ex concessis bought or redeemed the land from Chief Tamakloe, did so in his own right or did so on behalf of the Tovie tribe. The applicant’s predecessor’s position was that he did so in his own right and vis-à-vis the tribe, was the legal and beneficial owner. The Tovie tribe said that could not be because it was tribal land which Chief Tamakloe bought and the tribe raised contributions from members of the tribe and it was with this money that the applicant’s predecessor redeemed the land.
So the issue raised before the native court was a simple one of fact. If Agbemabiese redeemed this land with tribal money on behalf of the tribe, it would be stamped with the character of tribal land, if he did so with his own funds and in his own right, it would be his individual property.
The native court held that the applicant’s predecessor bought in his own right and rejected the claim that it was bought with tribal money or on its behalf. That was why they found for the applicant’s predecessor-in-title. It is clear that no issue was joined on the identity of the land. Both parties must have been ad idem on the land then in dispute. That, this must be so, is shown by what happened since this case was decided in the High Court.
The judge of the High Court set aside that judgment on the ground of fraud. Apparently, the respondents did not seek by appeal to have that judgment vacated in their favour on the merits. When judgment was set aside on the ground of fraud, the respondents proceeded to ask the court to grant them a writ of possession. But in doing so, they had to describe the land in respect of which they sought the order. They described it as bounded on the south with Tegbi beach and the sea, on the north with Tegbi Lawe tribal land, on the east with Ashornu, Vuvor and Ashornu’s properties and on the west by Chief Tamakloe’s land. This was precisely the boundary Agbemabiese, the applicant’s predecessor, gave of the land then in dispute in the 1953 action. This shows that if anything was in issue in that case, it was not the identity of the land. But it would seem that in further identification of the land, the appellant’s predecessor also tendered a plan of the land whose identity was not in issue. The basis of the allegation of fraud against the applicant’s predecessor and which was accepted by the High Court, is that the plan produced, allegedly copied from a 1906 judgment, was, altered. What possible impact could this be on an issue of whether or not the land then in dispute and whose boundaries and description were known to the parties was bought by the applicant’s predecessor in his
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own right or on behalf of the Tovie tribe? On the central issue in the case before the court, the question of the plan could, at best, only be a collateral issue. On this, the law is that:
“In an action [to set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud, the fraud] . . . must relate to matters which prima facie would be a reason setting the judgment aside if they were established by proof and not to matters which are merely collateral.”
See Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 22 at pp 790-791.
On the facts, it would be hardly accurate to say that the native court was deceived into finding for the applicant’s predecessor because of the plan produced. The learned judge found that it was altered, although he did not accept that plan in evidence. Granted that that finding was right, can it be said that that plan misled the court into accepting the applicant’s predecessor’s case that he bought the land in his own right? As at present advised, and without seeking to go into the merits of the appeal, we do not think so. That being so, we think the applicant showed, prima facie, that he has a serious issue for submission to this court and on that ground we feel disposed to grant stay.
But the respondents say it would serve no purpose because they had already gone into execution under a writ of possession duly issued by the court. If that writ was validly issued then we would not stultify ourselves by ordering a stay. But the applicant objected to the issue of that writ on the ground that it was invalid. And his reason is the one apparent on the face of the record, namely on a proper analysis of the judgment, the court below did not give judgment for the respondents for possession which could validly be enforced by a writ of possession.
That contention seems to be plainly right. The operative part of the judgment merely says “There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiffs against the defendant per their writ of summons.” In so far as material, that writ merely sought a declaration that the judgment obtained by the applicant’s predecessor in 1953 was null and void on the ground that it was obtained by “fraud, misrepresentation and perversity . . .”
So a judgment for the relief sought cannot decree possession and the learned judge did not and cannot have made an order for possession on that writ. It is elementary that the writ of possession is only issued to enforce a judgment for possession of land. If there is no judgment for possession, there plainly can be no jurisdiction to order the issuance of a writ of possession. We must therefore agree that that writ was a nullity and so were the steps taken on the strength of it. Therefore we cannot hold that there was a valid execution which precludes us from granting a stay.
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In the result, and as we have already held, the applicant has a serious question of law for the consideration of this court on the appeal and we think it right to exercise our discretion in his favour and grant a stay of execution of the judgment of the High Court.
Recent experience shows that appellants who obtain a stay of execution thereafter go to sleep and show very little interest in the prosecution of the appeal. On that account, we intend to grant the stay for a limited duration and on terms. From what we read of the judgment and bearing in mind the deprived conditions in the country, we think it should not take more than three months for the preparation and transmission of the record of appeal to this court. Accordingly, we order that the applicant shall use his best endeavours, including the provision to the registry of the court below of stationery to have the record of appeal and the service of Form 7 completed on or by 10 March 1985. If by that date the record of appeal has not been forwarded to this court, we would consider whether the order granting a stay should not be revoked. If by that date the record is transmitted and all the appeal formalities are concluded, we will proceed to hear the appeal on its merits.
We accordingly grant a stay of execution up to and including 11 March 1985 on the other terms mentioned in this ruling. The applicant is awarded costs against the respondents assessed at ¢1,500.
DECISION
Stay of execution pending appeal granted on terms.
M. C. N. – N.
