PATU-STYLES AND ANOTHER vs. AMOO-LAMPTEY [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
16 January 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 113 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) National Bank of New Zealand v. Chapman [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 480.
(2) C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366, C.A.
(3) Armah v. Naawu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 201, C.A.
(4) Asibey III v. Ayisi [1974] 1 G.L.R. 315, C.A.
(5) Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39.
(6) Lartey v. Baku II [1980] G.L.R. 257, C.A.
(7) Armah (Decd.), In re; Awotwi v. Abadoo [1975] 1 G.L.R. 374, C.A; affirmed [1977] 2 G.L.R. 375, C.A. (full bench).
(8) Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A.(full bench).
(9) Bordoh v. Aryebbir, Full Court, 20 November 1883, unreported.
(10) Spokesman (Publications) Ltd. v. Attorney-General [1974] 1 G.L.R. 88, C.A. (full bench). (11) Benneh v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 47, C.A. (full bench).
(12) Amonoo v. Tufts, Full Court, 24 September 1882, unreported.
(13) Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench).
(14) Nye v. Nye [1964] G.L.R. 95, S.C.
(15) Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C.
(16) Wood v. Riley (1867) L.R. 3 C.P. 26.
(17) Minister of Health v. R; Ex parte Yaffe [1931] A.C. 494, H.L.
[p.650] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 (18) Becke v. Smith (1836) 150 E.R. 724.
(19) Sam v. Comptroller of Customs & Excise [1971] 1 G.L.R. 289.
(20) Bedaabuor v. Duro, Court of Appeal (full bench), 5 July 1976, unreported.
(21) A/S Norway Cement Export v. Addison [1974] 2 G.L.R. 177, C.A. (full bench). (22) Republic v. Commissioner of Income Tax; Ex parte Maatschappij De Fijnhouthandel NV (Fynhout) [1976] 1 G.L.R. 380, C.A. (full bench).
(23) Director of Public Works v. Sang (Ho Po) [1961] A.C. 901; [1961] 3 W.L.R. 39; [1961] 2 All E.R.
721, P.C.
(24) Ward v. British Oak Insurance Co. [1932] 1 K.B. 392.
(25) Hutchinson v. Jauncey [1950] 1 K.B. 574; [1950] 1 All E.R. 165, C.A.
(26) Okine, In re [1960] G.L.R. 267, S.C.
(27) Ford v. Kettle (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 139.
(28) Scranton’s Trustee v. Pearse [1922] 2 Ch. 87, C.A.
(29) Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1982-83] G.L.R. 715, S.C.
(30) Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. v. Harlley [1976]1 G.L.R. 158, C.A.
(31) Moore v. Taye (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242; affirmed sub nom Noore v. Tayee (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, P.C.
(32) Hammond v. Odoi [1982-83] G.L.R. 1215, S.C.
(33) Kingston’s (Duchess) Case [1775-1802] All E.R. Rep. 623; 168 E.R. 175, H.L. (34) Pickard v. Sears (1837) 112 E.R. 179.
(35) Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129, H.L.
(36) Tonazzi v. Brunetti (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 403.
(37) Craven v. Craven (1957) 107 L.J. 505.
(38) Nubour v. Ampadu, Court of Appeal, 31 May 1960, unreported.
(39) Quaye v. Mariamu [1961] G.L.R. 93, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant-appellants to the Supreme Court in pursuance of (a) the provisions of the Courts (Amendment) Decree 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), s. 3 (2) (a) and the Constitution, 1979, transitional provisions, s. 5 from the decision of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal in favour of the plaintiff in an action for declaration of title to land; and (b) in purported pursuance of an order for extension of time within which to apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal granted the defendant-appellants by the ordinary bench on 2 November 1979, i.e. after the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Adade and Taylor JJ.S.C. and Osei-Hwere J.A. [p.651] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellants.
Quist for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
I agree with the judgment to be read by Adade J.S.C. and for the reasons which he gives I would dismiss the appeal.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C
I also agree with the judgment to be read by Adade J.S.C. and for the reasons which he gives I would also dismiss the appeal.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
On 14 January 1984 this court unanimously dismissed the above appeal, but we reserved our reasons. I now proceed to indicate why I concurred in the said decision.
The case was listed to this court as civil appeal No. 1 of 1983. Opening his case, however, Mr. Tsikata, counsel for the defendant-appellants, drew attention to its true nature, as a review-turned-appeal, by virtue of the provisions of section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. The said section 5 says:
“5. Any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution shall, subject to section 3 of this Schedule, be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”
This case has been argued at length on the merits and on the technical objection raised by the plaintiff-respondent as to its competence. I only, wish to make a few observations on the technical point that the appeal is incompetent, implying that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain it.
Remember that under the said section 5 of the transitional provisions, this court can take over only reviews that were pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal when the Constitution came into force on 24 September 1979. Mr. Tsikata says there was such a review pending. Mr. Quist, for the plaintiff-respondent, says there was no such review properly pending.
The background facts relevant to a resolution of this conflict may be briefly stated. Losing his case in the High Court on 3 April 1970, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal which on 11 April 1979 reversed the High Court and gave judgment in his favour. On 13 July 1979 (three months and two days after the Court of Appeal’s judgment) the defendants applied to the Court of Appeal:
“for leave to apply to the full bench of [the Court of Appeal] for a review and determination of the decision contained in the judgment of the ordinary bench . . . of [that] court delivered herein on 11 April 1979.”
[p.652] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
The motion came before the ordinary bench on 24 October 1979. The plaintiff raised an objection that the application was filed “completely out of time” and ought to be dismissed. The defendants did not agree. However, on 26 October, 1979, the defendants, through counsel, applied orally ex facie curiae, for an extension of time under rule 8 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13). This was opposed there and then. It would seem that at the court’s instance the defendants on 29 October 1979, formally filed their application for extension of time in which to apply for leave for review. The application was heard on 2 November 1979, and granted. In the same order, the defendants were given leave to apply for a review. Nothing happened again until 21 November 1979 when the defendants filed a “notice of appeal”, reciting that:
“pursuant to leave duly granted them by the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal on 2 November 1979, for a review of the full bench of a decision of the ordinary bench delivered on 11 April 1979 … [the defendants] now do appeal to the Supreme Court. . .”
(The emphasis is mine.) It is this pursuant “appeal to the Supreme Court” that has been listed before us for hearing, and which the defendants describe as a review that was pending before the full bench, which this court is empowered by section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979 to take over and dispose of as an appeal.
Leaving aside for the moment the issue of time limits for applications for leave for review (an issue that was hotly contested in the court below) the question that immediately arises is whether in the circumstances of this case and having regard to the language of section 5 of the transitional provisions, there was a review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal as at 24 September 1979 when the Constitution, 1979 came into effect. The operative date is 24 September 1979. I answer this query by resolving two subsidiary questions:
(a) was there anything at all pending in this case as at 24 September 1979? and
(b) where was it pending?
I understand “pending” in this context to mean any process or matter waiting to be dealt with or disposed of by the appropriate forum. Thus in National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. v. Chapman [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 480, MacMullan J. at 482 refers to litigation pending as:
“Any legal proceedings suit or action remaining undecided or awaiting decision or settlement (Garnham v.
Taylor [1959] 27
[p.653] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
W.W.R. 682). A legal proceeding can be said to be pending as soon as it has commenced and it remains pending until it has been concluded, that is, so long as the Court having original cognisance of it can make an order on the matters in issue or to be dealt with therein.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
In this case the appeal from the High Court had been pronounced upon by the Court of Appeal on 11 April 1979, so that appeal had been disposed of and could not be pending. But a new legal proceeding, an application for leave for review, had been filed on 13 July 1979. That application was on the files, awaiting a decision whether leave should be granted or not. It was therefore pending. It was not finally dealt with until 2 November 1979 when the ordinary bench granted leave. So that as at 24 September 1979, we do know that the application was pending before the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal which finally dealt with it. It could not lawfully have pended anywhere else, for as the defendants were seeking a review on points of law (see paragraph 18 of their affidavit filed with the motion on 13 July 1979) and not for miscarriage of justice, they required leave from the “Justice or Division” of the Court of Appeal which gave the decision: see section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101) which provides viz:
“3. (2) … (a) to review and determine a decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof upon a question of law, where such Justice or Division gives leave for such review and determination.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Therefore the application for leave must go to the forum whose decision is sought to be reviewed, i.e. in this case, the ordinary bench. It could not under any circumstances be deemed pending before the full bench (as Mr. Tsikata tried to argue) since, as a matter of law, the full bench would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101; the full bench not being the division of the Court of Appeal which gave the judgment of 11 April 1979. To try to bring in the full bench at the leave stage is to make the defendants’ position even more indefensible.
As at 24 September 1979 therefore, the position was that there was pending before the ordinary bench an application for leave. Nothing had gone to the full bench yet. As the defendant’s counsel conceded in the court below: “We cannot file an application for review without obtaining leave.” And as at 24 September 1979, the leave had not been
[p.654] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 given. So the review had not been filed. Therefore there was nothing before the full bench which this court can take over and deal with. This court under section 5 of the transitional provisions has no truck with the ordinary bench; we can only take over the unfinished business of the full bench; not uncompleted agenda from the ordinary bench.
This to me is the crux of the matter. If a proceeding is proved to be one from the ordinary bench (as it has been in this case), this court has no power, no jurisdiction, to touch it under section 5 of the transitional provisions.
Some attempt was made to persuade the court that for the purpose of review proceedings, no distinction need be drawn between the full bench and the ordinary bench; they are two arms of the same Court of Appeal. I have shown above why in applications for leave for review under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101, this cannot be.
Besides, section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979 speaks specifically of review proceedings pending before the full bench, not just the Court of Appeal generally; and the lawmakers must be deemed to have known the state of the law when they were writing section 5 of the transitional provisions. They knew the Court of Appeal had two arms, they chose to mention expressly one arm, not both arms, or the Court of Appeal generally. (Compare the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), s. 7 (2) cited below.)
But there is a further reason why the two divisions cannot be regarded as one court. The review jurisdiction given under section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D. 101 is not exercisable by the ordinary bench. It is exclusive to the full bench. The two divisions cannot therefore be regarded as one and the same court in areas where they clearly have different powers. They are two separate courts.
I am not unaware of the dictum of Sowah J.A. (as he then was) in C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366 at 396, C.A. that:
“It seems to me that section 13 (2) of the Transitional Provisions [of the Constitution, 1969] must be read to include all pending applications for review before the full bench, whether actually filed or not.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
This statement can be baffling in its sweep, until one reads the whole of the report in the light of the statute law as it then was, seeing that passages taken out of context can, in many cases, be grossly misleading. The said section 13 (2) of the Constitution, 1969 referred to in the passage is similar to section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. It reads:
[p.655] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
“13. (2) Where at the commencement of this Constitution there is any matter for review before a full bench of the Court of Appeal in being immediately before any such commencement, that matter for review shall be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court as established under the provisions of this Constitution.”
Before the Constitution, 1969, the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), then the controlling enactment, had constructed a hierarchy of courts terminating with the Court of Appeal at the apex. The Court of Appeal had two benches an ordinary bench of three and a full bench of five. The jurisdiction of the full bench was given by paragraph 7 (2) of the Decree as:
“(a) a review and determination of a decision of an ordinary bench of such Court— (i) upon a question of law alone; and (ii) upon an ordinary or full bench of such Court giving leave for such review and determination (b) a review and determination of any other decision of an ordinary bench of such Court where it appears to full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
This jurisdiction shall not be exercised by an ordinary bench of such Court.”
It is to be noted that under paragraph 7 (2) (a) of N.L.C.D. 84 the application for leave for review could be taken by either the ordinary bench or the full bench. I understand Sowah J.A. (as he then was) in C.F.A.O. v. Zacca (supra) to imply that once an application for leave for review was filed in the Court of Appeal, it could, if necessary and if circumstances so demanded, be taken to be pending before either the ordinary bench or the full bench, since either of them could deal with it. Hence, for the purpose of section 13 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969, Sowah J.A. (as he then was) was prepared at 396 to give “a matter for review before a full bench” a liberal or as he put it a benevolent interpretation to include “application for leave for review” pending before the Court of Appeal generally. That is why he could say that section 13 (2) must take in “all pending applications for review before the full bench, whether actually filed or not”, i.e. whether the application for leave had been heard and granted and the follow-up review papers filed; or whether the application for leave was still pending for a determination and the question of permission vel non was yet to be decided. In either case, Sowah J.A. (as he then was) would say there would be a “matter for review before the full bench”, within section 13 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969.
[p.656] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
The logic of the situation seems to be this, that if the leave stage is deemed to be pending before the full bench, then under sections 10 and 13 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969 that bench could continue and complete the proceedings, by granting the leave (if so advised), and then carrying the exercise to its logical conclusion by dealing with the review which the leave would have given rise to.
This line of reasoning is understandable, but only against the background that the application for leave itself could be taken as properly pending before the full bench, which in the Zacca case (supra,) by virtue of section 7 (2) (a) of N.L.C.D. 84, it could.
In the instant case we are faced with a situation where this can never be so, for reasons already given, having regard to the change in the language of the governing enactment, i.e. section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101. Therefore until the ordinary bench had disposed of the application for leave, and the pursuant papers filed to the full bench, review proceedings in any shape or form whatsoever could never pend before the full bench, the exercise of judicial or moral liberalism notwithstanding.
In Armah v. Naawu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 201, C.A. Amissah J.A. dealing with a similar situation under section 3 (2) (d) of N.R.C.D. 101 which empowered the full beach of the Court of Appeal: “(d) to hear and determine any appeal which had been duly filed with the [abolished] Supreme Court before the commencement of [the] Decree” commented at 204:
“The problem created by the present application is that although it was filed before the commencement of the Decree, there is no question that it was not an appeal which had been filed with the Supreme Court before that date. What was filed was merely an application for leave to appeal and not an appeal. So that the matter is not one which the full bench has jurisdiction to hear and determine under section 3 (2) (d) of N.R.C.D.
101.”
This pronouncement is consistent with the full bench decision in Asibey III v. Ayisi [1974] 1 G.L.R. 315, C.A. (full bench) is so far as the application of section 3 is concerned. See also per Archer J.A. (as he then was) in Armah v. Naawu (supra) at 220:
“An appeal is duly filed…when notice of appeal has been filed in the appropriate court registry. When an aggrieved person applies for leave to appeal, he has no appeal duly filed. On the other hand, if he is granted leave and he does not pursue the leave so granted by filing his notice of appeal, there is still no appeal duly filed.”
[p.657] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
By parity of reasoning, an application for leave for review is not a review. A review can come into being only after the leave has been granted, and the proper papers filed. (Compare rules 7 (3) and 8 (1) and (3) of C.I. 13.
But counsel for the appellants says that his position is protected by the Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39, which, he says, regulates both applications for leave for review, as well as the review proceedings themselves. Is this contention tenable? The Practice Direction in question is subtitled, “Review by the Full Bench of the Court of Appeal.” The whole of that Practice Direction, consistently with its sub-title, deals with proceedings on review at the full bench level. It makes reference, of course, to section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D. 101 and distinguishes between a review, (1) on a question of law under section 3 (2) (a); and (2) upon a miscarriage of justice under section 3 (2) (b). But thereafter the Practice Direction limits itself to what happens at the full bench level only. No reference is made to the fact that under section 3 (2) (a) the application is in two stages: (i) an application to the ordinary bench for permission to proceed; and (ii) an application to the full bench after permission has been granted; whereas under section 3 (2) (b) there is only one application, i.e. for review, made directly to the full bench on grounds of miscarriage of justice.
Therefore what the Practice Direction (supra) seeks to do is to regulate the practice which concerns the full bench only, when the case is before the full bench, i.e. proceedings under section 3 (2) (b) and stage two of section 3 (2) (a). The first stage proceedings under section 3 (2) (a) do not take place before the full bench, and the Practice Direction does not seek to regulate that stage. Whether this was a deliberate omission or an oversight I do not pretend to know. But the result has been to lure some of us into that state of confusion in which we found ourselves in the course of this case. Thus Mr. Tsikata, counsel for the appellant, could argue that the question of time limits [for applications for leave for review] must be deemed to have been dealt with by the court in chambers, and that once the Court of Appeal (ordinary bench) sat on the application in open court, it must be taken to have satisfied itself that the application was timeous. Counsel was here assuming that the two-stage full bench practice described in the Practice Direction applies also to the permission stage before the ordinary bench. I do not share this interpretation.
Even if the Practice Direction (supra) applied to the ordinary bench, this court would nonetheless not be precluded from reopening the question of the propriety of the application for leave to satisfy itself that it was filed in time and that it was properly before the Court of Appeal (ordinary bench), particularly as the issue was raised, vehemently contested, and ruled upon.
[p.658] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
This brings me to the issue of time limits which provides an even more fundamental reason why this appeal cannot succeed and must be rejected. I have already indicated that the defendants filed their application for leave for review on 13 July 1979, three months, two days after the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 11 April 1979. When its competence was challenged, the defendants, by counsel, sought and obtained an extension of time, presumably to cover the date of filing. The application for extension of time was filed on 29 October 1979 and the order was made on 2 November 1979.
Mr. Tsikata’s reaction to the objection based on time limits was rather ambivalent, ranging from:
(a) that time limits are irrelevant. Applications for leave for review are not limited by time. They are governed by the Practice Direction and they can be brought at any time; and
(b) that rules 7 and 8 of C.I. 13 do not apply; they became obsolete, following the repeal of article 105 of the Constitution, 1969 by N.R.C.D. 101; to
(c) that even if the said rules are applicable, the time limited for applications for leave for review is three months, which the court can extend for another period of three months.
Contrariwise, the plaintiff contends that the relevant rule is rule 7 of C.I. 13, that the time limit is fourteen days, and that this limit cannot be extended by the court.
The review jurisdiction of the full bench was introduced when that full bench was brought back by N.R.C.D. 101 which abolished the then Supreme Court. Under this jurisdiction leave was required to proceed to review under section 3 (2) (a). The abolished Supreme Court did not have review jurisdiction; it had appellate jurisdiction. (I am here leaving out of consideration the court’s original jurisdiction, as it is not relevant to the argument). Some matters went to the court on appeal as of right; others went there only on leave being obtained either from the court itself or from the court below, i.e. the Court of Appeal. These were cases fall within article 105 (1) (c) and (2) of the Constitution, 1969. To regulate the practice where leave was required, the Rules Committee had designed rule 7 of C.I. 13 specifying the time within which applications for leave could be made. The relevant part of the said rule provided:
“7. (1) An application for leave to appeal pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (c) of clause of article 105 of the Constitution shall be by motion on notice in the Form 2 set out in the First Schedule to these Rules which shall be filed with the Registrar of the Court below within fourteen days of the date of the decision against which leave to appeal is sought.…
[p.659] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
(3) Where leave to appeal is granted the appellant shall file a notice of appeal in accordance with the provisions of these Rules.”
This rule applied to all applications for leave, and it did not matter whether the appeal was in respect of an interlocutory order or a final judgment. If the application was refused, that was the end of the matter. If it was granted then under rule 7 (3), the proper appeal papers would be filed. It was in connection with the filing of the pursuant notice of appeal that a distinction was drawn, as regards time limits, between an interlocutory order and a final judgment, and it was in this connection that rule 8 came into play. If the appeal was against an interlocutory order then under rule 8 (1) (a) the notice must be filed within fourteen days from the grant of leave. After the fourteen-day deadline the right acquired under the leave would be lost forever, because there were no rules permitting the court to extend time. If, on the other hand, the appeal was against a final judgment then the notice of appeal would be filed within three months of the decision appealed against (rule 8 (1) (b)), with a grace period of another three months (rule 8 (4)). After the total time of six months, the court could no longer extend time and the right of appeal would again be lost forever.
Rule 8 was applicable only where (a), the person could appeal as of right, without leave; or (b) where leave was required, after the person had obtained his leave and had thereby acquired the right to appeal.
Rule 8 had no relevance to the application for leave itself which was regulated solely by rule 7.
These, among others, were the rules which section 6 of N.R.C.D. 101 ordered to be applied to the new full bench in order that the jurisdiction given to it by section 3 (2) of the said Decree could be exercised. So that where under the said section 3 (2) matters could be taken to the full bench as of right, rule 8 of C.I. 13 would regulate the time limits. Where, however, leave was required before a matter could be taken to that bench, then rule 7 would have to be resorted to for the leave proceedings. After leave had been granted, rule 8 would take over.
In my view, therefore on a proper interpretation of section 6 of N.R.C.D. 101, the relevant rule applicable to an application for leave to apply for review under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101 is rule 7 of C.I. 13.
The said rule, applied mutatis mutandis, requires that such an application must be filed within fourteen days from the date of the decision. Whether the decision is final or interlocutory is immaterial; the time limit remains fourteen days. This limit cannot be extended. Therefore after fourteen days no court has any jurisdiction to extend time; the right to apply for leave will have been lost for good. In
[p.660] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 arriving at this assessment I find good company with Amissah J.A. in the Naawu case (supra) when he said at 212-213:
“Rule 7 (1) of [C.I. 13] would, with the necessary modification, require that an application for leave be filed, with the Registrar of the [Court of Appeal] within fourteen days of the date of the decision against which leave to [apply for a review] is sought’ . . . On the other hand, where no leave is required, as indeed is the case where the request for a review is founded on a miscarriage of justice, then according to rule 8 as appropriately modified, the application in a civil case must, subject to the possible enlargement of time, be brought within fourteen days, if the review sought is of an interlocutory decision, or within three months in the case of a final decision. . . “
I would have been happier if the caveat: subject to the possible enlargement of time— had been brought immediately after or in the last time, see rule 8 (4) of C.I. 13.
The conclusion I have come to conflicts with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lartey v. Baku II [1980] G.L.R. 257, C.A. There the Court of Appeal decided that the time limited for filing an application for leave for review under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101 is three months and not fourteen days.
I must confess I have some difficulty following the ratio in the Baku case (supra). The opening paragraph of the ruling at 258-259 clearly states that it was an application for leave for review under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101:
“On 5 March 1979, we upheld the plaintiff-respondents’ counsel’s preliminary objection to the competency of the motion for leave to apply for review of the judgment of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal by the full bench under section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), and after dismissing the motion, we reserved our reasons. We now give those reasons.”
(The emphasis is mine.) In spite of this clear reference to section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101, the court proceeded to base its reason on rule 8 of C.I. 13 which deals with time limits for appeals (not leave.) Substituting review for appeal, and applying rule 8 mutatis mutandis, the court concluded that as the decision sought to be reviewed was a final decision, the applicant could apply for leave in three months (plus a grace period of three months).
A passage from the decision at 260-261 will show where, in my respectful opinion, a confusion seems to have arisen. After quoting [p.661] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of N.R.C.D. 101 the Court of Appeal proceeded at 260-261:
“The procedure prescribed for the exercise of the above review jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal is defined in section 6 of N. R. C. D. 101 as follows:
‘6. The Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) shall with such modifications as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree, apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 3 of this Decree.’
Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), contains the following provisions on the time limits for lodging civil appeals, both final and interlocutory:
‘8. (1) Subject to the provisions of any enactment governing the same a civil appeal shall be lodged within,
(a) fourteen days, in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision, or
(b) three months, in the case of an appeal against a final decision,unless in the case of an appeal against a final decision, the court extends the period within which an appeal may be lodged.
(2) The periods specified in the preceding sub-rule shall, (a) in the case of an appeal as of right, be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against, and
(b) in any other case, be calculated from the date on which leave is granted.
(3) A civil appeal shall be deemed to have been lodged when the notice of appeal has been filed.
(4) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal in respect of a final decision shall not be made after the expiration of three months from the expiration of the period prescribed by this rule within which an appeal may be lodged.
(5) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal shall be supported by an affidavit,
(a) stating that leave has been granted where necessary, and the date of the leave;
(b) setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application; and
(c) giving the grounds of appeal which, prima facie, show good cause that the appeal is of substance.
[p.662] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
(6) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4) of this rule where a person has applied to the Court below for an extension of time within which to lodge a civil appeal and period of not less than one month has expired since the time when the said application was made without the Court below having granted or refused the application, the applicant shall be entitled to move the court to have the application determined by the Court.
(The emphasis is mine.)
Applying the above rules mutatis mutandis to an application for review from a final decision, it is clear that such an application shall be lodged within three months of the date of the final decision. Failing that, an application for extension of time within which to apply for a review may be filed within a further grace period of three months … “
With the greatest respect to their lordships, the application before the court was not one for a review: it was an application for leave to apply for a review. The court failed to draw this distinction, and it was this confusion which informed the ratio in the ruling. It is clear to me that the ratio cannot be correct. To this extent I am of the opinion that Baku II (supra) was decided per incuriam. I must say though that this does not affect the ultimate result in Baku II (supra). The application was dismissed as being out of time. It would have been dismissed all the same even if the correct rule 7 had been applied. For if, given three months (plus three months’ grace) the application was out of time, then with fourteen days (and no grace period) the application would be irretrievably beyond the tow cable. So that while I unreservedly accept the conclusion in the Baku II case (supra), I cannot, with regret, support the ratio, which is demonstrably inaccurate.
I cannot leave this matter without commenting on a view expressed by Mr. Tsikata, counsel for the appellants and, indeed, held in certain quarters too, that rule 7 of C.I. 13 has been repealed and is therefore inapplicable. This view is based on the argument that section 5 (5) of N.R.C.D.101 repealed article 105, among others, of the Constitution, 1969; that the said rule 7 was drafted with specific reference to article 105. Therefore if article 105 goes, rule 7 cannot stay; it automatically goes too. I must say that this is an unpardonably simplistic interpretation of the relevant enactments, which interpretation I, quite naturally, do not share. Let us first reproduce these enactments. Article 105 of the Constitution, 1969 says:
“105. (1) An appeal shall lie from a judgment, decree or order of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, . . .
(c) with the leave of the Court of Appeal, in any other cause or matter, civil or criminal, where the Court
[p.663] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 of Appeal is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law or is of public importance.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding clause, the Supreme Court shall have power to entertain any application for special leave to appeal in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, to the Supreme Court, and to grant such leave accordingly.”
Rule 7 of C.I. 13 has already been quoted. Section 5 (5) of N.R.C.D. 101 says: “Articles 103 to 111 of the Constitution shall cease to have effect, and accordingly any reference in any enactment to any such article shall cease to have effect.”
It is true that rule 7 of C.I. 13 was drafted to govern the practice where under the Constitution, 1969 leave was required to go from the then Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. The leave was required under article 105 (1) (c); and when that is refused, under 105 (2). There was at the time no full bench to exercise any review jurisdiction and the Supreme Court itself was not given any power to review decisions of the Court of Appeal. Indeed, article 105 says that the Supreme Court shall not review any decision once given. So in drafting rules to regulate the practice and procedure in the Court of Appeal it was not necessary to include rules for review, when there was no review Jurisdiction.
It is to be noted that notwithstanding the suspension of the Constitution, 1969 by the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972 all courts in existence before 13 January 1972 were allowed to continue in existence with the same powers, duties and functions which they had under the laws existing immediately before 13 January 1972. These laws included the relevant portions of the Constitution affecting the courts, and the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372).
N.R.C.D. 101 abolished the Supreme Court. With this abolition all legal rules relating to the Supreme Court became otiose. Repealing them was a mere formality; it was not strictly necessary to do so expressly. However, N.R.C.D. 101 by section 5 (5) proceeded to affect repeals consequent upon the demise of the Supreme Court. Hence by section 5 (5): “Articles 103 to 111 of the Constitution shall cease to have effect. . . .”
These articles related to the establishment of the Supreme Court, its composition and its jurisdiction. With the abolition of the Supreme Court by section 5 (1) of N.R.C.D. 101, the articles had ceased “to have effect “any way; the repetition of such an obvious result could only be out of abundance of caution. But section 5 (5) of N.R.C.D. 101 did not
[p.664] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 stop there. It continued, “. . . and accordingly any reference in any enactment to any [of articles 103 to 111] shall cease to have any effect.” Which is to say any such reference shall be meaningless, i.e. the law or enactment must be read without the reference, as though the article had never been incorporated in that enactment. It is the reference that shall cease to have effect, not the enactment in which the reference is made.
Section 5(5) of N.R.C.D. 101, in more mundane language, is merely saying:
“The Supreme Court is abolished. Articles 103-111 which relate solely to the Supreme Court have therefore become useless. So if you meet any of the said articles in any enactment, first cross out the article. Read the enactment as though the article has never formed part of it.”
So we rewrite rule 7 of C.I. 13 without article 105 and we have:
“7 (1) An application for leave to appeal shall be by motion on notice in the Form 2 set out in the First Schedule to these Rules which shall be filed with the Registrar of the Court below within fourteen days of the date of the decision against which leave to appeal is sought.
(2) An application for special leave to appeal shall be by motion on notice in the Form 3 set out in the First Schedule to these Rules, which shall be filed with the Registrar of the Court within fourteen days of the refusal of the Court below to grant leave to appeal.
(3) Where leave to appeal is granted the appellant shall file a notice of appeal in accordance with the provisions of these Rules.”
It is to be observed that apart from rule 7 there are no other rules in C.I. 13 governing applications for leave to appeal or to do anything. Section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D. 101, conferring review jurisdiction on the new full bench, requires that leave should be obtained under section 3 (2) (a). And section 6 says that C.I. 13 should be applied. This is a clear direction that in going about the leave in section 3 (2) (a), one has to look at the leave rule in C.I. 13 for guidance (this is rule 7), and apply it “with such modifications as may be necessary” to enable the full bench to “exercise . . . its jurisdiction under [section 3 (2) (a)] of [N.R.C.D.101].”
Having removed article 105 from rule 7 we have arrived at an “appeal version” of rule 7. To modify this and make it ready for use under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101, all we need to do is to substitute
[p.665] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 the word review for appeal wherever the latter appears in rule 7 and we have a review version of rule 7 of C.I. 13, to use in applications under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101.
I am therefore of the considered opinion that contrary to the view held in some quarters, the abolition of the Supreme Court and the consequential repeal of article 105, among others, have no relevance whatever to the applicability of rule 7 of C.I. 13 to the practice and procedure under section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D. 101.
The time limited by rule 7 of C.I. 13 within which to apply for leave for review is fourteen days from the date of the decision sought to be reviewed. It means that in the instant case, the defendants’ application of 13 July 1979 filed relative to the judgment of 11 April 1979, was, as the plaintiff contended in the court below, “hopelessly out of time.” It was bad; incurably bad. The Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to grant the extension of time. The order of 2 November 1979, for the extension, as well as that for the leave, were therefore null and void and of no effect. All proceedings founded on, and subsequent to, the said orders, including this appeal are equally void and incompetent. It follows that there cannot be any proper appeal before this court.
In my opinion therefore:
(a) there were no review proceedings pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal on the coming into force of the Constitution on 24 September 1979. So there was nothing which this court can take over and deal with under section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979;
(b) the time limited for filing application for leave for review was fourteen days. This time could not be extended by the court. The plaintiff’s application of 13 July 1979 was filed out of time and was incompetent. The Court of Appeal (ordinary bench) had no jurisdiction to entertain it, let alone grant the extension of time sought by the further application of 29 October 1979;
(c) notwithstanding the repeal of article 105 of the Constitution by N.R.C.D. 101, rule 7 of C.I. 13 continued to subsist, and, with appropriate modifications, to regulate applications for leave under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101.
Whichever way one looks at this appeal one cannot escape the conclusion that it has nothing to commend it. I would dismiss it.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
Many a time in the unhappy legal history of this country particularly within the past exciting 27 years, since independence, there had occurred traumatic changes in the hierarchical structure and the jurisdictions of our courts. The effect of these changes on cases in their mid-careers to the ultimate final appellate or final review court
[p.666] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 has been the subject of many vaccilating decisions by our superior appellate courts.
The present appeal before us in this case is a classic illustration of this perennial phenomenon. Many of the previous decisions are in my opinion clearly unsatisfactory and so it seems to me that the time has now come for the legal principles applicable to such cases to be carefully and authoritatively laid down for such future cases, because past experience in our courts would seem to indicate that such cases will definitely continue to bedevil us in the years that lie ahead. For this reason, I am afraid I have to subject some of the past decisions to elaborate and in-depth examination to demonstrate my reasons for considering them unsatisfactory. In the circumstance, I cannot help feeling with profound regret that the judgment I am about to deliver must inevitably be long.
This case commenced its chequered course to this court as an action in the High Court by which the plaintiff, the respondent in this court, by his writ claimed the following reliefs: a declaration of title to a piece of land; damages for trespass committed by the defendants who are now supposed to be the appellants before us and an injunction restraining the said defendants, their agents and servants from trespassing on the said land. The High Court judge dismissed the claims of the plaintiff and although the defendants had not counterclaimed, he nonetheless adjudged the co-defendant, Ama Agyeiwa, as the owner of the land in dispute and ordered, that she retain possession of the land. He also granted perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff, his servants or agents from trespassing on the land.
The plaintiff aggrieved by the decision lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal. On 11 April 1979, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and in a judgment read for the court by the presiding judge Anin J.A. (as he then was) the court evaluated the rival contentions of the parties in a rather impeccable manner and advanced, in my view, convincing legal reasons why on the admissible evidence led at the trial, the judgment of the said High Court ought to be set aside. It accordingly vacated the judgment and in lieu thereof entered judgment for the plaintiff and granted the said reliefs set out in the plaintiff’s writ.
On 13 July 1979 the defendants by motion on notice under section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101) gave the plaintiff notice that on 1 October 1979, they would make an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to apply to the full bench for a review and determination of the said decision of the court given aforesaid against them.
On 24 October 1979 the motion came up before Jiagge J.A. and Sowah and Anin JJ.A. (as they then were); Mr. Quist on behalf of the
[p.667] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 plaintiff raised a preliminary objection to the effect that an application at the Court of Appeal for leave to apply for a review by the full bench is governed by rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), and as the said rule requires such an application to be made “within fourteen days of the date of the decision against which leave to apply for review is sought” the defendants’ application was filed completely out of time because judgment was delivered on 11 April 1979 and the application for leave was filed on 13 July 1970. He submitted further that rule 8 of C.I. 13 is not applicable, but, that even if it is assumed to be the applicable rule, then since it also enjoins that such applications should be made within three months the defendants’ application was still out of time.
Speaking for myself, I have not succeeded in finding any successful way to meet these submissions. As the defendants’ application stands, counsel’s submissions would seem to present impregnable barriers to limp the grant of leave. However, counsel for the defendants, Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata, pointed out contrary to the motion paper he had filed, that the motion before the court was “for a review”; presumably this was an inadvertent slip of tongue and probably he had intended to say “for leave to apply for review.” Be that as it may, he protested quite rightly, that he had had no notice of the preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff and he indicated to the court that “he needed time to reply.” Obligingly the court adjourned further hearing to 26 October 1979. Meanwhile before the end of the day the plaintiff formally filed a notice of intention to rely on the said preliminary objection he had raised.
On 26 October 1979, the court resumed the hearing and after Mr. Quist had reiterated his objection and made an elaborate analysis of the procedural position he supported it with the Court of Appeal case of In re Armah (Decd.); Awotwi v. Abadoo [1977] 2 G.L.R. 374, C.A. (full bench). Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata submitted in reply quoting Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179 at 190, C.A. (full bench) that rule 8 and not rule 7 of C.I. 13 was the applicable provision and in the course of his submission he abandoned all arguments and indicated, “at this point we want to apply for extension of time under section 8 (1) (b) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 pending the review application.” Mr. Quist opposed the application but the record shows that the motion was adjourned to 2 November 1979 and no order of any sort was made.
On 29 October 1979 a notice of motion supported by an affidavit sworn to by one of the defendants on their joint behalf was filed in the Court of Appeal. The said motion was not for extension of time to apply for leave for review, it was rather an “application through counsel for the court to exercise its power to extend time for our application for review of the judgment of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal delivered on 11 April 1979.”
[p.668] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
It is quite clear that this application to the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal was unquestionably made six months and eighteen days after the judgment of the said court. The application was heard on 2 November 1979 and was strongly opposed by counsel for the plaintiff who would seem to have drawn attention to the point he had previously made that such an application is maintainable, if at all, under rule 8 (1) (b) of C.I. 13. He demonstrated in his submissions that by virtue of rule 70 of C.I. 13, “Court” appearing in the said rule 8 is the full bench and not the ordinary bench, so that such an application could only be made direct to the full bench not later than six months, after judgment. Of course the full bench had at that date been abolished, thus making such an application misconceived and impossible and that probably explains the applicants’ dilemma. The somewhat inexplicable reply of Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata is as follows:
“Our application is for extension of time to file application for leave. We cannot file an application for review without obtaining leave. The court is already seised of the matter and the application is not being brought after the six months period.”
I have strained hard to understand this reply. The submission made by Mr. Quist, in my view a submission fully supported by statute, that in an application for review under rule 8 the “Court” as defined by rule 70 means the full bench, was completely ignored; and although the application for extension of time was filed as I have already indicated, on 29 October 1979 after a period of six months and eighteen days, nonetheless counsel nonchalantly made the extraordinary submission that “the application is not being brought after the six months period.” So startling were these submissions of the applicant’s counsel in the teeth of the facts as well as clear statutory provisions that I searched the record for the decision of the court to study the ratio decidendi of the ruling that is capable of answering the legal points raised by Mr. Quist.
The record was singularly silent indicating no ruling, whether bare or reasoned, for or against the application, nevertheless on 21 November 1979 counsel for the defendants filed a notice of appeal. The notice, its relevant format and vaunted legal foundation are so important that I set down hereunder the substantial portion:
“NOTICE OF APPEAL COURTS ACT, 1971 (ACT 372) AS AMENDED BY N.R.C.D. 101, FURTHER AMENDED BY CONSTITUTION, 1979.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendants herein, pursuant to leave duly granted them by an ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal on 2 November 1979 for a review by the full bench of a
[p.669] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 decision of the ordinary bench delivered on 11 April 1979, more particularly stated in paragraph 2 below now do appeal to the Supreme Court upon the grounds herein below indicated in paragraph …”
It is on the basis of this notice of appeal that this so-called appeal comes before this court. Is this appeal properly before us? For reasons which I propose to elaborate at length presently, I am firmly of the opinion that the enabling statutory and constitutional provisions sanctioning appeals to this court have not been satisfied and although I have studied the proceedings and the judgment of the Court of Appeal and have found no legal impediments to upholding the judgments I nevertheless think, speaking for myself that this appeal is incompetent and should be dismissed in limine particularly as I do not see what interest of justice will be served in our entertaining the appeal by driving a coach and four through clear statutory and legal requirements.
The said so-called notice of appeal to this court deserves three comments: In the first place, all the applications made to the Court of Appeal before the notice of appeal was filed were all made to the Court of Appeal after 24 September 1979 when the full bench had been abolished and a new hierarchy of courts established. On those dates therefore there were no “ordinary bench” and “full bench” of the Court of Appeal and these references are therefore misconceived for after 24 September 1979 there was only one Court of Appeal with no benches. In the second place, no legal reason was given for the apparent volte face of the applicants by which they alleged that they had been given leave to apply for a review, an impossible grant, but nevertheless they were rather appealing; and thirdly, since the Constitution, 1979 is being invoked as authority for the so-called appeal, it is clear that under article 117 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, an appeal lies “from a judgment decree, or order of the Court of Appeal” as of right in a civil cause or matter and therefore there was no need to seek leave of the Court of Appeal and consequently, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application. I think its ruling after 24 September 1979 granting the application, if that is what it did, is null and void and cannot be the basis for an appeal before this Supreme Court, the final appellate court.
In Lartey v. Baku II [1980] G.L.R. 257, C.A. (coram: Apaloo C.J., Anin J.A. (as he then was) and Koranteng-Addow, J.A.), the court speaking through Anin J.A. (as he then was), articulated the relevant principle very neatly at 259, C.A. thus:
[p.670] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
“Whether a review application or an appeal has been properly lodged before a court or not, depends on the relevant enactments and statutory rules regulating them, and in what circumstances a review or appeal lies and how it may be lodged. Litigants do not enjoy a common law right to appeal or review at will.”
On the basis of this principle, it seems to me that even if the judgment of the court below were erroneous in point of law, so long as the appeal is not legally before us, I do not think we can stretch the law and assume jurisdiction if our jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. Hector Macleod J. in Bordoh v. Aryebbir, Full Court, 19 November 1883, unreported faced with a somewhat not dissimilar situation appreciated this position poignantly when he said of such cases:
“The great difficulty in such cases as the present is to free one’s mind from the influence exercised upon it by a knowledge that a party is suffering from a hardship arising from a fault not perhaps his own. Yet it is a most dangerous thing to stretch the law to cover an individual hardship.”
In their apparent enlargement of time application made to the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal for leave to apply to the full bench for a review, the applicants indicated clearly the following grounds on which they were invoking the jurisdiction of the ordinary bench:
“We the applicants contend that the judgment of the ordinary bench is erroneous in point of law … on the issue of proof of title and identity of the land, and we also contend that the said judgment is erroneous in point of law on the question of acquiescence and laches . . .”
They were clearly raising questions of law. The jurisdiction and powers of the full bench of the Court of Appeal spelt out in section 3 (2) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101) are:
“3. (2) A full bench of the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction— (a) to review and determine a decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof upon a question of law, where such Justice or Division gives leave for such review and determination;
(b) to review and determine any other decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division [p.671] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 thereof, where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice;
(c) to hear and determine any matter in respect of which the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction under section 22 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) by virtue of section 2 of this Decree;
(d) to hear and determine any appeal which had been duly filed with the Supreme Court before the commencement of this Decree.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Clearly since the applicants were alleging errors of law the application which they made on 13 July 1979 was made and could only be made under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101. Under that provision they need the leave of the ordinary bench, subject to the rules of the court, for the purpose of filing an application for review before the full bench.
What however is very relevant about the notice filed on 13 July 1979, is best gathered by studying the notice filed and so I set it down is hereunder quite fully:
“NOTICE OF MOTION Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), s. 3 (2)
TAKE NOTICE that this honourable court will be moved on Monday 1 October 1979 at 9.00 of the clock in the forenoon or so soon thereafter as counsel may be heard in an application for and on behalf of the defendant-respondents, the applicants herein, for leave to apply to the full bench of this court for a review and determination of the decision contained in the judgment of the ordinary bench (Anin, Koranteng-Addow JJ.A. and Wiredu J.) of this honourable court delivered herein on 11 April 1979.”
It is significant that the defendants gave notice that they would apply to the ordinary bench on 1 October 1979 for leave to apply to the full bench for review. Now on 24 September 1979, the Constitution, 1979 came into force and created a new hierarchy of courts. Before the said Constitution the superior courts in Ghana were: (1) the Court of Appeal with two divisions, (a) a full bench and (b) ordinary bench; and (2) the High Court. After the Constitution, 1979, the superior courts in Ghana became: (1) the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Appeal; and (3) the High Court. By the Constitution, 1979 therefore the full bench of the Court of Appeal ceased to exist: see article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979. In spite of this the appellants by their counsel persisted in their motion and moved the Court of
[p.672] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
Appeal on 24 October 1979, exactly a month after the abolition of the full bench, for leave to apply for a review to a court that had ceased to exist; and undaunted, when they realised that they were completely out of time, they applied on 2 November 1979 to the same Court of Appeal over a month after the said abolition, not for leave but actually for an extension of time in order to apply for a review to the same non-existent full bench.
It seems to me that the great constitutional changes in the court system that took place on 24 September 1979 were sadly not noticed by the defendants and their legal advisers. This is the only way one can explain their stubborn and conservative attachment to the old system. As I have already pointed out, I have not had the privilege of reading the ruling of the Court of Appeal granting the said extension of time, but looking at the problem logically and fairly I think the court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an impossible application. The admirable ruling of the erstwhile full bench in a somewhat analogous situation following the suspension of the Constitution, 1969 and subsequent abolition of the Supreme Court in Spokesman (Publications) Ltd. v. Attorney-General [1974] 1 G.L.R. 88 at 93 C.A.. (full bench) lends support to this view if applied mutatis mutandis to the procedural point which has arisen here. Azu Crabbe C.J. delivering the ruling of the full bench said:
“The rights of the parties in those circumstances could have been decided in the Supreme Court according to the law as it stood before the suspension. But, as it has been said earlier in this ruling, the Supreme Court was abolished, and, therefore there is no court in which the plaintiff company can ventilate their action.”
That scholarly judge Amissah J.A., in his judgment in Armah v. Naawu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 201 at 205, C.A. commenting on the case of Asibey III v. Ayisi [1974] 1 G.L.R. 315, C.A. conceded the impossible nature of an application to a non-existent tribunal when he said:
“…the report of the case appearing in our law reports stated that the application in question was filed on 28 July 1973, that is, over ten months after the abolition of the Supreme Court. Had that been so, the application to appeal then to the non-existent court would have been clearly misconceived.”
It is significant that the application to the Court of Appeal was for extension of time to apply, apparently as of right, to the said nonexistent full bench of the Court of Appeal. As Mr. Quist so ably pointed out in his argument such an application can only be entertained
[p.673] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 under rule 8 of C.I. 13 by the full bench and not the ordinary bench, and so even if the full bench had not been abolished, the application to the Court of Appeal (ordinary bench) would have been incompetent. I shall later on in this judgment consider the ratio in Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. (supra) which the defendants’ counsel attempted to invoke at the Court of Appeal and which indeed he referred to in his arguments before us as an authority that sanctions the appeal before us.
Before I come to grips with the central issue raised in this so-called appeal, I must reiterate the point that there would seem to be no record of the decision or the ruling granting the said extension of time for leave to apply for review to the full bench. Having regard however to what the applicants applied for, and how they conceived the result of their application, it seems to me incongrous that the applicants spelt out the legal basis of their right to appeal, as a right founded on leave granted them to apply for a review.
If the applicants are right, they applied to the court for leave to ask for a review by the full bench of the court but the Court of Appeal granted them leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Azu Crabbe C.J. in Benneh v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 47 at 94, C.A. (full bench) quoted a number of cases local and foreign which warned against “pronouncing for a party on a case inconsistent with the one he put up. “ I agree with that proposition. A rejection of this caveat for a contrary proposition will cut across the fundamental principle of the accusatorial common law doctrine that it is the parties to litigation who initiate proceedings and who thus invoke the jurisdiction of the court and set the machinery of the judicial system in motion in vindication of their rights. The courts do not as a general rule suo motu do that.
From the factual history of the case as I have given it, the central procedural issue is not complex at all. This is in effect an apparent appeal made on 21 November 1979 to the Supreme Court against a judgment of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal given on 11 April 1979. At the time of the decision of the Court of Appeal the appellants had no right of appeal to any court, they rather had a right to apply for a review to the full bench of the Court of Appeal. However on 24 September 1979, the full bench was abolished and a new court, our present Supreme Court having, inter alia, final appellate jurisdiction, was established. The simple question is this: Have the appellants a right of appeal to this Supreme Court?
The tenor of the arguments on their behalf, as I understand it, is that it will be unjust and will create a great hardship to drive the appellants from the judgment seat without hearing their case on the merits. The court itself at the hearing raised the issue of its jurisdiction to entertain this so-called appeal, and the submission on behalf of the
[p.674] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 appellants in support of the validity of the appeal gave the impression that an objection to the jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case is a technicality which should not obstruct the dictates of justice.
I was at first impressed by this argument particularly as we did hear the appeal on its merits, and although I entertained no doubts whatsoever on the procedural point involved, nevertheless as it would seem no apparent harm had been done by our proceeding on the merits, I was inclined to gloss over it by drawing inspiration from an observation of Macleod J. in the case of Amonoo v. Tufts, Full Court, 2 September 1882, unreported, when he said:
“I do not think we can entertain this appeal, unless these two conditions have been complied with in accordance with the requirements of the Supreme Court Ordinance. I further think that until we are satisfied that these two conditions have been duly complied with, we ought not to proceed further, but in deference to a doubt entertained by my brother Bailey on this point, I do not press the objection and prefer to leave the point undecided, as in my opinion justice can be done in the present case without deciding it.”
I would have adopted this stand in accordance with my initial inclination, but in my considered opinion the Constitution, 1979 did not give us jurisdiction in this type of case and furthermore the proliferation of conflicting decisions in the lower appellate courts in these types of cases makes a decision by this court in the instant case imperative; moreover this is the first time the problem has come before us in this court and we are free to decide it untramelled by the binding force of any precedent.
From 1960 onwards the hierarchy of our superior appellate courts has from time to time been restructured and the jurisdiction of our courts at times altered. This has given rise to a recurring problem exemplified in this case as to whether on the abolition of court A and the creation of court B with differing jurisdiction, a party to litigation who has acquired a right, if aggrieved, to seek redress in court A but before exercising his right court A is abolished, can in the absence of a statutory provision giving him access to court B seek his redress in court B.
Our superior appellate courts have dealt with a number of these cases in which this situation has arisen. The judges have at times given conflicting judgments and the spectacle of the same court daubing a similar decision of its predecessor per incuriam has been an unfortunate feature of some of the cases. Since as I have pointed out none of these judgments are binding on this court, it seems to me that it is now
[p.675] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 necessary for us to examine the ratio decidendi of the decisions of the past and lay down the true principles which should apply to such cases.
I have studied a number of cases decided between 1964 and 1979 dealing with the problem and I propose to consider them and see whether from a critical examination of the statute law and the case ratios, principles can emerge which will enable the question raised in this appeal to be answered.
A very important aspect of the problem seemed to have had an unsteady genesis in the history of the case that ended up with the decision of the full bench in Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. In Nye v. Nye [1964] G.L.R. 95 at 98, S.C., Apaloo J. (as he then was) speaking for the erstwhile Supreme Court on 29 January 1964, in interpreting rule 10 (1) and (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), in an application for enlargement of time, gave a judgment conceding the undoubtedly clear statutory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to give such enlargement as is set out in rule 10 (1). The relevant rules are as follows:
“10. (1) Subject to any enactment for the time being in force no appeal shall be brought after the expiration of fourteen days in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision or of three months in the case of an appeal against a final decisions unless the Court below or the Court shall enlarge the time.
(2) The prescribed period for appeal shall be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against:
Provided that where there is no appeal as of right the prescribed period shall be calculated from the date upon which special leave to appeal is granted.
(3) An appeal shall be deemed to have been brought when the notice of appeal has been filed in the Registry of the Court below.
(4) No application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be made after the expiration of one month from the expiration of the time prescribed within which an appeal may be brought.
Every such application shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause for leave to be granted. Any such application shall be made to the Court below whose decision shall be final; and when time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”
Apaloo J. (as he then was) in reading the judgment of the Supreme Court after considering these rules made a penetrating construction, in my humble view rightly, at 98, S.C. as follows:
[p.676] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
“… on a true and proper construction of subrule (4) of rule 10 of the new rules, an application made to this court after the expiration of four months from the date of a final judgment, is not barred by subrule (4) of rule 10 of the new rules and that this court is properly seised of that application and can, in a fit case, exercise the power of enlargement of time granted it by subrule (1) of rule 10 of the new rules.”
This was the result of the unanimous reasoning of the Supreme Court in a decision to which no less an experienced legal luminary than the indefatigable and meticulous Adumua-Bossman J.S.C. lent the great weight of his learning by his participation. The decision however was reversed unanimously when after the enlargement of time, the appeal to the Supreme Court ultimately went to the Court of Appeal (full bench) on 27 February 1967 as reported in Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench). By the time the substantive case came before the said Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court had been abolished by paragraph 95 of the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), which came into force on 1 October 1966 by virtue of the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84) (Commencement) Instrument, 1966 (L.I. 522). Pending Supreme Court cases however were by paragraph 87 (1) of the said N.L.C.D. 84 preserved for the full bench of the Court of Appeal established under the Decree. So the hearing of the case before the full bench was statutorily justified.
In the meantime in Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C., on facts similar to the facts in the 1964 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra), the Supreme Court differently constituted decided coram: Sarkodee Addo C.J. and Ollennu J.S.C., with Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) dissenting, that the 1964 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra) was decided per incuriam and that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in the Nye v. Nye situation to enlarge time.
Ollennu J.S.C. after examining and analysing only rule 10 (1) and (4) of L.I. 218 laid down the law imperatively and positively at 558-559 as follows:
“A person desiring to appeal may bring his appeal:
(a) against an interlocutory decision within fourteen days of the date of the decision;
(b) against a final decision within three months of the date of the decision;
(c) he may however bring his appeal at a subsequent date if he is granted extension of time within which to bring it, such extension of time may be granted either by the court or by the court below, if the application for it is made before the expiration of the fourteen days or the three months;
[p.677] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
(d) after the expiration of the fourteen days or the three months, he has one month of grace within which he may apply for enlargement of time;
(e) the application for enlargement of time made within the one month’s grace can only be made to the court below, and not to the court;
(f) when the one month’s grace expires, the would-be appellant cannot apply to any court whatsoever for enlargement of time within which to bring an appeal, and his right to appeal is completely barred forever.”
In my view the formulation in (c) and (e) and (f) are with the utmost respect per incuriam and in this judgment after examining the rules, I propose to draw up what in my opinion is the proper formulation. In his dissent judgment, Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) conducted an elaborate and illuminating research into the history of the power of the court to enlarge time from the date of the passing of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 to modern times. That learned exposition demonstrated that the 1964 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra) was rightly decided and led him to hold that the Supreme Court’s power to enlarge time had been statutorily preserved. Unfortunately the mandatory statutory provision that would have clinched his conclusion beyond all reasonable doubts was inadvertently omitted in his able discourse as it was subsequently to elude the entire full bench in the 1967 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra).
I have examined the history of the interpretation of the enlargement of time provisions of the rules from the date of the Supreme Court Ordinance in 1876 to modern times and in particular the early interpretation given in the Full Court by some of our stalwart predecessors on the bench like Hector Macleod J. (as he then was) and Lesingham Bailey Ag. C.J. (as he then was) in the early 1880s, and I find that these interpretations have been consistently in consonance with the Apaloo and Azu Crabbe approach; I find the Azu Crabbe analysis of the historical position to be correct and impeccable and therefore contrary to the view of the erudite Akufo-Addo C.J. I am firmly of the opinion that Loga v. Davordzi (supra) and the 1967 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra) were all with due respect decided per incuriam.
I have already set down in this judgment the provisions of rule 10 (1) and (4) of L.I. 218. These were no doubt as Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) demonstrated, copied from rule 11 of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules, 1957 (L.N. 116) which in fact drew inspiration mutatis mutandis from rule 14 of the West African Court of Appeal Rules, 1950 the said provisions of the West African Court of Appeal
[p.678] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 ules, 1950 of r. 14 (1) and (4) which fathered the corresponding provisions of our own rule 10 (1) and (4) are as follows:
“(1) Subject to any provision which may be made by the legislature of any Territory no appeal shall be brought after the expiration of fourteen days in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision or of three months in the case of an appeal against a final decision, unless the Court below or the Court shall enlarge the time …
(4) No application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be made after the expiration of one month from the expiration of the time prescribed within which an appeal may be brought. Every such application shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause for leave to be granted. Any such application may be made to the Court or to the Court below (in which case the decision of the Court below shall be final) and when time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”
It is noteworthy that the provision that circumscribed and controlled the whole of the rule is the subrule (1) clause: “subject to any provision which may be made by the legislature of any Territory.” Under subrule (1) the application may be made to either the court or the court below and if made to the court below its decision will be final.
There can be no doubt that on a fair reading of the provision it is clear that this concession to the finality of the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a tardy application is to ensure finality in the disposal of enlargement of time cases in the local jurisdiction and to inhibit appeals from decisions in such cases. It did not mean that on a refusal of the court below an application cannot be made to the appeal court. “Final” as is used in the West African Court of Appeal Rules merely means that no appeal will be entertained from a ruling of the lower court with respect to the enlargement decision. The relevant subrule (1) clause of our provision when the 1964 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra), Loga v. Davordzi (supra) and the 1967 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra) were decided is: “subject to any enactment for the time being in force.” It seems obvious therefore that in order to interpret the subrules, it is necessary to find out if there is in existence any enactment for the time being in force. If such enactment is found, then it will be the combined effect of the two subrules and the enactment that will spell out the true meaning of subrule (4). The attempt to interpret only the two subrules in Loga v. Davordzi (supra) at 553 produced what Ollennu J.S.C. saw as a repugnancy calling for artificial solution. As he put it at 553:
[p.679] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
“… the intention of the legislature in subrule (4), i.e. absolute prohibition, is repugnant to a presumed intention in the earlier subrule, i.e. subrule (1), to give the court unlimited jurisdiction to enlarge time.”
He therefore borrowed the words of Keating J. in Wood v. Riley (1867) L.R. 3 C.P. 26 at 27 and, said at the same page, “if the two [sub] sections are repugnant, the known rule is that the last must prevail.”
In my view this is unsatisfactory. Under section 13 of the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), the subsisting provision when the said Loga case and the 1964 Nye case were decided, it was provided as follows, “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other provision of this Act, the Supreme Court may entertain any appeal from any Court on any terms which it may think just.” L.I. 218 was made in exercise of powers conferred on the Rules Committee by section 87 (1) of the Courts Act, 1960. L.I. 218 is a subsidiary legislation; it cannot by any of its rules impugn or restrict the power of the Supreme Court to “entertain any appeal from any court on any terms which it may think just”, as was provided in the parent enactment. This is therefore the reason why subrule (4) was restricted, and rightly so, to the court below because the Supreme Court itself was by the parent statute the sole arbiter of the just terms under which it will exercise its jurisdiction to entertain appeals. The provision in subrule (4) that the decision of the court below shall be final means no more as I have already indicated, than that from the decision of the court regarding enlargement of time no appeal will be entertained to the Supreme Court. It does not mean that an application cannot be made to the Supreme Court for enlargement of time because the combined effect of rule 10 (1) and what I call the master statutory provision, namely section 13 of CA 9, is clearly to confer jurisdiction for such an application. If subrule (4) deprived the Supreme Court of the power to enlarge time specifically given to it by rule 10 (1) then it will, in fact, be creating an absurdity for it will be repugnant not only to subrule (1) and commonsense but also to section 13 of C.A. 9 and in such a situation, it is not the rule adverted to by Keating J. in Wood v. Riley (supra) which is relevant as Ollennu J.S.C. thought, for in the application of such a rule the repugnancy will still persist. It is rather two common law canons of interpretation the first is the undoubted legal principle canvassed by the English Court of Appeal in a case before it that subordinate legislation is invalid if inconsistent with any provision of its parent enactment, a doctrine which was to receive the imprimatur of the House of Lords when the case ascended that court as Minister of Health v. R; Ex parte Yaffe [1931] A.C. 494, H.L. The second principle
[p.680] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 is the old one adverted to by Parke B in Becke v. Smith (1836) 150 E.R. 724 at 726 which I quoted in Sam v. Comptroller of Customs and Excise [1971] 1 G.L.R. 289 at 307 thus:
“It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further.”
It is these principles and section 13 of CA 9 which eluded the courts in Loga v. Davordzi (supra) and the 1967 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra). Of course between 1 October 1966 when N.L.C.D. 84 came into force and 22 August 1969 when a new Court of Appeal was established, the existing Court of Appeal under N.L.C.D. 84 had by virtue of paragraph 12 of the said Decree, jurisdiction to “entertain any appeal from any Court on any terms which it may think just.” At the time of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1964 in the Nye case (supra) section 13 of C.A. 9 was applicable. At the time of the decision of the Court of Appeal (full bench) in 1967 in the Nye case (supra) paragraph 12 of N.L.C.D. 84 was applicable. They both gave jurisdiction to the subsisting highest appellate court to entertain appeals but because prima facie every enactment is prospective; section 13 of C.A. 9 was still the applicable provision in the Nye v. Nye (supra) decision given in 1967.
Nye v. Nye (supra) came before the full bench coram: Akufo-Addo C.J. Ollennu, Apaloo JJ.A. (as they then were), Lassey and Amissah JJ.A. in 1967. The majority view of Ollennu J.A. (as he then was) in Loga v. Davordzi (supra) was accepted without question by Akufo-Addo C.J. and Lassey J.A. concurred; both Amissah J.A. and Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) did not find it easy to agree; they expressed grave doubts and pointed out the absurd and repugnant construction advocated by the majority. They were struck by the legal difficulties created by this epoch-making and incongruous decision which would seem to grant power of the High Court wider than the power of the highest court in the land. They were clearly unhappy. Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) demonstrated how wrong the 1967 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra) was, nevertheless he abandoned his impeccable reasoning in the 1964 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra) for the incongruous decision of Akufo-Addo C.J. supported as it was by Ollennu J.S.C. because as he lamented at 84, “I do not therefore wish to cling to a view of these rules which my learned and more experienced brothers have unequivocally
[p.681] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 rejected.” Amissah J.A. with less than six months’ experience as a judge also concurred after demonstrating how wrong the decision is; and although he succumbed to the majority opinion his agony was apparent in his soul-writhing remarks at 90: “On the whole, it is difficult for one who is uninitiated in the intricacies of civil procedure to grasp the reality of the present power in the Court of Appeal to grant an extension of time as envisaged in subrule 1 of rule 10.”
I cannot with the utmost respect, help feeling and regretting that the proper legal rule which they would seem to champion was sacrificed on a brittle altar daubed experience! The views of Amissah J.A. and Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) were so right and unanswerable that like Azu Crabbe J.A. (as he then was) did in the Loga case (supra) I think with the greatest respect that they ought perhaps to have carried their views into dissent. This would hopefully have encouraged the fifth member of the court to probably examine the rules more closely if his view is to be the meaningfully deciding factor.
I have been forced to deal at length with the proper interpretation and application of these rules for two reasons: first, they have now come up to us in this court in rules 7 and 8 of C.I. 13 and the repealed section 3, particularly subsection 3 of section 3, of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and the repealed paragraph 12 of N.L.C.D. 84; the successors of what I have earlier daubed in this judgment “the master statutory provision”, namely section 13 of CA 9 is now replaced by article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. Secondly, the objection to the jurisdiction taken by Mr. Quist in the court below and raised by this court at the hearing here is based on the correct application of these subsisting provisions.
In my view as of now the proper provisions governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to deal with appeals to this court or of this court to either entertain appeals or to enlarge time to enable a potential appellant who is out of time to appeal to this court are the following:
(1) rules 7, 8 and 66 (1) of C.I. 13;
(2) article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979; and
(3) the relevant provisions of the Provisional National Defence Council Proclamation, 1981 and P.N.D.C.L. 42, to be referred to presently.
Making allowance for the supremacy of the provisions of sections 4 (2), 9 (1) and 26 (1) of the Proclamation, 1981, and section 66 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, which have preserved the rules of court, i.e. C.I. 13 and article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, the first two provisions
[p.682] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 though differently worded and now quite clear in their terms, are in substance not very divergent from the provisions in operation when the Loga and Nye cases were decided. As against the Ollennu interpretation in Loga and formulation of their purport and Akufo-Addo CJ’s reasoned acceptance of the Ollennu position in the 1967 decision in Nye v. Nye (supra), I think with all due respect that they permit applications by would-be appellants under the following conditions or circumstances:
(1) Where an appeal to this court depends on leave of the court below then an application for such leave to appeal is only to be made within fourteen days and no more of the date of the decision against which the appeal is sought: see rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 and the excellent analysis of that rule in the judgment of my brother Adade J.S.C. There is no provision for an application to the court below for extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal to this court but if within one month after the said application for leave, the court below has not determined the application then the applicant can apply to have the application determined by this court: see rule 8 (6) of C.I. 13.
(2) If however, the application for special leave to the court below is refused, an application for special leave may then be made to this court within fourteen days of the said refusal: see rule 7 (2) of C.I.
13 and article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979.
(3) An appeal to this court is to be made as of right within fourteen days in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision or three months in the case of an appeal against a final decision, unless in the case of a final decision the court enlarges time on the application of the appellant: see rule 8 (1) of C.I. 13.
(4) Such an application for extension of time is only to be made within three months after the expiration of the critical three months within which an appeal as of right is permitted: see rule 8 (4) of C.I. 13.
(5) After an applicant has failed to comply with the provisions of rules 7 and 8, his failure will be a bar to the further prosecution of his case in this court unless this court considers that the non-compliance was not wilful and that in the interest of justice the non-compliance should be waived: see rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13.
(6) In all cases however an application may be made to this court for special leave to appeal in any case or matter including an interlocutory matter on any terms which this court consider just see article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979.
[p.683] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
Tested against these provisions it is clear that the court below was completely incompetent and devoid of jurisdiction to consider let alone to deal with the application for leave which was made on 13 July 1979 at the court below against that court’s decision given on 11 April 1979, more than three months after that decision, when the mandatory period for such an application is fourteen days, with the court below having no power to enlarge time; in my opinion the alleged so-called ruling or order of the Court of Appeal which is not even in the court record before us, is null and void.
The case, however, has been brought before us on an apparent appeal and the question this poses is this: Is this court clothed with jurisdiction to deal with it particularly in view of my formulations (5) and (6) above, and the hackneyed rule adverted to by Anin J.A. (as he then was) and already referred to in this judgment, namely that appellate and review jurisdictions are creatures of statute and exercisable strictly in accordance with the enabling legislation? It is to this question that I now turn my attention bearing in mind the indisputable fact that on 13 July 1979, the date the so-called appellants evinced an intention to challenge the decision of the court below and indeed filed their papers this court was not in existence; the relevant court was then the full bench of the same Court of Appeal, a bench which was also abolished as I have already pointed out, on the same date when the present Supreme Court was established.
Before I consider the relevant cases that I have succeeded in laying my hands on, it may be useful to indicate briefly some tenuous reasons, the only ones I can conjure up or elicit from the arguments of counsel, which appear to favour the so-called appellants’ contention of their entitlement to have the merits of their case gone into in this court. In this respect I have already referred to rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 and article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979.
In my statement of the facts and history of the case although I indicated that I thought the decision of the Court of Appeal against the appellants were impeccable, I did not go into the appeal and canvass the legal reasons which persuaded me to this view. This is an exercise I would have been obliged to perform if the appeal were properly before this court and the argument which struck me and probably others and which influenced Hector Macleod J. in Amonoo v. Tufts (supra) which I have already quoted is this: since a decision on the merits would in my opinion end up in the appeal being dismissed, a dismissal of the appeal in limine does not seem to be necessary because a dismissal on the merits will assuage the feelings of the appellant and give him satisfaction that he has not been driven from the judgment seat unheard.
Speaking for myself, I unhesitatingly reject without any reservation whatsoever this emotional approach to legal problems. I can understand
[p.684] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
Hector Macleod J. deferring to his colleague because he felt his colleague had some doubt and he willingly gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant. I am not prepared to ignore the implication of clear legal provisions unless doubts on the said implications are planted in my mind by the most cogent or even plausible argument. In the absence of that, I will true to my oath, give effect to statutory provisions uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations as the feelings of the appellant and the like.
Other arguments albeit obliquely which were urged on this court, some of which I have casually noted already, would seem to be the notions of hardship and an alleged technicality if the interpretation and application of the rule inhibit the consideration of the appeal on its merits.
As I have already pointed out the problems generated in this case are not new to our law. Two schools of thought have emerged over the years and proffered interpretations for resolving the problems. One school of thought which had entertained the cases in circumstances which would seem to be not too divergent from the case before us is represented by such cases as C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366, C.A.; and Armah v. Naawu (supra). In a marginal sort of way Benneh v. The Republic (supra); Bedaabuor v. Duro, Court of Appeal (full bench), 5 July 1976, unreported; the majority reasoning in Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. (supra); In re Armah (Decd.); Awotwi v. Abadoo (supra) and Lartey v. Baku II (supra). In my considered opinion the reasoning in these cases is faulty. A second school of thought which has accepted the principles canvassed in this judgment can be discerned in such cases as Spokesman (Publications) Ltd. v. Attorney-General (supra); Asibey III v. Ayisi (supra); A/S Norway Cement Export v. Addison [1974] 2 G.L.R. 177, C.A. (full bench); Republic v. Commissioner of Income Tax; Ex parte Maatschappij De Fijnhouthandel NV (Fynhout) [1976] 1 G.L.R. 380, C.A. (full bench). I propose to examine or comment on these cases which I have listed above.
The facts of the Zacca case are that the applicants, C.F.A.O., lodged an appeal against the respondent, who also cross-appealed on the damages of ¢24,000 awarded to him by the High Court. The appeals were heard by the Court of Appeal and the court on 15 August 1969 dismissed the appellants’ appeal but allowed the respondent’s appeal and varied the amount awarded to him as damages from ¢24,000 to N¢49,600. On 22 August 1969 the Constitution, 1969 came into force
[p.685] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 and established a new Supreme Court and in due course the applicants applied to the Court of Appeal under rule 33 of L.I. 218 for a review of the judgment. The said rule 33 provides:
“33. The Court shall not review any judgment once given and delivered by it, save where it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional and that in the interest of justice there should be a review.”
This application for review came before the Court of Appeal coram: Akufo-Addo C.J., Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) and Lassey J.A. The ruling of the court was given on 13 July 1970 although I note that the ruling of the court mistakenly gave the date as 20 June 1970 but this is not relevant. The ruling refusing the application is important because its reasoning must have led the applicants to give consideration to a misconceived further alternate mode of impugning the 1969 judgment. The court held:
“The application is without any merit. The points raised and argued are points that can properly be raised on appeal. The applicant has not been able to satisfy us that there are exceptional circumstances in this case which would call for a review under rule 33 of the rules of the Supreme Court. The application is refused with costs assessed at N¢21.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
On 21 August 1971, about thirteen months after the ruling and over two years after the judgment, the applicants by their counsel applied to the Court of Appeal under rule 8 (4) of C.I. 13 for extension of time within which to appeal to the new Supreme Court. I find it exceedingly difficult to understand this application in view of the clear procedural position which I have canvassed in this judgment that all applications under the said rule 8 are only justiciable by the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeal.
This procedural bar notwithstanding the Court of Appeal coram: Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was). Lassey J.A. and Sowah J.A. (as he then was) with Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) dissenting, entertained and granted the application. This was done in spite of the further legal position that apart from the discretionary review power under rule 33 of L.I. 218, a judgment or decision of the pre-Constitution Court of Appeal, the predecessor of the Court of Appeal at the time, is a final decision from which there was no appeal to any other forum whatsoever. The majority decision of the Court of Appeal respect clearly erroneous. Even delivering his rather unsatisfactory decision in Armah v. Naawu (supra) Amissah J.A. found himself quite unhappy with the Zacca case (supra) when he said at 221: “Certain
[p.686] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 propositions in the majority decision in C.F.A.O. v. Zacca are difficult to accept; upon these, I think, the full bench may one day have to pronounce definitively.”
The full bench is now defunct and this court is now the final appellate court. I hope that with my analysis of the Zacca case the definitive pronouncements which Amissah J.A. anticipated will emerge neatly without any necessity to identify them or even specify them.
Under article 105 (1) (c) of the Constitution, 1969 an appeal lies to the Supreme Court with the leave of the Court of Appeal in civil cases which involved substantial questions of law or are of public importance. Such applications for leave were covered by rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 and as I have already demonstrated in this judgment such applications can only be made within fourteen days and no more of the date of the judgment against which the appeal is sought, and there is no provision for applications for extension of time.
The Zacca application was completely incompetent and stale and the opinion of Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) dismissing the application is the proper and acceptable view of the law. Moreover a recurring problem which the Zacca type of cases and the case before this court exemplify is whether accrued rights which have vested can be disturbed by subsequent legislation which has not in clear language or by necessary implication been made retrospective. Azu Crabbe J.S.C., (as he then was) in the Zacca case (supra) at 386 highlighted the problem when he considered with apparent approval the following statement made by Blair-Kerr J. when the case was before the Supreme Court of Hong Kong and accepted by Lord Morris in the Privy Council when the case came before them on appeal in Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang [1961] A.C. 901 at 922, P.C.:
“It is one thing to invoke a law for the adjudication of rights which have already accrued prior to the repeal of that law; it is quite another matter to say that, irrespective of whether any rights exist at the date of the repeal, if any procedural step is taken prior to the repeal, then, even after the repeal the applicant is entitled to have that procedure continued in order to determine whether he shall be given a right which he did not have when the procedure was set in motion.”
In Spokesman (Publications) Ltd. v. Attorney-General (supra) at 92 Azu Crabbe C.J. speaking for the full court (coram: Azu Crabbe C.J., Apaloo, Sowah JJ.A. (as they then were), Jiagge and Kingsley Nyinah JJ.A.) reiterated a point he had previously made in his dissenting opinion on the Zacca case at 378, C.A. to the effect that:
[p.687] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
“As a general rule, when there is an alteration in the law during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was commenced, unless there is a clear intention in the new statute that it is to apply to pending proceedings,”
Substitute “appeal” for “action” wherever it occurs and “appeals” for “proceedings” and the Zacca situation is covered. It seems to me that this apparent reasoning in the Spokesman case, a full bench case, is binding on the ordinary bench. It shows that prima facie enactments repealing or revoking other enactments are prospective and not retrospective in their operation and thus embrace only prospective rights; they only cover rights which have already accrued if there is a clear intention specifically enacted or by necessary implication that they are to so operate. The failure to give consideration to the effect of this principle in the Zacca case, makes the decision in Zacca clearly unsatisfactory.
On 15 August 1969 the date of the judgment of the Court of Appeal and before the Constitution, 1969 came into force, the rights and obligations of the parties were clear: The respondent had a judgment which was to be completely final and unappealable and which must be satisfied if a review by the Court of Appeal under rule 33 of L.I. 218 was invoked and refused. The applicants had a right if they satisfied certain conditions to challenge the judgment by an application for review and nothing more, and if such review failed they had an obligation to satisfy the judgment.
Now subject to a contrary intention in the relevant repealing enactment sections 8 and 9 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) are:
“8. (1) The repeal or revocation of an enactment shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal or revocation takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed thereunder; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty , forfeiture
[p.688] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 or punishment may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed or revoked.
(2) When an enactment expires, lapses or otherwise ceases to have effect this section shall apply as if the enactment had been repealed or revoked.
9. Where an enactment is repealed or revoked and another enactment is substituted, by way of amendment, revision or consolidation— (a) all authorities and persons established or acting under the repealed or revoked enactment shall continue to be established, or to be entitled to act, under the substituted enactment;
(b) every bond and security given by a person appointed under the repealed or revoked enactment shall remain in force and all books, papers and things used under it shall continue to be used so far as consistent with the substituted enactment; and (c) all proceedings taken under the repealed or revoked enactment shall be prosecuted and continued under and in conformity with the substituted enactment, so far as consistently may be.”
From a study of the above provisions it would seem clear that as at 22 August 1969, the date of the Constitution, 1969, the applicants in the Zacca case had a clear right, the only outstanding right to apply for a review to the new Court of Appeal having regard to the provisions of the said sections 8 and 9 (c) of C.A. 4. The exercise of jurisdiction and the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Zacca civil motion No. 31/70 are therefore legally proper and unimpeachable. Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) however at 376 said of the decision of the Court of Appeal in civil motion No. 31/70, that it was decided per incuriam. I think this view is erroneous for failure to advert to the relevance in particular of section 9 (c) of C.A. 4. On this matter the view of Sowah J.A. (as he then was) emphasising as it did the keyword “successor” in article 125 (2) of the Constitution, 1969 to buttress the jurisdiction of the new Court of Appeal to decide motion No. 31/70 is the preferable view.
Having said that much the question that arises is this: On 22 August 1969 had the applicants in the Zacca case (supra) a right to appeal which was preserved by section 13 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969 or section 8 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1960. Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) posed this question in an attenuated form at 381 of the Zacca case. The majority
[p.689] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 decision did not answer this question. As there was clearly no such right there could be no question of the existence of a jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to exercise a non-existent right. The application in the Zacca case is in my opinion incompetent and extravagant and the majority decision on it is per incuriam. I will overrule that case and subject to the reservation I have already made in regard to civil motion No. 31/70. I will approve the reasoning and the decision in the dissenting opinion of Azu Crabbe C.J. in that case.
Armah v. Naawu (supra)
In this case, the applicants successfully had a judgment against the respondent in the magistrate court. Although the respondent appealed unsuccessfully to the High Court, his further appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 3 July 1972. On 13 July 1972 the applicants applied quite timeously by civil motion No. 28/72 under rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 and section 3 (1) of Act 372 “for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court” against the said decision of the Court of Appeal. Before the application could be heard by the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court was abolished by N.R.C.D. 101 on 13 September 1972.
On 25 March 1974 the application was struck out for non-appearance of the parties, but the applicants subsequently moved the court in civil motion No. 70/74 to have their appeal relisted and on 20 January 1975 the Court of Appeal granted the application, and so the original application in civil motion No. 28/72 thus restored but still asking for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was heard on 25 July 1975 and the court granted rather a volte face leave to the applicants to apply for review by the full bench, newly established under N.R.C.D. 101. Clearly on 20 January 1975 the date the applicants asked for and were granted leave for their application which had been thus struck out to be restored, the Supreme Court had to their knowledge been abolished. Their application was to their own knowledge an impossible one and one to be properly dismissed as Amissah J.A. rightly remarked at 205 and as was unanimously and rightly decided by the Court of Appeal in Asibey III v. Ayisi (supra) at 317. Yet for reasons difficult to appreciate the application was granted and the impossible application was entertained and because the relief which they asked for was an impossible one, a relief which the applicants had not asked for was granted to them. I think the decision of the Court of Appeal to relist the impossible application is erroneous in law.
Surely the question for a decision, glaringly simple in the circumstances is this: Had the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to entertain the application? On 13 September 1972 before the Supreme Court was abolished and the full bench established the applicants had the right to
[p.690] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 ask for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Under section 8 (1) and 9 (c) of C.A. 4, this right can only be exercised if there is no contrary intention appearing in the repealing enactment, but since the repealing enactment specifically repealed section 3 of Act 372, and abolished the Supreme Court to which the appeal could be made, a contrary intention is clearly indicated here and so the enactment extinguished the right. The court cannot suo motu vest a new right in the applicant. This would be a pure usurpation of the legislative function. Armah v. Naawu (supra) is in my view decided per incuriam. It is however worthwhile to advert to the principles which the court resorted to give the appellants their new right to ask for review.
Now as I have pointed out every enactment is prospective not retrospective in its operation unless the enactment specifically or by necessary implication is retrospective. The rule is stated with commendable clarity in Odgers, Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th ed. ) at 280 thus: “The natural and ordinary way to regard statutes is as affecting something in the future and as not affecting what has gone before.” N.R.C.D. 101 is therefore prospective for there is nothing in it enjoining retrospective operation. It therefore applies to future rights not past accrued rights. This means that the full bench which it established was to entertain future rights of review and if a right of review did not previously exist then the new law cannot operate retrospectively to create it. As Scrutton L.J. said in Ward v. British Oak Insurance Co. [1932] 1 K.B. 392 at 397, C.A.: “Prima facie an Act deals with future and not with past events. If this were not so the Act might annul rights already acquired, while the presumption is against the intention.” Azu Crabbe C.J. echoing virtually almost the ipssima verba of Maxwell as was quoted by Evershed M.R. in Hutchinson v. Jauncey [1950] 1 K.B. 547 at 578, C.A. had this in mind when he rightly quoted the words I have already indicated in this judgment at 91 of the Spokesman case (supra) and repeated them in C.F.A.O. v. Zacca (supra) at 378. Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) expressed similar views in Benneh v. The Republic (supra) at 85. See also the views of Granville Sharp J.S.C. delivering the judgment of the erstwhile Supreme Court in Re Okine [1960] G.L.R. 267 at 268.
By a process of reasoning however necessitating a consideration of the legislative policy behind N.R.C.D. 101 and a holding that in terms of its object and effect a review was the same as an appeal on a question of law the plain legislative language of the repealed section 3 (1) (d) of Act 372 was apparently subjected to interpretation by the majority in Armah v. Naawu (supra) in order to found jurisdiction. The section is as follows: “An appeal shall lie from a judgment, decree or order of the
[p.691] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court … with leave of the Court of Appeal.” This provision was in the Naawu case apparently in effect construed as follows: “A review shall lie … from a judgment, decree or order of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal to the full bench with the leave of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal” By this interpretation, N.R.C.D. 101 was construed to operate retrospectively to effect proceedings pending in the Court of Appeal although there is no provision in the said N.R.C.D. 101 meant to interfere retrospectively with pending proceedings. The rule of law which permitted such licence with enacted words was not indicated but after its elaborate consideration of the legislative policy behind N.R.C.D. 101, the court in its majority decision in the Naawu case asked itself one crucial question. Citing as authority C.F.A.O. v. Zacca (supra) and the Benneh case (supra) Amissah J.A. at 208 queried: “should an application originally couched in terms seeking permission to go to the Supreme Court now be granted but directed to the full bench?” And before answering in the affirmative he explored the answer to his own question on the same page as follows:
“In answering it, we must bear in mind that on this question of succession, it is the broad and equitable approach, rather than the narrow and technical, that has consistently found favour with our courts.”
I am, I regret to say not aware of any such rule in cases where the language of the enactment is so clear that there is no need to interpret or construe it, and in such a case there can with great respect be no question of a broad and equitable approach or a narrow and technical one. When words are clear and unambiguous the fundamental rule is that they need not be interpreted or construed. They are given effect to:
A right to appeal or to ask for a review is a creature of statute as Anin J.A. (as he then was) so ably pointed out in Lartey v. Baku II (supra) adding at 259, CA: Litigants do not enjoy a common law right to appeal or review at will.” When the statute gives the right the terms of the enabling enactment must be strictly complied with. It was the inimitable Jessel M.R.. who in Ford v. Kettle (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 139 at 142 adverted to the true rule in such cases when he said:
“I am always exceedingly loth to allow a purely technical objection to prevail. Here the objection which is taken is a purely technical one … At the same time a judge must not allow hard cases to make bad law. When we have, as in this case, an Act which was intended to be very strict in its provisions, and we find that, on a fair interpretation of its words, a condition which is imposed for ensuring the validity of the execution has not been
[p.692] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 complied with, we are not at liberty to depart from the meaning of the Act.”
With regard to the elaborate policy consideration indulged in by Amissah J.A. in Armah v. Naawu, Lord Sterndale M.R.. in Scranton’s Trustee v. Pearse [1922] 2 Ch. 87 at 123-124, C.A. gives a stern warning:
“I am bound to say I think it is an extraordinarily dangerous and mischievous doctrine to hold that a Court, in considering whether it can give effect to an Act of Parliament or not, is to examine the Act and see whether it considers it is the kind of legislation which is consistent with the general policy of the realm. Such an attitude . . . is one which might lead to extraordinary results. In my opinion all this Court can do is to say: Is that what is enacted by the statute? and, if it is, it must give effect to it: . . .”
With regard to the attempt at equating a review with an appeal in regard to their effects and objectives, I am afraid a review is to enable a court to correct its own errors and an appeal is a complaint to a higher tribunal and whereas in effect an appeal is a rehearing a review is not. The Court of Appeal for instance under rule 33 of L.I. 218 can review its own decisions; but because of the rule that there must in the long run be an end to litigation there is no such jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to review its decision once given. After the Court of Appeal has so reviewed its decision, if there is a right of appeal to a higher court that power can be exercised either after the decision was first given by the Court of Appeal or after the review. A full bench operating under L.I. 218 can review its own decisions as was pursued in civil motion 2/79 which was converted into an appeal when the Constitution, 1979 came into force: see Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1982-83] G.L.R. 715, S.C. Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) in his decision in A/S Norway Cement Export Ltd. v. Addison (supra) at 182 rightly, in my view, demonstrated that the effects and objectives of a review and appeal are quite distinct and I fear the attempt in the Zacca case (supra) and in Naawu (supra) to assimilate a review by the full bench to an appeal by the supreme Court is with respect most unsatisfactory and unacceptable. It seems to me that the reasoning sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeal cannot be supported. I hold therefore that Armah v. Naawu was decided per incuriam and I would overrule it.
Benneh v. The Republic (supra)
The point for decision in Benneh v. The Republic (supra) is whether the National Liberation Council (Investigation and Forfeiture of
[p.693] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 Assets) (Further implementation of Commissions, Findings (No. 3)) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 400) passed after the Constitution, 1969 had come into force, is a valid legislation since it clearly violates article 18 of the said Constitution. When that Constitution came into force on 22 August 1969 by virtue of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constituent Assembly (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 380), the National Liberation Council and its executive council were mandated by subsections 1 and 2 of section 14 of the transitional provisions to continue as a caretaker government under the said Constitution. At the same time by paragraph 3 of N.L.C.D. 380, the enabling Decree enacting these provisions, the Proclamation, 1966 under which the National Liberation Council was previously legislating was continued in force until it was repealed by the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 406) on 30 September 1969.
It is noteworthy that the executive power of the National Liberation Council which was previously wide, was under section 14 (2) of the transitional provisions not to exceed the executive power of the State exercisable by the President under the Constitution; an indication that the legislative powers were not to exceed the powers granted to the legislature under the Constitution. Clearly as a caretaker government functioning by virtue of the Constitution, 1969 which operated prospectively the legislative powers of the State which they were thus given by section 14 (1) of the transitional provisions can only be the legislative powers of the State under the Constitution. The continued operation of the Proclamation, 1966 as obviously amended by the Constitution, 1969, can only be to enable the National Liberation Council to exercise the legislative powers so given to them by “Decrees” instead of by “Acts” until the State Parliamentary Legislature created by the Constitution is organised to commence to exercise its functions by “Acts” of Parliament.
The Wesminster type of absolute legislative sovereignty which the National Liberation Council enjoyed under the Proclamation, 1966, was converted into a legislative power circumscribed by the said Constitution and therefore not wider than the Constitution mandated should henceforth be exercised as from 22 August 1969.
This clear and undoubted legal position which informed the erudite and impeccable decision of Azu Crabbe C.J. collided and was apparently rejected in a scholarly and brilliant judgment of Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) which was concurred in unanimously by the other members of the full bench of the Court of Appeal. In my view in so far as it can be said that the Azu Crabbe C.J. reasoning delineated above was rejected by the judgment of the majority then in my view that judgment must be considered to be unsatisfactory.
[p.694] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
Bedaabuor v. Duro (supra)
In this case Baidoo J. gave judgment for the plaintiff in suit No. LC 21/66 at the High Court on 30 July 1969. On 12 August 1969 an appeal has lodged by the defendants at the Court of Appeal. On 22 August 1969, the Constitution, 1969 came into force. The appeal, civil appeal No. 100/70, was heard and allowed by the Court of Appeal on 31 July 1972. On 11 August 1972 the plaintiff by civil motion No. 36/72 applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. While his application was thus pending in the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court was abolished on 13 September 1972 by N.R.C.D. 101 and the full bench of the Court of Appeal was established. On 18 March 1974: (coram Apaloo J.A. (as he then was), Lassey J.A. and Archer J.A. (as he then was)) the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, an impossible application was rightly dismissed with costs. Archer J.A. (as he then was) in Armah v. Naawu (supra) at 220 proudly gave the clear legal reasons which led the court unanimously to dismiss the application. In support of the principles I have been at pains to canvass in this judgment, he succinctly explained the stand of the Court of Appeal thus:
“There is now no court to which we can grant the applicant leave to appeal. We therefore cannot stultify ourselves by granting this motion even if we had been satisfied of its merit which we are not. The application is dismissed.”
The application so dealt with and rightly dismissed as impossible is virtually similar to the application which the applicants, Patu-Styles and wife, made in this case to the Court of Appeal on 2 November 1979. On 26 March 1974 an application for review of this impeccable decision was made to the new full bench established on 13 September 1972. The application was heard and the review granted on 5 July 1976. By the principles I have canvassed in this judgment, N.R.C.D. 101 applied to future cases; the Decree did not cover rights which had accrued and were pending before it was enacted. The full bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. On 13 September 1972, the application pending before the Court of Appeal became an impossible application and the court was right to dismiss it. The review rejecting as it does the principle that statutes are prima facie prospective not retrospective, must be considered per incuriam and erroneous. I would overrule it.
Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. (supra)
The applicant had a decision of the High Court given in his favour set aside by the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal on 27 November
[p.695] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
1975 (reported sub nom Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. v. Harlley [1976] 1 G.L.R. 158). On 16 February 1976, the applicant applied specifically to the full bench within the statutory period of three months under rule 8 (1) (b) of C.I. 13 for a review on stated grounds that the decision was wrong. He later on 29 March 1976 filed four additional grounds. Admittedly the first three grounds he thus filed were alleging errors of law. The fourth ground seemed merely to show that the decision which was alleged to be wrong in the original ground had occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
For reasons difficult to understand, the application so specifically and timeously made to the full bench was listed before the ordinary bench and that bench purported to remit the matter to the full bench. In my respectful opinion this was an usurpation and an unnecessary exercise of jurisdiction for the ordinary bench had no jurisdiction at all to deal with the matter. Azu Crabbe C.J. however had a majority of the court with him in holding that rule 5 of C.I. 13 [which provides that where no provisions are expressly made in the rules regarding the practice and procedure applicable to any cause or matter before the court, the court should prescribe such practice and procedure as would serve the interests of justice] enabled the full bench to entertain the application. I cannot with respect see how rule 5 can be resorted to, to give or assume jurisdiction where none existed. Such use of rule 5 is in my humble opinion dangerous and misconceived, a right to appeal or to ask for a review must be specifically given by statute. To use rule 5 to give a right to ask for a review where none specifically is given is with respect quite improper.
On the assumption that the four grounds filed by the applicant were alleging errors of law, a view that commended itself to the majority, counsel for the respondents argued quite properly that under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101 leave of the Court of Appeal, a condition precedent, had not been satisfied before filing the application for review in the full bench. Furthermore counsel submitted that under rule 7 of C.I. 13 such an application for leave was to be filed within fourteen days. So that by the rules and the enabling enactment the application was incompetent. Clearly if the grounds were errors of law simpliciter then the court lacked jurisdiction and his point was unanswerable. The majority decision however having conceded that the grounds encompassed errors of law, nevertheless prayed in aid rule 5 of C.I. 13 to assume jurisdiction and to thus circumvent the rules and the enabling legislation. I held and still hold that this is not permissible and in my considered opinion in so far as the reasoning of the majority was founded on this method of assuming jurisdiction it is with respect erroneous and should be overruled. The grounds of the application particularly the original grounds appear quite obviously to be alleging
[p.696] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 miscarriage of justice and under section 3 (2) (b) of N.R.C.D. 101 leave of the Court of Appeal was not necessary and rule 8 of C.I. 13 and not rule 7 was the applicable provision. Under the said rule 8 the applicant filed his application within the three months period and his application was therefore properly before the full bench. It is because the majority ignored this that in my opinion its decision although right in its result is to be considered with respect to be founded on faulty reasoning. In purporting to reply to the argument of Mr. Quist in support of his preliminary objection raised before the Court of Appeal in this case on 26 October 1979, Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata referred to Harlley v. Ejura Farms (supra) as authority sustaining his entitlement to be granted leave to apply to the full bench in spite of the clear breach of rule 7. I would overrule the reasoning of the majority in the Harlley case in order to forestall any future reliance on the unsatisfactory Harlley ratio as was attempted by counsel in this case.
In re Armah (Decd.); Awotwi v. Abadoo (supra)
In an application to the full bench for a review of the judgment of the ordinary bench reported sub nom; Awotwi v. Abadoo [1975] 1 G.L.R. 374, C.A. the applicant stated his grounds for invoking the review jurisdiction of the full bench as based on an error of law and miscarriage of justice. The court assumed jurisdiction and heard the application. The judgment of the court stated at 379:
“The grounds lumped together two statutory grounds for review, one of which requires leave. In so far as this application can be said to be based on a ground of law, leave to apply to this court should first have been given by the ordinary bench under section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D.
101). No such leave is required if the only ground of the application is the amorphous one that the decision occasions a miscarriage of justice.’ We first considered this matter in chambers. It did not appear to us that the well-reasoned decision of the ordinary bench occasioned a miscarriage of justice. We felt that notwithstanding the infelicitous manner in which the ground for the review application was formulated, the applicant’s real complaint was one of law. At least in view of the ordinary bench’s own position on the law and its application of it to the facts, the applicant’s complaint was plausible. We treated the application as one brought under section 3 (2) (a) and granted leave so that we could hear full argument on the law in open court. We heard this on 19 April last.”
Having regard to the principles I have stated in this judgment the ground for assuming jurisdiction is obviously erroneous. Under section
[p.697] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101, the court to grant leave was the ordinary bench not the full bench. The applicant has obviously failed to comply with the rules and by recourse to rule 66 (1) of the rules, the full bench can waive the non-compliance if it is in the interest of justice so to do and if the non-compliance is not wilful. The ultimate decision of the court showed that there was no interest of justice to be satisfied by waiving non-compliance, however the question of whether the non-compliance was wilful or not was never considered. The only other conceivable basis for the assumption of jurisdiction is article 105 (2) of the Constitution, 1969 but under that provision an application should have been made to the full bench for special leave for the review. As this was not done, it seems the assumption of jurisdiction was erroneous. I think in so far as contrary to the provision of section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101 the full bench assumed jurisdiction without the leave precedent of the ordinary bench, its assumption of jurisdiction is per incuriam.
Lartey v. Baku II (supra)
With a few reservations I agree with the view of my brother Adade J.S.C. that although the ultimate decision of the court in Lartey v. Baku II is right, the reasoning sustaining the decision is with respect wrong. Civil motion 11/79 was filed in the Court of Appeal on 31 January 1979 “for leave to apply for review of the judgment of the ordinary bench by the full bench under section 3 (2) of … N.R.C.D. 101.” The judgment sought to be impugned was delivered by the ordinary bench on 20 July 1977, practically nineteen months before the application. The applicant argued that non-compliance with the rules should be waived by virtue of rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 and the court labouring under the impression that rule 8 of C.I. 13 had been breached felt that the application should have been filed within six months and proceeding under the belief that it had jurisdiction in proper cases under rule 66 (1) to waive non-compliance, thought the case was not appropriate for invoking the said jurisdiction and consequently declined to exercise the alleged jurisdiction. Anin J.A. (as he then was) speaking for the court considered the alleged applicable rule 8 and said at 262, C.A:
“Having regard to the clear and unambiguous language of C.I. 13, r. 8, we are satisfied that the present application ought to have been filed within six months of the final decision of the ordinary bench. The defendant-applicants are clearly guilty of unreasonable delay, their motion having been filed thirteen months outside the permitted maximum period of six months. This court consequently lacks jurisdiction to entertain this time-barred motion; hence it was dismissed in limine.”
[p.698] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644
Citing with apparent approval remarks of Lord Atkin in Moore v. Tayee (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43 at 45, he considered the applicability of rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 at 262 thus: “Undoubtedly, this rule enables the court, when properly seised with jurisdiction to entertain a motion, to waive non-compliance with any rule of practice or procedural direction or order if the non-compliance was not wilful and if the interests of justice so require. By exercising this power in appropriate cases, the court can do substantial justice between the parties. But …the appellate court can only invoke its power to waive rules only if it is seised of the appeal and has jurisdiction to entertain it. Here, the motion is time-barred and consequently the court is not seised with jurisdiction to entertain it and is powerless to invoke rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 in the applicants favour.”
I think my brother Adade has ably demonstrated that the court’s invocation of rule 8 is wrong and I agree with his powerful criticism of the Lartey v. Baku II case on this score and his conclusion that in so far as the court applied rule 8 instead of rule 7 “Baku was decided per incuriam.”
I have also indicated here that the Court of Appeal did consider rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 and thinking it gave it jurisdiction, declined for reasons it gave to exercise the said jurisdiction. In my opinion the Court of Appeal with all due respect, has no jurisdiction to waive non-compliance with any of the rules in C.I. 13. That jurisdiction as I pointed out in this court in Hammond v. Odoi [1982-83] G.L.R. 1215, S.C. can only be exercised by the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of rule 70 of C.I. 13. To the extent that the Court of Appeal implied in the Lartey v. Baku II case (supra) that it had jurisdiction to waive non-compliance with C.I. 13, its implied assumption of jurisdiction in the said decision is per incuriam.
I have now completed the examination of the cases which in my view were wrongly decided. The second group of cases beginning with spokesman (Publications) Ltd. v. Attorney-General (supra) and ending with the Republic v. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra), applied rightly the principles which I have canvassed in this judgment and I therefore approve their ratios.
I have had the advantage of reading beforehand the judgment of my brother Adade J.S.C., I agree completely with his holding as to the meaning of “pending” in section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. I concur also in his further holding that on 24 September 1979 this case was not a review pending before the full [p.699] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 bench and was not one of the cases contemplated by the said section 5 and I therefore agree with the conclusion which he draws from these holdings.
Furthermore I am impressed and I agree with the able process of reasoning by which he demonstrated that rule 7 of C.I. 13 is a subsisting rule and had not been made otiose by the abrogation by N.R.C.D. 101 of article 105 of the Constitution, 1969. I have given considerable thought, however, to the opinion expressed that on breach of rule 7 (1), “no court has any jurisdiction to extend time; the right to apply for leave will have been lost for good.”
Having regard to my stand in regard to the legal effect of rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13, I find it difficult to share the view that the Supreme Court is powerless to entertain an appeal on breach of rule 7 of C.I. 13. Indeed in Hammond v. Odoi (supra), our assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal when obviously the rules were breached can be justified, inter alia, on recourse to rule 66 (1) of C.I. 13 as I endeavoured to show in my judgment in that case. Of course, I concede that the Court of Appeal has no right to extend time on such breach, but I am unable to subscribe to the view that the right to apply for leave to the Supreme Court “will have been lost for good” in view of the unambiguously contrary constitutional provision in article 117 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 as preserved by the Proclamation, 1981 and P.N.D.C.L. 42. Subject therefore to these reservations I agree with his apparent conclusion that this appeal is incompetent and ought to be dismissed.
Accordingly it is my view that this so-called appeal does not deserve to be considered on its merits as it is not a proper appeal in accordance with law. I will in the circumstances for the reasons I have been at pains to articulate in this judgment dismiss it in limine with costs.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
At the close of the hearing of arguments in this appeal we were of the unanimous mind that the appeal totally failed on the merits. We dismissed it and reserved our reasons. The judgment appealed from, as noted by the appellate court below, involved an uncomplicated land case wherein the plaintiff claimed title to a plot of land at Link Road, Accra measuring 120 feet by 140 feet square. The plaintiff based his claim on outright purchase from one Abraham Adotei Allotey on 1 August 1959. His vendor, in turn, acquired the absolute title from the Sempe stool by virtue of a deed of gift dated 1 October 1941 and registered as No. 415/1944. The plaintiff also claimed damages for trespass and an injunction to restrain the defendant from trespassing on his land. The defendant denied the plaintiff’s claim and maintained that in 1960 his wife (the co-defendant) and their two children acquired the land in dispute by a
[p.700] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 customary sale from one Emmanuel Kofi Danso. They went into possession that same year and, by their request, the defendant constructed a wooden structure on the land. The customary sale was later incorporated in a formal deed of conveyance and registered as No. 1264/1964.
The plaintiff ‘s action was triggered off when he saw that the defendant had invaded his land and had commenced building operation thereon. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims mainly, as it seems, on the grounds that the plaintiff was caught by two of the three kinds of estoppel, that is by record and in pais (or by conduct); and also by the equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence. We fail to comprehend what evidence there was before the court to support the trial judge’s finding of estoppel by record which operated against the plaintiff. What he conceived as amounting to an estoppel by record was obviously exhibit H. This was the plan of the land in dispute which the court had ordered to be drawn in an earlier suit where the plaintiff had sued J.A. Quaye and others. In that plan the surveyor had indicated within the disputed land a “platform” for Patu-Styles. The trial judge himself was at a loss to know which of the parties in that earlier suit gave the information about the ownership of this platform to the surveyor. He however made much capital of this platform and held: “If a plaintiff puts in evidence a document such as exhibit H, it will be wrong in my view not to accept its contents as binding upon him.”
To use exhibit H as an estoppel by record was clearly a misconception because this type of estoppel is that a person may not deny facts which have previously been decided against him by the judgment of a court of law: see the Duchess of Kingston’s Case (1776) 168 E.R. 175.
The doctrine of estoppel by conduct, as adumbrated in Pickard v. Sears (1837) 6 A & E 469, is that:
“Where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.”
From the evidence there was not so much as a peg on which the trial judge could hang the above doctrine. The trial judge, however, made bold to apply the equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence enunciated in Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 140 because in his view the plaintiff knew of the existence of the defendant’s platform and wooden structure on his land but sat by and did nothing about them and even knowingly permitted the defendants to incur expenditure in building on the land. He imputed knowledge in the plaintiff partly
[p.701] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 because of the insertion of “Patu-Styles’ platform” in exhibit H dated 9 May 1964 and partly from his own deduction that since the plaintiff had lived nearby since 1959 he could not be believed when he said that he did not know of the existence of both the platform and the alleged wooden structure.
When the judgment came on appeal the court below had no difficulty in setting it aside. Although an appellate court has to pay great respect to the findings of fact of a trial judge yet when the judgment appealed from is not based upon the whole evidence and all the facts and circumstances of the case have not been taken into consideration by the trial judge the issues become at large and it is the duty of the appellate court to arrive at its own conclusion on the evidence: see Tonazzi v. Brunetti (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 403. The Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs evidence in support of his root of title, acts of ownership and possession including earlier successful litigation by the plaintiff himself and also by his predecessor in defence of their title was largely documentary. It found further that not only was none of these documents in any way impugned by the plaintiff’s adversaries or by the judge but also that the judge paid little or no attention to them as well as to the other circumstances of the case. These, it appears, formed the overall basis which led the Court of Appeal to make up its own mind on the evidence.
Briefly, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the trial judge for the following reasons: In the first place it held that the trial judge was wrong to fix the plaintiff with virtual responsibility for the plan, exhibit H, and to hold him bound or estopped by it as the plaintiff was not the author of the plan and he had also objected to the spot where the platform was as belonging to Patu-Styles. In the second place the defendant and the co-defendant were not parties or privies to the Quayes in connection with whose suit exhibit H was first drawn by the surveyor. That suit in any event is a res inter alios acta and exhibit H could not be used as evidence of facts. The trial judge missed the relevance of exhibit H which was to identify what was really the subject matter of the earlier dispute and also to provide a specific instance of earlier litigation conducted by the plaintiff in defence of his title to the disputed land. Thirdly, the trial judge overlooked the fact that exhibit H was prepared and dated 9 May 1964, some five months before the writ of summons in the instant suit was issued. The building plan was recommended on 30 September 1964, only a fortnight before the plaintiff’s action, and the building operations were commenced after the issue of the building permit. The defendant himself said he started supervising the building project in October 1964. Prior to this there had been direct confrontation on the land between him and the
[p.702] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 defendant. In the fourth place, the trial judge failed to advert his mind to the material evidence of the co-defendant’s vendor who said that he put his purchasers in possession after the execution of the deed and payment of the final installment of the purchase price in September 1963. The co-defendant herself told the court that she started the building before she got the permit and that at the time she got the building permit in October 1964 she had only dug the foundation. The Court of Appeal found that these and other pieces of material evidence, which the trial judge overlooked, lent credence and weight to the plaintiff’s case and demolished the findings of laches and acquiescence made against the plaintiff.
It is against the judgment of the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal that the defendants were granted leave for a review by the full bench and which review has now turned into an appeal before us because, as the defendants’ counsel argued, this was justified by the provisions of section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. Grounds (1), (3) and (4) of the grounds of appeal which counsel argued together were to the following effect:
1. Although it noted that “the plaintiff above shouldered the onus probandi of title to the land in dispute” yet the ordinary bench erred in its uncritical recital of the plaintiff’s evidence without considering whether it established the plaintiffs title to the land.
2. The ordinary bench erred in its claim that none of the documents tendered by the plaintiff in support of his title was in any way impugned by the defendants or the judge.
3. The ordinary bench erred in substituting an uncritical acceptance of the plaintiff’s evidence of title for the trial judge’s rejection of the same, and his preference for the defendants’ evidence.
In his effort to answer the charge that both the defendants and the trial judge failed to impugn the documents tendered by the plaintiff, counsel for the appellants pointed at both the defence which denied the plaintiff’s title and the summons for directions which brought out clearly that the dispute was as to which of the parties owned the land. He also argued that the trial judge came to a definite conclusion on his view of the evidence as a whole when he said:
“It is said that in a civil case the issue should be determined on a balance of probabilities. Considering, therefore, the most unsatisfactory nature of the evidence for the plaintiff both documentary and on oath, I come to the conclusion that weighing all the evidence in this case as a whole the balance of probabilities is
[p.703] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 strongly in favour of the defendant and the co-defendant. I, therefore, have no hesitation at all in accepting the evidence of title as established by the co-defendant.”
Whilst no court will treat reliance upon pleadings as pedantry or mere formalism but will accept their function as ascertaining with precision the matters on which the parties differ and the points on which they agree and thus to arrive at certain clear issues on which both parties desire a judicial decision, yet I venture to say that it is the duty of the defendant to negate by his evidence (or by some other proof in court) the case which the plaintiff has alleged against him in the witness-box. When so considered it becomes clear from the record that the documents tendered by the plaintiff in support of his acts of ownership stood in the main unchallenged.
It was said in Craven v. Craven (1957) 107 L.J. 505, C.A. that:
“The judicial process is a duty to resolve the facts in issue and facts relevant to the issue and then to apply the law to the facts. If the question:—what were the facts found?; could not be answered with precision and particularity, the judgment ought to be held to be unsatisfactory.”
See also Nubour v. Ampadu, Court of Appeal, 31 May 1960, unreported and Quaye v. Mariamu [1961] G.L.R. 93, S.C. It was not enough for the trial judge to arrive at that conclusion on the plaintiff’s evidence without fully assessing the plaintiff’s evidence and indicating why he found it unsatisfactory. In the absence of such findings of fact the appellate court will not be debarred from reaching its own conclusions. Equally so, where the trial judge drew wrong conclusions from facts found by him an appellate court will also be entitled to set straight those conclusions. To be sure it was found by the trial judge that the plaintiff saw and knew that the platform was on the land, that there had been a wooden structure on the land and that he wilfully did not do anything about it. This finding together with the conclusion of laches and acquiescence found against the plaintiff was critically destroyed by the Court of Appeal. I am in full agreement that the equitable doctrines of laches and acquiescence could not prevail against the plaintiff because by launching this law suit against the defendant soon as he actively commenced his building operation the plaintiff showed himself to be “ready, desirous, prompt and eager” to resist him.
Exhibit G was the result of the search which the plaintiff conducted in respect of his vendor’s land out of which his own grant was carved. The plaintiff also tendered at the trial exhibit E, the judgment in suit No. 32/58 which his vendor, A. A. Allotey, obtained against I. A. Akwei, Madam Amuaku and S. M. Abraham. In that suit A. A. Allotey was given
[p.704] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 judgment declaring him owner of the land edged red on the plan tendered in this suit as exhibit F. The plan attached to exhibit G is the same as the plan in exhibit H which featured in the plaintiff’s suit against Quaye and the others. It also bears the same relationship with exhibit F except that for Outer Ring Road as a boundary feature we have Link Road in exhibit F. The search disclosed no less than sixteen conveyances over the land encompassed by A. A. Allotey’s judgment. In their order of registration there is first a deed of gift dated 30 January 1953 from Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II to I. A. Akwei. Then there is a deed of gift dated 30 January 1953 from Nii Kofi Akrashie II to E. K. Danso and another. One Ashitey then made two separate conveyances of the same date to I. A. Quaye and E. T. Quaye. This is followed by five conveyances from Abrahams, the last of which was to I. T. Okine dated 26 June 1957.
A. A. Allotey made a conveyance dated 13 June 1958 and I. A. Akwei made another conveyance. A. A. Allotey followed with three conveyances. J. E. A. Pappoe and J. S. Nettey followed. The last registered conveyance dated 18 September 1963 was from E. K. Danso to the co-defendant. This document was registered in 1964. Indeed, exhibit 1 shows that it was delivered for registration on 26 September 1964. The trial judge made certain inferences against the plaintiff from exhibit G which are completely non-sequitur. For instance he inferred that because exhibit G does not show that the Sempe stool gave land in the area to the plaintiffs vendor, Allotey, no such grant was ever made to him; and he further inferred that his vendor never registered his title as contended by the plaintiff. Exhibit G cautioned that a search could only be made in respect of an instrument executed and stamped subsequently to 1 October 1948. The plaintiff said in evidence that his vendor acquired the land on 1 October 1941 and registered it as No. 415/1944. The recital in the plaintiff’s title deed, exhibit B, confirmed his evidence. The title deed of the plaintiff’s vendor, exhibit C, shows on its face that it was presented for registration on 6 November 1944 and was duly registered as No. 415/1944.
The defendant’s counsel attacked the judgment of the Court of Appeal on other grounds. He argued that as between the plaintiff’s unregistered deed and the defendant’s registered deed, the priority was in favour of the registered deed. Counsel relied on section 21 (1) of the Lands Registry Ordinance, Cap. 133 (1951 Rev.) for this proposition. The priority envisaged in the above section arises where the grantee in each document derived titles from the same grantor. The question of priority is inapplicable here because both the plaintiff and the co-defendant derived their titles from different original allodial owners. It was also argued that the plaintiff failed to prove that the plaintiff’s land, as shown on his deed of title, was identical with the land in
[p.705] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 644 dispute, overlapped it; or came anywhere within or near it; nor was it proved that the plaintiff’s vendor’s land, as shown on his title deed of 1941, was identical with or overlapped, or fell within, or came anywhere near the land in dispute. Although counsel advanced his argument in support with characteristic force it became quite obvious that he was clutching at mere straws. He pointed out, for instance, that in the plan attached to the title deed of the plaintiff’s vendor (exhibit C) the land is described as bounded on the south by the African Methodist Episcopal Bethel Mission’s property and on the east by the Link Road. Equally so the site plan attached to exhibit G shows the land of the plaintiff’s vendor lying along the Link Road. Counsel contends, however, that the disputed property is at Lartebiokorshie and about a mile north of the Link Road.
I think that it was misleading to say that the Link Road lies about a mile south of the disputed property. A look at the plan, exhibit A, ordered by the court to identify the disputed plot shows that it is only 310 feet from the Link Road. In fact from the farthest extremity of the disputed plot to the Link Road, as shown in exhibit A, measures 410 feet. The land of the plaintiff’s vendor is 400 feet square. In exhibit A the plaintiff ‘s own plot on which he resides is separated from the disputed plot by only one plot which appears to be of the same dimensions (100 feet by 70 feet square) as the disputed plot. Thus we find the three plots in the same geographic area. As a matter of fact when one looks at the site plan attached to the plaintiff’s deed of title, exhibit B, it becomes quite easy, using the plot the plaintiff occupies as the starting point, to measure out and identify the two building plots granted to the plaintiff. Apart from exhibit C, the plot occupied by the plaintiff is showing in all the plans of his vendor’s land tendered at the trial. The identity of the land in dispute as covering half of the land granted to the plaintiff by exhibit B cannot be disputed. The site plan of A. A. Allotey in exhibit C reveals a vacant land bounded by other vacant properties. With the rampant and conflicting land acquisitions in Accra and also with its rapidly changing face it is not strange that the vacant land described in 1941 as the property of the African Methodist Episcopal Bethel Mission may have changed hands years later.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal stands solid. Apart from this, I am in full agreement with the conclusion reached by my brothers Adade and Taylor JJ.S.C. that the appeal itself was incompetent. It was for all these reasons that I formed the view that the appeal was properly dismissed.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
D.R.K.S.
