REPUBLIC vs. CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, TAMALE; EX PARTE VOLTA, SENIOR GAME WARDEN (No. 2) [1984-86] 1 GLR 378
2 July 1986 · AMUA-SEKYI JA · ≈ 5 min read
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CASE REFERRED TO
Republic v. Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Volta, Senior Game Warden [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 367, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the High Court, Tamale presided over by Dove J., refusing an application for an order of certiorari to quash the order of the trial circuit judge for the return of seized equipment to the respondent who had been acquitted of offences under regulation 5 of the Wildlife Reserves Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 710). The facts are fully set out in the judgment delivered by Amua-Sekyi J.A.
COUNSEL
Addo, Principal State Attorney (led by Charles Tetteh), Solicitor-General, for the appellant.
Kwaku Baah for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.
The respondent, Charles Tieye Zieche, was charged before the Circuit Court, Tamale with offences under the Wildlife
[p.380] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 378 Reserves Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 710), reg. 5. He was acquitted and discharged. A rifle and other equipment seized from him by the appellant, Bernard Volta, Senior Game Warden, Mole National Park, Damongo were ordered to be restored to him. The question then arose as to whether the power conferred on the trial judge by section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) overrides the provisions of regulation 3 (2) of L.I. 710 under which the officers of the Mole National Park, Damango seized the rifle.
The provisions of section 145 of Act 30 which are well-known, provide:
“145. Where, upon the apprehension of a person charged with an offence, any property is taken from him, the Court before which he is discharged may order that the property or a part thereof be restored to the person who appears to the Court to be entitled thereto, and, if he be the person charged, that it be restored either to him or to such other person as the Court may direct, or that it be applied to the
payment of any costs or compensation directed to be paid by the person charged.”
They give the court before which a person is charged power to order that property taken from him on his arrest be restored to him. However, regulation 3 (2) of L.I. 710 provides as follows:
“(2) A Game Officer may seize and confiscate any equipment or apparatus brought into a Reserve which is in the opinion of the Game Officer capable of being used to hunt, capture or destroy any animal, and such equipment or apparatus may be disposed of in such manner as the Chief Game and Wildlife Officer thinks fit.”
The discretionary power given to the game officer and the Chief Game and Wildlife Officer is a very wide one. So long as they act in good faith, the exercise of their discretion cannot be questioned.
Counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to section 1 of Act 30 and to the earlier decision of this court in Republic v. Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Volta, Senior Game Warden [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 367, C.A. which was between the same parties. Section 1 of Act 30 provides:
“1. All offences under the Criminal Code and, subject to the provisions of any enactment, all other
offences shall be enquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to this Code.”
Now, although the offence with which the respondent was charged is not an offence under Act 30, it fell to be “enquired into, tried and
[p.381] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 378
otherwise dealt with” under section 1 of the Code, unless the legislative instrument creating the offence provided otherwise. And although L.I. 710 made no provision as to how offences under regulation 5 are to be enquired into or tried, it did make special provision under regulation 3 (2) for the disposal of equipment or apparatus brought into a reserve. Counsel for the appellant was, therefore, on firm ground when he argued that on a proper construction of the statutory provisions, section 145 of Act 30 does not apply to offences tried under regulation 5 of L.I. 710.
An alternative construction was put forward in the Court of Appeal earlier decision in Ex parte Volta (supra) which was an appeal from an order of Sapong J. setting aside the decision of Dove J. now on appeal before us. Dove J. had refused an application for an order of certiorari to quash the order of the learned circuit judge for the return of the equipment to the respondent, holding that the order of the circuit court was valid. Sapong J. subsequently reversed the decision of Dove J. and quashed the order of the circuit court. This court in its decision (supra) set aside the orders of Sapong J. as having been made without jurisdiction. On regulation 3 (2) the court said at 370:
“This provision like the provision under section 145 of Act 30, only gives the officer concerned a discretionary power. The game officer therefore may exercise his power of seizure and confiscation. Thus, while the court may not make any order respecting the article found on the accused person in the reserve if it is informed that the game officer had already made a seizing and confiscatory order, the court is not precluded from making an order of restitution respecting the articles when no such order has been made by the game officer.”
This was also the view of Dove J. who found that no such order had been made by the game officer. The question is whether from the record of appeal before us it can be said that the game officer had exercised the powers conferred on him by regulation 3 (2) of L.I. 710.
The order of the circuit court stated that, “all the equipment and apparatus found on him and seized by the officers of the Mole National Park, including the rifle, should be surrendered to the respondent.” Thus, the trial judge acknowledged that the rifle and other equipment had been seized and taken into the custody of the appellant. Therefore, on either construction, the learned circuit judge had no jurisdiction to make an order under section 145 of Act 30. It follows that Dove J. erred [p.382] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 378 in refusing the application. This appeal ought, therefore, to be allowed and the order of the learned circuit judge quashed.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
Trial judge’s order for return of seized rifle to respond quashed J A A
