HANSEN vs. ANKRAH [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
21 March 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 171 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Hansen v. Ankrah [1980] G.L.R. 668.
(2) Ankrah v. Hansen [1981] G.L.R. 847, C.A.
(3) West of England and South Wales District Bank, In re; Ex parte Dale & Co. (1879) 11 Ch. D. 772.
(4) Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] A.C. 339, P.C.
(5) Ahoklui v. Ahoklui (1959) P.C.L.L.G., 212.
(6) Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215.
(7) Ruttmern v. Ruttmern (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 178.
(8) Tamakloe v. Attipoe, West African Court of Appeal, 22 June 1953, unreported. (9) Ansah-Addo v. Addo; Ansah-Addo v. Asante (Consolidated) [1972] 2 G.L.R. 400, C.A. (10) Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260.
(11) Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102.
(12) Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158.
(13) Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1953) 9 W.A.C.A. 127; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 16, P.C.
(14) Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86 (15) Archibong v. Arhibong (1947) 18 N.L.R. 117.
(16) Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.
(17) Fiaklu v. Adjiani [1972] 2 G.L.R. 209, C.A.
(18) Akuyea v. Kweku, 17 July 1888, unreported.
(19) Larkai v. Amorkor (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323.
(20) Amarfio v. Ayorkor (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554 (21) Akenten v. Dapaah (1954) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 185.
(22) Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
(23) Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
(24) Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027; [1972] 2 W.L.R. 645; [1972] 1 All E.R. 801, H.L.
(25) Hammond v. United African Co. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 60.
(26) Daatsin v. Amissah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 480.
(27) Amekoo v. Amevor (1892) Sar F.C.L. 220.
(28) Annan v. Kwogyirem [1975] 1 G.L.R. 291.
(29) Gaisiwa v. Akraba (1896) Sar F.L.R. 94.
(30) Aworchie v. Eshon (1872) Sar F.C.L. 170.
(31) Bayaidee v. Mensah (1878) Sar F.C.L. 171.
(32) Assraidu v. Dadzie (1890) Sar F.C.L. 174.
(33) Bokitsi Concession Inquiry (1903) Sar F.L.R. 159; Ren 239.
[p.644] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 (34) Welbeck v. Brown (1884) Sar F.C.L. 185.
(35) Karaba v. Quansimah (1871) Sar F.C.L. 53.
(36) Owoo v. Owoo (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 81.
(37) Sappor v. Amartey (1913) D. & F. ‘11-’16, 53; Ren. 787.
(38) Manko v. Bonso (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62.
(39) Agyapa v. Fosu (1952) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 85.
(40) Agbloe v. Sappor (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 187.
(41) Katai v. Katai (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 151.
(42) Esson v. Moubarak (1938) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 30.
(43) Ankrah v. Methodist Church (1949) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 170.
(44) Etuah v. Richardson (1948) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 378.
(45) Fynn v. Koom, High Court, Cape Coast, 20 February 1960, unreported. (46) Osonoware v. Ayiku II, High Court, Accra, 27 July 1962, unreported. (47) Isaac Ammetifi, Re. (1889) Red. 157.
(48) Villars v. Baffoe (1909) Ren. 549.
(49) Cole v. Cole, Supreme Court, Accra, 11 September 1939, unreported. (50) Millers Ltd. v. Van Hien (1912) D. & F. ‘11 -’16, 15.
(51) Attipoe v. Shoucaire (1948) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 17.
(52) Khoury v. Tamakloe (1950) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 201.
(53) Wellington v. Papafio (1952) 14 W.A.C.A., 49.
(54) Laryea v. Union Trading Co. (1931) D. Ct. ‘29-’31, 122.
(55) Quassua v. Ward (1845) Sar F.C.L. 125.
(56) DeGraft v. Mansah (1871) Sar F.C.L. 125.
(57) Sackie v. Agawa (1873) Sar F.C.L. 126.
(58) Johnson v. Clark [1908] 1 Ch. 303; 77 L.J. Ch. 127; 98 L.T. 129. (59) Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A. (full bench). (60) Osborne v. Rowlett (1880) 13 Ch. D. 774, 49 L.J. Ch. 310; 42 L.T. 650. (61) Asiedu v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 589.
(62) Owusu v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 435.
(63) Hammond v. Odoi [1982-83] G.L.R. 1215, S.C.
(64) Tamakloe v. Attipoe (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 378.
(65) Angu v. Attah (1916) P.C. ‘74-’28, 43.
(66) Abaka v. Ambradu [ 1963] 1 G.L.R. 456, S.C.
(67) Botchway v. Solomon, Divisional Court, 7 December 1935,unreported. (68) Amoabimaa v. Okyir [1965] G.L.R. 59, S.C.
(69) Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria [1931] A.C. 662, P.C.
[p.645] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the Court of Appeal reversing the decision of the High Court which overruled the preliminary objection of the respondent overall head of the Mantse Ankrah family of Accra that he was not liable to an action brought by the two appellant branch heads of the family. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Apaloo C.J., Sowah and Taylor JJ.S.C. and Francois J.A.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellants.
S. A. X. Tsegah for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
The parties to this appeal are all members of the Mantse Ankrah family of Accra. That family seems to be possessed of substantial landed property. Sometime ago, the government acquired a portion of that land compulsorily and compensation fell to be paid therefor. The immediate cause of this litigation is that the sum of ¢160,547.40 was paid to the first respondent as part of the compensation money and this sum was received by the latter in his capacity as head of the family.
By a standing family arrangement, this money should have been paid into a designated bank account to the credit of the family. Apparently, to keep a check on the disbursement of this money, the family mandated four persons to draw cheques on that account. They are the parties to the suit which culminated in this second appeal. It is now clear from the evidence that the first respondent did not pay that sum into the family account but paid it into his own personal account. It is obvious that the check which the family devised for the disbursement of that sum would be negated by this course and it seems the main object of this action was to prevent it. The appellants before us also complained that the head of family in abuse of his fiduciary duty towards the family, made some unauthorised expenditures out of this account. So they sought to hold him to the fiduciary duty of accounting for these moneys.
The appellants also felt that the sum of ¢160,000 odd was in danger of being misspent by the first respondent. Accordingly, they applied to the judge, Amua-Sekyi J., before the hearing of the substantive suit to make an order preserving it from misuse. They invited the judge to order that that sum be paid into the designated family account. After an in-depth examination of the customary law on the subject, the learned judge thought this was a deserving plea and he made the order sought.
The respondents appealed against the order to the Court of Appeal. Their main complaint to that court was that the appellants were not, as a matter of customary law, entitled to the remedy of accounts. There
[p.646] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 were, on the pleadings, disputed issues of fact but as there was no hearing of the substantive suit on the merits, the learned judge did not resolve the factual conflict. Like the trial court, the appellate court also examined the customary law in some depth. In the end, they reached the conclusion that the respondent’s objection to the legal propriety of the relief sought, namely accounts, was valid and that the action failed in limine. It would be necessary to examine the reasons given for the contradictory opinions expressed by the High Court and the Court of Appeal on the legal competence of the claim for accounts.
But before examining the customary law position, it is necessary to look at the internal structure of the Mantse Ankrah family. It is common ground that the family has three branches, each with its own head and were described in the proceedings as the Ankrah, Ayi and Okanta branches. Sitting on top of all these three, is the overall head of the composite family. He is the first respondent. The second respondent is the head of the Okanta branch.
The course which this suit took and the way in which the parties ranged for battle, suggests that there is a serious dissension in the family. The appellants before us, are the heads of the Ankrah and the Ayi branches. The mandate given to the bank was that the first respondent and any one of the three heads of the branch families could validly operate the family account. So that account can be legitimately operated and moneys required for family purposes withdrawn under the signatures of the two respondents alone. But the reason proffered by the first respondent for not paying the money in question into the family account was that as the appellants were unco-operative to him in the discharge of his family responsibilities, especially the payment of family debts, a later family meeting decided that he should open an account for the family’s business and operate it all by himself—not even jointly with the second respondent who was apparently “co-operative” towards him. It is understandable therefore that this reason for opening the sole account which removes the small check that the family decision devised to safeguard ground funds seemed odd to the trial judge.
In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Amua-Sekyi J. should have formed the view in Hansen v. Ankrah [1980] G.L.R. 668 at 677 “that the plaintiffs have shown clearly and convincingly that the aid of the court is necessary to protect the interests of the family pending the final determination of this suit.” It is this view of the matter that led him to direct at 678 that “the order for the payment of the proceeds of the Lands Department cheque into the family bank account is to be complied with forthwith.” The learned judge did not make an order for accounts although his appreciation of the customary law
[p.647] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 entitled him to conclude that that remedy was competently sought. The Court of Appeal disagreed (see [1981] G.L.R. 847, C.A.). They did not concern themselves with the desirability or otherwise of preserving the family funds pendente lite. That court reasoned that as the main remedy account sought against the respondents was not a competent remedy according to customary law, the interim preservation order, was like the main relief itself, incompetent. The appellants invite us to say that the Court of Appeal was wrong and that the ruling and consequential order of the High Court were right and should be restored.
In view of the position taken by the Court of Appeal and its expressed view on the law, it is perhaps necessary to pose and attempt answers to a number of questions: first, is the head of family a fiduciary of the family in relation to family property in his possession? Secondly, is the remedy of accounts available against fiduciaries generally? Thirdly, is the notion of accountability repugnant to customary law? Fourthly, what is the policy justification for granting the head of family immunity from the duty to account? It is now necessary to attempt answers to these questions.
We do not think that it can be open to doubt that a head of family who is in possession of family property fits the description of a fiduciary. The American Restatement of the Law of Trusts provide a helpful definition of a fiduciary-beneficiary relationship. It says: “A person in a fiduciary relation to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relation.” In In re West of England and South Wales District Bank; Ex parte Dale & Co. (1879) 11 Ch. D. 772 at 778, Fry J. attempted a definition from a procedural standpoint. He said:
“What is a fiduciary relationship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against the wrong-doer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust.”
Cases and treatises on West African customary law abound with pronouncements which designate various customary functionaries, in particular the chief, the head of family and the caretaker as “trustees” or “fiduciaries.” In the well-known case of Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at 404, P.C., the Privy Council said:
“. . .in every case the Chief or Headman of the community or village, or head of family, has charge of the land, and in loose mode of speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to some extent in the position of a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use of the community or family.”
Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Law contains numerous references to the chief and head of family as trustees. He says at 89 that “… in this country, the head of a family holds family possessions in trust for himself and members of the family.” Writing earlier at 65-66 the learned author writes:
“At the most the king or headchief is but a trustee, who is as much controlled in his enjoyment of the public lands by his subordinate chiefs and councillors as the head of a family by the senior members thereof.”
The well-known customary successor is, in certain cases, regarded as the head of the immediate family and as such, is entitled to litigate the family’s title to the property even against the head of the wider family to whom this right ordinarily belongs. Even he is regarded as a fiduciary. In Ahoklui v. Ahoklui (1959) P.C.L.L.G. 212 at 213, Ollennu J. (as he then was) said: “A successor according to native custom, is in the position of a trustee and holds the estate to which he had succeeded in a fiduciary capacity.”
We think it is too late in the day to dispute that a head of family is, vis-à-vis the family, a fiduciary or trustee. That he is, seems to be the beaten track of the decided cases. Yet in her short supporting judgment in the Court of Appeal Jiagge J.A. seems to dispute this with some apparent depth of feeling. She said at 865 that: “… the pressure on the courts to equate the position of the head of family with that of a trustee should be firmly resisted.”
But the learned judge did not say what the head of family who jointly with the rest of the family has the legal and beneficial title to family property but who alone has the right of management and control and the sole right to assert or defend the family’s title by action, is? Unless the head of family is not under a duty to act for the benefit of the family, then the learned appellate judge must be wrong in asserting, contrary to the weight of decided authority and textbook writers, that the position of a family head cannot be likened to that of a trustee. To the extent that that faulty appreciation of the head’s position vis-à-vis the family informed her eventual holding that such head is not accountable, then she was, with respect, in error.
The next question is, are fiduciaries generally accountable? This question admits of no doubt in equity jurisprudence and to a large extent in customary law. Dr. Asante puts it in his book, Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana 1844-1966, at 110 as follows:
“A trustee in Anglo-American law is under a duty to keep accurate and clear accounts in respect of the administration of trust property, showing receipts and expenditure, accretions and
[p.649] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 losses. The duty to account may be described as the handmaiden of the duty of loyalty; it translates the lofty incantations of the duty of loyalty into the harsh realities of financial liability. The duty to account is so fundamental that in some jurisdictions an express exemption therefrom is adjudged contrary to public policy.”
What is the position in customary law? It is perhaps accurate to say generally that the duty of account exists in a principal-fiduciary relationship at customary law. In Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215 some of the children of the deceased brought an action for accounts against a brother of theirs who had been appointed by the deceased on his deathbed to look after the interests of the estate. He was held accountable to them. Michelin J. who spoke for the court said at 217-218:
“In my opinion, this is not the case of an action by a junior member of a family against the head of a family but is brought by brothers and sisters of the defendant against him in his fiduciary position as a caretaker on their behalf, not only at the request of the deceased but also at the request of the head of the family, to look after their interests in the property of the deceased.
He was therefore clearly liable to account to the plaintiffs.”
In Ruttmern v. Ruttmern (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 178, a member of the family who acted as agent for the family in conducting its affairs, was held accountable to his brothers and sisters. In Tamakloe v. Attipoe, West African Court of Appeal, 22 June 1953, unreported, the West African Court of Appeal held that two joint heads of a patrilineal family not having any beneficial interest in the deceased’s estate, were accountable to the deceased’s children. In Ansah-Addo v. Addo; Ansah-Addo v. Asante (Consolidated) [1972] 2 G.L.R. 400, C.A., the defendant and co-defendant acted for a syndicate of farmers who pooled their resources together and purchased a piece of land. They received rents and other moneys in that capacity. It was held that they were fiduciaries and were accountable to the syndicate. The Court of Appeal said, inter alia, at 411:
“The liability to account is indeed one of the main vehicles by which a court of equity enforces the trustee’s fiduciary duty. That principle of the received common law is wholly in consonance with our indigenous conceptions of justice.”
In Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260, the plaintiff representing a branch of the family claimed in the native court as against the defendant, a head of family, for a declaration that they were
[p.650] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 joint-owners with the defendant and for an account of the rents which the defendant had been collecting and appropriating to her own use pursuant to her claim of exclusive ownership of the house. The native court not only granted the declaration, but acceded to the claim for accounts. The defendant appealed to the Land Court where the decision of the native court was reversed. On further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the judgment of the native court was restored save the order for accounts. It is to be noted that the order of the native court for accounts was disallowed by the appellate court not because it was opposed to any principle of justice but because it was not available to a defined class of family members against their head and the plaintiff was assumed to be a member of that class.
I think on a proper analysis of the case law on the subject, it is accurate to say that the duty to account cast on a fiduciary towards his principal far from being repugnant to customary law, is in fact accord with customary notions of justice.
But it cannot be denied that there are a number of decisions even at appellate levels which hold, professedly on the authority of Sarbah in his book Fanti Customary Law, that the head of family as long as he remains in office, cannot be sued for accounts. The learned trial judge went through the cases thoroughly and expressed the view at 675 that “Sarbah’s cautious statement of the custom of his day [has] acquired, by constant repetition in the courts, the posture of an inflexible rule of law.” The case which is often cited as giving its final stamp to the proposition of the customary rule that an incumbent head of family is immune from suits for accounts is the appellate decision in Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102. The trial judge, with admirable boldness, thought that decision “questionable.” The judge’s examination of the decided cases against Sarbah’s conception of the customary law and his final view seems to me eminently reasonable and had I not been pressed with some of these older cases in argument, I should have been content to adopt the trial judge’s analysis and evaluation of these decisions. But out of deference to the detailed argument presented to us and out of respect for the Court of Appeal which, perhaps less critically, adopted that statement of the customary law, I should myself look at the statement of the customary rule and how it accords with both the equitable and customary law requirement that a fiduciary is under an obligation to account to the beneficiaries and that this duty is enforceable by action.
The immunity rule, so to speak, has its origin in Sarbah’s statement in his Fanti Customary Laws at 90 that:
“If the family, therefore, find the head of family misappropriating the family possessions and squandering them, the only
[p.651] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 remedy is to remove him and appoint another instead; and although no junior member can claim an account from the head of family, or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate, or income therefrom arising, yet the Customary Law says they who are born and they who are still in the womb require means of support, wherefore the family lands and possessions must not be wasted or squandered.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
This statement carries the clearest implication that a family consists of both senior and junior members. That such a classification exists in our family set-up is a truism beyond dispute. Sometimes the more senior members of the family are designated principal members. They, in fact, act jointly with the head in alienating family property. But it is the class designated junior members who in Sarbah’s conception of the Fanti customary law that are denied the right of suing the head for accounts. That is how the law was conceived and applied both at the trial and appellate level in Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158.
It is only fair to point out that Sarbah, that learned jurist, did not pretend that his exposition of the customary law was of universal application throughout the country. Clearly, custom varies in various parts of the country. But Pappoe v. Kweku (supra)—a Ga case was based on Sarbah’s exposition of the Fanti customary law. Sarbah’s conception of the customary law was not accepted as necessarily reflective of the true position throughout the country. For instance, in Solomon and Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 127 at 131, Kingdon C.J. quoted Bannerman J. as having observed in the trial High Court on 21 December 1942 that:
“I should like to mention that it was Sarbah, in his books, who propounded the principle that a member of the family cannot claim an account from the head of the family. This is an Akan custom and not a Ga custom.
With the utmost respect to the learned author I hold that this principle is contrary to equity and natural justice and it is not unknown that some unscrupulous and callous heads of families have mercilessly exploited this so-called custom to the detriment of individual members of the family. This is common knowledge.”
This case came on appeal and the West African Court of Appeal was thus afforded an excellent opportunity of deciding whether Sarbah’s views on the custom is of universal application and whether it has a tendency of shielding callous family heads who exploit it to their advantage and to the detriment of the family. The court would also not
[p.652] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 be drawn on the question, whether a custom which grants immunity to a fiduciary from of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639-726accountability offends natural justice. The appellate court burked a decision on this issue and merely concluded that that dictum was obiter.
So the immunity of a family head from suit was questioned by an important legal personage, at least in so far as it purports to apply to a Ga as distinct from a Fanti area. But Bannerman J. (as he then was) was not alone in questioning the soundness of the immunity doctrine. In his book John Mensah Sarbah, Azu Crabbe J.A. (as he then was), went further than Bannerman J. He not only concurred in the strong criticism of that principle by Bannerman J., but went further to contend that Abude v. Onano (supra) “was decided per incuriam.”
It seems therefore that when Amua-Sekyi J. doubted the correctness of the Abude judgment (supra) at 675 and stigmatised it as “questionable” he was in respectable company. Yet the Abude judgment was the authority which Ollennu J. (as he then was) claimed and on which he founded his decision in Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86 at 88 when he stated that “by native custom a member of a family cannot sue the head of the family for accounts.”
This case originated in Keta, i.e. an Ewe area. And the custom which allegedly precluded the suit was what Sarbah propounded as applicable to the Fanti area and which by judicial pronouncements was extended to the Ga jurisdictional area. Its correct applicability in Ewe territory was disclaimed by Dr. Kludze in his book, Ewe Law of Property. At 91 of his book, the learned author says:
“The general rule of Ewe law is that the head of family is accountable for family property under his management and administration. He accounts to the family of which he is the head, and this means the principal elders of the family as representing the entire membership.”
As regards the enforcement of this duty by suit, he says at the same page:
“… if the head of family declined to account for family property under his control, or if his accounting was unsatisfactory, members of the family could enforce the obligation to account by instituting proceedings in the tribunal …”
This exposition of the customary law cuts across Sarbah’s up to a point. But it cannot be said to be the unsupported theory of an academic. It has the blessing of a court of no less standing and authority than that which appeared to have set the customary rule to rest in Abude v. Onano. That is the West African Court of Appeal in
[p.653] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 the case of Tamakloe v. Attipoe (supra). The facts are these: T. died intestate leaving substantial immovable property at Pagan Road, Accra. He was survived by nine children. On his death, the wider family appointed two persons, one from the paternal and the other from the maternal branch of the family as joint heads to administer his estate. The children thereafter appointed their eldest brother as their father’s successor and the property was transferred to him. Three of the children then sued the joint heads and their brother, the successor, for account. Jackson J. held them all accountable and so ordered. The heads of family appealed against the order for account and it was urged on their behalf that in accordance with native custom, the children being junior members of the family had no right to call on the heads for account. The appeal was dismissed and Coussey J.A. who spoke for the court, disposed of that argument as follows:
“I can see no difference in principle in their liability to account both by English law and by the customary law, once it is appreciated that the first and second defendants [meaning the joint heads] have no beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased, and that their true function as the heads of the larger family is advisory and protective…”
This case established two principles, first, that a head of family is a fiduciary, and secondly, that he is not immune from a suit to account. The only apparent difference between that case and the Abude and Fynn v. Gardiner type of cases, is that in the Tamakloe case the heads of family have no beneficial interest in the property whereas in the latter cases, they have such interest jointly with other members of the family. But in equity, the fact that a trustee is also a beneficiary of the trust estate, does not confer on him immunity from accountability. Once he is in possession or control of property of which he is not the sole beneficial owner, he has a duty to account to other beneficial owners for whose benefit he is expected to act. It would seem therefore that the Tamakloe case was more soundly based than Fynn v. Gardiner and the Abude type of cases.
Apart from Amua-Sekyi J. whose decision on the question of accountability was reversed by the Court of Appeal, all text-writers who had the chance of looking at this aspect of our customary law, had nothing but unflattering comments to make on the rule which grants immunity to a head of family from a duty of accountability. For instance, Bentsi-Enchill in his book, Ghana Land Law (1964) thought it significant that In the Fynn v. Gardiner case the native court which is the repository of customary law should have granted an order for
[p.654] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 accounts against the head of family only to be reversed by the appeal court. As he put it at 98:
“It is indeed significant that the trial Native Court had had no difficulty in upholding the claim for an account. By contrast the only ground advanced by West African Court of Appeal in support of its rejection of the claim for account in a clearly proven case of adverse user by a head of family was the fiat of an allegedly settled doctrine which turns out to be nothing more than a verbatim reproduction without acknowledgement of Sarbah’s unelaborated statement …”
Dr. Asante in his Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana 1844-1966, also referred to Sarbah’s pronouncements on the head family’s power of disposition of family property including his dictum that “no junior member can claim an account from the head of family “. And at 110 he considered that: “What looks like a passing reference to the head of family obligations in this area has now achieved the hallowed status of the first authoritative pronouncement.” He considered that the abstention of the courts in pre-independent days from affirmative involvement in customary law of trusteeship may have been sound colonial policy but he thought it resulted in relieving customary fiduciaries, especially the head of family, of any institutional checks, and ultimately paved the way for the decline in fiduciary standards.
Dr. Ekow Daniels in his learned article on “Law of Trusts in West Africa” (1962) 6 J.A.L. at 164-178, considered the Ghana customary law on the accountability of a head of family and having noted Sarbah’s oft-quoted dictum reproduced earlier in this judgment, was of the view that Sarbah’s statement calls for fresh interpretation. He pointed out at 173 that: “the law on this point also need looking into again, for customary law has undergone considerable change.”
Dr. Kludze, like the rest of the legal scholars, was not enamoured with the rule which grants the head of family immunity in a suit for accounts. At 97-98 of his Ewe Law of Property, he states:
“The rule that in Ghana the head of family cannot be held accountable until he has been deposed is, in any case, an absurd one which needs to be changed. It denies members of the family the right to go into accounts with their head and yet retain him in office notwithstanding any irregularities. It engenders instability in the family since any suspicion of mismanagement can only be investigated after first deposing the suspected head of family. Furthermore, it is a strange rule that requires a suspected or accused head to be first removed from office before he can be compelled to account; for removal from office can only be a sanction for mismanagement or misconduct.”
[p.655] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
It seems manifest that in considering the West African Court of Appeal decision in the Abude case (supra) “questionable” and in feeling that the cause of justice is not served by slavishly following it, the learned trial judge had behind him considerable body of enlightened opinion. What then is the policy-justification for granting a head of family who ex concesis, is a fiduciary, immunity from suit for account? Sarbah, the acknowledged father of the doctrine, did not put forward any reasoned argument for the exemption. There is very much to be said for the view that his doctrine was “unelaborated”, or “was a passing reference” to a head’s obligations vis-à-vis his family. It was thus left to that learned and resourceful judge and author Ollennu to put forward a theoretical justification for the head’s immunity. He says at 138-139 in his Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana (1962) that the proper place to inquire into these is the family or traditional Council. Therefore if it is sought to call the holder of any such traditional office to account in his individual capacity, custom requires that complaints against him must be dealt with at the proper customary forum and when he has been proved there to have mismanaged the property or the affairs, or abused his office, he is removed from office.
It makes sense that members of a family who suspect their head of family to have misspent family funds should seek an explanation from him first in a family forum. And in a normal case, this is what would happen. But if the family proves fractious or as appears to have happened in this case, if attempts to get an explanation failed, what sound reason of public policy prevents the family from seeking the aid of the chief’s court to compel him to give an account of his disbursement of family resources? The native court in the course of time became the successor of the chief’s court. It is to be remembered that in the Gardiner case (supra) that court acceded to the claim for accounts.
Yet another reason proffered by that learned author is a somewhat legalistic one. He said an action in respect of family property can only be a representative one. And therefore if an individual brings this suit against a head, he can only sue him also in a representative capacity. So it will, in effect, be an action by the individual as a representative of the family against the head who is equally a representative of the family. So the author argued that it will be an action by the family against the family “which is absurd”: see Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana (1962) at 138-139. That point has been well answered by Dr. Asante in his book, Property law and Social Goals in Ghana, 1844-1966, and it is sufficient to quote his answer in reply thereto. He said at 117:
[p.656] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
“There is in fact no general procedural bar against members of the family suing the head in respect of family property. Members have been allowed to sue the head for a declaration that a certain property in the hands of the head is family property, and for a rescission of dispositions of family property without the consent of principal members of the family.”
Jiagge J.A. in the Court of Appeal gave what appears to be the true reason for the head’s immunity from action for accounts. She said at 866: “Taking action against the head of family while he is still the head derogates from his authority as head . . .” Can it be a sound rule that a privileged position conferred on the head by the family be regarded as a shield for wrongdoing? One’s experience of the world teaches one that that question should be answered firmly in the negative. It is now necessary to look at the reasons why the appellate court upset the trial judge whose reasoning and analysis of the law and facts seem impressive and who prima facie reached a just result. The main judgment of the court was read by Wiredu J.A.
After reciting the facts and taking note of the well-nigh unanimity of the text-writers urging a fresh look at the law granting the head of family immunity from a suit for accounts, he summed up the customary law just as Sarbah implied it was. And that is (a) principal elders of the family can call the head to account at a family meeting, (b) that before the head can be sued for accounts, he must first be removed from office. These are the only summations of any relevance to this case. He offered no criticism of the way Sarbah’s “unelaborated” statement was by process of interpretation made into an inflexible rule which absolutely shields the head of family from a suit for accounts. It is unclear whether the Court of Appeal thought if by reason of dissension in the family, a family meeting was impracticable, the immunity rule could be relaxed. The learned judge made no comment on the critical view expressed on the doctrine of non-accountability by text-writers. The court clearly did not engage in the detailed analysis of the immunity rule and the cases that laid it down as Amua-Sekyi J. did. He did not contest the trial judge’s conclusion that the Abude decision (supra) was open to question and one cannot help feeling that the Court of Appeal saw nothing objectionable in principle about shielding a wrongdoing head of family from suit for accounts—a remedy available against other customary fiduciaries.
What about the two opposing results reached by the trial and appellate courts? There is evidence on which the trial court could hold as it did that, the court’s assistance was necessary to preserve the family’s funds from being dissipated to the prejudice of the family. The
[p.657] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 appellants cannot by any stretch of imagination be described as “junior members”. They are admitted heads of two of the three branch families. And the order they sought was the payment of family funds into family account. They sought nothing for themselves. They are joint signatories with the respondents to the designated family account and are as much family fiduciaries as the respondents. In seeking the preservation of the funds they were acting for the benefit of the family as was their fiduciary duty. The appellate order put an end to the action and whether the appellants were right in thinking that the respondents were breaching their fiduciary duty and squandering family funds cannot be determined. In these circumstances, it should not be difficult to hold that of the two conclusions, it is the trial court’s that produced anything nearly like a just result.
In the Nigerian case of Archibong v. Archibong (1947) 18 N.L.R. 117, the facts were not dissimilar to the present one but the court reached a conclusion which while not ignoring the exalted customary position of the family head, kept him to his fiduciary duty. In that case, members of a Calabar family sued their head for accounts in respect of compensation and other income which the family ought to have received from the Nigerian Government in respect of compulsory acquisition of family land. The family head accepted £353 from his negotiating agent instead of the £600 paid by the government. The court held that the head had to justify his action in respect of the £600 in proper accounts supported by receipts in accepting the lesser amount in his capacity as Etubom of Archibong House. At 123 of the report Robinson J. said:
“What is defendant’s position, as Etubom, towards Archibong House and its members? It seems to me that he must be regarded as a kind of trustee and that each member of the Achibong House has some kind of interest in the trust moneys. His obligations to the cestus que trust are not nearly as high as those of a trustee known to English law. He is given considerable latitude, but his actions must be capable of reasonable explanation at any time to the reasonable satisfaction of members of a sub-branch of his House. He cannot treat House money as his own. If it is his own, he can throw it away or misuse it. He cannot do that with House money. Although I think he can spend it without consulting any member, if he thinks reasonably it is in a good cause and for the good of the House. He should certainly keep accounts and work on some rules, either laid down by himself or preferably after consulting with the Heads of the House.”
In this case, family land was compulsorily acquired by the government. That family has three branches. Compensation money was paid
[p.658] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 to the family and received by the overall family head. The family itself had made provision for the payment of that money into an account it designated. It mandated the family head and the three heads of the branch families to operate that account on the family’s behalf. That money was not paid into the account so designated by the family but into an account over which none of the three branch heads had any control. Two of the branch heads sought the court’s assistance after trying unsuccessfully in family circles to keep the head to his duty. The court considered that its assistance was necessary and gave it. A higher court said the trial court should not have given its assistance because an “unelaborated” customary rule, judicially hallowed in Abude v. Onano (supra), precluded it from so doing.
The question is, ought we to keep such rule in our day and age? The Court of Appeal were not bound in 1980 to follow a precedent which yields this result. Whatever that court might have thought of the binding efficacy of that principle, it is plain beyond the possibility of controversy that this court is not bound by it. The constitutional position of precedent in 1980 was laid down by clause 2 of article 116 of the Constitution, 1979, in these words: “The Supreme Court shall not be bound to follow the decisions of any other court.” That position has been preserved by section 9 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 and the repeal of the Constitution, 1979 by the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42) has not altered the position. The fact that we are not bound by precedent does not mean that we should, as it were, by a stroke of the pen strike down a customary rule that has stood for the best part of 50 years. There is such a maxim as communism error facit jus—common error sometimes passes current as law. But the application of that maxim is normally predicated on the fact that a party acquired some rights, usually proprietary rights, on the basis of that error. As the matter is put in Brooms Legal Maxims (9th ed.) at 100:
“But where a decision of the Courts, originally wrong, or an erroneous conception of the law, especially of real property, has been made, for a length of time, the basis upon which rights have been regulated and arrangements as to property made, the maxim … may be applied.”
The first respondent acquired no rights in this case and cannot be heard to say that in reliance on the customary rule that he cannot be sued for accounts, he has squandered the acquisition money. Such a plea would sound ill in his mouth. He has not said so. On the contrary,
[p.659] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 the averment in his affidavit is that he has regularly accounted to the family of the trust moneys. But he made the verification of that fact impossible by his eventually successful contention that the customary law shielded him from a suit for accounts.
This court ought clearly to decline to follow the Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) and Abude v. Onano (supra) line of cases. The customary rule they laid down is productive of injustice and provides a potent shield for the breach of fiduciary duties. After all, the law must adapt itself to changing social conditions and those precedents are inapplicable to modem conditions. There is some question whether doing this will amount to judicial legislation. Refusing to follow an obviously unjust precedent cannot rightly be construed as judicial legislation. We have constitutional authority to refuse to be bound by a precedent which injures the innocent, benefits the guilty and puts a premium on blatant breach of fiduciary duty. To do otherwise, would be an exhibition of judicial inertia wholly indefensible in our day and age.
Whatever may have been the true customary law in Sarbah’s day, a head of a family should be suable for accounts by principal members of his family or by ordinary members in circumstances in which they may sue within the guidelines laid down by the Court of Appeal in Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67.
In the result, I think the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal should be set aside and that of the High Court restored with costs.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.
The issue which is placed before this court is whether or not an incumbent customary head of family is accountable in court to the writ of a member or members of the family whether principals or otherwise, while he still holds the status or position of head? The High Court answered the inquiry affirmatively but the Court of Appeal upset that decision holding that the answer must be in the negative.
The matters leading to the action are quite simple. The parties all belong to the Mantse Ankrah family of Dadekome Otublohum, Accra. The family consists of three branches. The first plaintiff is the head of the Ankrah section; the second plaintiff, Mark Kodjo Ankrah, is the head of the Ayi section; the second defendant is the head of the Okanta branch; and the first defendant, Joseph Adjabeng Ankrah also known as Nii Ayi Ankrah I (his stool name), is the overall head of the entire Mantse Ankrah family.
The pleadings indicate that sometime in 1977, the family received compensation from the Lands Department in the sum of ¢13,968.95 which was paid into a family account at the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra operated by the parties on a mandate of the family.
[p.660] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
The bank accepted as valid, cheques signed by any two of the four signatories.
It is alleged by the plaintiffs that sometime in the third week of August 1979 “against the express opposition of the plaintiffs” the defendants withdrew certain sums and expended them on Homowo festivities. The defendants do not deny the averment, indeed they admitted they withdrew the sum of ¢4,000 in August 1977— “entirely in accordance with the resolution of the whole Mantse Ankrah family for such withdrawal and that the said amount was expended on various rituals, customary observances and ceremonies which every head of the Mantse Ankrah family is in duty bound to perform and observe at every Homowo festival.”
The next important averment pertinent to this inquiry was that on 13 September 1977, the Ministry of Finance paid the sum of ¢160,547.40 to the first defendant on behalf of the Mantse Ankrah family which he failed to pay into the family account at the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra, despite strong and persistent pressure from the plaintiffs and other elders of the said family. The first defendant admits its receipt but alleges that owing to the behaviour of the plaintiffs, their obstructive and unco-operative attitude, the family resolved that the said sum be paid into a separate account to meet urgent family liabilities and he accordingly did so.
We must observe that the pleadings in this action have been reproduced almost verbatim in both judgments of the High Court (see Hansen v. Ankrah [1980] G.L.R. 668) and the Court of Appeal (see Ankrah v. Hansen [1981] G.L.R. 847, C.A.) therefore we consider it otiose and burdensome to recite them in detail. But amongst the defences raised, was whether the defendants were accountable at customary law to the plaintiffs in court. In our view, there is no question that a head of family is accountable to the family at a family meeting for his stewardship. We think it convenient at this stage to set down reasons why the customary rules abhors the procedure initiated by the plaintiffs. Who is a head of family in Ghanaian society? The status of “head” can be traced to the origin of our society. Every family has a head whether formally elected or informally appointed. On the death or removal of an incumbent, the principal members of the family meet and appoint a successor in place of the departed or the removed.
The duties and responsibilities attached to the office are of a complex character. If he is to succeed as head, his first and perhaps primary duty is to maintain the unity and integrity of the family.
In furtherance of this duty, he becomes an arbiter of disputes amongst members of the family. In this onerous duty he avails himself
[p.661] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 of the aid of the principal members. In the rural environment if a member of a family behaves anti-socially it is to his head that the victim of such anti-social behaviour complains and expects redress.
The rural population by and large are governed by the ethics and morality of the community in which they live.
It is a proverbial saying that Ghanaian marriages are marriages not of individuals but of the families of the bride and the groom. This is because the couple owe it a duty to their respective families to maintain the integrity of their marriage obligations whether performed under customary law or under statute. It is the responsibility of a head of family to assist in the observance of their obligations by settling matrimonial disputes and discords. If and when the marriage finally breaks down, it is the head that the customary law spouses turn to for the dissolution of their marriage. The family in the Ghanaian context is a microcosm of social services and its head is the administrator. There is no universal social security service covering every citizen in this country. The percentage covered is a minute proportion of the population and the beneficiaries are mostly urban dwellers. In this country there are no old age pensions, no old people’s homes: it is to the family that its indigent members look up to for these provisions and maintenance.
Every citizen is aware of the Ghanaian’s inordinate love for funeral and funeral observances. Huge sums of money are spent on funerals which could usefully be employed otherwise. The family is in honour bound to bury its dead even though the deceased might have been delinquent in the observance of such practices in his lifetime. It is the head of family who must perform these funerals, sometimes at his personal expense; finally the head is the custodian or “caretaker” of family funds and properties. The description “caretaker” is used in the context of customary land law. A caretaker is a person who not only has an interest in the property he administers but also a very wide discretion in its administration. Such wide discretion is denied the ordinary trustee and would constitute a breach, if he so exercises it.
In the performance of all these duties, the head is accorded that due reverence befitting his status. He is, in his little world, a fount of honour. This peculiar institution is unknown to Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is for the lack of adequate or compendious nomenclature in English that the head is sometimes referred to in judgments of these courts and in textbooks as a trustee. A proper trustee must by reason of his duties keep proper books of accounts of funds or property which are entrusted to him. His expenditures must be verified by proper receipts. A head of family unlike a trustee, owes no
[p.662] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 such duty. No member of the family expects him to keep account-books and ledgers. Nevertheless he owes it a duty to give generally an account of his stewardship from time to time. If he refuses to do so, he is liable to be removed immediately and without notice.
The learned High Court judge, it is said, considered in depth the genesis of the customary rule that a head of family cannot be assailed by a writ of summons emanating from a member of the family for an account of his stewardship and came to the conclusion that all the decisions and precedents were wrong, and further that the errors were due to a misunderstanding or misappreciation of Sarbah’s exposition of Fanti customary law on this aspect of customary law. He opined at 675 that “After Pappoe v. Kweku [[1924] F.C. ‘23-’25, 158] Sarbah’s cautious statement of the custom of his day acquired, by constant repetition in the courts, the posture of an inflexible rule of law.”
There, the learned judge questioned the principle laid down in Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102 and ruled it “questionable” for the only reason that Abude v. Onano concerned stool funds and not family funds as was the action before him. In our view, the customary law principles governing the election and destoolment of a chief and his powers over stool property including funds are not dissimilar to those appertaining to appointment and removal of family heads and their powers over family property. In so far as the judge considers the decision in the Abude case to be questionable, we think he was in error.
In any event, today we recognise that the custom is a custom of judicial decision, and not of popular action: see Benjamin Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process at 60. Sowah J.A. (as he then was) perhaps put the principle more bluntly in Fiaklu v. Adjiani [1972] 2 G.L.R. 209 at 212 when he stated:
“Whatever be the content of a custom, if it becomes an issue in litigation and the courts are invited to pronounce thereon, any declaration made by the courts supersedes the custom however ancient and becomes law obligatory upon those who come within it confines.”
An illustration of the above principle where judicial decisions appear to be at variance with popular custom is succession amongst the Ga Mashi people of Accra. The courts have in a series of cases held that succession amongst the Ga Mashi people is maternal, the same as the Akan custom, vide Akuyea v. Kweku, 17 July 1888, unreported; Larkai v. Amorkor (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323; Amarfio v. Ayorkor (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554 and others. But every Ga knows contrary to these decisions and judgments, that inheritance amongst Gas is patrilineal
[p.663] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 and that upon the death of the father his children inherit; it is only when he enters a court room that he is confronted with the judicial custom. This precedent has the blessing of the superior courts of the land and is binding upon all courts except perhaps the Supreme Court. In any event, it has so crystalised and solidified into a rule of customary law that only legislation can change it. Equally we consider that it is not the function of the judiciary to legislate. This should be left to the proper organ of State.
We may turn our attention to the cases of Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) where the following appears in the headnote at 158:
“The defendant as head of family, took out letters of administration of the estate of a deceased member. Held that he was not liable to [give an] account [of his administration] to another member of the family [who was only a beneficiary in respect of his membership].”
The next case of importance is Kwaku Abude, Adjetey Konobi, Elders of the Labadi Stool, for themselves and on behalf of the Elders of the Quarters of Abese, Abafum, Nmati Abonase and Krana v. Adjei Onano and Others (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102. We have set out the names and positions of the plaintiffs in full to indicate that they were by no means junior members of the Labadi stool; they were elders of the stool and brought the action as such. Their claim (which is not dissimilar to the claim in this court) is also of some interest; it is, as stated at 103, for:
“(a) An injunction restraining the defendants from making any further withdrawals from the said account except with the consent and approval of the Elders of the Stool.
(b) An account of all moneys that have come into the possession of the defendants or any of them for the Labadi Stool.”
This, if we may say so, was a straightforward action for account from the defendants whom the plaintiffs regarded as trustees. The action was dismissed and the plaintiffs appealed to the West African Court of Appeal. In the course of his judgment, Korsah J. (as he then was) said at 104:
“It is an accepted principle of Native Customary Law that neither a chief nor the head of family can be sued for account either of state or family funds.
Counsel for appellants admitted before us that he could not quote one case which has been brought in the Supreme Court
[p.664] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 against a chief and/or his elders and councillors to render account of Stool funds or Divisional Council fund .
. .”
The membership of the court in that appeal is also of some interest: the presiding judge was Harrangin C.J. (Gold Coast) and the other members, Lucie-Smith C.J. (Sierra Leone) and Korsah J. (as he then was) (Gold Coast). The court considered the reasonableness of the customary law rule which insulates the head of family or a chief from attacks by individuals or factions of the family and held at 104-105: “This native law is in our opinion reasonable and not contrary to natural justice or good conscience.” In effect a policy justification was given for the decision.
These judges must have been aware of the ordinary equitable principle of trusts in relation to trustees and fiduciaries.
Reference ought to be made to the case of Akenten v. Dapaah (1954) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 185 which went on appeal to the Lands Division, Kumasi, from the Asantehene’s “A1” Court. In the Asantehene’s court the following rule of customary law on the issue as to whether or not an incumbent head of family could be sued in court while occupying that office was stated at 186:
“There is sufficient evidence proving that the defendant holds the disputed cocoa farm in trust for the whole members of the family, and it stands to reason that when the relations detect or have reasonable cause to suspect any acts of embezzlement and wanton waste by the successor (defendant) then they reserve legal and customary right to call him to give account of his stewardship and if they are dissatisfied with his conduct they can remove him from office. It is then and only then that the relations can, according to custom, claim recovery of possession of the property he holds in trust for them.”
An appeal was lodged from that decision. The learned High Court judge before whom the appeal was heard gave approval stating at 187:
“I agree with the view of the Native Appeal Court that before the plaintiff could sue for the recovery of possession of the family property, the Native customary procedure should be followed, the defendant removed from office, and a new person substituted in his place.”
How then does a member of family ventilate his grievance against a head whom he considers incompetent, irresponsible or frivolous in the handling of family matters or dissipates family funds? It is at a family meeting. It is usual that the elders or principal members of the family are made aware of any grievance a member may have, for it is they
[p.665] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 who will decide whether the allegations are sufficiently weighty to warrant the summoning of a family meeting. If their decision is in the affirmative, a family meeting is summoned and the allegations are debated upon and a conclusion arrived at.
If the head is found guilty of serious charges such as disobedience to advice of his elders, dissipation or misappropriation of family funds, he may be removed. If the charges are found to be less serious, he may be allowed to continue in office provided he renders an apology to the family, if demanded by the elders. We think the removal from office is a more efficacious deterrent than merely issuing a writ especially as has happened in this case when an action may drag on for several years before it is finally disposed of.
We have already observed that the core of Ghanaian society is the family and that the head symbolises the hopes and aspirations of that family. We have also given reasons why we think it is irreverent and improper for a member to bring him to court while he occupies that office and have given justification for the customary law rule. The head of family must of course have the capacity to handle the routine orders and disorders of the daily life of the family.
We must emphasise that we are not against judicial activism or creativity, indeed we welcome and applaud it. We are aware of the American cases like Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) in which after 50 years, the American Supreme Court made a complete somersault and rendered an opinion completely at variance with its own previous decision. We think that the American Supreme Court was responding to the heartbeat of its current society as indeed it was, when it delivered its earlier judgment. Our society is still very much attached to the family system and the justification for the powers reposed in the head of family still exists. We think it just, right and reasonable to maintain the system, rather than by judicial action destroy it. Our view is that law should be based on society rather than it be foistered on it.
Our courts should also be alert and remain faithful to the heartbeat of our society if we are to do justice. As we have already observed, the debate is simply in what forum should the head of family be called upon to account? Is it the family forum or the court? And what advantage has the court over the family forum? Are the courts in a better position to determine what is right expenditure to be allowed than the family? We have given our opinion on these issues.
We think the customary law rule that a head of family should be taken to task for his default by his own family in the first instance is sound in principle and is in accordance with the established custom of our society. We will observe that the proposed piece of legislation
[p.666] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
“Head of Family Accountability Law” will when enacted, endorse this customary law principle.
I have had the privilege of reading the admirable and erudite judgment of my brother Taylor J.S.C. It is not often that he reconciles himself with opinions which are not in consonance with his own. In his view Korsah C.J., van Lare, Ollennu J. (as he then was) and Azu Crabbe C.J. are all wrong in their opinions on the principles at issue. He sits on appeal on the judgments of these great and illustrious jurists. As a High Court judge he refused to follow the decisions of superior courts if, in his opinion, those decisions were wrong even though in our jurisprudence, precedential value is attached to decisions rendered. If they are by superior courts they are binding on courts of subordinate jurisdiction. The suspended Constitution, 1979 and the P.N.D.C. (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 mandate that inferior courts shall accept the decisions of courts of superior jurisdiction. There must be some discipline in the judicial system and judges must obey the dictates the Constitution, 1979 and the Proclamation, 1981.
In Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972] 1 All E.R. 801, H.L. Lord Hailsham observed at 809: “…in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers.” Lord Diplock also observed in the same case at 874 that:
“It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the supreme appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary … But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted.”
Of course, under our suspended Constitution, 1979 and the P.N.D.C. (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 the present Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions and may depart from them when necessary. But there will be chaos in the system if on each and every occasion the Supreme Court departs from its own decision because there is a change in its composition.
It is true that the origin of this appeal emanated from an interlocutory application of which notice had been given by the defendants. Paragraph 8 of the defence reads: “The defendants will contend that they are not accountable to the plaintiff in respect of the several matters alleged in the statement of claim.”
Subsequently the defendants by counsel raised the preliminary objection; an objection which went to the root of the plaintiff’s action; if it had succeeded the substratum of the action would have disappeared completely and nothing would be left before the court to proceed with.
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In the event it failed and an appeal was lodged. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the defendants were not accountable in court to the plaintiffs. In my view, that was the end of the proceedings and the action. The Court of Appeal was right in dismissing the whole action.
Before I am done I consider it ethically and judicially unacceptable the comments on the composition of the panel in this appeal. If my brother Taylor J.S.C. had reservations, he should have made them abundantly clear before the hearing and not after opinions have been rendered which are contrary to his own. And in any event the judges referred to are by all standards, including their knowledge of the law and integrity, competent to adorn the Supreme Court bench. It is by sheer accident of past politics that they have not taken precedence over some members of the Supreme Court.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
I have had the advantage of digesting beforehand the splendid and scholarly judgment of the Chief Justice. I have also had the privilege of studying all the learned and lucid judgments of my other brothers who have delivered the majority judgment in this appeal. Naturally, it is with considerable regret that I find myself unable with the utmost respect, to concur in the majority judgment of this court. On the other hand I support completely the logic of the Chief Justice’s line of reasoning and I accept as legally valid, his conclusions that the judgments and orders of the Court of Appeal (see Ankrah v. Hansen [1981] G.L.R. 847, C.A.) should be set aside and the High Court ruling of Amua-Sekyi J. (see Hansen v. Ankrah [1980] G.L.R. 668), an excellent ruling if I may say so, restored.
In my respectful opinion Amua-Sekyi J. in a praiseworthy and certainly erudite effort subjected the authorities such as he was able to consider in his ruling to impeccable and critical scrutiny and I entirely agree with his brilliant analyses of these cases as well as the faultless steps in his reasoning which founded his rational conclusion, if I may say so, that the interlocutory application of the plaintiffs should not be dismissed in limine.
In the circumstances I am tempted to short-circuit the reasons for my own decision by merely registering my approval of the able judgment of the Chief Justice which has in my view so convincingly upheld his ruling. I have however resisted the temptation to so concur because his, is a minority opinion. Moreover it seems to me, with respect, that this appeal appears to involve an unnecessary pronouncement of the validity of a dubious customary law principle of alleged importance concerning a recurrent problem of the property rights of litigants in family property and in my opinion the purpose of a final
[p.668] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 appellate court whose membership is invariably large, is best served when many minds once and for all conscientiously grapple with the challenging questions thus posed by such a problem. Secondly, as the minority opinion championed by the Chief Justice is contrary to the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal, I consider it more decorous if I also give expression to my own views to supplement the Chief Justice’s learned exposition. Thirdly, it is my opinion that in this Supreme Court we are now obliged by the fundamental law governing our decisions to operate the common law doctrine of judicial precedent in a much more modern and discriminating manner and hopefully less rigidly than the other courts in our judicial hierarchy. For this reason also I have thought it expedient to articulate fully my own views why at least as a court of last resort, committed to advancing the interests of substantial justice, untramelled by the will-o’-the-wisps of pretentious technical legal restraints, the proposition of customary law propounded by the Court of Appeal and acquiesced in by the majority judgment even if it has been sanctioned by our courts in the past ought not to have been countenanced by this Supreme Court. Furthermore, although our customary laws and principles are undoubtedly heterogeneous in character the so-called immunity rule has nonetheless been formulated in a form suggestive of a consistently uniform principle applicable throughout Ghana. Lastly, there are one or two elements of the facts in the proceedings of the court below, sadly overlooked on all sides, which cast grave doubts on the correctness of the Court of Appeal judgments and which I do not feel disposed to gloss over.
In the circumstances, I regret I am obliged to give elaborate and I suspect time-consuming explanations why I am dissenting from the majority judgment in this case. I propose to concentrate on Sarbah and the cases exhaustively. I will not touch the text-writers because I accept the criticism of these text-writers who have expressed dissatisfaction with the immunity rule and by and large I concur and adopt in the Chief Justice’s judgment his appraisal of these text-writers.
In his Judgment, the Chief Justice in his characteristically lucid manner has set down substantially the facts which grounded the ruling of Amua-Sekyi J. These are thus the facts which informed the judgments of the Court of Appeal and which perforce must be the only basis for the judgment of this Supreme Court. It will therefore serve no useful purpose for me to repeat the facts. However, I believe, it is essential for a clear understanding of one of my reasons for differing from the learned conclusion of the Court of Appeal to reiterate and highlight at least one or two important and decisive aspects of the case which it would seem were inadvertently ignored by the Court of Appeal. One of the important features I speak of is the fact that the plaintiffs made an interlocutory application in the High Court for
[p.669] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 interim preservation of the property, the subject matter of the action, pending the final determination of the suit.
It seems clear therefore that the merits of the substantive case were not the subject matter of the appeal and the decisions of the courts should not turn on the pleadings since these could have been amended in the course of the proceedings. In my view, unless a High Court decision on a motion to dismiss the suit under Order 25, r. 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1954 (L.N. 140A), had been the subject matter of the appeal, the plaintiffs action should not be dismissed in this court.
Be it noted that it is an interlocutory application. The proceedings in the suit had not reached even the summons for directions stage. It is therefore the ruling of the High Court granting the interlocutory application which triggered the appeal by the defendants in this case and consequently the appeal was solely against the said ruling.
It seems to me, in the circumstances that the interim orders which the plaintiffs asked for, deserve to be looked at. They are the following orders:
1. A mandatory injunction requiring the first defendant forthwith to pay into the Mantse Ankrah family’s current account with the headquarters at High Street, Accra branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank the proceeds of the cheque for the sum of ¢160,547.40 . . . due to the said family.
2. A prohibiting injunction restraining the defendants until judgment or further order herein from drawing any cheque or order upon any bank or branch bank in Accra wherein moneys belonging to the said family have been deposited.
3. A further prohibiting injunction restraining the defendants until judgment or further order herein from making any disposition of lands or any interest therein belonging to the said family.”
Counsel for the plaintiffs was absent in court when the application of his clients was being considered and counsel for the defendants after referring to Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102 at 104; Pappoe v.
Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158; Dr. Asante’s Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana 1844-1966 at 89; Hammond v. United Africa Co. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 60 and Daatsin v. Amissah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 480, submitted:
“that a head of family while head of family cannot be called upon to account by any member of the family however important or by any group of members however large … That a head of family or chief has absolute discretion in the disposal of family funds and
[p.670] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 property including land; the only consideration is what the head considers to be the general welfare of the family or stool…. It is entirely for him to decide into what account he should pay moneys. He can even pay family moneys into his personal account or any other account. The application is misconceived and should be dismissed.”
(The emphasis is mine).
I should have thought that if counsel for the plaintiffs was aware that an application to dismiss the action was in the offing, he would hardly have absented himself from court. Moreover no application to dismiss the action under the rules of court or the inherent jurisdiction was made to the court and dismissal of the action therefore was never an issue before the trial court or the Court of Appeal. I am unable to appreciate therefore how we can permit or tolerate dismissal of the suit to be in issue before this Supreme Court as the majority decision would seem to have done. Furthermore, the suit was against two defendants one of whom, the first defendant, was admittedly the overall head of the family, but the second defendant had a status equal to that of the standing of the plaintiffs, and the application for the last two interim orders was directed also at the second defendant who was not the head of the family. In fact the learned High Court judge appreciated fully the issue before his court when he pointed out poignantly in his ruling at 673: “[T]he defendants resist the application on the ground that they are not accountable to the plaintiffs.” (The emphasis is mine.)
It is obviously the grant or refusal of the application for these interim orders that is the issue that the parties litigated at that stage of the proceedings and it is with respect, the issue and nothing more before the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances one would have thought, with respect, that on the appeal succeeding, the interlocutory orders of the High Court, consequent upon the application, would be set aside and the substantive suit would be left to take its normal course. This however was not to be, for on the apparent success of the interlocutory appeal the substantive suit was for inexplicable reasons dismissed by the Court of Appeal in limine in favour of both the head of family and the non-head of family. I have read the judgments of the Court of Appeal and I have devoted considerable time to a study of the case, but I have not succeeded in finding any possible legal ground both in substantive law or in procedure which warrants and justifies this order of dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit, in blatant disregard of the issue before the Court of Appeal. Even if the court’s dubious invocation of the so-called head of family’s immunity doctrine is accepted as a legal ground for dismissal, it can hardly affect the continuation of the plaintiff’s suit against the non-head of the family.
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I am firmly of opinion that this course of action pursued by the Court of Appeal has, with respect, no rational foundation and was an obvious and glaring error, for quite plainly the Court of Appeal granted a relief wider in scope than the appellants asked for and would have been entitled to at the court of first instance. I cannot help feeling, with the utmost respect, that the Court of Appeal was misled into this serious error by the following extravagant formulation of the relief claimed by the appellants in their notice of appeal: “That the judgment of the High Court be reversed and judgment entered for the defendants.” In my opinion, having regard to the ruling appealed from, all that could possibly be meant by this relief asked for is that the interim orders granted in the ruling of Amua-Sekyi J. in the High Court be set aside and nothing more. The inept and infelicitous wording is clearly an unfortunate lapsus linguae, a mimicry of some textbook form of irrelevant precedent, obviously not intended to have the effect given to it probably inadvertently by the Court of Appeal in its final decision. Clearly, even if the court’s ratio decidendi is accepted, the interlocutory application, and not the action should be dismissed. For this reason alone, I will without any hesitation allow the appeal since in the circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the action and not the interlocutory application is, with respect, misconceived and cannot be supported in law.
The ratio of the judgment of the Court of Appeal is, however, founded on a proposition of a customary law theory said to be well-settled and alleged to have support in the writing of the celebrated Sarbah to the apparent effect that as a general proposition, barring exceptional cases which the court indicated, a head of family cannot be called upon for account at the suit of any member of the family in the courts of this country unless he is first removed as head of the family. The ratio is in effect a recognition of a customary law procedural bar to the institution of proceedings in all cases where it is intended to call on the head of family to account. In the instant case, as I have already pointed out, although the appeal was mounted in order to test as an issue the legal validity of the interlocutory orders granted by the court, the Court of Appeal abandoned that issue and resorted to the said immunity doctrine to non-suit the plaintiffs. The doctrine therefore and its ambit deserve to be canvassed.
This alleged customary doctrine with its conceptual implications was elaborately formulated and explicitly categorised in the leading judgment of the court by Edward Wiredu J.A. 863-864 as follows:
“(a) he cannot generally be sued for an account; (b) the immunity is not an absolute one; (c) that principal elders of the family who appointed the head can call on him at a family meeting
[p.672] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 for an account; (d) that junior members of the family cannot call on the head for an account; (e) that in order to sue the head for an account he must be first removed or that facts must be shown that it is either unjust and unreasonable or that it is impracticable and impossible or that the head has, by his acts, been frustrating all attempts to convene family meeting to go into accounts. And in any such situation, which, of course, must be pleaded in the statement of claim, the court may intervene. It should be stressed that the immunity is limited to funds or property which was succeeded to by the head as such and moneys accruing from such property and not in relation to funds or property (which though are family funds) yet which should go to some other member of family as successor but which has come into the hand’s of the head as a temporary custodian . . .”
From a close study of the leading judgment, it is obvious that the supposed principle with its elaborate subsidiary judicial accretions stated by Edward Wiredu J.A. therein was distilled from a consideration of statements of Sarbah and Ollennu and the cases of Amekoo v. Amevor (1892) Sar F.C.L. 220; Pappoe v. Kweku (supra); Abude v. Onano (supra); Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86; and Annan v. Kwogyirem [1975] 1 G.L.R. 291. I propose to consider the ratios of these cases and other relevant cases which have a bearing on the said principle. As the alleged principle is however attributed to Sarbah with the ratio decidendi of the case founded on his formulation and as this is the first time the validity of the so-called principle has been questioned in this Supreme Court, it seems to me that the time has now come for us to examine critically in its proper context what Sarbah actually said. The exercise will enable us to decide whether or not the principle advocated does really exist and has “crystallised and solidified” into a well-settled principle of such a nature as can presumably only be discarded by the legislature.
In this respect I note that Ollennu’s statement of the principle was admittedly founded on Sarbah and previous judicial decisions which merely drew inspiration from Sarbah. As Sarbah is by common consent the source of the alleged principle, it is the statement attributed to Sarbah and the context within which the statement was made which deserve to be studiously examined and to Sarbah therefore I now turn.
Sarbah’s book, Fanti Customary Laws, is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with the principles of Fanti customary laws and Part II with Fanti law reports of decided cases. We are not concerned with Part II.
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Part I is a 116 page monograph in nine chapters, the first of which contains his fifteen page “introduction to the customary laws.” Chapter II is headed: “Persons” and covers “the family, marriage, divorce, husband and wife, parent and child.” It spans pages 15 to 56. Chapter III at pages 57 to 64 is a short treatise dealing with “Property.” Chapter IV at page 65 to 74 is entitled “Tenures.” Chapter V at pages 74 to 77 covers rather very briefly “Suretyship.” Chapter VI at pages 78 to 100 is the longest chapter and deals extensively with “Alienation.” Chapter VII at pages 100 to 113 embraces “Succession and Inheritance.” Chapter VIII at 113 to 114 contains a very short dissertation on “Slander” and the last chapter, chapter IX at page 114 to 116 discusses also quite briefly the various “Modes of enforcing payment” under customary law.
The statement of the great Sarbah which appears to be authority on which the cases expostulating the alleged immunity principle are founded is at page 90 in chapter VI, the chapter is concerned specifically with all forms of alienation of property both moveable and immovable.
Sarbah’s format in dealing with “alienation” generally in chapter VI, illustrative of the approach of a tidy and disciplined mind, is to expound this topic under five heads. After two and-a-half pages of introductory and preliminary remarks, he dealt comprehensively with his five heads one after the other in the following order, namely alienation by means of (i) gift, (ii) mortgage and pledge, (iii) loans, (iv) sale and (v) testamentary dispositions. The Sarbah statement was in connection with the fourth head: “sale.” In a neat and methodically scientific treatment of this head at page 86 he itemised the customary ingredients of a valid sale of land when he stated:
“To constitute a valid sale of land … there must be— 1. Competent contracting parties;
2. Mutual assent of such parties;
3. The marking out or inspection of the land and its boundaries …
4. Valuable consideration …
5. The payment of Trama (earnest money) to the vendor …”
This treatment of the topic enabled him to tackle the stated ingredients one by one and at 87 under “competent contracting parties” his irrepressible and analytical mind postulated five further sub-heads for exhaustive exposition. As he put it:
“1. To find out who are the competent contracting parties, one must know whether the land about to be sold or purchased is— (a) Land appurtenant to a stool; or
[p.674] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
(b) Land held in common by members of a village community or a company; or
(c) Ancestral property; or (d) Family property; or (e) Self-acquired property.”
It is in his brief discussion in three pages of the last subheading: “Self-acquired property” under (e) above at 89 to 91 that his oft quoted statement appeared. It is of some importance to appreciate the statement in the context within which it was made. Before making the statement Sarbah commenced his discussion by explaining what self-acquired property as distinct from ancestral property connotes under customary law and he dilated on the owner’s power of disposition. He stated also the peculiar status of the head of family and his position as the possessor and controller though not the owner of the family property. Furthermore at 89 he emphasised the customary law rule that “all the self-acquired property of a person which remains undisposed of at his death descends to his successors as ancestral property.” And he pointed out that it is the head of family who has possession of such ancestral family property in trust for the members of the family. He then drew attention to the fact that although under English law individual ownership of property is the rule, the converse holds in Ghana: and it is at this stage in his discourse while thus dealing with alienation by sale that he made his famous statement at 90:
“The head of a family has greater powers of alienation over moveable than he has over immovable ancestral property and family property. He can alienate such moveable property in gifts to any of the members of the family, for their education, support, or getting a wife for any member of the family.
If the family, therefore, find the head of the family misappropriating the family possessions and squandering them, the only remedy is to remove him and appoint another instead; and although no junior member can claim on account from the head of the family, or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate, or income therefrom arising, yet the Customary Law says they who are born and they who are still in the womb require means of support, wherefore the family lands and possessions must not be wasted or squandered.
The head of a family cannot, without the consent of or notice to all the principal members of the family or the greater part thereof, alienate any part of the family immovable possessions, and if such consent is secured, the alienation must be for the benefit of the family, either to discharge a family obligation, or the proceeds of such alienation must be added to the family fund.”
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As can be seen from this excerpt, if the Sarbah statement is not taken out of context, then there is no doubt whatsoever that primarily Sarbah was merely dealing with the power or competence of the head of the family to dispose of the moveable and immovable property of the family by sale. In respect of the moveables, the text would seem to be authority for the proposition that normally the Akan head of family as a trustee with a customary responsibility, inter alia, for the education and support of members of the family and for their relief from distress or for starting them in trade or business and the duty if necessary to procure a wife for a member, has considerable power of suo motu alienating the moveable as distinct from the immovable property of the family to fulfil these obligations. With regard to the immovable property, the Sarbah statement above is declaratory of the customary principle that the head of family acting on his own and without the consent of, or notice to, all the principal members or a majority thereof is incompetent to dispose of immovable family property. In support of this last principle Sarbah referred to two authorities, namely the decision of Hayes Redwar J. in Gaisiwa v. Akraba (1896) Sar F.L.R. 94, and the case of Aworchie v. Eshon (1872) Sar. F.C.L. 170, the judgment of Chalmers, the Judicial Assessor, before the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1876.
Sarbah concluded his exposition of this matter of who is the competent authority to sell immovable ancestral property by asserting a consequential subsidiary principle of customary law of alienation; that one of the senior or elder members of a family who had opposed a sale acting timeously has a right to sue apparently on behalf of the family to rescind or set aside a sale or mortgage of ancestral family land. A proposition which he buttressed by quoting in support, the judgment of the Full Court presided over by Marshall C.J. in Bayaidee v. Mensah (1878) Sar F.C.L. 171; the judgment of Hutchinson C.J. in Assraidu v. Dadzie (1890) Sar. F.C.L. 174 and the Bokitsi Concession Inquiry (1903) Sar. F.L.R. 159 in which he appeared as counsel for the respondents.
It is clear to me beyond any doubt on examination of his statement that Sarbah was not dealing with the civil procedure or the procedure under customary law by which a member of the family asserts his right against the head of family in a court of law or even in a traditional customary tribunal. The topic, namely customary civil procedure was to be the subject of an exhaustive and learned dissertation nine years later in 1906 in his other book: Fanti National Constitution (2nd ed.) at 31-47. A close study in his historical perspective of the customary civil procedure spanning a period of over 300 years from 1600 to about
[p.676] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
1903 as was thus canvassed by Sarbah in the said book demonstrates rather vividly that the head of family’s alleged immunity which the statutory courts of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 were supposed to have fathered and foisted on the law was never and could never have been conceived by the indigenous customary law. The rule if it exists is clearly a judge made one and since it post-dates the Supreme Court Ordinance, it should not on the authority of the Full Court judgments of Bailey C.J. and Smallman Smith J. on 21 April 1884 in Welbeck v. Brown (1884) Sar. F.C.L. 185 be considered as a rule of customary law.
If the statement of Sarbah is analysed and the context considered very carefully it becomes evident that in the first paragraph he was only considering the head of family’s power to dispose of moveable family property and in the third paragraph he dealt merely with the head’s capacity to alienate ancestral immovable family property. If the substance of the first paragraph is in the circumstances recast and expanded for the purpose of elucidation what emerges is this:
“The head of family apparently acting on his own has considerable discretionary powers in respect of the disposal of moveable family property in his possession, and because of his obligations to the members of his family, he and he alone has a customary discretion to determine the amount, if any, which any member should be given. This means quite obviously and logically that no individual member can call for an appropriation or allocation of a specified sum or a specific property to himself.”
If this is acceptable as the meaning of the paragraph, as I think it should be, then considerable light is shed on the penultimate paragraph which is alleged to contain the pith of the so-called immunity rule. In that paragraph the adverb “therefore” in the first line is very significant. It means “for that reason”, or “in consequence” and is in the circumstances only understandable and meaningful when one considered what had been. said before it in the first paragraph.
Clearly the said paragraph with its conjunction “if” which means: “supposing that” or “on the condition”, must as a matter of good English be joined to another sentence to complete it. The “if” in the paragraph, when linked with the adverb “therefore” in “if the family, therefore”, means: “supposing that the family for the reason, e.t.c.”, and predicates logically a prior state of facts which will be precedent and consequently dependent on a subsequent state of facts. In my view, and on this analysis, the second paragraph if allowed to stand by itself will be inchoate and incomplete and will do no credit to clarity because from the point of view of English grammar it needs a conjunction to link it to a relevant sentence in order to make sense and attain semantic harmony. If this is done an elucidation of its meaning will run like this:
[p.677] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
“The head of family exercises a great discretionary power in the interest of the family over the moveable family properties in his possession and in its exercise he can choose to quantify and allocate any amount of family money or portion of family property to any member of the family.
For this reason, in discharging this function supposing the members consider that he is misappropriating or squandering the family property by depriving them of what they consider to be their fair share, their only remedy is to replace him. Furthermore although no junior member of the family can:
(1) ask the head of family for an account to be gone into so that his claim for a sum due to him can be given to him; or (2) call for an appropriation of any portion of the properties to himself, nevertheless under customary law the family properties are for infants and unborn children as well and therefore the head and indeed the family must not waste or squander them.”
In my respectful opinion the true meaning of Sarbah’s penultimate paragraph is as I have stated it above. It is remarkable that with the exception of the admirable judgment of Amua-Sekyi J. in this case, in most of the judgments in which the judges have had occasion to rely on Sarbah’s statement to elucidate the alleged immunity rule, including the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case, the very relevant first paragraph had been consistently ignored with the result that what Sarbah meant has been emasculated and virtually made vacuous.
On my analysis and having regard to Sarbah’s introductory remarks at 78 of his book, I am of the considered opinion that significant principles which can be gathered from the Sarbah statement touching the rights, privileges and duties of an Akan head of family under customary law in respect of family property are the following:
1. The head of family has the moveable ancestral property including family money in his control and management in trust for the family and has a customary law discretion to allocate any such money or property in any manner he deems fit to any family member of his choice.
2. The discretionary power of thus allocating family money or moveable property to a member of the family belongs to the head of family alone and so no member of the family specially a junior member can call or sue the head of family for account merely to compel him to exercise the said power in a particular way or to his personal benefit.
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3. A member who is aggrieved because of the manner the discretionary power of the head is being exercised has as an individual no remedy outside the domestic forum, where of course he can prevail on the family to remove the head on proof that by his conduct the family property is being squandered or wasted.
4. The head of family can only alienate the immovable property of the family for the benefit of the family with the consent of or knowledge of all principal members of the family or a majority of them.
5. A senior member of the family can sue for an account for the benefit of the family to preserve the family property and prevent it from being squandered or wasted.
I am persuaded of the correctness of these principles when I consider the whole of Sarbah’s discourse under his sub-head (e): “Self acquired property” at 89 to 91 of his book together with his other view, inter alia, in his introductory remarks at 78 of the said book when he stated:
“Amid all the conflict of contradictory accounts which meet one at every turn, it is nearer the mark to say, that the head of family has the moveable ancestral property in his absolute control; if, therefore, the family find he is misappropriating, wasting, or squandering the ancestral fund, it is to their interest to remove him at once and appoint another in his stead.”
The following one single sentence in the Sarbah statement, in my view a correct general statement of the customary law if considered within its context, would seem to be the genesis of the present so-called immunity rule that: “no junior member can claim an account from the head of family.”
Quite apart from the fact that within the, context of the overall Sarbah statement, this sentence was obviously not dealing with procedure, what, one may ask, did Sarbah mean? Even from this distance of time, his writings, I think, do declare his meaning. When Sarbah mentioned “Claim on account”, he no doubt had in mind the situation canvassed in the unreported judgment of Chalmers, the Judicial Assessor, on 17 May 1871 at Cape Coast in Karaba v. Quansimah (1871) Sar F.C.L. 53 where as a result of money transaction between two spouses involving the giving of sums of money to each other and the incurring of expenses on behalf of each other a balance was struck on the dissolution of the marriage and the balance paid to the party entitled: see Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) at 53-54. Where a party or one for whom he claims is not entitled to a specifically ascertainable sum a claim for account must of necessity fail.
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Why did Sarbah mention “junior member”? Certainly in the scheme of the nomenclature he adopted he drew a sharp distinction between a junior member and a senior or elder member of a family and so by deliberately debarring junior members, he impliedly conceded that the prohibition about the claim for account does not necessarily apply to senior members on the apparent strength of the legal maxim: expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Although this maxim as I have applied it here to the rule was trenchantly criticised by Azu Crabbe C.J. in his book, Mensah Sarbah, I do not think, with respect, that the criticism is sound. Indeed, when a senior or principal member claims an account against the head not for himself but on behalf of the family, there is no customary law reason why the claim should fail. This is because although the senior member has no right to call for any sum or specific property to be allocated to him personally, nonetheless by virtue of being a principal member and consequently a trustee with the head and the other principal members of the power of alienation, he can claim an account from the head of family on behalf of the family in order to preserve the property and thus fulfil his fiduciary customary obligation as one whose knowledge or consent is necessary for a valid alienation to strangers of the family property. This is no doubt the reason why Sarbah confined the prohibition, and rightly so, to junior members.
The point is clearly brought home in Sarbah’s consideration at 78-79 of the part played by senior members in valid alienation of family property, when he said:
“The head of a family cannot, without the consent of all the principal members of the family, or the greater part thereof, that is the Ebusuafu, alienate the immovable ancestral or family property. And although an alienation may be necessary for some family purpose, or for the discharge of a family obligation, nevertheless, unless confirmed by the senior or principal members of the family, such alienation is revocable.
Neither the head of the family acting alone, nor the senior members of a family acting alone, can make any valid alienation nor give title to any family property whatsoever.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It seems to me that on the authority of Sarbah, senior members of a family as joint trustees for valid alienation of family property can jointly or severally claim an account from the family head either at a family meeting or before a competent court, otherwise they cannot vindicate their undoubted customary law right of knowing or giving [p.680] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 their consent to a valid alienation of family property and their right can then be violated by of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639-726 the head of the family with impunity.
In so far as the Court of Appeal in this case repudiated the absolute right of senior members on behalf of the family to sue the head qua head for account without first removing him, its appreciation of the formulation of the rule is erroneous. The maxim is ubi jus ibi remedium and the customary rule disqualifying junior members from suing is nothing but an antonymous conceptualisation of this maxim. The rule is not peculiar to our customary laws. It is in fact nothing more than a trite common law principle well-known to the jurisprudence of many nations, ancient and modem, that a claim for account cannot be made against a person who is not an accounting party. The head of family is an accounting party to the whole family or the senior members, but he is not, without more, an accounting party to the junior members, consequently the use of the word “junior” by Sarbah is deliberate and understandable.
I will venture to think that if a junior member can by virtue of his lawful dealings with the family property bring the head within the compass of an accounting party, he can maintain the supposed proscribed action for account against the head. Suppose a man were to die and bequeath to a junior member of the family the proceeds of his cocoa farm, for say two years after his death by valid samansiw. If the head of family were to incur expenditure in collecting the produce of the farm within the two years and eventually mix the amounts obtained from the proceeds of the farm with family account, I am unable to appreciate the soundness of any principle of law customary or otherwise which debars him from maintaining an action for account against the head of family, a junior member though he may be.
The distinction thus drawn between “junior” and “senior” members would seem to be founded on, inter alia, at least two customary law norms. The first is the respect which the customary law expects the junior members to have for the senior members by not disregarding their experience and mature views; and the second is the respect which the entire family reposes in its own accredited head. These norms generate in the relationship between all the members of the family including the head a collective attitude calculated to promote reconciliation and respect for the elders who are the most important members of the family and in the process to eschew conflicts. McCarthy J. delivering the judgment of the West African Court of Appeal in Fixon Owoo v. Owoo (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 81 at 84 came very near, indeed, to appreciating this position. In a comment on the reason for this attitude of members of the family in our customary society he said: “This attitude becomes more intelligible if one remembers … the great respect usually paid by a family to its most important members.”
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With regard to the head of family’s position he observed that one must have: “regard no doubt to the latitude not infrequently allowed to an influential member who is for the time being enjoying the usufruct of the family property.”
It appears to me with the greatest respect that the immunity rule as was generally stated in the leading judgment of the Court of Appeal and as has been consistently formulated in some judgments by our superior courts lacks clarity and in the form in which it is couched, it is not supported and is not legitimately derivable from what the great Sarbah said in his book on Fanti Customary Laws. On the contrary, it would seem to be merely an inchoate product of the statutory courts which subsequently emerged after the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 (No. 4 of 1876).
After 1897 when Sarbah first published his book, the courts in their enthusiasm to declare the customary law as was expounded by Sarbah inadvertently, due no doubt to a misreading of Sarbah, formulated the so-called immunity rule in such vacillating and elusive forms as to militate against its easy reception as a consistent principle within the matrix of the customary law. It remains now to examine precisely the scope and purport of what the courts have actually decided and the rationale of the decisions as well as what they have said obiter in regard to the so-called immunity rule.
Before considering these, however, one or two matters need to be clarified. It must be kept in mind that the alleged immunity rule as asserted even by the courts is restrictive and is an immunity to actions for account against the incumbent head of family at the instance of a member of the family if the head of family has not been first removed. It does not therefore cover other actions not involving accounts or those mounted to preserve family property. This was conceded very early by the statutory courts more than 70 years ago in a judgment of Lennard J. in the Full Court in Sappor v. Amartey (1913) D & F ‘11-’16, 53 at 55. In that case in concurring with the judgment of Crampton Smyly C. J. that a single member of a family cannot maintain an action of trespass against the head of family in respect of family land which the plaintiff had unilaterally appropriated to his exclusive use, Lennard J. said:
“…it seems to me that the majority of a family can depose a head whom they dislike and that under ordinary circumstances no Court ought to interfere with this domestic discipline. Assuming however that the head of a family can carry a majority of it with him and his intentions are entirely selfish and unjust I have no doubt whatever that upon … a proper case made a Court of Justice can afford relief.”
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The principle that in a case at least not involving a claim for account the head can be sued by a member was impliedly conceded by Bayaidee v. Mensah (supra) and Manko v. Bonso (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62 and was not questioned in Agyapa v. Fosu (1952) D.C. (Land) ‘52-’55, 85. In the leading case of Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 58 at 161, Gardiner Smith Ag. J. would seem to have echoed the 1913 views of Lennard J. when he took for granted the right of a family member to sue the head in appropriate circumstances. He said of the rights of the family member: “He has a certain claim upon the head of family for support—the extent of support varying with family means—and I assume that he could enforce this by action.”
With respect, it would seem the dictum is perhaps too carelessly formulated. Between “that” and “he” I would interpolate “in appropriate circumstances.” Be that as it may, Mr. Justice Azu Crabbe at 85 of his excellent book on John Mensah Sarbah (1971), has criticised this view of Gardiner Smith Ag. J. as “obiter dictum and . . . in any case not good law.” It seems to me that if Gardiner Smith Ag. J. had in mind a case where in the absence of special circumstances a junior or ordinary member sues the head for account for the purpose of claiming that his customary interest of support in the family property be quantified, then the criticism of Azu Crabbe is well justified. Such an action is what Sarbah’s statement proscribes and the Gardiner Smith dictum would seem to be amenable to such a construction. If however he was thinking of special circumstances which could render the head an accounting party then the criticism is misconceived. Suppose in fulfilling his obligation to a particular member of a family, a head of family were to give possession of a portion of the family land for a short term of years for the support of that member. If that member were to cultivate the land and before harvesting the products of his efforts, the head of family were to capriciously deprive him of his possession and appropriate further the proceeds of the farm to the family account, I cannot see what reasonable customary law principle can debar the member from suing the head of family for an account of the farm proceeds of the said family land in enforcement of his right. Presumably Gardiner Smith Ag. J. had such analogous situation in mind in the view he expressed which Justice Azu Crabbe so nonchalantly deprecated. Indeed, Justice Azu Crabbe at 87 of his book would seem to concede such a right when on the ostensible authority of Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 85 at 88-89, to be discussed later in this judgment, he observed:
“where an individual member of the family has established a usufructuary title over a portion of the family land for his support he can maintain an action for recovery of possession against the head of the family when the head wrongfully dispossesses him of
[p.683] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 that portion of land. This appears to be the only instance in which a junior or individual member of the family can sue the family head.”
Before examining the decided cases, I think a second matter which also deserves attention and which was politely dealt with in a masterly manner by the Chief Justice is the caveat by Jiagge J.A. at the Court of Appeal at 865 that the courts should not “equate the position of the head of family with that of a “trustee”—a stand supported by the majority judgment and apparently by Wiredu J.A. when he said (supra) at 862 000: “I must remark here that even though the head of family’s position in relation to family property in his possession has been likened to that of a trustee the two are not the same.”
With the utmost respect, I am afraid it is too late in the day for the courts to resile from their previous unequivocal stance. The great Sarbah himself had no doubts about the nature of the relationship between the head and family members for at 89 of his Fanti Customary Laws, he stated the position thus: “But in this country the head of a family holds the family possessions in trust for himself and the members of the family.” On 23 July 1890 barely fourteen years after the establishment of the Supreme Court, Hutchinson C.J. lent the full weight of his judicial authority to this view when he said in Assraidu v. Dadzie (1890) Sar F.C.L. 174 at 176, while referring to the family head as its chief that: “Family land does not belong to the chief: he is merely the trustee of it for all the family.” Since 1890 the judges of our courts have consistently persisted in this position as can be seen in the opinion of Barton J. in Esson v. Moubarak (1938) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 30 at 31. See also the views of Harragin C.J. to the same effect in Agbloe II v. Sappor (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 187 at 189 and of Wilson C.J. in Ankrah v. Methodist Church (1949) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 170 at 172 as well as van Lare J. (as he then was) in Katai v. Katai (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 515 at 156.
I now turn to a consideration of the case law in chronological order. I propose to consider within a 100 years span all the cases relevant to the immunity rule which I have succeeded in laying hands on and which were decided between 1876 when the Supreme Court Ordinance came into force and 1975 when the last of the cases cited by the Court of Appeal was decided. These cases which are said to have institutionalised the so-called immunity rule directly or indirectly either in their obiter dicta or by their alleged ratios are, inter alia, the following;
(1) Amekoo v. Amevor (supra), an Ada case;
(2) Pappoe v. Kweku (supra), a Ga case;
(3) Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215, a Ga case;
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(4) Solomon and Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 127, also a Ga case;
(5) Abude v. Onano (1946), another Ga case;
(6) Etuah v. Richardson (1948) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 64, an Akan case;
(7) Mary Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 164, also a Ga case;
(8) Tamakloe v. Attipoe (1951) D.C. (land) ‘48-’51, 378, an Anlo case;
(9) Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260, an Akan case;
(10) Tamakloe v. Attipoe, W.A.C.A. 22 June 1953, unreported; also an Anlo case;
(11) Katai v. Katai and Abodin (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 151, a Ga case;
(12) Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 16, a Ga case;
(13) Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86, an Anlo case;
(14) Fynn v. Koo, Land Court, Cape Coast, 20 February 1960, unreported, an Akan case;
(15) Osonoware v. Ayiku II, High Court, 27 July 1962, unreported, a Ga case; and
(16) Annan v. Kwogyirem [1975] 1 G.L.R. 291, an Akan case.
Five of the cases emphasised above were specifically prayed in aid by the Court of Appeal as authorities vindicating the immunity doctrine. Amekoo v. Amevor (supra) was the first case quoted by the Court of Appeal in this case as authority in support of the doctrine. The case is certainly inapposite. It was an administration suit and was concerned with Ada customary law. In an earlier application on 13 June 1889 for letters of administration in Re: Isaac Ametifi (1889) Red 157, it was decided by Hutchinson C.J. that according to Ada customary law Amevor, the defendant, as the eldest uterine brother of the deceased, was prima facie entitled to the control and management of the property of the deceased and that he was justified to claim the largest share although he ought to give something, the amount of which was not fixed by Ada custom, to his brothers and sisters and children of the deceased. The instant administration suit before the same judge was apparently against the defendant as successor and although the precise amount to be given to the claimants was at large, Hutchinson C.J. upon equitable grounds after payment of the costs divided the resultant balance of the sum due to the estate from the Basel Mission equally amongst the widow and the sisters and children of the deceased, since on an examination of his filed accounts the defendant and his two brothers appeared to have already enjoyed part of the estate. The case had nothing to do with the immunity doctrine. On the contrary, it was a case of a member of the family suing another member who had the
[p.685] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 control and management of the estate. Although it was an administration suit and the defendant filed account, his status as customary successor and manager and controller of the property is if anything, so analogous to that of head of family that the case must be considered to be in a sense at variance with the alleged doctrine.
Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) is the second case cited in support. It is the locus classicus. It is a Ga case. The plaintiff, the only surviving brother of the full blood of a deceased intestate, sued the head of family who had taken out letters of administration, inter alia, for an account of his administration. Smyly C.J. at the High Court in Accra held on the authority of Sarbah’s statement that the plaintiff as a “junior” member could not claim an account from the head of family. The plaintiff’s appeal to the Full Court coram Gardiner Smith Ag. .J, Michelin and Hall J.J. was dismissed. As the head of family had taken out letters of administration, the Full Court following its earlier decision in Villars v. Baffoe (1909) Ren. 546 at 550 where it had held that: “A man cannot by simply taking out letters of administration oust the native law so far as the ‘family’ is concerned”, decided that the case must be governed by customary law and like Smyly C.J. at the court below, Hall J. relying on Sarbah’s statement said at 165: “By native law the personal property of a deceased person on his death becomes family property, and no junior member of the family can claim an account from the head of family.”
Michelin J. at 163 supported this correct and innocuous line of reasoning and the judgment of Smyly C.J. when he said:
“The onus was . . . on the Plaintiff to prove that in accordance with native customary law he could claim such account, and no such proof having been given by him, the learned Chief Justice was in my opinion correct in holding that no cause of action had been shewn and in dismissing such action accordingly.”
It was his inelegant misreading of Sarbah’s statement and some questionable pronouncements in the contribution of Gardiner Smith Ag. J. which subsequent courts did not examine critically that would seem to have given rise to so much confusion in the conceptualisation of the immunity doctrine as so stated in the majority judgment. At 161 of the report, this was what Gardiner Smith Ag. J. who would seem to have given the leading judgment said:
“[I]t is a general principle of native law that the personal property of a deceased head of a family passes to his successor (subject to certain obligations to support the other members of the family), and that an action of accounting is unknown to native law. It
[p.686] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 may be asked what remedy a member of a family has if the head refuses to give him of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639-726 anything. The answer would appear to be that although in the words of Sarbah he cannot claim an account from the head of the family or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate or income therefrom arising, yet he has a certain claim upon the head of the family for support—the extent of support varying with the family means—and I assume that he could enforce this by action.
(The emphasis is mine.)
The acting judge makes three positive statements here. I have emphasised them. First, he asserts that an action of accounting is unknown to the customary law. I have already referred to the case of Karaba v. Quansimah (supra) to show that before the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1876 an action of accounting was not unknown to Akan customary jurisprudence. The Karaba case (supra) for instance shows that Gardiner Smith Ag. J. was wrong and that in an action for dissolution of marriage, it is not unusual under the customary law for a subsidiary claim for account to be tagged to the substantive relief of divorce. I shall deal with this again later on in this judgment. Secondly, he purports in his second statement to reproduce the words of Sarbah. He says: “In the words of Sarbah he cannot claim … therefrom arising.” From the word “claim” up to “income therefrom arising”, Gardiner Smith Ag. J. has repeated the actual words of Sarbah. However where Sarbah said: “no junior member can claim” he has converted to “he cannot claim” and has in the process deprived the Sarbah thesis founded as it is on the “junior” factor, of its most significant element; if his rendering of it is taken without checking from the Sarbah text as Sir William Brandford Griffith would seem to have done in his book: A Digest of and Index to the Reports of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony at 4, where a synopsis of the substance of the case of Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) in relation to the immunity rule is given as follows:
“Defendant, being head of family, took out administration of the estate of a deceased member:—Held, that he was not liable to give an account of his administration to another member of the family, who was only a beneficiary, in respect of his membership.”
This would seem to be the ratio decidendi of the decision of Gardiner Smith Ag. J. If for “another” in the Digest is substituted “a junior” this will accord with the ratio decidendi of Smyly C.J. in the
[p.687] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 court below and the majority decision of Michelin and Hall J.J. in the Full Court. In my view the reasoning of the majority and Smyly C.J. is unexceptionable and their decisions are therefore a correct statement of the customary rule on accounting to a junior member by an Akan head of family in the circumstances of the case, if, indeed, the plaintiff is merely a beneficiary in respect of his membership and not in fact a successor or a member with the right to inherit.
I have already discussed the inelegant dictum of Gardiner Smith’s third statement which because of its lack of clarity and its ambiguous formulation was no doubt criticised by Mr. Justice Azu Crabbe in his book to which I have already referred.
Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) as I have indicated is a Ga case. Like the instant case, Nelson v. Nelson (supra) decided in 1932 is also a Ga case. In that case some of the children of the deceased brought an action for account against a brother of theirs who was appointed by the deceased on his death bed to look after their interest in his estate. The head of family confirmed the appointment and apparently gave the said appointed brother power to manage the estate presumably in his stead. A submission on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiffs were junior members of the family and that the defendant was virtually head of the family and so on the authority of Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) and the second paragraph of Sarbah’s statement he was not liable to account was rejected by the court. At 217-218 of the report Michelin J. in whose views the other members concurred said:
“… this is not the case of an action by a junior member of a family against the head of family but is brought by brothers and sisters of the defendant against him in his fiduciary position as a caretaker on their behalf.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
If the principle is a principle simpliciter of non-accountability to junior members and is an inflexible rule, then I would have thought an agent being in law his principal’s alter ego, the caretaker if appointed by the head can take advantage of the rule and be accountable only to the head who appointed him; but although the member caretaker was held accountable to the children, the case would seem to have been distinguished in the subsequent case of Katai v. Katai and Abodin (supra) to be discussed later on in this judgment.
Solomon and Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra), the next case decided in 1943, is another Ga case. The first and second plaintiffs were the nephew and eldest son respectively of the deceased and they sued the head of family for themselves and on behalf of the children and members of the family, inter alia, for a declaration that the children of the deceased have an interest in the self-acquired personal and real
[p.688] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 property of their deceased father. The trial judge Woolhouse Bannerman sitting in the High Court, Accra on 21 December 1942 in an unreported decision granted the application. On appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, that court held in effect that on the assumption that the second plaintiff and his brothers and sisters were the children of A Ga six-cloth marriage, then on the authority of Cole v. Cole, Supreme Court, Accra, 11 September 1939, unreported, they were entitled to the said declaration. The case is hardly an authority on the immunity doctrine except that the trial judge, the first Ghanaian superior court judge himself apparently a Ga, criticised the alleged immunity rule in its application to Ga customary cases when he said:
“I should like to mention that it was Sarbah in his book who propounded the principle that a member of the family cannot claim an account from the head of family. This is an Akan custom and not a Ga custom.”
The West African Court of Appeal daubed this statement a mere obiter and unfortunately they studiously ignored it instead of re-reading Sarbah and correcting the misapprehension so needlessly seeping into his statement and overflowing into the law.
Clearly like many judges before him and after, Woolhouse Bannerman J. has misread Sarbah’s statement.
The Gardiner Smith lapsus linguae has infected him. Outraged at the principle underlining such a custom revealed by his misreading he protested:
“With the utmost respect to the learned author, I hold that this principle is contrary to equity and natural justice and it is not unknown that some unscrupulous and callous heads of families have mercilessly exploited this so-called custom to the detriment of individual members of the family. This is common knowledge.”
It seems to me that in his criticism of the custom as he understood it, Woolhouse Bannerman was being “alert and … faithful to the heart beat of our society” if I am to borrow with permission the words of my brother Sowah J.S.C. in his judgment. I must say that the form in which the immunity rule is here attributed to Sarbah reflects the confusion in legal and judicial circles of what Sarbah had said, a misconception which Gardiner Smith Ag. J. had peddled in his views in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra). It is a misconstruction which Sir Brandford Griffith had institutionalised in his Digest and which is apparently still with us.
Although Woolhouse Bannerman’s effort at repudiating the rule as a Ga custom was not heeded, the thrust of subsequent authorities would seem to indicate that he was right for it is inconceivable under Akan customary law for children who in theory are not members of their
[p.689] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 father’s family for the purpose of succession to claim shares in their father’s estate; since sharing may necessitate going into account to determine the appropriate share of the child. For this, see Sarbah, Fanti Customary Law (3rd ed.), p. 274 where the right of children under Ga customary law to share in the estate of a deceased father is also conceded, thus vindicating the view of Woolhouse Bannerman that the rule, if it exists, is an Akan one and not a Ga customary law.
Abude v. Onano (supra) decided in 1946 is still another Ga case from Labadi. It is the third case quoted by the Court of Appeal in support of the so-called immunity doctrine of the head of family. The facts however are illuminating: The plaintiff, as elders of the Labadi stool, for themselves and on behalf of the elders of four of the six quarters of the La Division of the Ga State brought an action at the High Court against the La Mantse as the first defendant and five other defendants styled trustees of the La Benevolent Society. They alleged that the La Mantse as custodian of money paid to the Labadi stool had deposited the said money in a Post Office Savings Bank in the name of “La Benevolent Society” and had constituted himself and the five other defendants trustees of the said fund. They claimed that the defendants were using the stool money so deposited, for their own selfish ends and for other purposes prejudicial to the interests of the La stool. Accordingly they claimed at 103:
“(a) An injunction restraining the defendants from making any further withdrawals from the said account except with consent and approval of the Elders of the stool.
(b) An account of all moneys that have come into the possession of the defendants or any of them for the Labadi stool.”
The learned judge, Smith J., dismissed the action and the plaintiffs appealed. The case had obviously nothing to do with the supposed immunity of a head of family to account and any pronouncement on the matter must of necessity be obiter. However, Korsah J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment of the West African Court of Appeal founded the judgment mainly on the ostensible authority of Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) as that case was erroneously digested at 4 of Griffith’s Digest already quoted in this judgment. As I have already pointed out this Digest has misconstrued the ratio decidendi of Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) for that case decided that no junior member of the family can claim an account from the head of family and if its reasoning is to be applied by analogy to the Abude case, the plaintiffs who were admittedly elders of the stool can hardly be dismissed upon that ground. It seems to me with the greatest respect that Abude v. Onano (supra) was without doubt decided per incuriam.
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About two years after the Abude v. Onano case (supra), Quist J. sitting at the Lands Division of the Divisional Court at Cape Coast heard an appeal from the judgment of the native court in Etuah v. Richardson (1948) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 64. It is an Akan case. The defendant as head of family had received compensation for compulsory acquisition of the family land. The plaintiff sued on behalf of a branch of the family for a half share of the compensation money. The defendant agreed that members of the family had equal rights to the family property, but contended that a member’s right to a portion was at the discretion of the head of family and resisted the plaintiff’s claim. The native court gave judgment for the plaintiff, but the defendant’s appeal to the Land Division was allowed by Quist J.
It must be noted that this was an action for an appropriation of half portion of family property. It was not an action for an account. Admittedly, the family land has been converted into money by the payment of compensation and the plaintiffs were in the circumstances and in contemplation of the law virtually asking for partition. At 67, Quist J. however stated baldly the ratio of his decision:
“It is an accepted and well established principle of Native Customary law that the Head of Family cannot be sued by a member of the family for account or for apportionment of the family property.”
(The emphasis is mine.) For this proposition he cited the second paragraph of Sarbah’s statement and supported it with Sappor v. Amartey (supra) and the decision in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) as attenuated in the summary of Sir Brandford Griffith in the Digest; and relying further on the Abude v. Onano case (supra) he said:
“Applying the principles enunciated in the cases I have referred to, and the Customary Law as stated by Sarbah, I hold that neither the plaintiff nor the members of his section can maintain an action against the head of the family for appropriation or payment to himself or to them of any special portion of the family estate—compensation paid in the present case.”
The proposition regarding “account” is no doubt obiter and of course not necessary for the decision and as it is founded on a misreading of Sarbah and a misapprehension not only of the basis of the decision in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) but also on a reliance on the per incuriam ratio of Abude v. Onano (supra), it is clearly a misconceived proposition.
After Etuah v. Richardson (supra) the West African Court of Appeal in 1951 dealt with a case bearing directly and squarely on the
[p.691] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 alleged immunity rule in a Ga customary law setting. The said case Mary Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 164 is the locus classicus of the Ga cases. It involved the Vanderpuye estate which had been the subject of their previous decision in Solomon and Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra). Following the decision in the said Solomon and Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra) the said case was remitted to the Divisional Court for a decision as to the status of the children under Ga customary law. McCarthy J. in the Divisional Court dealing with the referred case, declared that the children were the children of a Ga six-cloth marriage. In view of this declaration the children brought an action in the Ga native court against the head of family claiming:
(a) A declaration of their share (gbena) and the appropriation to them of such of the estate as represents the share to which they are entitled according to Ga customary law; and
(b) An account of all rents and profits of the estate since 1935 and payment to the plaintiffs of their share thereof
The native court held that under Ga customary law, the appointment of the head of family did not constitute succession to a deceased self-acquired property and that a head of family who was not the brother or the nephew of the deceased did not inherit the deceased. As a matter of interest it is worthy of note that this Ga custom would seem to be the same as the Akan and which Wiredu J.A. was to articulate later in his famous decision in Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra) decided in 1975.
Back to the Mary Vanderpuye case (supra) the court held that since the defendant was a cousin of the deceased, he had no right as long as the children were alive to succeed merely because he was the head of family. In the view of the court, he was head only for the purpose of managing the estate for the children in particular and the family in general—once again reminiscent of the subsequent view of Wiredu J.A. in the Kwogyirem case (supra) and a later view of Coussey J.A. in the Vidal Tamakloe case (supra) to be discussed later in this judgment, as to the status of a family head who is not a successor to the self-acquired property of an intestate.
The court found that the defendant had mismanaged the estate and held that since there was no brother or nephew of the deceased alive, the interest of the children extended to the whole estate and gave judgment accordingly against the head of family adding that the children were entitled to all rents and profits as would be shown by the defendant’s account. On a peal to the Land Court Smith J. varied the judgment although he did not impugn the principle which the native court had upheld that the head was accountable to the children. The judgment of Smith J. was itself varied by the West African Court of
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Appeal, but the principle of the head’s accountability to the children as was advocated by the native court and supported by Smith J. was not disturbed. On further appeal to the Privy Council, in Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 16 at 23, Lord Cohen delivering the judgment of the board advised: “That the appeal be allowed, the orders of the West African Court of Appeal and of the Land Court be set aside, and the order of the Native Court be restored.”
It is noteworthy that in this Ga case the children’s right as members of the family to sue the family head for account of what was admitted to be their entitlement according to customary law was not questioned in all the judgments from the native court right up to the Privy Council. Perhaps it is worth stressing that the status of children of a legal marriage according to native law as was expounded by the native court is different under the Ga customary law from its conception under Akan customary law. As Crampton Smyly C.J. put it in Millers Ltd v. Van Hien (1912) D & F ‘11 -’16, 15 at 16: “The Accra law differing to the extent, that the children of the deceased of that marriage, inherit in conjunction with those, who would otherwise be the heirs.” The great Sarbah—Crampton Smyly’s source, records the following at 274 of his Fanti Customary Law (3rd ed.):
“ . . . in the Fanti country . . . [c]hildren are not considered members of the father’s family, as far as having any right to his property. In … Accra and east of it, children of legal marriage, that is, marriage according to native law said to be known as the six-cloth marriage—sometimes inherit the property of their father in conjunction with the heir—and the property cannot be disposed of without the consent of the children.”
Edmund Bannerman, an eminent Ga solicitor whose knowledge of the customary laws and long experience as a practitioner were described by the great Sarbah as “unsurpassed”, gave his opinion on the Ga custom in 1891 at the request of Hutchinson C.J. He said as recorded in Fanti Customary Law (3rd ed.) at 110:
“With reference to … six-cloth marriage, real property descends the same as personal property with this exception, that it is inherited in conjunction with the children of the deceased of that marriage and such real property cannot be disposed of without the children’s consent.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Thus among the Gas in the case of “legal marriage” a person’s family is made up of members of his maternal family and his own children of the marriage for the purpose of succession.
[p.693] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
I have, in setting down the cases involving the immunity rule, indicated the applicable customary law in the community whose customary law is in issue. I have done this because in Ghana the expression “customary law” has for long been legally defined as “the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities” in the country. The combined effect of section 4 (2) of the Proclamation 1981 and section 61 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 is to continue these laws in operation only in so far as they are compatible with “national aspirations.” Although the term “national aspirations” has not been defined or clarified under the new dispensation, I dare say it connotes the articulation of public policy embodying, inter alia, what my brother Sowah J.S.C. aptly called just now “the ethics and morality of the community” by recognising those indefinable and subtle beneficial norms operating in the country as a whole and capable of judicious ascertainment for the purposes of the judicial process by virtue of a judge’s membership as a citizen of the country. The effect of this new national aspiration principle sponsored by our present fundamental law is probably to bring some uniformity and homogeneity gradually as far as that is practicable into the whole corpus of the customary laws by this process of subjecting them to one national common denominator.
I have drawn attention to this legal position because the next case which was decided a few months after Mary Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra) is an Anlo case: Tamakloe v. Attipoe (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 378. I have had to consider that case at length because another Anlo case, Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86, was cited by the Court of Appeal in support of the supposed immunity doctrine. In the Tamakloe case (supra) the property in the suit was a house at Accra, the self-acquired property of one Emmanuel Tamakloe, an Anlo man, who had died intestate and was survived by nine children, five of them sons. The fourth defendant, one of the sons, was appointed successor to the deceased and the first and second defendants were the heads of family of the deceased representing the maternal and paternal branches of his family respectively. In this action before Jackson J., four of the children as plaintiffs sued the said heads and the successor as well as a third defendant as the lessee to whom the two heads with the concurrence of the successor had leased the property. The action was (1) for the lease to be set aside; (2) for an account of rents and profits received from the property; and (3) for an order that the two family heads assign their interest in the lease to the fourth defendant for himself and the other children. Jackson J. declined to set aside the lease. He examined the earlier proceedings before Coussey J. (as he then was) in Attipoe v. Shoucaire (1948) D.C. (Land) 148-’51, 16 and another before Smith J. in Khoury v. Tamakloe (1950) D.C. (Land)
[p.694] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
‘48-’51, 201 and found that according to Anlo customary law, “the only persons entitled to any beneficial interest in the property of a father who dies intestate and leaving self-acquired property are the surviving children of that man.”
In view of the Anlo customary law position Jackson J. ordered the first, second and fourth defendants to account to the plaintiffs in respect of the property. It was contended on appeal to the West African Court of Appeal that the nine children of the deceased were junior members of the family and that by native customary law, obviously the supposed Akan custom allegedly noted by Sarbah, no individual member or group of members could call upon the family head to account. In Vidal Tamakloe v. Chief Attipoe (supra) an unreported decision delivered on 22 June 1953 by Foster Sutton P., Coussey J.A. and Windsor Aubrey J. dealing with the appeal, the court rejected this contention and decided that:
(a) By Anlo customary law no one other than the nine children were entitled to any beneficial interest the property.
(b) That the management and control of the property was vested in the child elected by the family to succeed.
(c) That the true function of the first and second defendants as heads of the larger family was advisory and protective, i.e. to watch the interest of the children and if necessary to convene meetings in matters affecting the deceased’s estate and that as they had no beneficial interest in the estate, they were liable to account for all their dealings with the property.
With regard to the fourth defendant, the successor, Coussey J.A. speaking for the court said that:
“By Anlo customary law all the children have an equal share in the property of the deceased … Their voice decides the additional recompense that shall be made to the successor appointed in consideration of assuming personal liability for the debts of the deceased. But the fourth defendant says native customary law protects him from liability to account at the suit of a brother or sister who has an equal interest with him in property committed to his management as successor. Even if the native customary law were as stated by the defendant, I consider that to apply it to the present case would be contrary to public policy.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Note very well the approach of the court, per Coussey J.A., reminiscent of the subsequent “national aspiration” compatibility principle which is now the current measure of the validity of all our pre-revolution laws as is expoused in section 61 of P.N.D.C.L. 42.
[p.695] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
I now revert to the Ga customary cases. About a year after the West African Court of Appeal decision in Mary Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra) the court decided the case of Wellington v. Papafio (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 49. The facts of the case are not necessary. The court purported to throw doubt on the correctness of the customary law as was stated by the Ga native court in Mary Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra) and relied as authority for this stand on the West African Court of Appeal decision in the said case which was set aside by the Privy Council on 23 April 1956 in Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra). Of course on the, date of the decision in the Wellington case, the court could not possibly have been aware of this because the Privy Council had not yet handed down its opinion, but that opinion casts doubts on the authentic character of the West African Court of Appeal pronouncements in the Vanderpuye case which were, inter alia, the bases of the decision in the Wellington case although probably the actual decision in the Wellington case may very well be supported on other grounds.
Barely a year later the court came to grips once again with the immunity rule in an Akan case: Fynn v. Gardiner (supra). In that case, one Amelia Harrison who was adjudged to have acquired a house at Commercial Street, Cape Coast died intestate leaving a daughter—the defendant. The plaintiffs were the children of the sister of the deceased and they sued the defendant the head of family for (1) a declaration that they were joint owners with her; and (2) an account of the rent. The native court gave judgment for the plaintiffs and this was reversed by the Land Court. On further appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, the judgment of the Land Court was set aside and the claim for declaration was granted, on the authority of Sarbah that when a person died intestate, property held by him as sole owner and possessor relapses in the next generation “into a state of joint tenancy.” The court however deprecated the order for account made by the native court and Foster Sutton J. reading the judgment of the court with the concurrence of the other members: Coussey J.A. and Korsah J., said:
“… in our opinion, the native court erred in ordering an account. It is well a settled principle of native law and custom that junior members of a family cannot call upon the head of the family for an account.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It is remarkable that Korsah J. (as he then was) who delivered the earlier judgment of the court in Abude v. Onano (supra), where the so-called immunity rule was very widely stated concurred in the narrow
[p.696] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 statement of the principle confining it to junior members in accordance with the correct Sarbah statement and the true Pappoe v. Kweku ratio. It seems to me therefore that all the authorities which have relied on the wider statement in Abude v. Onano had in the circumstances ignored the rank of the plaintiff member of the family, thus blurring the senior/junior dichotomy of Sarbah in the family set up and must therefore be considered wrong.
Three years after this case, at the Land Court in Accra, van Lare J. (as he then was) decided the Ga case of Katai v. Katai and Abodin (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 151. It was a claim by the plaintiffs, who were the children of a Ga man who died intestate, against the defendants, the other children of the deceased, for an account of rents of a house, the self-acquired property of the deceased. The children were issues of a six-cloth marriage who had taken possession of the house and arranged among themselves that the defendants should manage the house and collect the rent accruing therefrom for and on behalf of all the children. The action was brought by the aggrieved plaintiffs to compel the defendants to render accounts. The head of family who was the niece of the deceased subsequently joined the suit as co-defendant. van Lare J. (as he then was) dismissed the action and entered judgment for the defendants. The ratio decidendi deducible from his judgment would seem to be:
(1) The plaintiffs as children were not competent to maintain an action because the head of family alone could sue and be sued as representative respecting claims on the family possessions and that Laryea v. U.T.C. (1931) D.Ct. ‘29-’31, 122 at 125 is authority for the proposition that the head of family in whom the property vests in trust for the family is the proper person to bring action with respect to the family property.
(2) The plaintiffs’ action was misconceived because “the head of a family is not liable to account” on the apparent authority of the statement of Gardiner Smith Ag. J. in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) that “an action of accounting is unknown to native law.”
The rights of Ga six-cloth children as had been stated in the dubious West African Court of Appeal cases of Mary Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra) and Wellington v. Papafio (supra) were restated although their authority was, as I have already pointed out, eroded by the subsequent decision of the Privy Council in their 1956 opinion in Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra), which unfortunately had admittedly not then been decided by the time van Lare J. (as he then was) delivered his judgment. It seems to me that the ratio of Katai v. Katai case
[p.697] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
(supra) is unsatisfactory since the correctness of the proposition that the head of family is not the only person who can sue in respect of the family property was not impugned in any of the courts that decided the Vanderpuye v. Botchway case (supra) as it ascended the courts from the native court right through to the Privy Council. In fact, the right of children of six-cloth marriage to sue in appropriate circumstances would seem to have been specifically conceded in the said Vanderpuye case (supra) in all the courts. In the circumstances the inherent proposition sponsored apparently by the van Lare ratio that the successor of an intestate cannot sue the family head for account is faulted by the decision of Wiredu J. (as he then was) in Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra).
Furthermore the bald statement of Gardiner Smith Ag. J. that an action of accounting is unknown to native law is with respect clearly erroneous. Presumably he thought the action of accounting is peculiar to the English common law. I have already considered the customary law remedy of accounting when I referred to the unreported decision in Karaba v. Quansimah (supra). If reported cases are necessary to buttress the principle, then Quassua v. Ward (1845) Sar. F.C.L. 117, the very first case reported in Sarbah’s Law Report of Decided Cases (3rd ed.),—DeGraft v. Mensah (1871) Sar. F.C.L. 125 and Sackie v. Agawa (1873) Sar. F.C.L. 126 demonstrate that “an action of accounting” is not foreign to our customary jurisprudence. The three customary law cases I have cited were decided long before the Supreme Court was established in 1876. The last two were decided before the time of Chalmers, the Judicial Assessor, and in the last case the principle was clearly stated at 126 that:
“On a discontinuation of marriage, accounts are gone into between the husband and wife as to their separate expenses, and a balance is struck, which becomes payable by the one on which it lies.”
It is interesting that in the Katai v. Katai case (supra) the assessor dissented from the judgment and gave as his view that the action properly lay against the co-defendant as head of the family to account to the plaintiff because in his view as reported at 157:
“the co-defendant has utterly failed in her duties according to Native Custom and as she can be removed from office for lack of management, she is accountable in the circumstance to the plaintiffs and must therefore give account of her stewardship.”
I think Katai v. Katai (supra) was decided per incuriam for its ratio contradicts the applicable Ga customary law.
[p.698] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
Heyman v. Attipoe (supra) is an Anlo case and was an appeal from a decision of the Anlo Native Court in favour of the defendant in an action for a declaration of title to land, an order for possession and for an account. It is not necessary to refer to the facts. Ollennu J. (as he then was), relying on Abude v. Onano (supra) and apparently on pronouncements of the courts on the Akan line of cases, laid down the law applicable to this Anlo case without any reference whatsoever to the very important and relevant Anlo case of Vidal Tamakloe v. Chief Attipoe (supra) in which the West African Court of Appeal had made authoritative pronouncements on the Anlo customary law involved.
Ollennu J. (as he then was) said at 88:
“By native custom a member of a family cannot sue the head of family for accounts. The authorities are many on the point; One of them is Abude and Others v. Onano and Others. The plaintiff’s claim for account must therefore fail.
Again, by native custom the head of family is the proper person to have charge of and control of the family land for and on behalf of the family. A member of the family cannot maintain an action against him for recovery of general family land in the possession of the head. The only instance in which he can maintain an action for recovery of possession against the head is when the head wrongfully takes possession of a portion of the family land which the individual member or a branch of the family has reduced by one of the customary methods, into his possession, i.e. land over which the individual member or branch of the family has established a usufructuary title.”
In so far as Anlo customary law was overlooked and the unsatisfactory ratio in Abude v. Onano (supra) was resorted to in the case, I think Heyman v. Attipoe (supra) which is one of the cases specifically relied upon by the Court of Appeal in formulating its general immunity rule must be considered, with respect, to have been decided upon erroneous principles of law.
In the subsequent case of Borketey Osonoware v. Nii Odai Ayiku II (supra) a Ga case decided by the same judge on 27 July 1962, he emphasised and offered a rationale for his view, still relying on the unfortunate Abude v. Onano (supra) ratio when he said:
“By customary law as laid down in Abude v. Onano … while … a head of family continues in office he cannot be sued in Court for accounts of . . . family funds which he controls; one of the reasons for this rule of customary law is that the funds are the property of the stool or the family; and the proper person to sue in respect of them is the head … of family … Therefore if it is
[p.699] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 sought to get the holder in his individual capacity to account, he must first be removed from office; having been removed from office he becomes liable in his individual capacity to hand over the property of the . . . family which he held [over] to his successor … It is then and only then that he may be sued … to account for the … family property.”
I think this view of the law is faulted by many cases which demonstrate that under Ga customary law while a head of family is in office, he can be sued for account depending on the circumstances and the status of the plaintiff. There are also numerous cases which also show that other persons apart from the family head can under the appropriate circumstances sue to protect family property. There are decided cases against the Ollennu proposition of the Ga customary law on accountability, some of which I have already referred to in this judgment and which show that, that is not, with respect, a correct statement of the true Ga customary law on accountability.
I suspect that the Ollennu thesis that to sue the head of family he must be first removed is predicated on his interpretation of Sarbah’s second paragraph where he said: “If the family therefore find the head of family misappropriating the family possession and squandering them the only remedy is to remove him and appoint another in his stead.”’ (The emphasis is mine.)
I have already canvassed in its context the meaning of this paragraph in this judgment by considering the linguistic significance of the place of the word “if” in juxtaposition to “therefore.” It is the use of the words “the only remedy” that is in issue now and seems to be the reason for the Ollennu construction. Clearly the use of those words can, with respect, hardly justify the Ollennu meaning. Taking the head of family to court or recourse to any other action can hardly produce a remedy if the discretionary power of the family head is to be still inviolate; since the complaint of the family member is about the manner the head’s power is being exercised, the family head’s power being discretionary cannot under the customary law be controlled outside the domestic forum, if the continued misappropriation is to cease. I think if the misappropriation is definitely to cease, then Sarbah’s formulation is unexceptionable: “The only remedy is to remove him.”
I find support in this viewpoint by considering Sarbah’s introductory remarks at 78 of his book:
“the head of the family has the moveable ancestral property in his absolute control; if, therefore, the family find he is misappropriating, wasting, or squandering the ancestral fund, it is in
[p.700] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 their interest to remove him at once and appoint another in his stead.”
(The emphasis is mine.) I do not think the Sarbah statement pre-empts in any way the right of a member, particularly a senior member, in appropriate circumstances to sue the head of family for account.
The last case is Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra). It is the fifth case cited by the Court of Appeal to support the so-called immunity rule. The facts are not necessary. It is an excellent judgment but clearly inapposite because far from supporting the rule, its ratio decidendi was a concession to a right in the customary successor, as such successor, to sue the head for account. It rightly confined the Sarbah statement to “junior” members as Adumua Bossman J. (as he then was) had characteristically done in the unreported case of Fynn v. Koom, High Court, Cape Coast, 20 February 1960, unreported.
It is noteworthy also that in Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra) the case of Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) was not even cited although the facts were to all intent and purposes almost on all fours. The plaintiff in the Pappoe v. Kweku case (supra) was the only surviving brother of the full blood of the intestate and in contemplation of the customary law he would seem to be the customary successor. If indeed he was, then the case was indistinguishable from the Kwogyirem case (supra) in which the customary successor was held entitled to pursue an action for account. In my view if the ratio decidendi in Kwogyirem (supra) is right, and I think it is, then on the assumption that the plaintiff in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) was the customary successor, then Pappoe v. Kweku will be considered to have been decided per incuriam. Of course, if the plaintiff was not a customary successor and was just an ordinary member of the family asking for account then the case is unexceptionable.
Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra) does show conclusively that there is in fact no such thing as a family head’s immunity from suit in our customary laws. Indeed, a close study of the famous Sarbah statement at 90 of his book and the case law does reveal that in fact there is no peculiar unaccountability principle applicable to all family heads in our heterogeneous customary laws. What is alleged to be a customary law doctrine of unaccountability is nothing but a specie of a principle of universal application that a person who is not an accounting party is not amenable to a suit for accounts.
In the customary laws of most of our tribal communities, where family property is in the control and management of a head of family in trust for himself and other members, all those members who by custom
[p.701] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 have power to give their consent or approval or be notified before a valid alienation of the family property can be made, can institute action for account, if disposition of family property are made or contemplated in violation of their customary law rights. In the Akan communities the senior members have this power whereas junior members do not have it and this is the reason why the Sarbah statement is confined to junior members. In the Anlo area it seems the head of family is generally a custodian of the family property in trust for the children and he has himself no interest in the property. In the circumstances the right of the beneficiaries to sue him for account accords with the principle that he is an accounting party.
With regard to the customary laws so far discussed it must be appreciated that among the Akans a man dying intestate and possessed of self-acquired property is not inherited by his children at all. They have thus no interest or share in his self-acquired property except a right to live in his house during good behaviour. This is because succession or the right to such property is traced exclusively in the female line through the mother of the intestate and her issues, namely uterine brothers and sisters and issues of such sisters. The Ga custom on the other hand is more complex. While in the Ga customary law succession is also traced through the female line in the same manner the question of the right of children of six-cloth marriage as distinct from those of two-cloth marriage living in the house during good behaviour does not arise at all. They live in the house as of right and they also inherit the property in conjunction with the heir and the property cannot be disposed of without their consent. The Anlo customary law however recognises the children as the only rightful heirs; they inherit the property equally and thus a head of family who is not one of the children is a trustee managing the property for the children exclusively and the property cannot be disposed of without the consent of the children.
Jackson J. in Tamakloe v. Attipoe (supra) at 384 exploded the idea which seems to run through the majority judgment, that the so-called immunity doctrine is a rule of “universal application” and that the case law “is a further illustration of the universality of the doctrine.” In Tamakloe v. Attipoe (supra) at 384 he said:
“Clearly in cases arising under Akan or Fanti law where the interests of the family are so diverse and unequal, and where the rights of the varying degrees of relationship have to be taken into account before the amount of support to which each member may be assessed then as has been held, no member can claim an account from the head of the family. His remedy can only be
[p.702] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 obtained by the removal of the head and not until then is the head liable to account.
But in cases arising out of the Ga law and where the rights of children of a six-cloth marriage in a ‘right of support in conjunction with the other members of the extended family is traced through the female, then it seems, upon the decision given in Vanderpuye & Ors. v. Botchway & Ors. that an account may be ordered and was so ordered by the learned Judge in that case. In that case the defendant, as head of the family had been in exclusive possession since 1935, without admitting them to a share in the rents and profits and they claimed a declaration of their share, an account of all the rents and profits of the estate since 1935 and payment to the plaintiffs of their share thereof and the learned Judge’s decision ‘that the children were entitled to all the rents and profits as would be shown by the defendant’s account’ was upheld by the West African Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered by Coussey, J. as recently as the 8th March, 1951.”
The Ada custom involved in Amekoo v. Amevor (supra) would seem to be a specie of the Ga six-cloth variety. Its ambit and scope is not necessary for a decision in this case; suffice it to remark that it clearly supports the accounting party principle I have enunciated in this judgment. Thus the only conclusion derivable from the study of all the cases is that a head of family becomes an accounting party to all those with the customary right of inheritance in respect of self-acquired property of a person dying intestate. The notion of unaccountability is as anathema to the customary law as it is against public policy and the spirit and letter of our old and new constitutional law and order.
I have shown that the rationale of the rule gratuitously offered by Mr. Justice Ollennu is with respect based on a misapprehension of the “only remedy” phrase used by Sarbah. Jiagge J.A.’s proffered justification for the rule adumbrated on by the Chief Justice is in my respectful opinion unfortunate. To consider appearing before a court of justice as apparently infra dignitatem is a concept which casts a slur on the honourable nature of our functions and undermines the integrity of the judicial process in a manner subversive of the judicial order prescribed in section 1 (1) of P.N.D.C.L. 42. The reluctance to appear becomes hypocritical when it is only invoked when the liability to render accounts is involved.
In the Ga case before us the plaintiffs are certainly not junior members, they are heads of two branches of the family and are therefore considered important and “senior” members of the family. Their statement of claim reveals shocking dealing with the family
[p.703] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 property by the defendants which if not checked may end up with the dissipation of the family property; dealings which the defendants contrary to the customary law, have carried out without the consent of the plaintiffs who are senior members of the family. The extravagant defence put up on their behalf is, as I have already indicated, that no “member of the family however important or any group of members however large” can call on the first defendant to account, and that he “has absolute discretion in the disposal of family funds including land.” The blatant submission is that “he can even pay family moneys into his personal account”.
Under Ga customary law as the Ga cases reveal, the head of family cannot deal or dispose of the family property without the consent of the senior members of the family. The senior members of the family are trustees with the power of consenting to dealings with the family property. They have a customary law duty as such trustees to see that their power and that of the head are exercised in such a manner as, inter alia, to prevent the family property from being misappropriated, wasted or squandered. The head of family vis-à-vis the senior members is therefore an accounting party. It is said that there is a customary law rule that denies them access to the courts to enforce their right to protect the family possessions. In a court of equity such a rule will be considered a shield for flagrant breach of trust and I do not think a rule that countenances such a breach of trust so inconsistent with equitable principles can survive in a customary court of law as a customary rule. As Parker J. said in Johnson v. Clark [1908] 1 Ch. 303 at 311:
“… a custom to be valid must be such that, in the opinion of a trained lawyer, it is consistent, or, at any rate, not inconsistent, with those general principles which, quite apart from particular rules or maxims, lie at the root of our legal system.”
The alleged rule flaunted before us is certainly against public policy and undermines the integrity of the judicial process as is enshrined in section 1 (1) of P.N.D.C.L. 42. In the unreported case of Tamakloe v. Attipoe (supra) it will be recalled that as far back as 1953 when a defendant claimed to rely on this so-called rule, Coussey J.A. speaking for the court repudiated the claim and castigated the rule as contrary to public policy. He said: “If the native customary law were as stated by the defendant I consider that to apply it to the present case would be contrary to public policy.”
The operation of such a rule will not be compatible with national aspirations inherent in the need to infuse probity and accountability into the public and private lives of the populace as well as the necessity to discourage corrupt practices and abuse of power whether discretionary
[p.704] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 or mandatory as would seem to be prescribed by sections 1 (1)(c) and 61 of P.N.D.C.L. 42.
I am firmly of the considered opinion that there is in point of fact no such rule as can be legally and legitimately elicited from a consideration of any authoritative text-writers or any of the cases I have discussed in this judgment and I have not been made aware of any other cases or lawful authority sponsoring any such monstrous rule. If indeed for purpose of argument, there is such a rule and it has allegedly “crystallised and solidified into a rule of customary law” as the erroneous ratio of Abude v. Onano (supra); shows, and the majority judgment would seem to indicate, then it is not in consonance with the said provisions of P.N.D.C.L. 42 and consequently it will not debar the plaintiffs from instituting their action. In the result it will be a wrong rule and it will be right for us to depart from it as article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979 which has been saved by section 9 (1) of the Proclamation, 1981 enjoins us to do. The article, inter alia, reads: “The Supreme Court may … depart from a previous decision when it appears right so to do.”
In the circumstances, I share and adopt fully the view which the Chief Justice in his usually inimitable way so nobly expressed in his judgment where, recognising the outrageous consequences of the supposed rule, he reminded us of our responsibility when he said at 659, ante:
“We have constitutional authority to refuse to be bound by a precedent which injures the innocent, benefits the guilty and puts a premium on blatant breach of fiduciary duty. To do otherwise, would be an exhibition of judicial inertial wholly indefensible in our day and age.”
So wholly indefensible indeed is the alleged rule of law, in contemporary Ghana, that speaking for myself, I will not be a part of any such decision that sponsors this so-called rule which perpetuates and probably will continue to perpetuate these evils which the Chief Justice so honourably deprecates.
In this respect, quite apart from a consideration of the true ambit of the doctrine of judicial precedent, it is quite obvious that by virtue of article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979 the legislature has given exclusively to the Supreme Court ample discretionary power to avoid and thus depart from judicial precedents when it appears right to do so.
In its traditional setting, it is not every pronouncement of an appellate or higher court that is binding on lower courts by virtue of the doctrine of judicial precedent. It is rather the ratio decidendi of the case logically and demonstrably supporting the decision that is so binding on
[p.705] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 a subsequent lower court: see Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179 at 212; and Osborne v. Rowlett (1880) 13 Ch.D. 774 at 785 per Jessel M.R.
It is for this reason that in Asiedu v. The Republic [1967] G.L.R. 589, Amissah J.A. sitting as an additional judge of the High Court, refused to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in Owusu v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 435, C.A. It is also for the same reason that while I was a High Court judge although I valued decisions of superior courts, I nonetheless refused to follow such decisions of superior courts whenever I thought those decisions were wrong, if their ratios did not support the decision, in spite of the fact that “in our jurisprudence precedential value is attached to decisions rendered.”
There are two schools of thought that emerge from a consideration of the immunity principle. Each school of thought has eminent jurists as its adherents. The school that saw nothing legally wrong with the liability of the head of family to account is made up of the following illustrious jurists: (1) Lord Oaksay, (2) Lord Tucker, (3) Lord Cohen; (4) Lord Keith of Avonholm, and (5) Mr. L. M. D. de Silva. They gave the Privy Council judgment restoring the decision of the Ga Native Court B which was given on 25 November 1947 in Vanderpuye v. Botchway (supra) to the effect that the head of family was amenable to account at the suit of the children of the intestate. Others are (6) Blackall P.; (7) Lewey J.A. with (8) Coussey J. (as he then was) who decided the case at the West African Court of Appeal. Furthermore, Coussey as a justice of appeal subsequently affirmed the accountability principle in Tamakloe v. Attipoe (supra) with (9) Foster Sutton P. and (10) Windsor Aubrey J.
Those who took the contrary view and supported the immunity principle, also illustrious jurists, are (1) Crampton Smyly C.J.; (2) Hall J.; and (3) Gardiner Smith Ag. J. in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra); (4) Harragin C.J., (5) Jucie-Smith C.J.; and (6) Korsah J. (as he then was) in Abude v. Onano (supra), (7) van Lare J. (as he then was) in Katai v. Katai (supra); (8) Ollennu J. (as he then was) in Heyman v. Attipoe, and (9) Adumua Bossman J. (as he then was) in Fynn v. Koo (supra).
Clearly whichever school of thought a judge is persuaded to follow, his decision will in effect be a repudiation of the views of many illustrious and eminent jurists in the opposing camp. Under such circumstances even an inferior court is free to choose one line of cases and ignore the other cases sponsored by other illustrious judges.
It appears to me that the discipline and beauty of the adjudicating process lie in the fact that a judge’s decision is supposed to be founded on well considered and articulated reasons. It should not be capricious
[p.706] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 nor demonstrably erroneous in law. If therefore the reason proffered by any judge do not support his decision, I am afraid the decision cannot be saved by considering his status however lofty it may be, and the experience of the judiciary in almost all the common law countries bear convincing testimony to this undoubtedly trite legal position. The jurisconsulti of Roman jurisprudence is not part of the common law principles applicable in this country.
I have taken great pains and devoted considerable time and energy in studying and investigating as fully as I can, the alleged customary law in this case, because I recall the advice of the great Sarbah in August 1896 when he said in his Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.), XII:
“…I am certain, that it is only by patient investigation and intelligent study, that the Customary Law can be well defined and consolidated. Customary Law and other Usages recorded by Bosman, as existing two centuries ago, have not altered to any extent up to the present day, although one knows that, as the mind of a community becomes enlightened, its legal convictions will change, and this will constitute a change in its Customary Law as that law is, from time to time, recognised and enforced in local tribunals.”
Is this new theory of unaccountability post-dating the Supreme Court Ordinance an enlightened change reflected in the hearts and convictions of our people? I am unable to believe it, when I am a witness to the extraordinarily persistent convulsions in the body politic engendered by arrogant resistance to accountability in public and private life leading to remarkable and repeated structural and revolutionary changes in our attempts at creating an enlightened constitutional order responsive to modern civilisation. How can I believe it when I am aware that all these painful and distressing experiences of the country are all the result of a concerted effort to dignify the principle of accountability and enshrine it as a norm to satisfy national aspirations requirement in accordance with the letter and spirit of a fundamental law that now rests in P.N.D.C.L., 42.
In view of the legal position as I see it, I am of the opinion that the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal should be vacated, the ruling of the High Court restored and the case ordered to take its normal course. In my judgment the appeal should be allowed with costs.
I have a few last remarks which my conscience will not permit me to withhold and which therefore I wish respectfully to make. Since this is a dissenting judgment, these remarks of mine are of course clearly obiter and I therefore have no inhibitions whatsoever in making them
[p.707] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 particularly as they represent my candid view of the subsisting legal and constitutional position. I wish to put on record that the judgment of this appellate Supreme Court which is sanctioning what in my view is a discreditable and dubious so-called doctrine of unaccountability is a three to two majority decision. If a subsequent Supreme Court differently constituted, as seems to happen often, were to consider the rule in a future case and three of the panel members are persuaded that the ratio sustaining the rule is not right, for any reason or for the reasons I have here advanced, then there will be no legal impediment to their upsetting the decision given here today.
Now, it is on account of this type of situation that in Hammond v. Odoi [1982-83] G.L.R. 1215 at 1246, S.C., I said of such decisions:
“In my view, such decisions because they are fortuitous, need to be given considerable thought in order to eliminate, if it can be done, the lotto element of luck implicit in them and to rest the decisions on a sound ratio decidendi. Indeed cases of this sort are poor precedent for the lower courts and I think it is therefore desirable in the interests of the doctrine of judicial precedent and of certainty and consistency in the law that if possible members of the final appellate court do not participate in the decisions of the lower courts; on the contrary it is essential for the full complement of the court to handle appeals.”
I must remark that this view of mine has nothing to do with the status of a panel member sitting either as of right or by invitation. My view has nothing to do with past politics or the sheer accident of judicial appointments, nor has it anything to do with the competence and integrity of any member of the judiciary sitting at the Supreme Court. I made those remarks when the full complement of the Supreme Court was seven and I thought empanelling five and leaving out two, even if it is done for good reasons, is conducive to a situation where consistency and certainty will elude the Supreme Court having regard to the constitutional mandate to depart from our decisions if to do so is right. The same situation will also develop if the membership for decision making shifts as seems to happen often.
For this reason I see nothing morally wrong or ethically unbecoming in expressing my opinion that the practice of the Supreme Court sitting with some of its actual members absent is with the greatest respect conducive to this deplorable state of affairs and should be discouraged. I intend no disrespect to any person or authority when I say that in all cases before the Supreme Court, it is my well considered conviction that the incumbent members have a constitutional obligation to sit unless any of them is incapacitated from sitting by reason of
[p.708] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 ill-health, or is abroad or otherwise not available or for lawful reasons he excuses himself. This is the practice in the United States Supreme Court and with respect, the true constitutional position in this country. Indeed, since by law the composition of the Supreme Court is made up of a specified number of persons thereof, no person or authority has any right to constitute the Supreme Court for the determination of any case or appeal in such a manner as in effect to supplant a Supreme Court judge from his membership of the Supreme Court in the said case or appeal. Of course if for determination of any particular case or appeal, the requisite quorum is not available from the existing members of the Supreme Court due to the absence of a member or members for the reasons I have indicated herein then to obtain a quorum it seems section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 permits a Court of Appeal judge to be invited to provide the working quorum. That section is no authority for so to constitute the Supreme Court as to nullify the obligation of a Supreme Court judge to participate in the decision making process of the court.
In my respectful view, in the existing state of the law, a member of the Supreme Court cannot be deprived of his constitutional right to sit, nor can any person or authority claim the privilege of permitting him to sit by invitation. He is entitled to insist on sitting as of right for the determination of any case or appeal whatsoever that comes before the Supreme Court.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I have been privileged to see beforehand the erudite judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Sowah J.S.C. and must express regret that in such an important appeal as this, unanimity has not been possible. It is my further misfortune that my views on the matter and those of the learned Chief Justice are inexorably divergent. I derive comfort however from the fact that a solid phalanx of past and present members of the bench have had no hesitation in acclaiming the universality of the immunity rule to which I subscribe.
My main disagreement with the learned Chief Justice’s opinion stems from his contention that two opposed lines of decisions exist which leaves the court an unfettered power to emblazon a new path aided by the torch of equity, and armed with the constitutional authority of the Constitution, 1979 to sever any attachment to hidebound decisions.
With respect, I think the immunity principle has been upheld throughout the cases and the judges, while affirming the doctrine, have been careful to distinguish where the principle did not apply. True, some textbook writers would wish a change in the law but that desire in itself is proof of their appreciation of the universality of the rule.
[p.709] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 My stand then is one of respectful agreement with the opinion expressed by my brother Sowah J.S.C. That judgment sets out with admirable clarity the law on the family head’s exemption from the legal process to account, and had it not been for the traditional requirement that separate opinions should be delivered where the lack of unanimity spans so wide a chasm, I would have been content to merely concur.
This appeal then exposes for critical examination the question of the head of family’s immunity from court actions for accounts—the immunity principle as the learned Chief Justice so aptly terms it. It is necessary at the outset to dispel the notion that alliance with the protagonists of the doctrine betrays a callous disregard of the interest of the family and demonstrates a perverted delight in encouraging the dissipation of family assets. The argument invariably propounded is that the failure of judges to put legal brakes on the head’s wrongdoing by the non-exercise of the power of scrutiny has encouraged breaches of the head’s financial responsibilities, sometimes equated with a trustee’s duty. These attacks which legal writers indulge in, invariably degenerate into charges that judges have displayed a cynical insensitivity to the plight of the lowly placed family member who would have been recognised as a cestui-que-trust in other jurisdictions and received aid from the courts. Such attacks have sometimes acquired regional and ethnic dimensions even to lengths that deny the doctrine any universal application or negate its existence in customary law altogether.
The traditional stand which is derived from the judge’s own appreciation of the customary law, is rooted in a basic awareness that an examination of family accounts and an inquiry into a head’s stewardship is best done in the domestic forum which, a family meeting provides; the inquiry itself being conducted by the head’s peers. At such a meeting the cognoscenti of custom would be abler and better judges in the evaluation of reasonable expenditure, and fair disbursements of family assets in the maintenance, upkeep, and advancement of family interests. That caucus would be best equipped to fix a permissible level of expenditure for the due performance, of customary and ceremonial rites and functions. More importantly, that forum would protect the primacy that headship connotes and shield the institution from the onslaughts of disgruntled members, or at least keep the lid firmly shut on any disunity they may foment.
There is almost a constant refrain in the old cases that the immunity principle, is neither unreasonable nor against good conscience. I would have thought that judicial pronouncements concluding that a principle was sound and reasonable, encapsulated a considered examination of the matter and though one is entitled to differ on the merits of the claims to soundness or reasonableness, one does less than justice to judges to consider such decisions as per incuriam or shorn of
[p.710] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 empathy for the indigenous family unity. An examination of the rationale of the doctrine is of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639-726 called for if only to demonstrate that the rule rather than the doubts cast on its viability by the trial judge, constitutes a more enlightened and reasonable approach to the quest for justice.
The facts which I turn to now, have been fully set out in the earlier judgments referred to. I shall consequently be as skeletal as possible. The parties to the appeal are all members of the Mantse Ankrah family which consists of three sub-branches, namely the Ankrah, Ayi and Okanta families. They have an overall head. The first and second plaintiffs sued as heads of the Ankrah and Ayi sections and the first defendant and the second, are sued as overall head and head of the Okanta branch, respectively. The writ claims an account of moneys received by the defendants and complains about their financial maladministration. The defence maintain that every act of the head had been in pursuance of explicit recommendations of the family at a family meeting to which the head had regularly accounted. The defence challenges as a matter of law, the competence of a suit for accounts against a family head. The writ and claim demonstrate a split right down the middle of this family which public ventilation in a legal suit could hardly do less than excoriate.
The issue over which a pronouncement is sought had its legal genesis from the researches of Sarbah. That learned scholar wrote of the head of family’s liabilities in his Fanti Customary Laws (2nd ed.) at 90 as follows:
“If the family, therefore, find the head of the family misappropriating the family possessions and squandering them, the only remedy is to remove him and appoint another instead; and although no junior member can claim an account from the head of the family, or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate, or income therefrom arising, yet the Customary Law says they who are born and they who are still in the womb require means of support, wherefore the family lands and possessions must not be wasted or squandered.”
This passage, simple as it appears, has been the subject of a variety of interpretations. Quot homines tot sententies. The passage clearly states that a junior member cannot claim “on account” or “call for an appropriation” of a share, “or income” from the estate. It must be noted that the preposition employed in relation to account, is “on” and not “an.” There is a transparency of meaning if the significance of “on” is appreciated and the whole passage is read conjunctively. There is the clearest prohibition on the junior member to call for a moiety of the undivided family estate, or the allocation of a proportion of family funds as of right. The application of the ejusdem generis rule in that
[p.711] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 collocation which sets out the impropriety of the junior member seeking an aliquot share of the family estate, is with respect, the key to the passage. The difficulty, if any, is only one of linguistics, nothing more. Put another way, all family members have an interest in the family estate but this remains an undivided share. Consequently, a junior member cannot defy this absolute customary ban to supplicate a share of either income or estate. The passage continues with a warning to the head that his financial responsibilities extend beyond the living to the unborn so he should not waste the estate; the fact that a junior member cannot claim a share as of right should not make his share lapse into the kitty to be squandered by the head. There is an obvious warning against devastavit with the attendant sanction, “the only remedy”, of removal.
Read in that light, it is easy to see where the trial judge erred. His view can be paraphrased as follows; Sarbah says junior members cannot sue for accounts. Since junior members are singled out and constitute the only category expressly prohibited, no impediment can attach to a suit instituted by senior members. The conclusion therefore, so goes the argument, is that since the plaintiffs are senior members, indeed branch elders, there can be no impropriety in their initiating a suit. I must reject this interpretation as a non sequitur and an unfortunate misreading of the context. This is manifestly clear in the opening lines of the passage from Sarbah where the head’s immunity is unequivocally stated, and the only available remedy open to all is as equally clearly expressed. It then becomes a curious twist, born of fallacy and not logic, to deduce from Sarbah’s statement that juniors cannot, but seniors can sue.
Leaving the consideration of the passage for a moment and taking an analogy from customary practice elsewhere, it is well known in customary law that stool occupants or chiefs are created by kingmakers who have the correlated power to depose them. The adage being that those who make chiefs have the sole right to unmake them. The junior members of the family do not create the head. It is the elders who do. Consequently it is the elders who may challenge his malfeasance and depose him if they find him wanting. Junior members can have no pretensions to a right to call their head to account under any circumstances, but they have the right to remove the head when they are satisfied he is squandering family funds. When he is deposed, he becomes a different creature altogether, an ex-head whose immunity has been withdrawn and is consequently amenable to a law suit for accounts.
In sum then, Sarbah’s statement of the customary law rules out entirely any legal suit against a head for account while in office. It restricts inquiries to the family forum where the ultimate sanction of
[p.712] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 deposition may be imposed for “misappropriation” and “squandering of family possessions. Borrowing again from the analogy of a chief’s deposition, customary law allows complaints by juniors to elders or kingmakers as the case may be, who in turn set in train the inquiries contemplated for deposition. The juniors therefore are not left out in the cold without relief or remedy. They must channel their grievances through their elders who are constitutionally clothed to fight their cause.
There is nothing fundamentally wrong in restricting the venue of inquiry into the head’s maladministration to the cloistered sanctuary of the domestic hearth. In such a family enclave, a general consensus is promoted and the steps necessary to be taken to resolve any questions, are agreed upon by the family as a whole. Factionalism which disgruntled and fractious members might indulge in or fan, can be suppressed by the collective weight of the family before irreversible damage by publicity is done. By this course, the dignity of the office of head and the unity of the family is preserved. This is important as the homogeneity of the family unit which in the past had been an overriding consideration and which is presently under siege with the uncritical imbibing of western culture and influences may be reserved. The flexing of muscle by minority elements in families as an expression of their dissatisfaction with their head’s performance, is a modern phenomenon marching in step with misplaced ideas of liberation. This incontinent clamour by dissentient elements in the family which would press family disputes into the open, virtually exposing the family’s dirty linen to the public gaze, is universally decried and the case law reflects the customary abhorrence of subjecting the head of family to the hurly-burly indignity and publicity of court litigation. It recognises that in some aspects of human conduct better results are achieved in the informal atmosphere of a family forum. It is this wisdom that informs the customary law and blazes a beacon through the old decisions. Thus in the locus classicus on the head’s immunity Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102 at 104, the West African Court of Appeal held that:
“It is an accepted principle of Native Customary Law that neither a chief nor the head of a family can be sued for account either of state or family funds … No individual member or even a section of the community is entitled to institute an action for account.”
The court further stated at 104-105: “This native law is in our opinion reasonable and not contrary to natural justice or good conscience.” An important passage from that judgment shows the mischief which the native law in its supreme wisdom sought to avert. The court put it this way at 105:
[p.713] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
“It is inconceivable that any rate payer or group of rate payers could maintain an action against the president and/or members of a local Council whenever the said rate payer or group of rate payers believed that the president and/or his councillors have misappropriated council’s funds: the proper persons to enquire into complaints of individuals or sections of the people are their elected representatives who are entitled to take the matter to a council meeting where by its resolution the council may give necessary directions. If this were not so, it would be possible for a member of rate payers who are opposed to a particular regime to maintain many suits against the president and councillors merely for the purpose of ridiculing them or bringing their administration into disrepute, and thereby make it practically impossible for them to perform their duties.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Before we leave Abude v. Onano (supra) it is interesting to recall this significant statement from the judgment at 104:
“Counsel for appellants admitted before us that he could not quote one case which has been brought in the Supreme Court against a chief and/or his elders and councillors to render account of Stool funds or Divisional Council funds. . .”
The institutions of chieftaincy and head of family are so alike in their incidence of rights and duties that to assert that any reference in the Abude case (supra) to a family head is pure obiter as the trial judge did, displays a lack of appreciation of the native customary law.
The passage in Sarbah quoted above has received scholarly attention. Ollennu J. (as he then was) in an article in the Journal of African Law (1971) Vol. 15, No. 2 at 152-153 expresses the view cogently, that unlike a beneficiary of a fund or a cestui que trust who is entitled to an ascertained share of the trust property, a member of a family has only a general undivided life interest in the family estate and so under customary law cannot seek an order for payment to him of any sums due from the family estate. The family member has no cause of action against the family head as he has no ascertained share upon which he can litigate in his own right as against the general communal right. This lack of a locus standi differs from the trust situation where a cestui que trust would be entitled to an order for payment of amounts found to be due upon the taking of accounts. The trust principle translated to the family set up would mean apportioning a share of the family estate which is as contrary to customary law at the attempt to equate the quasi-fiduciary relations of a head of family with a trust.
[p.714] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
Again I am indebted to that indefatigable author, Ollennu J. (as he then was) for the following customary principle from his book Customary Land Law in Ghana (1962) at 139:
“But although the head of the family, while head, and the occupant of the stool, while still such occupant, cannot be sued for account of stool or family funds, that does not mean however that the stool or family have no remedy against the said occupant of the stool or head of family in his individual capacity when he misappropriates stool or family property. The remedy of the stool or family is firstly to remove the said occupant of the stool, or the said head of the family from office. The moment he is deposed, he is no longer the lawful representative of the stool or the family and he becomes liable to hand over and account to his successor or the person or persons entitled by customary law to have custody and control of the stool property. The new occupant or the new head of the family or any individual or group of individuals authorised in that behalf by customary law, can then call upon him to hand over and to make full and proper account of all stool or family funds and other property which came into his possession during his term of office. In short, therefore, while the occupant of the stool or head of family, cannot be sued for accounts, because that is tantamount to a claim by the stool against itself or by the family against itself, the ex-occupant of the stool or an ex-head of the family may be sued for accounts.”
One discerns in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice a leaning to the school of thought that the immunity principle is an incidence purely of Akan customary practice imbedded in the customary milieux of that ethnic group only. I regret another parting of the ways. With respect, the case law rather suggests that the principle has been applied without protest by various judges of various ethnic hues and I express no apology for dilating on this at length.
Dr. Kludze whom the learned Chief Justice cites, is an enthusiastic protagonist of the non-universality view. Dr. Kludze, however writes from the standpoint of the “Northern Ewe speaking people of Ghana” only, and not on behalf of all Ewes. What is more important a number of Ewe cases have exemplified the principle. Thus Jackson J. in Tamakloe v. Attipoe (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’57, 378 echoed the refrain of immunity of a claim on “account against the head. However after his removal he would be liable to account.” Katai v. Katai (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 151 is another interesting illustration of this point. The facts must be stated briefly thus: Children who were entitled to rents accruing from an estate sued for their entitlements. The head of family was joined as [p.715] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 co-defendant in the suit. On the basis that the head only was entitled to sue and be sued on behalf of the family, the action was dismissed. But the point of interest was the observation of van Lare J. (as he then was), a distinguished jurist who hailed from Ewe land. He said at 156:
“I am disposed to think that upon the head of the family being joined as a co-defendant in the case the plaintiffs should have dropped their action; but they did not. Their statement of claim was filed as against the co-defendant as well claiming accounts and for an Order against her to pay to the plaintiffs what may be found due to them. On the authorities the head of family is not liable to account; that being so the plaintiffs’ action, which has been fought to this bitter end, is in my view misconceived.”
(The emphasis is mine.) In the course of his judgment, van Lare J. (as he then was) quoted from Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158 the following passage at 161:
“The appellant does not attempt to assert that Ga law imposes on the head of the family an obligation to account which is unknown to Fanti law . . . [I]t is a general principle native law … that an action of accounting [against the successor] is unknown to native law.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Interesting also is the opinion of the assessor who was assisting in the determination of the Katai case (supra). He was a Mr. Codjoe who stated the view that is canvassed by those who do not accept the immunity principle. He said at 151:
“ . . . the action properly lies against the co-defendant as head of the family to account to the plaintiffs because the co-defendant has utterly failed in her duties according to Native Custom and as she can be removed from office for lack of management she is accountable in the circumstance to the plaintiffs and must therefore give account of her stewardship.” van Lare J. (as he then was) was very curt with this attempt to subvert the known customary law. He said at 157:
“I am unable to accept the opinion expressed by the assessor. The Courts should not by any subtlety of reasoning or by any sense of morality attempt to weaken the well-established doctrines of the law which have long been acted on by the public and their advisers.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
[p.716] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
These sentiments have been echoed by Jiagge and Wiredu JJ.A. in the Court of Appeal judgment. We add our voices to the mounting diapason.
A few other examples may be quoted to show the universality of the doctrine. Amoabimaa v. Okyir [1965] G.L.R. 59, S.C. which confirms the principle, comprised a Supreme Court bench totally composed of judges from the Ga area. In Fynn v. Koom, High Court, 20 February 1960, unreported, the great Ga jurist and researcher, Bossman J. (as he then was) said:
“The latter proposition that the head of the family cannot be called to render accounts by junior members of the family has received so much judicial recognition as to be quite common learning now.”
In Etuah v. Richardson (1948) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 64 at 67 Quist J., a judge from the Ga area, stated his view on this question. He said at 67:
“This principle of the Native Customary Law has been pronounced by the Courts to be reasonable, and not contrary to natural justice, or good conscience; and they have given effect to it in many cases. One or two of the cases in which the principle has been applied may be mentioned. Sappor v. Amartey [(1913) Ren. 787] where it was held that a member of the family has [sic] no locus standi to bring an action for trespass against the head of the family who has [sic] resisted an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to appropriate to his exclusive use as an aliquot part of the common land. Pappoe v. Kweku [F.C. ‘23-’25, 158] in respect of which the following note appear in Griffith’s Digest, at 4. ‘Defendant being head of family took out administration of the estate of a deceased member: Held, that he was not liable to give an account of his administration to another member of the family, who was only a beneficiary, in respect of his membership.”’
The decision of the Full Court in Villars v. Baffoe (1909) Ren. 549 is to the same effect.
In Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86 at 88 Ollennu J. (as he then was) whose roots are firmly imbedded in the Ga region, emphasised the point in a case that affected Ewes. He said: “By native custom a member of a family cannot sue the head of the family for accounts. The authorities are many on that point.” In that judgment, Ollennu J. (as he then was) quoted a concession by a former Chief Justice whose legal pre-eminence cannot be doubted. He said: “Mr. Akufo-Addo, learned counsel for the plaintiff, conceded that the claim for an account against the defendant, the head of the family is not main-
[p.717] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 tainable, according to native custom.” The two beneficiaries of Mr. Akufo-Addo’s concession were the head of family in the case, an Ewe, and his lawyer, the learned president of this bench, the Chief Justice. That was of course many, many years ago when the president was in the heyday of his professional career as a lawyer. Many a stream has passed under the bridge since then and the ardour of youth has yielded to the maturity of age, but I would have thought the result would have been more conservatism not less. I record this because scouring the report, I discern no disclaimer or dissent from the proposition of a head’s immunity to account.
The criticism of Bannerman J. (as he then was) quoted by the learned Chief Justice seems a lone voice considering the number of his brethren who had no qualms in accepting the principle as universal. In any event, if Bannerman J. (as he then was) felt the principle had been applied per incuriam he could have rejected it. He felt bound because he could not resist the force of precedent. It is too late in the day to put a parochial complexion to the doctrine. Angu v. Attah (1916) F.C. ‘24-’28, 43 is authority for the proposition that customary law which has by frequent proof and consequent adoption by the courts become notorious, is automatically absorbed in the common law (see the last holding of the report).
It is in this sense that Ollennu J. (as he then was) could write in [1971] J.A.L. 132 at 160:
“Judicial decisions have established common customs within the Republic with respect to land tenure, succession and family law. It must be stated categorically that the common custom in these subjects declared by the superior courts as in other subjects form part of the Ghana Common Law as defined in section 17 of the Interpretation Act 1960.”
The learned author further opined at 161 that: “The definition of customary law as rules of law applicable to particular communities in Ghana is inconsistent with the concept of the common law.” (The emphasis is mine.)
Sarbah in the early chapters of his invaluable book, Fanti Customary Laws gives the reason for the universal application of the immunity rule. At 2 the author quotes the observations of earlier foreign writers:
“The language of the country is undoubtedly Fanti—this is the language spoken for general purposes and in every day transactions;—and it is a fact worthy of notice that Fanti is the lingua Franca of the Gold Coast and adjacent countries.”
[p.718] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 From similar sources he had traced Fanti links spreading throughout the whole country from “Assinee to the River Volta … and beyond Ashanti”; no wonder the custom and traditions of the Fanti Akan had received wide acceptance.
Edmund Bannerman, a great solicitor of Ga extraction had co-operated with white judges in settling the customs of the people of the Gold Coast by proffering information on their questionnaires. Sarbah wrote at 109 of his book: “Bannerman’s opinion relates specially to the Accra district but it will be noticed that the Accra customary laws differ very little from what have been explained here-in.”
Turning to the case law once more, Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215 is a further illustration of the universality of the doctrine. The headnotes read.
“Some of the children of a deceased native brought an action for an account against a brother of theirs who had been appointed by the deceased, on his death bed, to look after their interests in his estate. Held that an action for an account lay against him as he was not the head of a family as that term is understood in native customary law, but a caretaker for his brothers and sisters.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Nelson v. Nelson (supra) illustrates the principle that the head of family is not accountable in court. Michelin J. by ordering a brother to account to his brothers and sisters was very careful to state: “this is not the case of an action by a junior member of a family against the head of a family.” It is clear that the learned judge appreciated the customary law that, such an action could not lie. The parties here also were Gas. For other examples in case law which are innumerable: see Ruttmern v. Ruttmern (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 178 at 180 and Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1943) 13 W.A.C.A. 166.
The basic point which Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260 establishes is that the order for accounts is not available against the head of family. In that case the president of the West African Court of Appeal stated at 261:
“We indicated, during the course of the arguments, that, in our opinion, the Native Court erred in ordering an account. It is a well settled principle of native law and custom that junior members of a family cannot call upon the head of the family for an account. Their remedy is to depose him and appoint another in his stead.”
I turn now to the observation of Coussey J.A. in Tamakloe v. Attipoe, West African Court of Appeal, 22 June 1953, unreported, which was commented upon by the learned Chief Justice. My respectful view is that Coussey J.A. drew a distinction between those whose status
[p.719] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 as proper family heads in the customary sense brought them under the immunity rule, and those who were merely fiduciary stakeholders. He emphasised the point that the head’s immunity arose from the fact that he was also a beneficiary and as the heads in the Attipoe case (supra) had no beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased and their function was purely advisory and protective, they could not call in aid the customary immunity rule.
The great jurist, Ollennu J. (as he then was) explains that since the head also enjoys a part of the family estate he cannot while occupying at one and the same time the position of beneficiary and trustee, be amenable to a suit for accounts since he would be filling the contradictory roles of plaintiff and defendant simultaneously.
A lot of learning has gone into equating the trust concept with patriarchal obligations of the head of family. But the unique nature and amplitude of the head’s powers and responsibilities make the trust doctrine of Anglo-American jurisprudence totally inapposite to the Ghanaian situation. It has already been noted that for the due performance of his multifarious duties the head has unparalleled discretionary powers, especially in the dispensation of largess which is necessary to ensure the advancement of members of the family in education, marriage, bereavements and the observance of festivals and customary rites. He bestrides the living and the dead like an awesome colossus communicating with the ancestors with rum—an almost daily occurrence with libations which turn into rivulets at festival time. The family would not think that wasteful, but a regular court might well think it ill-advised, extravagant or unnecessary. A perfect example is what has occurred in this present suit where doubts are cast on the legitimacy of expenditure for a Homowo festival even though there had been no previous protests.
When Sarbah says “the head of a family holds the family possessions in trust for himself and the members of the family”, he is stating the factual position of a joint proprietary interest of head and family member. The use of the term “trust” in the context is certainly not in the wide connotation of western jurisprudence. Anyone combining in his person the two offices of executor and trustee under a will, may well be a beneficiary as well as administrator of the deceased’s estate. But it will be of specific property, and specific shares. The distinction is important.
It is urged that situations sometimes arise where the principle of immunity must give way to less staid customary rules for the attainment of justice. Since customary law is flexible and promotes what is reasonable, the doctrine enshrined in Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67 must be pressed into service to enable an affected member of the family to sue the head for accounts to prevent the despoliation of the estate. So
[p.720] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 runs the argument. Granted that Kwan v. Nyieni (supra) is the ultimate resort for family members denuded of the requisite locus standi to initiate suits to protect family property, the record in the present appeal shows that there were no exigencies that called for the application of the rule. I agree with the observation of Wiredu J.A. at 864 of the Court of Appeal decision that nothing was:
“pleaded by the plaintiffs to justify, the [High Court] seising itself with jurisdiction since the action on the pleadings is a straightforward case for an account against a head of family in respect of family funds in his hands. The pleadings of the plaintiffs fall short of creating an exception to the general rule which is now well-settled that generally the head of family cannot be sued for accounts. This principle of our customary law cannot be easily ignored by the court merely because it is being urged on them to do so.”
I discern echoes of Sarbah in Wiredu J.A.’s conclusion which I respectfully applaud, that the courts should not “arrogate to themselves decisions which customary law and the common law have for centuries reposed in the families themselves.”
A careful examination of the pleadings which have been fully set out in the judgments of the Court of Appeal, has failed to reveal any averment that the head had been summoned to a meeting purposely called to inquire into accounts and he had refused to attend—see Abakah v. Ambradu [1963] 1 G.L.R. 456, S.C. and Sappor v. Amartey (1913) 2 Ren. 787 at 788 where these mandatory requirements of the customary law are stated. If these issues had been raised in the claim, factual answers thereto would have been given and a clear issue on the applicability of the Kwan v. Nyieni (supra) rule would have arisen for determination. Thus in Botchway v. Solomon, Divisional Court, Accra 7 December 1935, unreported, where the head had defied his family and refused several calls to attend meetings, he was duly removed with the court’s post facto blessing.
What however the pleadings disclosed in this case is the plaintiffs’ obstructionism in the family. They may well have enjoyed no mandate from the principal members of their branch family and if the learned trial judge had not been too obsessed with a thesis to throw doubt on the established law, he would have ordered the joinder sought to determine the capacity or authority of the plaintiffs, which was as necessary and as preliminary an issue in the determination of their locus standi as the viability of the claim itself.
Many writers and judges have essayed to proffer a rationale for the immunity rule. Dr. S. K. B. Asante in his book, Property Law and Social
[p.721] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
Goals in Ghana 1844-1966, bases the doctrine on the “ultimate accountability to ancestral spirits”, and the punctilious accord of respect for the family head which customary law demands. The first justification should not be pooh-poohed as infantile. The family head like a chief is not only the paterfamilias of the living. But also of the dead and the unborn at any given time, during his occupancy of office.
In so far as that principle has potency in the indigenous Ghanaian society today, I see no reason why its concept as a sanction to ensure strict accountability should be decried. One might as well condemn as obsolete the practice of communicating with the ancestral dead with libations and offerings at festivals. Indeed, the persisting manifestations of an attempt to keep alive links with dead ancestors should inform any fair minded and objective observer that to the indigenous Ghanaian the dead ancestors are around, to be respected, fed and obeyed. The fact that western culture debunks these concepts is no reason why we should set them at nought when evaluating known and current tradition and practice. It is not what one believes in, but what prevails; that is the customary law.
Dr. Asante offers this second reason at 115 of his book for the immunity rule that: “It was most unbecoming to arraign the head before a public tribunal….”; with the attendant mischief which Korsah J. (as he then was) saw in Abude v. Onano (supra). The same sentiment was expressed by Dr. Danquah that: “The head of a family in Ghana enjoys a general immunity from anything savouring of a public inquisition into his stewardship.”
It is consequently wrong to think the body of authority from decided cases to textbook writers sing in concert for the application of the trust concept to the head of family’s duties. The contrary seems discernible. Whatever their discipline, the wealth of material and scholarship from both sides of this intellectual divide, has made it clear that the immunity principle exists, and financial questions can be determined by the family itself at its cloistered meeting.
Turning to the Court of Appeal’s judgment once again, Jiagge J.A. in a short supporting opinion synthesised the claim to immunity. In sum, the unity of the family which the institution of family nurtures and promotes would be eroded if the principle did not exist. The dignity of the head must be ensured. His discretion to manage estate funds for the benefit of the family must not be abridged by opening the floodgates to disgruntled members to bring frivolous actions. The learned judge blew a clarion blast that the courts should firmly resist all pressures to equate headship with a trustee’s liability, She concluded (supra) at 866: “Taking action against the head of family while he is still the head, derogates from his authority as head and customary law rightly prohibits this.”
[p.722] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
Wiredu J.A. likened the head’s immunity to the immunity a Republican President enjoys. I think the principle extends further than that. Any person placed in the position of head, be he president, headmaster or judge, who is hauled up before the court on any trumped up charge would soon find his authority eroded and his credibility reduced to ashes. The pity is that he may merely be the pawn of mischief makers and the butt of disgruntled fanatics.
Professor Allott reminds us in his Essays in African Law that on the whole a system of law reflects a way of life; it represents an adjustment to life in a particular environment. If then the principle of the non-accountability of the head before the courts has been accepted by hallowed practice and it now no longer meets the changing circumstances of a developing nation, then the answer is a change by legislation or decree and not pre-emption by judge-made reform. Law reform by judges in areas where the law is well-settled and known and families have regulated their affairs by it, should rarely be undertaken. Though one agrees with Dr. Allott that changing social norms demand corresponding changes in the law, this should be in the province of the law givers. We need constantly to be reminded of Jeremy Bentham’s warning that judges should not make new laws.
It appears from the reference to the powers of the Supreme Court in the learned Chief Justice’s opinion, that the Supreme Court is being invited to shake off its stupor and legislate to make the head of family amenable to the equitable jurisdiction of the courts. If this is the call then I raise my voice in protest against an unconcealed venture into the arena of law making. It would be a naked usurpation of the legislative function. According to Lord Diplock (in his address to Commonwealth Law Association, Scotland, 1977) since 1966 the House of Lords has been empowered to reverse its own decisions yet, it has voluntarily placed curbs on its new found freedom. He put it this way: “Since 1966 the House of Lords has ceased to treat itself as inexorably bound by its own previous decisions; but it still remains extremely reluctant to depart from them.” One should take a cue from these words of wisdom. And as Lord Devlin explained in Sample of Law Making (1962) “Statute is more powerful and flexible instrument for the alteration of the law than any that a judge can wield.”
There must be a curb on the law reforming proclivities of our creative judges. A fortiori where a new law on the subject is already on the draftsman’s desk, the courts have no business to pre-empt the law maker. If for nothing else, constitutional propriety forbids the exercise: see Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria [1931] A.C. 662.
These reasons compel me to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal and urge the dismissal of this appeal.
[p.723] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
I am of the opinion the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed. The facts which raise the point of law in this appeal have been fully and impeccably set out in the judgment of His Lordship the Chief Justice, whose judgment I have had the privilege of reading beforehand and from which I am obliged to dissent.
I do not intend to repeat them.
The criticism that Sarbah’s statement of the law was terse and unelaborated is not without some justification. But the learned author might well be excused as he seemed to have regarded what he observed as the custom among the Fantis to be of acknowledged acceptance.
That must have been the like fate that befell the learned judge, Ollennu J. (as he then was) in the case of Heyman v. Attipoe (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 86. There, the plaintiff, representing a branch of a wider family, sued the defendant as head of the wider family at the Anlo Native Court for a declaration that a certain land which their common ancestress had died intestate possessed of, was the property of the wider family.
The defendant, however, claimed that the common ancestress in her lifetime had disposed of that land to her daughter, Nyanya, and that Nyanya having died intestate possessed of it, the land became the sole property of the direct descendants of Nyanya, which was constituted by the defendant’s branch of the family. The plaintiff further claimed possession of the land and an order for an account.
It was held by the learned judge that the trial native court having found that the ancestress had died intestate possessed of the land, the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration he sought; but that the defendant, being also the head of the wider group of family as well, was by customary law the proper person to control the family land. Finally the learned judge held, somewhat axiomatically, at 88 that: “By native custom a member of a family cannot sue the head of family for accounts”—relying on Abude v. Onano (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. 102.
The judgment does not set out argument of counsel, but at 88 it is stated “Mr. Akufo-Addo, learned counsel for the plaintiff conceded that the claim for an account against the defendant, the head of family, is not maintainable according to native custom.” There is nothing to indicate that the eminent counsel for the defendant demurred to that view of the law. In those circumstances the learned judge must have taken the point of law as self-evident, and required no explanation. The view that the learned judge uncritically applied Sarbah’s statement of the customary law among the Fantis to an Anlo family; is in my respectful view irrelevant in this appeal, which relates to a Ga family.
Be that as it may, the case of Heyman v. Attipoe (supra) would seem to decide that in general, actions by a member of family lie
[p.724] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 against the head of family, save as to the excepted cases; notably an action for an account. The exception is said to be absurd in view of weighty legal pronouncements and respectable authorities that the head of family holds family funds or other property in trust for the family. Consequently to exempt him from the obligation to account by court action is at variance with customary notions of trust.
In my respectful view, the employment of terms well known to equity lawyers to express the nature and working of concepts as pertain to our indigenous family system may not always give happy results. To start with it may be helpful to observe that the word “family”, is not synonymous with clan or tribe. A family in its true meaning is, in my opinion, a land owning unit bound by lineage from a common ancestry.
In his book The Truth About The West African Land Question (1913), the learned author, Casely Hayford of the Inner Temple, barrister-at-law and of the Gold Coast Bar, at 56 explained the nature of family property in relation to the head of family in these terms:
“…But in the Customary Law, we find no trace of individual ownership. What the head of family acquires today in his own individual right will in the next generation be quite indistinguishable from the general ancestral property of which he was trustee. Even during his lifetime the person on the stool scarcely makes a difference in his own mind between what he received as family property and what he adds thereto by his exertions… Both what came to the head of the family and what he has made, pass at his death, to his uterine brother, cousin or nephew as the case may be, who being the only possible and legitimate successor to the stoolholder the latter gladly regards as the trustee in one sense and one of the beneficiaries in another sense of all after his death.”
A mystic union of personality with resultant admixture of property which is unknown to the English law of trusts; but which might well explain the non-accountability of such head of family.
Indeed a caution was given by the same learned author we have just quoted above at 53 that: A successor in the English system has sole control and ownership. In the customary law, he is co-owner and has no such control. He continues:
“…Nor is the successor a trustee in the sense of equity jurisprudence. The rights of the Chief in respect of land is not separable from those of his people who have a co-joint right in the property as well as a joint control. A chief has no such control, but must, immediately upon realisation, share the proceeds with the people. The trustee is owner for the time being, exercising the [p.725] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 rights of ownership for the cestui que trust. In customary law this is not so, since the people never at any time divest themselves of their rights and active exercise thereof in favour of the trustee . . . Hence it is important to note that the English Law of Trusts does apply to Gold Coast Land Tenure. And the term, ‘trustee’ where it occurs in this summary must be taken with that qualification.”
The above statement of the customary position of the chief, it seems, equally applies to the head of family and the property he holds on behalf of the family. But more pointedly I think the case of Abude v. Onano (supra) did give full consideration to the question whether funds of such nature in the hands or control of a head of family constitute “trust funds.” The facts of that case are well known and need not be rehearsed. It suffices to say that the money deposited at the savings bank was patently stool funds in the control of the Mantse and the nominated elders of the La stool. Its character did not change by the device adopted to avoid the funds being absorbed into the Ga stool treasury accounts.
At 105 of the judgment, the court in dismissing any notions of “trust” proceeded as follows:
“The first defendant-respondent is described in the Writ as ‘La Mantse’ but the remaining defendant-respondents are described as ‘trustees of the La Benevolent Society’, and from this description it would seem as if the claim is in respect of trust funds of a benevolent society in the accepted sense of the term. This, however, is not the case; because the pleadings and evidence adduced by both sides clearly prove that the money deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank, and in respect of which the claim is made, is part of La Stool funds or La Council funds controlled by the Divisional Council of the La Division of the Ga State … the money so deposited remained part of Stool funds subject to Native Customary Law, and to the control of the La Divisional Council. It follows that neither the first defendant-respondent nor the remaining defendants-respondents could be sued in the Supreme Court in respect of said Stool funds.”
It would seem, therefore, that illustrations from cases where the courts have found “trusteeship” are strictly inapplicable to the position of the head of family as such.
In my respectful opinion, the instances cited in support of a recognition of “the fiduciary”, are really capacities of agents or ad hoc administrators or in the nature of receivers and managers. Referring to only one such instance in Ansah-Addo v. Asante [1972] 2 G.L.R. 400, the leader of a syndicate of farmers has no lineage of ancestry with the
[p.726] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639 other members, nor does his farm necessarily become family property of the others should he of [1987-88] 1 GLR 639-726 die intestate, possessed of it.
It may be noted that the immunity from accounting is only as to resorting to court actions. For in Abude v. Onano (supra) the court was satisfied that there was a viable domestic jurisdiction under customary law, with drastic penalties, to investigate cases of misappropriation of stool funds by stool holders or stool elders. The jurisdiction of the divisional council or the Ga State Council with sanction of deposition from the stool or removal of an elder from office, was considered “reasonable and not contrary to natural justice and good consciences.”
No doubt, no system of human institution can be perfect. The wily will always make room for advantage, and the faddist will not be wanting of defects. But so long as the system is reasonable and not contrary to natural justice and good conscience and serves the community as a whole, it is enough. In all probability such domestic jurisdiction (conceivably up to the divisional state council) is available in the present case.
The criticism that the immunity of the head of family is irrational, would seem again to have been answered in the Abude case (supra). At 105 where the court considered the necessity for resort to the domestic jurisdiction, it observed:
“…the proper persons to enquire into complaints of individuals or sections of the people are their elected representatives who are entitled to take the matter to a council meeting where by its resolution the council may give necessary directions. If this were not so, it would be possible for a number of rate payers who are opposed to a particular régime to maintain many suits against the president and councillors merely for the purpose of ridiculing them or bringing their administration into disrepute, and thereby make it practically impossible for them to perform their duties.”
It is for the reasons given above that I am unable to share the views advocated in the learned judgment of the president of the court.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
L.K.A.
