ADABELE AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 478
28 November 1986 · ESSILFIE-BONDZIE J · ≈ 5 min read
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction by the Circuit Court, Bolgatanga on a charge of unlawful assembly contrary to section 202 (2) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), wherein the appellants raised a preliminary contention founded on non-compliance with section 171 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the court.
COUNSEL
W A Atugubah for the appellants.
Osei, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF ESSILFIE-BONDZIE J.
Originally 132 accused persons were arraigned before the Circuit Court, Bolgatanga charged with the offence of unlawful assembly contrary to section 202 (2) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). When the case came on for hearing on 12 December 1985 all the accused persons (who will hereinafter be referred to as the appellants) with the exception of the thirteenth and sixteenth accused persons were present. Apparently because there was some urgency about the case and the circuit court judge had to be brought from Tamale to hear the case at Bolgatanga, the prosecution became anxious to have the case heard. The charges against the thirteenth and sixteenth accused persons were therefore withdrawn and the trial commenced against the appellants on the said 12 December 1985. The appellants were on that day represented by counsel and as the record of proceedings shows, they were represented by counsel throughout the trial. Even though it is obvious from the record of proceedings that before the trial of the appellants proceeded on 12 December 1985 their plea was not taken. The prosecution led evidence in support of the charge against the appellants by calling four witnesses. The record of proceedings indicates that all these witnesses who gave their evidence on oath were duly cross-examined on behalf of the appellants by counsel.
Again as the record of proceedings shows, the prosecution closed their case on 6 February 1986. After the close of the case for the
[p.480] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 478
prosecution, counsel for the appellants made a submission of no case which by a considered ruling given by the learned circuit judge from Tamale, was overruled. On 10 March 1986 learned counsel for the appellants opened the defence for the appellants. It is evident from the record that learned counsel closed the case for the defence on 22 April 1986 and addressed the court on 28 April 1986 without any comment on the fact that the appellants’ plea was not taken before the trial began. Judgment in the case was given on 19 May 1986 and the appellants were convicted. Aggrieved by their conviction the appellants filed an appeal on 22 May 1986.
When the appeal came to be heard on 27 November 1986 learned counsel for the appellants referring to the additional grounds of appeal filed on 21 October 1986 applied to take the first ground as a preliminary point by which he intended to dispose of the appeal in favour of the appellants. He submitted as a preliminary point that “the trial court erred in law and acted ultra vires in trying the appellants without taking any plea from them thus rendering the trial a nullity.” Counsel contended that throughout the proceedings the plea of the appellants was not taken. He referred to section 171 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) and argued that in criminal trials the whole course of the trial is dictated by the plea of the accused. Since the plea of the appellants was not taken before the trial commenced, the trial of the appellants should be declared a nullity and the appellants acquitted and discharged.
The learned principal state attorney for the respondent could not offer any argument in reply to the submission of learned counsel for the appellants. In fact, he conceded to the view that since the trial commenced without the taking of a plea, it is a nullity.
I do not subscribe to the simplistic view which both counsel have taken in this matter. As I have indicated earlier on, the appellants were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings in the court below. In fact, it is obvious from the record of proceedings that counsel for the appellants was the only counsel in the case. If indeed he felt that the failure to take the plea of the appellants would prejudice the case for the appellants why was he silent about it? If he knew that the failure to take the plea of the appellants before the commencement of the trial of the appellants was fatal to the trial, he would have commented on it both in his submission of no case to answer and in his address at the close of the case for the defence. It is my view that the fact that learned counsel participated in the trial from its ineption to the end of the shows that he knew that the appellants were being tried on a plea of not guilty. I do not think that the appellants’ case was prejudiced in any way and this court will not interfere with the conviction of the appellants solely on the ground that their plea was not taken. The irresistible inference I
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draw from the conduct of counsel for the appellants throughout the trial at the court below of [1984-86] 1 GLR 478-481was that he and his clients knew that the trial proceeded on a plea of not guilty to the charge. I hold that the fact that the plea of not guilty was not taken and recorded as required by section 171 of Act 30 was a mere technical error which is not fatal to the trial. For the above reasons, I do not accept the preliminary point raised by counsel for the appellants and it is overruled.
DECISION
Preliminary objection overruled.
S Y B – B
