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[1985] SLR (CA) 23Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II vs. ABUDULAI [1984-86] 2 GLR 226

14 November 1985 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 23
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OSCOLAIN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II v ABUDULAI [1984-86] 2 GLR 226 [1985] SLR (CA) 23
APAIN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II v ABUDULAI [1984-86] 2 GLR 226, [1985] SLR (CA) 23 (Ghana).
BluebookIN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II v ABUDULAI [1984-86] 2 GLR 226, [1985] SLR (CA) 23 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C.

(2) Yendi Skin Affairs, In re; Abudulai v. Yakubu II [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 189, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the applicant for a stay of execution of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in favour of the respondent pending the determination of his appeal to the Supreme Court. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court delivered by Abban J.A.

[p.228] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 226

COUNSEL

Nana Otoamfom Bekoe (Peter Adjetey) (with him Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama) for the applicant.

E. O. Appiah (with him W. A. N. Adumua-Bossman) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The applicant is seeking an order for stay of execution of the judgment and orders of this court made on 29 October 1985. The applicant has appealed to the Supreme Court against the said judgment and orders. Quite apart from the appeal, the applicant has also applied to the Supreme Court for an order of certiorari to quash the said judgment and the consequential orders.

Learned counsel for the applicant contended that both the appeal and the certiorari have reasonable chances of success and it is eminently undesirable to disturb the status quo. Counsel made reference to the grounds of appeal filed and argued at length in an attempt to show that this court was wrong in overturning the findings of the Ollennu Committee, and that the arguments against the judgment and the orders are so weighty that it is likely that the Supreme Court would not have any difficulty in setting aside the judgment. Learned counsel therefore submitted that in that respect irreparable damage would be caused to the applicant if stay of execution was not granted and the respondent was allowed to go into execution which would involve the applicant leaving the palace. In brief, this is the burden of the argument of learned counsel for the applicant.

The application was resisted by the respondent, whose counsel contended that the applicant in the first place has no right of appeal to the Supreme Court for the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law, 1984 (P.N.D.C.L. 86) did not give the applicant that right. Learned counsel contended that the expression “such person” in section 1 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 86 could only refer to the party who appealed against the findings of the committee in terms of section 1 (1) of P.N.D.C.L. 86; and that it is that party alone whom section 1 (2) granted further right of appeal to the Supreme Court. He argued that the applicant not having appealed against any of the findings of the committee did not fall within the expression “such person” in section 1 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 86.

Counsel for the applicant answered that argument by referring to article 117 (1) (a) of the Constitution, 1979 which granted any person aggrieved by the judgment or orders of the Court of Appeal to appeal to the Supreme Court. And article 117 of the Constitution is one of those articles of the Constitution which the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 saved. Thus according to counsel, under the general law the applicant has a right of appeal, section 1 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 86 notwithstanding.

[p.229] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 226

Of course, learned counsel for the respondent submitted in reply that if the argument of counsel for the applicant is right then his further submission is that the provisions of article 117 (1) (a) run counter to those of P.N.D.C.L. 86, s. 1 (2); and so by the provisions of section 4 (3) of the P.N.D.C. Proclamation, 1981 the said clause (1) (a) of article 117 ought and must bow to section 1 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 86. Thus so long as this particular case is concerned counsel for the respondent submitted that the provisions of the general law as stated in article 117 (1) (a) of the Constitution, 1979 are inoperative and the applicant’s purported appeal is frivolous and in any case it is a nullity, and the court should not grant the stay.

The next contention of council for the respondent was that no inconvenience or hardship would be caused to the applicant if the application is refused; for the respondent was the Ya-Na at the time the Ollennu Committee was set up. But after the said committee had taken evidence of six witnesses for the applicant and when the applicant had not even closed his case, the committee made an order restraining the respondent from acting as a Ya-Na. Counsel argued that now that the respondent’s position has again been established by the judgment of this court, on the balance of convenience and in fairness to the respondent, it is better that the application should be refused.

In the first place, we do not wish to express any opinion on whether or not the appeal is frivolous, except to say that we do not think much of the arguments put forward as the basis for the submission that the appeal is likely to succeed.

The main issue of importance is whether or not the applicant has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, he not having appealed against any of the findings of the Ollennu Committee. An appeal is a creature of statute and if the statute does not give a right of appeal, that is the end of the matter. Clearly the words “such person” in P.N.D.C.L. 86, s. 1 (2) could only refer to the person who appealed against the findings of the Ollennu Committee in terms of section 1 (1) and no other person.

The applicant, as matters stand now, cannot bring himself within the expression “such person.” On the face of it the provisions of P.N.D.C.L. 86, s. 1 (2) are in conflict with the provisions of article 117 (1) (a) of the Constitution, 1979, and in such a situation the provisions of sections 1 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 86, ought to prevail in view of the P.N.D.C. Proclamation 1981, s. 4 (3) which states:

“4. (3) Where any enactment or rule of law in force immediately before the 31st day of December, 1981, is in conflict with any provision of any law made by the Council, the said provision shall prevail over such enactment or rule of law and to the extent to which the enactment or rule of law conflicts with the

[p.230] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 226

provision of such Law, that enactment or rule of law shall be deemed to be amended by such Law.”

That being the case, the applicant is bound to face an obstacle which he may find difficult to surmount. In any case, we are clear in our minds what judicial reliefs, apart from payment of costs, that our orders decreed in favour of the respondent he can execute by a court process and which can properly be stayed.

However, assuming that the applicant has a right of appeal and that there is an order to be stayed, the question to be decided is the balance of convenience and hardship. In this respect, we have to apply the usual principles which always guide the court in applications of this nature. These principles are well settled: see Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C. The court has a discretion as to whether to grant or refuse such an application and in exercising the discretion a lot of factors must be taken into consideration. The respondent’s position as a Ya-Na has been confirmed by the judgment complained of: see In re Yendi Skin Affairs; Abudulai v. Yakubu II [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 189, C.A. And the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299) ceased to have effect as from 29 October 1985. So as at now the respondent is the Ya-Na of Dagbon. The applicant not being the Ya-Na cannot legally and constitutionally as at now, perform any functions or exercise any right which is exercisable by a Ya-Na in the Dagbon Traditional Area. At the moment, it is only the respondent who can exercise that right, and a stay will undoubtedly have the effect of preventing the respondent from performing his legitimate duties as a Ya-Na and then allow the applicant who is not the Ya-Na to enjoy a right which legally and constitutionally he is not entitled to.

We think it will not be right or proper to make an order which will bring about such an unfair situation. In fact, the respondent will suffer greater hardship and inconvenience if the request of the applicant is granted. Accordingly, we dismiss the application with costs of ¢5,000 to the respondent. DECISION Application dismissed with costs.

D. R. K. S.

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