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[1986] SLR (HC) 15High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

REPUBLIC vs. MASSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 640

25 June 1986 · ADJABENG J · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 15
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v MASSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 640 [1986] SLR (HC) 15
APAREPUBLIC v MASSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 640, [1986] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v MASSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 640, [1986] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION under section 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), for an order to amend an error made in the judgment by the High Court, Sekondi allowing an appeal against conviction for stealing and ordering a retrial by a circuit court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

S. K. Acquah, Assistant State Attorney, for the Republic.

K. Osae Brenu for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ADJABENG J.

This is an application under section 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), for an order amending apparent defects in the order made by this court on 4 December 1984, in the criminal appeal No. 55/84 entitled Musah Massah v. The Republic.

The facts of the case are that Musa Massah was on 11 July 1984 convicted by the District Court Grade I, Takoradi of the offence of stealing and was sentenced to a fine of ¢2,000 or in default, eighteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour after he had pleaded guilty to the charge. Against this decision Musah Massah appealed to this court on the main ground that he did not appreciate or understand the charge or procedure. This court allowed the appeal and ordered that the appellant be retried by the Circuit Court, Takoradi. This court, however, before making the order for retrial recorded the following, “I would allow this appeal and acquit and discharge the appellant.” This application was therefore brought for an order to amend the order “acquitting and discharging” the appellant who is now the respondent herein. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit in support of the application state as follows:

[p.642] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 640

“3. That after submissions by both counsel for the appellant and the Republic respectively, the court ordered that the appellant should be retried at the Circuit Court, Takoradi.

4. However, it has transpired that his lordship when making the order inadvertently added that the appellant had been ‘acquitted and discharged.’ 5. I am therefore of the opinion that the part of the order ‘acquitting and discharging’ the appellant was given ‘per incuriam’.”

No affidavit in opposition was filed by the respondent.

At the hearing, counsel for the respondent opposed the application. Counsel argued that this court had no jurisdiction to amend its judgment and that the amendment sought was not in respect of an order as is provided for under section 408 of Act 30 but that the “motion is a ploy” to have the court amend its judgment “which it cannot do” according to counsel. Section 408 of Act 30, provides:

“408. The Court may at any time amend any defect in substance or in form in any order or warrant, and no omission or error as to the time and place, and no defect in form in any order or warrant given under this Code shall be held to render void or unlawful any act done or intended to be done by virtue of such order or warrant, provided that it is therein mentioned or may be inferred therefrom that it is founded on a conviction or judgment, and there is a valid conviction or judgment to sustain the same.”

Now, the question which arises for determination in this application is whether what is sought to be amended herein is an order. If it is an order, counsel for the respondent impliedly argues, this court can amend it. If it is not an order but part of the judgment then the court cannot amend it. Now what is to be amended in the judgment or order of 14 December 1984? It is this: “acquit and discharge.” the applicant wants the court to delete the word “acquit” so that the sentence reads as follows, “I would allow this appeal and discharge the appellant.”

Now, is the sentence in which the words in question occur part of the judgment or is it an order? The sentence is: “I would allow this appeal and acquit and discharge the appellant.” Counsel for the respondent says that it is part of the judgment while the learned assistant state attorney argues that part of it contains part of the judgment whilst the other part is an order. I agree with Mr. Acquah, the learned assistant state attorney. I think that that part of the sentence which says that “I would allow this appeal” is part of the judgment. The other part of the sentence, namely, “. . . . and acquit and discharge

[p.643] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 640

the appellant”, is obviously an order which directs that the appellant be acquitted and discharged. I say therefore that this part of the sentence is not part of the judgment. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (3rd ed.) at p 1538, item (8), it is stated as follows:

“(8) A conviction is a ‘judgment’ within s. 7 of the Quarter Sessions Act, 1845 (12 & 13 Vict, 45) … An

acquittal by justices is not a judgment (R v. London Justices, 25 Q.B.D. 357. . .”

It is clear from the above that an acquittal is not a judgment. In any case the intention of the court in ordering a retrial of the appellant has been made clear in the sentence following the sentence in controversy which states, “I order that the appellant be tried by the Circuit Court, Takoradi.” If this court intended to acquit and discharge the appellant the court would not have ordered that he be tried by the Circuit Court, Takoradi.

In the result, it is my view that the court has jurisdiction under section 408 of Act 30 to amend the order sought to be amended. I accordingly order that the word “acquit” be deleted from the order so that the sentence reads as follows, “I would allow this appeal and discharge the appellant.”

DECISION

Application granted.

L. K. A.

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