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[1985] SLR (CA) 30Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

MANAGING DIRECTOR OF SADISCO HOTEL vs. MARMON [1984-86] 1 GLR 333

25 June 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 30
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAMANAGING DIRECTOR OF SADISCO HOTEL v MARMON [1984-86] 1 GLR 333 [1985] SLR (CA) 30
APAMANAGING DIRECTOR OF SADISCO HOTEL v MARMON [1984-86] 1 GLR 333, [1985] SLR (CA) 30 (Ghana).
BluebookMANAGING DIRECTOR OF SADISCO HOTEL v MARMON [1984-86] 1 GLR 333, [1985] SLR (CA) 30 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for stay of execution of the trial court’s judgment in favour of the respondent in an action for recovery of possession of a premises being used by the applicant as a hotel. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

Kwaku Baah for the applicant.

Brown for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The dispute in this case relates to a building described as an annexe to Sadisco Hotel. It appears that the main building to which it is said to be an annexe belonged to a Lebanese called Baksmaty. He rented the premises to a man called Kissi. He has since died. The evidence shows that it was a tenancy from month to month. Kissi used the building in running a hotel.

About 1970-1971 Baksmaty sold the annexe to the respondent. He was then resident in Nigeria. As he did not then require the premises for his own occupation, he permitted Kissi to continue his tenancy of the

[p.335] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 333 premises. It appears it was on the same monthly basis. After the respondent purchased Baksmaty’s interest, Kissi was desirous of extending the hotel premises. The respondent was agreeable to this on condition that Kissi met the cost of the extension initially from his own pocket. It was estimated to cost ¢18,000 and it was agreed that this sum should be set off against future rents.

Sometime in the early 1980s the respondent was minded of returning home from Nigeria. He was in ill-health. So he gave notice to Kissi sometime in 1981 that he would be requiring the premises on his return for his own occupation. As Kissi was a tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), the respondent could not recover possession of the premises without judicial assistance. He had to base his claim on one of the many grounds laid down by section 17 of that Act. But before the respondent could launch any suit against his tenant Kissi, the latter died. He was said to have died in the first half of 1983. The legal position which resulted to the tenancy on Kissi’s death did not receive the consideration of the court below. As we are not now hearing the appeal on its merits, it is not necessary for us to say what, in our opinion, resulted from the tenant’s demise.

But although Kissi had died, the hotel continued to be run. To obtain vacant possession of the annexe, the respondent took out a writ against the apparent occupant of the premises. He seems unsure of who he was, so he sued him as managing director or manager of Sadisco Hotel and sought recovery of possession and accrued rents. The respondent’s position in the court below seems to have been that as Kissi’s tenancy was brought to an end by a valid notice to quit before his demise, his right to the premises determined with his death. The applicant made an issue of it and pleaded in paragraph (6) of his statement of defence that: “The defendant denies paragraph (6) . . . and says that the right of the management of Sadisco Hotel did not terminate with the demise of the late Donkor Kissi.”

In view of the position taken up by the parties, the learned judge came under a duty to decide:

(a) Whether Kissi’s monthly tenancy determined on his death; and

(b) If it did not, whether the respondent satisfied the court that he reasonably required the premises for his own occupation as a dwelling house.

The learned judge, in a judgment which is remarkable for its brevity, found for the respondent and ordered recovery of possession in his favour. He proceeded on the footing that the applicant was a tenant under a subsisting lease and held that as on his own showing he obtained an assignment of the lease from Kissi, such assignment constituted a breach of covenant and was void on that account. The

[p.336] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 333

applicant says he has appealed against that judgment to this court and prays that pending the determination of his appeal, the order granting possession against him be stayed.

The principle on which this court acts in considering applications of this sort is now old hat. It is well known. The court will normally not suspend the operation of a judgment given after a hearing unless, at least the applicant shows that he has a serious point for consideration by this court. If prima facie the judgment discloses an error of law, the applicant would, at least, show such point. One of the incidents of a lease is that it is assignable unless the tenant covenanted against it. Although technically a monthly tenancy is a lease within the meaning of section 36 of Act 220, a lease in its ordinary connotation imports the grant of a term of years. And the object of the covenant against assignment is to give the landlord an opportunity of preventing the demised premises going into the hands of a disreputable or undesirable tenant.

It is plain that there is no question here of a grant of lease in its ordinary sense, and there is no warrant for holding that there was a covenant against assignment which was breached. As that is the only ratio of the learned judge’s conclusion against the applicant, his judgment shows ex facie that he committed an error of law. Although counsel for the respondent was engaged in some sort of prevarication on this, in the end, he felt obliged to concede the judge’s error.

That being so, acting on our usual principles, the applicant has shown that the judgment against him discloses an error of law. And as that was the only ground on which a decision adverse to him was rested, he is entitled to the exercise of our discretion staying the operation of the judgment.

But it was argued for the respondent that notwithstanding that error of law, the court’s conclusion can be justified on other grounds. Counsel then took us through some of the documentary material submitted for our consideration on this application. As at present advised, we refrain from saying that those grounds have or have no merit. We are not hearing the appeal on its merits and it would, we think, be wrong to deny the applicant the benefit of our discretion on the ground that on hearing the appeal, this court may find some basis other than the one expressed by the trial judge for finding against the applicant.

In those circumstances, we think it just and equitable to exercise our discretion in the applicant’s favour and suspend the operation of the judgment until the hearing and determination of the substantive appeal. And we propose to so order. But clearly, it should be on terms and of limited duration.

[p.337] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 333

From the papers filed in this motion, it should not take more than a fortnight to compile the record of appeal. The applicant who is the beneficiary of our discretion, should not be made to go to sleep. He should use his best endeavours to secure a completion of the record and its transmission to this court as early as possible. For that reason, we grant a stay of execution up to and including 15 July next. If by that date, the record of appeal has not been transmitted to this court and the other appeal formalities have not been perfected, the stay of execution will be deemed to be revoked and the respondent will be at liberty to take steps to realise the fruits of the judgment in his favour. We make an order on those terms.

In all the circumstances, we think each party should bear his own costs on this application and we so order.

DECISION

Application granted on terms.

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