SARIMBE ALIAS OLALA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 13
11 April 1984 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 7 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 30Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Nkansah v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, 17 February 1981, unreported.
(2) Republic v. Accra Circuit Court; Ex parte Appiah [1982-83] G.L.R. 129, C.A.
(3) Seldon v. Davidson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1083; [1968] 2 All E.R. 755, C.A.
(4) Armah v. Government of Ghana [1968] A.C. 192, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 828; [1966] 3 All E.R.177, H.L.
(5) Jaundoo v. Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] A.C. 972; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 13, P.C. (6) State v. Kassena (Ali) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C.
(7) Twum v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 724, C.A.
(8) Konkomba v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 717, C.A.
(9) Tilling v. Whiteman [1979] 2 W.L.R. 49; [1980] A.C. 1; [1979] 1 All E.R. 737, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a ruling of the High Court, Accra dismissing a submission of no case to answer. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Francois J.A.
COUNSEL
Heward Mills (with him Botsio) for the appellant.
Sam Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
Francois J.A. he delivered the judgment of the court. On 28 February 1984 we dismissed this appeal and fixed 11 April 1984 for the delivery of our reasons. We accordingly do so now.
Before setting out our reasons, however, we must dispose of a preliminary objection raised by the respondent, the Republic, on the competency of the appeal. It has been a constant theme of the Republic to deny any viability to interlocutory appeals of this nature. The Republic appears not to accept that article 122 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, saved by the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 has reserved an unfettered right of appeal in a dissatisfied party. We do not wish to go over old ground, but we expressed this view in Nkansah v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, 17 February 1981, unreported and Republic v. The Accra Circuit Court; Ex parte Appiah [1982-83] G.L.R. 129, C.A. These decisions have had more illustrious precursors.
We repeat that an appeal lies to this court from any matter determined by the High Court, and it does not matter whether the decision is given at the end of the case or in the course of it. The [p.15] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 13 inconvenience to the courts and the whole administration of justice in the suspension of proceedings while unpalatable rulings are tested during the course of a trial, is clearly regrettable and we may echo the sentiments expressed in Seldon v. Davidson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1083 at 1089, C.A. that a chaotic state of affairs may well result from the practice. But the supreme law which has not been abrogated by any P.N.D.C. law, has conferred the right of appeal and that cannot be whittled down. Administrative or other convenience has never been held sufficient justification for depriving a person of his rights: see Armah v Government of Ghana [1968] A.C. 192, H.L. And as Lord Diplock expressed it in the Guyanese case of Jaundo v. Attorney General of Guyana [1971] 3 W.L.R. 13 at 16, P.C., “€ the Constitution€..will have a hollow ring unless the fundamental rights which it bestows upon every person in Guyana’ are buttressed by an effective legal remedy
Now, turning to the appeal, the main thrust of counsel for the appellant’s argument was that the High Court failed “to direct the jury to return a verdict of ‘not guilty’ at the close of the case for the prosecution”, and consequently erred in not acquitting and discharging the appellant. For an appreciation of the merits or demerits of this contention the facts must be briefly narrated. They are these: A quarrel between a husband and wife ended in the husband locking up his wife in a room and pummelling her mercilessly. She could only be rescued when soldiers rammed the door open. The woman was sent to the hospital where she died shortly after. The husband is the appellant and the deceased, his wife. The sad but important aspect of the prosecution’s story is that the deceased was heavy with child at the time she received that severe beating.
One would have thought that on these facts there was sufficient material for the case to go its full length at a trial to allow a jury to bring in its verdict one way or the other, but counsel for the appellant thinks otherwise and accordingly filed this interlocutory appeal after the failure of his submission of no case. He raises several issues to justify a short termination of the matter.
First, counsel argued at some length and with considerable ardour that discrepancies existed in the evidence of material prosecution witnesses, which were of such magnitude as to render their testimony thoroughly discredited and manifestly unreliable. Counsel therefore urged that the High Court should have applied the test in the celebrated case of The State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 1 G.L.R. 144, S.C. to withdraw the case from the jury and acquit.
We do not wish at this stage to express any positive opinion on the veracity of the witnesses who testified in the court below; we think this is a matter for the jury as judges of fact to evaluate. We can however
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say that the matters of discredit which Ali Kassena (supra) exemplifies and those alleged in this case are dissimilar and furnish no useful comparison. Indeed, Ali Kassena emphasises that where a conviction could be founded on the facts by a reasonable tribunal the case should not be withdrawn from the jury but must go its full length, especially where proof is not by circumstantial but by direct evidence.
It was urged next with some vehemence that the prosecution failed to prove affirmatively the cause of death, consequently no case should have been left with the jury. On this ground the academic qualifications and professional competency of Dr. Dankwa who performed the autopsy on the deceased, were subjected to attack which sometimes bordered on the virulent. It was urged that the doctor was a trainee pathologist who on his own showing was still attending lectures and had some more examinations to get through to qualify, so he could not be put forward as a pathologist. Counsel for the Republic’s short reply was that the requirement under our laws in section 121 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) is that a medical officer should perform a post-mortem examination and attest to it in court: see Twum v The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 724, C.A. There is no requirement for a specialist pathologist to conduct a postmortem. Indeed, if a post-mortem should be performed by a pathologist wherever the need arose in every village in Ghana, in a country where the number of qualified pathologists barely reaches double figures, no autopsy would pass a legal test.
On the doctor’s proficiency, the subject of much adverse comment, we were referred to huge chunks of grilling cross-examination whose purpose was to expose the doctor as a medico who was unsure of himself and of his opinions and paint him as half-baked. These attacks, which we think unwarranted, sprang from the doctor’s professional modesty not to be categorical or dogmatic in his assertions.
In any case, medical evidence, like any other form of expert opinion, may be accepted or rejected by the jury. It certainly deserves the highest respect and attention but if there is matter sufficient to create doubts in the mind of the jury as to the soundness of the medical opinion expressed, the jury is fully entitled to give expression to that view in the verdict they ultimately pronounce. Provided this verdict is not perverse they have the last say in the matter. Even if they err here, there is machinery within the hierarchy of the court system to correct any errors. Furthermore, since the facts may establish some punishable offences other than murder; the disqualification of the doctor cannot ipso facto terminate the trial. Again, in proving death, evidence from the medical officer is desirable but not essential. There however must be clear evidence that the death of the deceased was the direct result of the act of the accused to the exclusion of all other reasonable or
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possible causes: see Konkomba v The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 717, C.A. We have tried to be as non-committal as we can within reason so as not to prejudice the result of this case either in the resumed trial to which we have remitted it, or in any subsequent appeal. We however must firmly state that in our view the questions raised are all factual ones within the competency of the jury to decide.
The appellant chose a short cut by this appeal, in dismissing it we can only repeat the warning given by Lord Scarman in Tilling v. Whiteman [1979] 1 All E.R. 737 at 744, H.L., “Preliminary points of law are too often treacherous short cuts.” Their price can be, as here, delay, anxiety and expense.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J.A.A.
